Why Has Telegram Remained Accessible Despite the Ban? The Iranian government’s attempt to restrict access to Telegram has failed to curb usage, with tens of millions of users continuing to access the messaging platform through virtual private networks and other circumvention tools, according to Telegram co-founder Pavel Durov. “Iran banned Telegram years ago,” Durov said, adding that widespread use of VPNs has enabled users to bypass national firewalls and maintain access to the service. VPNs allow users to route internet traffic through external servers, masking their location and bypassing domestic restrictions. This has become a primary method for accessing blocked platforms in jurisdictions with strict online controls. The outcome suggests that enforcement efforts have not reduced demand but instead redirected user behavior toward privacy tools and workarounds. What Has Been the Impact on User Behavior? Durov indicated that the ban has had the opposite of its intended effect, driving large-scale adoption of circumvention technologies rather than state-backed alternatives. “The government hoped for mass adoption of its surveillance messaging apps, but got mass adoption of VPNs instead. Now, 50 million members of the digital resistance in Iran are joined by over 50 million more in Russia.” The shift highlights how restrictions on widely used platforms can accelerate demand for privacy-preserving tools. Instead of consolidating usage within regulated ecosystems, users often migrate to decentralized or encrypted alternatives that are harder to control. Investor Takeaway Platform bans can increase adoption of circumvention tools and privacy infrastructure. Demand for VPNs and encrypted messaging tends to rise in parallel with tighter state controls, creating indirect growth drivers for decentralized communication technologies. How Are Users Adapting During Internet Restrictions? Access challenges have intensified amid broader internet disruptions. A nationwide blackout imposed in January remains in effect during ongoing geopolitical tensions, limiting conventional connectivity options for users in Iran. Despite restrictions, alternative access points remain available. Satellite-based internet services such as Starlink have been used to bypass local controls, while decentralized messaging tools offer additional communication channels outside traditional networks. Applications such as BitChat rely on Bluetooth-based mesh networks, allowing devices to connect directly and relay data between nearby users. This structure removes dependence on centralized infrastructure, enabling communication even when internet and satellite services are restricted. Investor Takeaway Mesh networks and satellite connectivity represent fallback layers in restricted environments. These technologies expand the resilience of communication systems and highlight alternative infrastructure paths beyond centralized internet providers. Is This Trend Limited to Iran? Similar patterns have emerged in other regions facing political instability and online restrictions. In Nepal, a social media ban introduced during protests in September 2025 led to a sharp increase in downloads of decentralized messaging applications such as BitChat. The application recorded more than 48,000 downloads in Nepal during the week of the ban. A comparable surge was observed in Madagascar during a period of political unrest, indicating that demand for alternative communication tools rises quickly in response to access limitations. These cases point to a broader dynamic as attempts to control digital communication channels can accelerate the adoption of decentralized technologies, particularly in environments where users seek reliable and censorship-resistant alternatives.

The Saudi Exchange announced today the eligibility of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (“SPACs”) for listing on Nomu – Parallel Market, which provides an additional listing route for fast-growing businesses and SMEs, unlocking early-stage capital, and creating new opportunities for investors. A Special Purpose Acquisition Company (“SPAC”) is a company created to raise capital through an Initial Public Offering (IPO) for the purpose of acquiring or merging with a private company. This structure provides an alternative route to public markets, which can facilitate faster access to capital, and is a model well-suited to high-growth and innovative businesses seeking to scale rapidly. In accordance with the regulatory framework, SPACs are required to complete an acquisition within a 24-month period from the date of listing, which may be extended to 36 months subject to the approval of the Capital Market Authority (CMA). Throughout this period, the shares of the SPAC will be actively traded on the market, providing liquidity and enabling continuous investor participation This launch is part of the Saudi Exchange’s strategy to diversify its offerings of listing products and investment opportunities. Through this new track, the Saudi Exchange aims to expand the investor base in Nomu – Parallel Market, attract new categories of issuers, and strengthen the ability of the Saudi capital market to offer leading and innovative products and services. Mr. Mohammed Al Rumaih, CEO of the Saudi Exchange, commented: "Introducing SPACs on Nomu – Parallel Market is another milestone in the evolution of the Saudi capital market. This sponsor-led structure provides companies with faster, more flexible access to capital while giving qualified investors early access to high-potential businesses. By expanding listing routes while ensuring investor protection, we are aligning with global best practices and reinforcing our mission to support the Saudi Vision 2030.” The introduction of SPACs underscores the Saudi Exchange’s role as a catalyst for capital market development and product innovation. By expanding access for issuers and investors alike, the Saudi Exchange continues to foster a more dynamic, inclusive, and competitive market. For more information on SPACs, please visit PressRelease.

