In honor of the 250th anniversary of the United States of America, President Donald J. Trump’s signature will appear on future U.S. paper currency along with the Secretary of the Treasury, marking the first time in history for a sitting president. “Under President Trump’s leadership, we are on a path toward unprecedented economic growth, lasting dollar dominance, and fiscal strength and stability,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “There is no more powerful way to recognize the historic achievements of our great country and President Donald J. Trump than U.S dollar bills bearing his name, and it is only appropriate that this historic currency be issued at the Semiquincentennial.” “As the 250th anniversary of our great nation approaches, American currency will continue to stand as a symbol of prosperity, strength, and the unshakable spirit of the American people under President Trump’s leadership,” said Treasurer Brandon Beach. “The President’s mark on history as the architect of America’s Golden Age economic revival is undeniable. Printing his signature on the American currency is not only appropriate, but also well deserved.”

The Federal Reserve Board on Thursday announced it has made the joint findings with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) required for the OCC to approve a request by Morgan Stanley Bank, N.A., of Salt Lake City, Utah, for an exemption under section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act. Section 23A establishes limits and imposes requirements on a bank's transactions with its affiliates. The bank submitted the request in order to engage in an internal corporate reorganization involving its affiliate, Morgan Stanley Europe SE, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Order (PDF) Statement by Vice Chair Philip N. Jefferson Statement by Vice Chair for Supervision Michelle W. Bowman Statement by Governor Michael S. Barr Statement by Governor Lisa D. Cook

MIAX Options and MIAX Emerald Options will change the maximum valid bid/ask differentials for certain symbols traded on the Exchanges. The changes to the extended quote width requirements will begin on Wednesday, April 1, 2026, and remain in effect through Tuesday, June 30, 2026, unless withdrawn by the Exchanges before that time.For additional information on the expanded bid/ask differentials, please refer to the following Regulatory Circulars: MIAX Options RC 2026-45 MIAX Emerald Options RC 2025-34

The 39th edition of the Global Financial Centres Index (GFCI 39) was published today by Z/Yen Group in partnership with the China Development Institute (CDI). New York continues to lead the index, in first place since GFCI 24, published in September 2018. Only one rating point now separates each of the top four centres in the index, New York, London, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Dubai and Tokyo enter the top 10, replacing Chicago and Los Angeles. Overall, the rating for almost all centres fell, with the average rating across all centres down 1.82%. The largest fall in average ratings was in Latin America and The Caribbean down 2.5%, and the smallest decrease was in Eastern Europe & Central Asia, where average ratings fell by 0.56%. There is no change among the top five FinTech rankings, with Hong Kong in top position followed by Shenzhen, New York, Singapore, and London. Chinese and US centres continue to feature strongly in FinTech, with five US centres and six Chinese centres in the top 20. This reflects the continuing strength of their economies in the development of technology applications. We have also researched views on the aspects of regulation that are most important to the development of financial centres. The most important factor was predictability, followed by the speed of regulatory response, flexibility, and the quality of regulation. Cost was identified as the least important aspect by those responding to the survey. The top 20 centres in GFCI 39 are shown in the table below:   Full details of GFCI 39 can be found at www.globalfinancialcentres.net. Professor Michael Mainelli, Chairman of Z/Yen, said:“The significant gap in ratings between the leading four centres and the rest implies there is no paradox of increasing concentration on fewer safe centres during a period of increasing deglobalisation. Still, with Dubai and Tokyo bouncing Chicago and Los Angeles out of the top 10, competition is keen. The data for this edition of the GFCI predate the current conflict in the Middle East. We anticipate that the economic shocks caused by that conflict will materially affect future editions of the index.”