A new whistleblower dossier strengthens FinTelegram’s earlier reporting on GammaG, the Georgian payment processor operating as GammaG. The new material does not prove common ownership with CoinsPaid, CryptoProcessing, or the wider Dream Finance ecosystem. But it does show something operationally important: a merchant relationship that allegedly began through CoinsPaid appears to have been routed into GammaG, then collapsed into a prolonged funds dispute, opaque “bank return” claims, and a notice that the servicing entity would be shut down. In the post-Lithuania environment, that is exactly the kind of pattern compliance professionals should pay attention to. Key Findings A whistleblower says a merchant seeking crypto payouts was onboarded through CoinsPaid but ultimately signed to GammaG. The merchant says it topped up its wallet with $30,000, after which the funds effectively disappeared for months. Uploaded emails show GammaG repeatedly claiming the money had been returned by the bank, while failing to provide documentary proof. In a separate email chain, GammaG informed the same client that the servicing legal entity would be closed and the contract terminated due to “operational and compliance requirements across various jurisdictions.” This sequence strengthens FinTelegram’s working hypothesis that GammaG may have served as a continuity or substitute rail for parts of the CoinsPaid / CryptoProcessing / Dream Finance orbit. The Merchant Trail Is the Real Story According to the whistleblower, the affected business is a YouTube creator payment network that pays partners a revenue share. Some clients wanted to receive their payouts in crypto, so the company used CoinsPaid. But instead of remaining in a clearly branded CoinsPaid relationship, the merchant says it was ultimately contracted through GammaG. It then topped up its wallet with $30,000, and the money allegedly became stuck for almost a year. That matters because this is not just another support complaint. It goes to the compliance core: who actually contracted the merchant, who controlled the wallet, who touched the funds, and which entity carried the AML and conduct obligations. The Emails Add Evidentiary Weight The uploaded correspondence materially supports the whistleblower’s account. In one thread, GammaG told the merchant that the funds had been returned by the bank and asked the client to verify receipt. When the merchant replied that nothing had arrived, GammaG said it had requested formal payment confirmation and would forward it once received. But in the materials provided to FinTelegram, no such proof appears. Instead, the merchant repeatedly escalated, stating: “We’ve received nothing yet,” then demanding proof, and later warning that the matter would become public and criminal complaints would follow. That is a serious red flag. If a processor claims that funds were returned through a banking partner, it should be able to produce a clear documentary trail. The Shutdown Notice Is Even More Telling A second email thread may be even more revealing. There, GammaG told the merchant that the legal entity providing services would be formally closed and would cease operations. As a result, the contractual relationship would need to be terminated. GammaG attributed this to a review of “operational and compliance requirements across various jurisdictions.” That is not routine language. It suggests an entity under stress, whether due to restructuring, banking pressure, jurisdictional risk, or migration into another vehicle. Combined with the unresolved funds issue, the message points to something larger than a single merchant dispute. It suggests an unstable servicing chain at the very moment the legal entity itself appears to have been in flux. The GammaG emails — citing “ongoing review of operational and compliance requirements across various jurisdictions” — mirrors the language used by Dream Finance UAB in its Lithuanian suspension notice and the liquidation notices in El Salvador and Poland. This is a recurring playbook: regulatory pressure triggers entity closure, but client funds are not returned — they are “in transit from the bank” indefinitely, and communications degrade into automated ticket responses with no substance. Why This Fits the Existing FinTelegram Hypothesis FinTelegram has already reported on the apparent proximity between GammaG, CoinsPaid, CryptoProcessing, and the wider Dream Finance / SoftSwiss ecosystem. The new whistleblower material does not prove formal integration, but it does reinforce the functional closeness FinTelegram had already identified. That is especially relevant because Dream Finance’s Lithuanian route came under pressure as the regulatory perimeter tightened. In that context, a Georgian processor assuming a more prominent role would make obvious operational sense. If one structure becomes impaired, another node in the network may pick up the flow. This is why GammaG matters. The issue is not whether the public-facing brands look separate. The issue is whether GammaG functioned as a continuity rail when older structures became less usable. Why GammaG Fits the Existing FinTelegram Hypothesis FinTelegram’s earlier reporting already placed GammaG in the same investigatory field as CoinsPaid, CryptoProcessing, Dream Finance, and the broader SoftSwiss payment orbit. The new whistleblower information does not overturn that reporting. It reinforces it. The critical point is this: the source says it came to GammaG through CoinsPaid. That alone does not prove common ownership. But it does strongly support the view that GammaG was not operating in isolation. Rather, it appears to have been functionally close enough to the CoinsPaid channel to serve as a contracting or operational endpoint for a merchant relationship that originated there. That is precisely the kind of arrangement investigators need to scrutinize. In high-risk sectors, especially those touching crypto, gambling, offshore merchants, and cross-border processing, the real