Thank you, Professor Metrick, for the kind introduction and the opportunity to return to Yale to speak to the Yale Program on Financial Stability today.1 I have long admired and been a grateful consumer of all the insightful work you have done here since its inception in 2013. I know that a number of the staff of the Board of Governors have been contributors to, and are avid consumers of, your work. I place a high priority on using novel sources of information to address data gaps. Given that, let me commend the effort to turn the information gathering and analysis the program conducted into a standardized, research-friendly platform. That impressive work includes a data set covering over 850 years of banking crises, which must have been a true labor of love on the parts of Andrew Metrick and Paul Schmelzing. These data-collection efforts provide a valuable public good to the finance and financial stability communities, as well as to the broader research community. This is my third trip to New Haven and my first since becoming a Governor on the Federal Reserve Board in 2022. One of the parts of my job that I find most intriguing is my work on the Board's Committee on Financial Stability. Indeed, financial stability is a long-standing research and policy interest of mine. Early in my career, I studied how underdevelopment in Russia's banking system hampered post-Soviet growth and how poor regulation fuels instability. Later, as an economist on the Council of Economic Advisers, I saw how financial system weaknesses contributed to instability in the euro area. Shortly after arriving at the Fed, I became a member of the committee and, since 2023, have had the honor of serving as chair. After four years of careful attention to this topic, it seems like an appropriate moment to reflect on and share lessons I have learned in this role. Today I will start by discussing the financial stability committee itself and then move to reflections on the Fed's Financial Stability Report (FSR) and scenario analysis, the analytical workhorse of financial stability analysis. I will then conclude with a few thoughts about the real-world complexity of making financial stability policy. Committee on Financial StabilityFollowing the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the Board adopted a revised approach to financial stability. This approach emphasized bringing together insights and analyses from all parts of the Federal Reserve System—economists, market experts, bank supervisors, and payment system experts. This work, coordinated by the then-new Office of Financial Stability Policy and Research, focused on the connections across sectors and their implications for the macroeconomy. The Board and the Federal Open Market Committee began receiving periodic briefings on this work. As part of this evolution, the Board created the Committee on Financial Stability in 2014. The committee provides a venue to discuss financial stability issues. Let me take a moment to acknowledge the contributions of the committee's first chair, the late Stanley Fischer. He made seminal contributions to the literature on financial stability, as well as open-economy macroeconomics, and he was a dedicated public servant who took on several roles as a central banker. Specifically, he played key roles in managing financial crises—first as a senior official at the IMF through the turbulence of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s and then as governor of the Bank of Israel through the GFC. As Vice Chair of the Board from 2014 to 2017, he recognized the value of having a dedicated forum where policymakers could learn the lessons of the GFC and other crises and discuss and evaluate financial stability issues. It is my great honor to continue in the tradition that Stan established. Many of the topics that Stan focused on and spoke about during his time at the Board remain highly relevant to policymakers a decade later. For instance, Stan pointed out in several speeches that while post-crisis regulatory measures had significantly bolstered bank resilience, certain activities were going to migrate to nonbank intermediaries that were not subject to the same regulatory safeguards.2 He noted in his aptly named speech "Financial Stability and Shadow Banks: What We Don't Know Could Hurt Us" that the data gaps and limited visibility into some of these activities were their own source of systemic risk.3 We are working to better understand these issues with an eye toward improving our financial stability monitoring, and I will continue to work with my Board colleagues to find concrete ways to do so. Stan also appreciated the value of giving policymakers a venue in which to discuss tail risks and longer-horizon questions related to the evolution of the financial system. These considerations do not always have immediate bearing on the near-term macro forecast, but you do not want to lose sight of them. That is why staff briefings to the financial stability committee explore the plausible range of severe shocks that could hit the economy and the ways in which such shocks could ramify through financial markets and institutions, with a view to understanding the ultimate effects on the macroeconomy. However, in response to a negative shock, financial conditions tighten. One way to see the work of financial stability is as the quest to understand how much, or how rapidly, that tightening would occur. Answering that question requires thinking about the plausible range of shocks that could hit the economy, as well as the resilience of key financial markets and institutions. While macroeconomics has made great strides in the past 15 years to incorporate the lessons of the financial crisis, it is fair to say that models cannot yet reflect the full institutional richness of the modern financial system. And the public's attention to these issues can fade because financial crises are, thankfully, rare. However, policymakers at the Fed remain vigilant. For families negatively affected by the financial crisis, we know the scars linger. In the spirit of an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, the financial stability committee is a place of consistent focus on this vital issue. This is the impetus for the Board's staff examining and Board members receiving periodic briefings and updates on a range of topics related to the financial system's behavior under stress. These updates occur even during the extended periods of relative calm we have seen over the past few years. Recently, among the issues we have discussed are hedge fund trading strategies, the rise of private credit arrangements, and the connections between banks and a range of nonbank financial entities. Some of this work appears in the Fed's twice-yearly assessment of vulnerabilities in the financial system. Financial Stability ReportWhen he introduced the first FSR in November 2018, Chair Powell noted that he hoped it would provide transparency into the set of indicators the Fed monitors for financial stability and that it would prompt feedback and engagement from the public. Thus, since its inception, the FSR was designed to act as a platform that policymakers build upon to develop their own views about the system's overall resilience rather than expressing a centralized view. The FSR carefully works through a long list of data series relevant to the four key vulnerabilities or amplification channels we track: asset valuations, borrowing by businesses and households, leverage in the financial sector, and funding risk. It comments on whether these vulnerabilities are high or low relative to history. This disciplined approach is helpful in coming to a view on the system's resilience. But, by itself, the approach is insufficient. Policymakers concerned with the system's ability to withstand shocks also need to take a view on the interaction among vulnerabilities and the most plausible shocks that might hit the system. Some policymakers might be more concerned about the consequences of a rapid decline in asset prices or view contractionary shocks as more likely than inflationary shocks. These perspectives would lead them to place different weights on the four vulnerabilities in forming their overall view of the system's resilience. The value in the FSR lies in the consistent attention to, and updating of, the underlying indicators of both the resilience and evolution of the financial system. Let me give you one example. Since its inception, the FSR has contained a chart based on the Board's data showing bank lending commitments to nonbank financial institutions. We affectionately refer to this graph as the "rainbow chart" because it comprises 10 separate colors, each reflecting a different type of nonbank borrower. This category of loans has been growing quite rapidly, much faster than overall lending to nonfinancial businesses—a category known as commercial and industrial (C&I) lending. During the past decade, large bank credit commitments to nonbank financial institutions have grown at an annualized rate of about 9 percent, roughly three times the pace of C&I lending. This growth is tracked in successive editions of the FSR. Observers would also see changes in the composition of the rainbow in the report. For example, that category that includes special purpose entities, collateralized loan obligations, and asset-backed securities has expanded in recent years. This work gives us deeper insights into the evolution of private credit and other important sectors, helping us better understand how stress in one area might affect other parts of the financial system. And even without real-world stress, getting refined and more precise estimates of the linkages between sectors proves useful in scenario analysis, my next topic. Scenario Analysis in Assessing Financial StabilityScenario analysis is the process of analyzing the implications of a sequence of shocks, or exogenous events. It has proven to be a powerful mechanism for assessing financial stability. Such inspection involves three forms of analysis: the vulnerabilities described in the FSR, an assessment of how sectors interact with each other, and a set of plausible shocks. Let me start by contrasting financial-stability scenario analysis with the well-known stress test exercise that those tasked with supervision at the Fed have undertaken since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. These stress tests feature a severe but plausible scenario based on the Great Recession and highly quantitative assessments of the first-round effects of such a shock on individual banks. The emphasis is on precision, with the published loss estimates having material consequences for the participating banks. I would characterize these exercises as excellent at addressing the "known unknowns" we face. In the realm of financial stability, by contrast, we start with scenarios that may never have happened. One could plausibly ask, for example, "What if AI disappoints?" Although tech booms and periods of technological progress have occurred in the past, it is difficult to know if any compares to the current situation. Therefore, any such scenario would not have an historical precedent. Nonetheless, the scenario must both feature a coherent narrative and be quantitatively specific. A good scenario is not path dependent and aids us in thinking about tail, not