structure often only becomes visible when a merchant relationship breaks down. And when it breaks down, the most important question is usually not what the public-facing brand says. It is which entity actually held the risk, touched the funds, and dealt with the banks. The Dream Finance Context Makes GammaG More Important This case cannot be viewed in isolation from the regulatory backdrop. As FinTelegram has reported, the Dream Finance Group, associated with CoinsPaid and CryptoProcessing, was forced to retreat from Lithuania at the end of 2025 as the regulatory perimeter tightened. That matters because Lithuania had long been a favored jurisdiction for crypto and payment structures serving cross-border business. Once those structures became impaired or politically costly, any ecosystem dependent on them would need alternatives. That is where GammaG becomes strategically interesting. A Georgian company stepping into a more prominent role would make obvious operational sense. Georgia sits outside the tightening EU crypto perimeter, offers geographic and structural distance, and can function as a useful alternative base for higher-risk payment activity if Lithuanian channels become unavailable or commercially toxic. This is why the new whistleblower material matters so much. It adds a concrete merchant-side example to a broader pattern FinTelegram has already been documenting: when one legal route closes, another node in the network appears to pick up the flow. The GammaG–CoinsPaid–SoftSwiss Triangle The wider context is what gives the GammaG material its investigative significance. CoinsPaid and CryptoProcessing sit within the Dream Finance cluster, while SoftSwiss is not just a gaming software name in the background. SoftSwiss publicly said that FinteqHub was developed by its PSP team, and Ivan Montik’s official SoftSwiss biography states that he serves as an adviser and mentor at CoinsPaid. Those are not rumor-level associations; they are public statements from SoftSwiss itself. Read more about the Dream Finance Group here. FinTelegram’s prior investigations establish the structural context: GammaG LLC (Georgia) surfaces behind the “CoinsPaid” deposit button at offshore casinos such as Vegadream (Starscream Group), where the merchant descriptor explicitly reads “STARDUST GLOBAL CCS LTD (Starscream)”. GammaG and CoinsPaid are presented jointly as a combined rail in iGaming support documentation (“Coinspaid / GammaG”), confirming operational integration rather than coincidence. The Dream Finance Group (CoinsPaid / CryptoProcessing) is controlled by beneficial owners Max Krupyshev (CEO, Ukraine) and Alexander Horst Riedinger (Austria), with entities spanning Estonia, Lithuania (now shut), El Salvador (liquidated), Poland (liquidated), Delaware, and Canada. Dream Finance UAB (Lithuania) suspended all crypto services at the end of 2025 following the expiry of MiCA transitional arrangements and the Bank of Lithuania’s enforcement wave. FinTelegram’s hypothesis — confirmed by the whistleblower — is that GammaG serves as a Georgian jurisdictional escape hatch: when EU/Baltic entities face regulatory closure, client funds and processing activity are routed through GammaG, which operates outside MiCA’s reach and with minimal Georgian VASP oversight. The whistleblower’s own reference to maxkrupyshev.com in his March 5 email to GammaG confirms that clients themselves have connected the dots between GammaG and CoinsPaid’s CEO. Conclusion: Another Piece of the Same Puzzle The new whistleblower information is not the whole story. But it is another meaningful piece of the same puzzle. It confirms that GammaG was not just a name surfacing in technical breadcrumbs or side references. It was a real operational and contractual counterparty in a merchant relationship that, according to the whistleblower, originated through CoinsPaid. It also confirms a disturbing pattern: missing funds, unverified claims of a bank return, evasive communication, and a sudden notice that the servicing entity itself would be closed. In FinTelegram’s assessment, this materially strengthens the working hypothesis that GammaG sits closer to the CoinsPaid / CryptoProcessing / Dream Finance ecosystem than public branding alone suggests. In the shadow world of offshore gambling, crypto processing, and high-risk merchant flows, that is exactly how the real payment chokepoints tend to reveal themselves. GammaG now deserves to be treated not as a peripheral Georgian curiosity, but as a priority node in the continuing investigation into the real payment infrastructure behind the CoinsPaid and SoftSwiss orbit. Summary Data CategoryDetails CategoryDetailsEntityGammaG LLC (Georgia)Domaingammag.geContactaccounts@gammag.geRelated BrandsCoinsPaid, CryptoProcessingParent GroupDream Finance Group (CoinsPaid / CryptoProcessing)Beneficial OwnersMax Krupyshev (CEO), Alexander Horst RiedingerKnown Casino ConnectionsVegadream, Rant Casino (Starscream Group); merchant descriptor “STARDUST GLOBAL CCS LTD (Starscream)”Whistleblower Incident$30,000 frozen (Enfinity/enfinity.com); funds not returned; contract terminated March 2, 2026Regulatory ContextDream Finance UAB (Lithuania) shut down Q1 2026 (MiCA); El Salvador and Poland entities liquidated; GammaG (Georgia) appears to serve as offshore continuation vehicleRisk Rating Critical Whistle42 Call If you have contracts, onboarding packs, bank correspondence, wallet screenshots, transaction hashes, settlement records, KYB files, internal chats, or compliance memos involving GammaG, CoinsPaid, CryptoProcessing, Dream Finance, or SoftSwiss-linked payment structures, contact FinTelegram securely via Whistle42. We are particularly interested in material showing: the actual contracting entity behind merchant onboarding, which entity held or controlled merchant funds, banking partners involved in returns or settlements, and any evidence of migration from Lithuanian structures into Georgian or other substitute vehicles. Share Information via Whistle42