just modal, risks. That is, it helps us break free of the well-known human tendency to believe that tomorrow will be like today. The next stage is to assess the effect of the scenario on all the key markets and institutions in the system. This step is where our disciplined approach matters: the FSR starts each section with a table summarizing the most important markets and institutions for a given vulnerability. Fed analysts focus on those at the top of the tables. Further, estimating losses and liquidity drains from the scenario is inherently imprecise. For instance, we often lack microdata on key exposures and must make informed guesses, in some cases. This is another difference from the supervisory stress test exercises. We analyze the interactions across markets and institutions, or second-round effects. Institutions and investors will take losses or watch liquidity being drained in the scenario. They will respond in a given way—deleveraging, for example. Those responses, in turn, will have spillover effects. The question we ask in scenario analysis is, will those second-round effects meaningfully amplify the original shock? This is obviously a difficult question to answer precisely. Indeed, these effects are not modeled in supervisory bank stress tests at all. We maintain as much specificity and quantitative rigor as possible. For example, when leveraged intermediaries take losses, their leverage increases, and they might choose to, or be forced to, sell assets to deleverage. We aim to be as precise as possible about the plausible range of sales as outcomes. Then, we use several different approaches to measure the effects of these sales, such as direct measurement or comparing sales volumes to purchasing capacity at dealers. Another approach is using historical analogy: has the system handled similar volumes in the past? Finally, we recognize that our assessments are inherently uncertain. This posture prompts us to look for markers that, should the scenario actually come to pass, would confirm or falsify our assessment. Indeed, scenario analysis is a guide to the financial system's behavior under stress. We need signposts to understand whether the guide is proving valid or whether we missed a key amplification channel. If we have a valid guide, the work warns us which markets and institutions would come under pressure and whether their distress, in turn, would have severe repercussions. Sometimes, the most valuable part of these exercises is to familiarize us with the entities that could be most affected. Reflections on PolicymakingBefore I conclude, let me offer some thoughts on policymaking to support financial stability. I am not going to comment on any specific proposals or past actions. My purpose is to describe some of the lessons I have drawn from my years on the Board. If I could send a message to myself four years ago, here is what I would say. First, I cannot underscore enough how important it is to remain vigilant about obtaining high-quality data to guide financial stability analysis. The stability data challenge is distinct from that we face in our macro work, where we also sometimes have to grapple with measurement issues. In our financial stability work, we confront the evolving nature of the system, where new markets and institutions can rise suddenly. Data permit us to answer key questions. How large is the sector? What share of loans is associated with it? Do borrowers have alternative sources of credit? I have observed a synergy between scenario analysis and data collection. Sometimes when we run a scenario, the most important lesson we take away is the data we need to identify to truly understand how the system might evolve. You can see some of the fruits of that work in our FSR as we add new series or refine our estimates of existing series in response to findings from our scenario analyses. Second, the policy landscape reflects a long history of decisions that multiple state and federal agencies made in response to a complex mix of mandates and considerations. However, financial stability requires viewing the web of markets and institutions as an ecosystem ultimately designed to support the needs of businesses and households. This perspective is different from that taken by authorities who are accountable for a particular part of the financial system. If the system is hit with a bad shock, will it continue to function? Would the collapse of one part of the system present an opportunity for a different part to grow? Furthermore, the tools available to policymakers are typically able to build resilience or constrain activity in one segment of the ecosystem. This practice might make one corner safer, but would such an action lead to a "trophic cascade," or the unwanted growth of a different part of the ecosystem? Considering an example may be helpful. In the late 1990s, the Australian government undertook conservation efforts to eradicate the feral invasive cats plaguing native, rare birds on Macquarie Island. The effort helped preserve a critical breeding ground for several native, rare bird species, but it also led to an unforeseen consequence: the explosive growth of the rabbit population. Ultimately, after Herculean effort, the Australian government was able to control the rabbit population and that of other invasive rodent species. As a result, critical vegetation has regrown, and rare albatross are nesting on the island again. But even with the happy ending, the experience is a cautionary tale. Inaction itself can have dire consequences, but interventions will also have their effects—anticipated or otherwise. It is all well and good to remove the metaphorical feral cats, but policymakers should be prepared to manage the ensuing boom in rabbits, too. If you permit me to strain the ecology metaphor further, the global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) are a truly unique genus in our financial ecosystem. The diversity of the U.S. banking sector—with banks of many sizes and business models serving a variety of customers and communities—can help promote resilience of the overall system. But, for better or worse, G-SIBs are unique and highly interconnected, and the system depends on them for many services. These largest banks can be a source of stability that buffers the entire system in times of trouble. But their resilience is fundamental, because they are connected throughout the ecosystem by extensive networks shuttling resources among them as stress emerges. While I take comfort in the very high levels of resilience of the U.S. G-SIBs, vigilance in ensuring their continued resilience is critical. Third, we should embrace responsible changes that strengthen our financial system, not hinder them. The Committee on Financial Stability and the Board's staff monitor financial and technological innovations that are in early stages of development, including digital assets and the use of artificial intelligence. The fact that the U.S. financial system is the largest and deepest in the world is the result of decades of successive, and transformative, financial and technological innovations. As a corollary, we need to understand innovations at early stages to see the system's trajectory. We have also observed innovations that have brought unintended consequences, and we need to stay abreast of potential risks in order to better understand where guardrails and industry engagement might be helpful. And a final note, the tradeoffs between acting to prevent the worst near-term effects at the cost of a larger Fed footprint and moral hazard are real. We know that making policy during a stress event presents the highest degree of difficulty. The stakes are high, with significant real-world losses looming. Time and information are often in short supply. The available options are almost always suboptimal. That is why properly undertaking scenario analysis in advance is a high priority. This allows policymakers to have some familiarity with the key players and dynamics at play. It is much easier to follow Michel Camdessus's 1994 dictum that "in a crisis, you do not panic," if you have thought through options well in advance.4 As we have seen time and again, credible announcements by central banks can have dramatic calming effects. Indeed, a strong initial announcement can result in a smaller intervention than a series of ambiguous or insufficient announcements. But, as with all forms of central bank credibility, this effect is the result of a long history of deep analysis and a consistent track record of following through on previous announcements. The credibility that supports effective financial stability policy interventions is the product of careful, deliberate work, such as the work the FSR details. ConclusionThank you for allowing me to reflect upon my first four years on the financial stability committee. I hope I have made clear that while I, and the Fed, have learned much in recent years, financial stability is an exercise in continual study and improvement. Likewise, it is important to keep you and the public, more generally, informed of this work, which is why we regularly publish the FSR. I trust you are eager to review the next version, when we release the report later this spring. Consistent with the goal of keeping the public informed, I hope my discussion of scenario analysis and the complexities policymakers face when making financial stability policies added to your understanding. Thinking back to the financial crisis, we know the damaging effects of economic downturns on employment and household wealth. Americans depend on a stable financial system to start and support families, buy homes and vehicles, start businesses, and pay for their education. Ultimately, our efforts to maintain financial stability are a service to the American people. Thank you again to the Yale Program on Financial Stability for the opportunity to speak with you today. I look forward to your questions. 1. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee.  2. See Stanley Fischer (2015), "The Importance of the Nonbank Financial Sector," speech delivered at the "Debt and Financial Stability—Regulatory Challenges" conference, the Bundesbank and the German Ministry of Finance, Frankfurt, Germany, March 27; Stanley Fischer (2015), "Nonbank Financial Intermediation, Financial Stability, and the Road Forward," speech delivered at the "Central Banking in the Shadows: Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Postcrisis," 20th Annual Financial Markets Conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Stone Mountain, Georgia, March 30; and Stanley Fischer (2015), "Macroprudential Policy in the U.S. Economy," speech delivered at the "Macroprudential Monetary Policy," 59th Economic Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, Massachusetts, October 2.  3. See Stanley Fischer (2015), "Financial Stability and Shadow Banks: What We Don't Know Could Hurt Us," speech delivered at the "Financial Stability: Policy Analysis and Data Needs" 2015 Financial Stability Conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and the Office of Financial Research, Washington, December 3.  4. See Stanley Fischer (2011), "Central Bank Lessons from the Global Crisis (PDF)," dinner lecture delivered at the Bank of Israel conference on "Lessons of the Global Crisis," Jerusalem, Israel, March 31, page 11. 

We sympathise with former members of the British Steel Pension Scheme (BSPS) who lost money after they were given unsuitable advice from people they trusted. Complaints are a valuable source of feedback which help us improve and learn. There have also been 4 independent reports into the BSPS since 2018, which have helped us learn lessons. We have accepted several of their recommendations and implemented improvements, including those below. We now have much closer collaboration between the FCA, The Pensions Regulator, Pension Protection Fund, and the Money and Pensions Service. This has improved intelligence sharing, enabling us to identify defined benefit pension transfer risks more swiftly. We are also collecting more pension transfer data from advisory firms to proactively monitor trends. We created a tool so people can check if they may have had unsuitable defined benefit pension transfer advice and have banned contingent charging for defined benefit pension transfers to reduce conflicts of interest. Our latest evaluation shows these changes have helped reduce the scope for harm and shift the market away from advice models that put advisers’ interests ahead of consumers. The Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) levy and compensation amounts stand at a 10-year low, which is also one indicator of significant improvements in the system. Redress for BSPS members Together with the Financial Ombudsman Service and FSCS, we have helped more than 6,500 former members complain following extensive engagement with former members. At least £106m in redress has been offered to 1,870 former BSPS members to put them back in the position they would have been at retirement. We have also taken enforcement action against more than 20 individuals and firms where there was evidence of serious misconduct. Read our full response.

The periodic review for determining the eurobonds to be included in the BIST-KYD Corporate Eurobond Indices has been completed in accordance with the BIST-KYD Indices Methodology.  It has been decided to make the changes listed in the in the annex for the second quarter of 2026 (April 1, 2026 - June 30, 2026). Please click for the periodic changes in the BIST-KYD Corporate Eurobond Indices.

This European Union Finances Statement (EUFS) is the 45th in the series. The focus of this Statement is on the implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement (WA). Documents The European Union Finances Statement 2025 PDF, 268 KB, 20 pages This file may not be suitable for users of assistive technology. Request an accessible format. If you use assistive technology (such as a screen reader) and need a version of this document in a more accessible format, please email digital.communications@hmtreasury.gov.uk. Please tell us what format you need. It will help us if you say what assistive technology you use. Details This year’s edition is the fifth in the publication series to cover the UK as a non-Member State. It gives a breakdown of the invoices received from the EU, setting out payments made in 2025. Although mostly backward looking, the Statement also provides a forecasted estimate of the UK’s total outstanding liability.

The Senior Credit Officer Opinion Survey on Dealer Financing Terms (SCOOS) is a quarterly survey providing information about the availability and terms of credit in securities financing and over-the counter (OTC) derivatives markets. The SCOOS is modeled after the long-established Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, which provides qualitative information about changes in supply and demand for loans to households and businesses at commercial banks. The SCOOS collects qualitative information on credit terms and conditions in securities financing and OTC derivatives markets, which are important conduits for leverage in the financial system. The survey panel for the SCOOS began by including 20 dealers and over time has been expanded. These firms account for almost all of the dealer activity in dollar-denominated securities financing and OTC derivatives markets. The survey is directed to senior credit officers responsible for maintaining a consolidated perspective on the management of credit risks. The HTML links below include the full report; the PDF links include the summary only. 2026 March* HTML | PDF 2025 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2024 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2023 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2022 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2021 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2020 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2019 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2018 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2017 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2016 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2015 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2014 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2013 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2012 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2011 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2010 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF *Current Release

FTSE Russell, the global index provider, today announces the alignment of the minimum free float requirement for both UK incorporated and non-UK incorporated companies within the FTSE UK Index Series.  Taking effect from the June 2026 index review, both UK and non-UK incorporated companies with a minimum free float of 10% will be eligible for inclusion to the FTSE UK Index Series, subject to satisfying all other inclusion criteria. The current minimum free float requirement for non-UK incorporated companies is 25%. The rule change removes the distinction between UK and non-UK incorporated companies in relation to the minimum free float requirement. It is intended to make the indices more representative of the real economic exposure they are designed to measure, with the requirement aligning with the London Stock Exchange Main Market minimum free float requirement for all companies. David Sol, Global Head of Policy at FTSE Russell, comments: “We regularly review our index methodologies to ensure they continue to reflect the markets they are designed to track. Following a recent market consultation, we are aligning the minimum free float requirement for UK and non-UK incorporated companies. While we do not expect any immediate impact on index constituents, this change aims to strengthen how accurately the indices reflect the UK market.” This follows the March 2025 announcement of changes to the Sterling Denominated Price Requirement and Fast Entry Thresholds in the FTSE UK Index Series, which came into effect at the September 2025 index review. For more information, see the full technical notice.

The New York Stock Exchange, part of Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. (NYSE: ICE), one of the world's leading providers of financial market technology and data powering global capital markets, today announced it listed the Global X NYSE® 100 ETF (NYSX), allowing investors to participate in the performance of the NYSE 100 Index. The NYSE 100 Index (NYSE100) is a rules-based, modified float-adjusted market capitalization-weighted equity benchmark designed to track the performance of U.S listed, actively traded securities of 100 highly capitalized technology and tech-enabled growth companies spanning multiple sectors. "A technology focused ETF with exposure across multiple sectors gives investors a way to participate in a more complete view of the innovation driving the American economy,” said Lynn Martin, President of NYSE Group. “We’re pleased to work with Global X as it introduces a new, inclusive ETF that seeks to truly track the performance that investors seek from actively traded and growth-focused tech companies.” As of March 23, 2026 and based on hypothetical, backtested levels prior to the index launch date of November 18, 2025, the NYSE 100 Index has risen 27.65% over the trailing year and delivered annualized growth of 30.15% over the trailing 3-year period, 15.06% over the trailing 5-year period, and 22.13% over the trailing 10-year period, all on a gross total return basis. Prior index performance is not indicative of future index performance. The NYSE 100 is administered by ICE Data Indices, LLC and was developed with input from asset management firm Global X, part of Mirae Asset Global Investments. "At Global X, we’re always looking for ways to capture market exposure and innovation," said Pedro Palandrani, Head of Product Research & Development at Global X. "The NYSE® 100 ETF focuses on exposure to core innovation, and it’s designed to capture the companies genuinely reshaping the economy across sectors." The NYSE 100 Index is part of the NYSE family of equity indices administered by ICE Data Indices, LLC. With over $2 trillion in assets under management benchmarked to ICE indices, ICE has deep expertise in administering and publishing indices that are used throughout global markets. Its broad offering includes more than 7,500 fixed income, equity, currency, commodity, and mortgage indices that are trusted by market participants around the world and backed by a nearly 60-year track record. For more information about the NYSE 100 Index / ICE Data Indices, please visit ICE’s Index Solutions. For more information about the Global X NYSE 100 ETF, please visit www.globalxetfs.com.

With Germany’s sweeping MiKaDiv reporting regime set to take effect from January 2027, financial institutions across Europe are facing a fundamental shift in how dividend withholding tax is reported, validated, and reclaimed. RAQUEST, German fintech and market leader in withholding tax technology for financial institutions, announces its plug-and-play MiKaDiv software solution, built around three role-specific modules designed to address the distinct responsibilities across the reporting chain. MiKaDiv introduces a fully digital reporting framework for dividend income, replacing paper-based tax certificates and requiring detailed, end-to-end transparency. The regime is aimed at strengthening compliance and preventing tax abuse, following high-profile Cum/Ex cases. “MiKaDiv is not just another reporting requirement – it reshapes how intermediaries manage compliance and data in withholding tax processing along the custody chain,” said Alexander Lerch, CEO and Co-Founder of RAQUEST. “Financial institutions need clarity on their role and a solution that reflects that complexity. That is why we structured our software into three role-specific modules, enabling organizations to implement targeted compliance.” Foreign Financial Institutions and Service Providers can create MiKaDiv-compliant reports, manage tax vouchers and UUIDs, and integrate with digital tax reclaim processes. German Financial Institutions and Paying Agents are supported with full reporting capabilities, including validation, aggregation, overclaiming controls, and submission to the German Tax Authority. International Custodians can validate and consolidate incoming data, manage risk, and ensure accurate transmission of reporting information along the custody chain. All modules are connected via RAQUEST’s secure data transfer infrastructure, enabling seamless exchange of information from investor level through to the German Tax Authority. The solution also integrates with RAQUEST’s broader withholding tax suite, including tax reclaim and relief at source. With MiKaDiv making accurate reporting a prerequisite for tax relief, organizations must ensure both data quality and operational readiness ahead of the 2027 deadline. RAQUEST’s modular approach allows financial institutions to implement targeted solutions based on their role while preparing for wider European initiatives such as the EU’s FASTER Directive.

Meeting date: 29 September 2025, 15:00-16:00 Location: Virtual meeting (via MS Teams) Attendees: HM Treasury (the Treasury): George Barnes (Chair), Henry Grigg, James Stillit, Naomi Lawrence, Precious Oladipo Bank of England: Nishi Shant, Ben Mitchell, Geoffrey Davies Financial Conduct Authority (FCA): Rob Mak Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA): Jonathan Sepanski Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) Clear Europe: Charles Lindsay LCH, LSEG: Owen Taylor London Metal Exchange (LME): Chris Jones International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA): Ulrich Karl, Sarah Crowley Futures Industry Association: Doanh Le Ngoc City of London Law Society: Insolvency Law Committee: Peter Hughes Financial Markets Law Committee: Brian Gray R3 General Technical Committee: Mike Pink, David Mitchell Insolvency Service: Steven Chown Insolvency Lawyers Association’s Technical Committee: Gabrielle Ruiz 1. Introductions – agenda item 1 The Treasury explained that the Panel was being brought together to discuss a planned piece of secondary legislation, to further expand implementation of the resolution regime for central counterparties (CCPs) under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, in order to consider high-level views on the policy intent of this proposed legislation. 2. Update on the legislation – agenda item 2 The Treasury outlined that, further to establishing and operationalising the resolution regime, an additional piece of secondary legislation was now being developed to deliver on the commitment made following consultation on the regime in 2021 to fully implement the ‘No Creditor Worse Off’ (NCWO) safeguard. Responses to the consultation had asked for greater clarity over the safeguard. The Treasury noted that this legislation was specifically focused on establishing the framework for a post-resolution independent valuer to assess the treatment each relevant person (including clearing members) would have received under the hypothetical ‘counterfactual’ scenario (in which resolution action was not taken on the CCP) against the actual treatment that these persons received as a result of the resolution. This was explained as an essential step in order to calculate compensation due under any claim. The Treasury explained that the legislation would include a clear description of the counterfactual an independent valuer would need to consider when deciding on potential compensation claims. 3. High-level comments and discussion – agenda item 3 A number of technical policy points were raised in discussion which the authorities sought to address during the meeting and which they will reflect through their further work to prepare the legislation: One Panel member asked how compensation would be calculated if CCPs did not all have the same recovery and loss allocation arrangements in their rulebooks as compared to those available to the Bank in resolution. The Bank of England noted that, while UK CCPs have comprehensive recovery loss allocation arrangements for some scenarios, not all scenarios are covered comprehensively within the CCPs’ rules and so some losses would likely be allocated during a CCP’s insolvency. The proposed legislation was being designed to reflect this. One Panel member noted that a clear counterfactual would be important should the Bank of England intervene to take resolution action before a CCP had applied its full recovery arrangements, so that a valuer could clearly determine how the CCP would have crystallised its losses and how it would have deployed its rulebook tools to allocate these. The Bank of England noted that the proposed legislation would detail a set of assumptions for the independent valuer to follow, covering how the CCP’s recovery arrangements would have operated under the counterfactual scenario. Another Panel member noted that, under conditions of extreme market stress, a CCP may encounter difficulties in setting settlement prices that reflect fair market values for financial instruments it clears, which the Bank of England should be mindful of should it plan to perform a termination (‘tear-up’) of any of the CCP’s cleared book as part of its resolution of the CCP. The Bank of England acknowledged that determining tear-up prices may be challenging in periods of acute market stress but noted that CCPs typically have contingency arrangements in their settlement price determination procedures which are matched by the Bank’s processes for resolution.[footnote 1] The Bank of England further noted that it would be important when determining tear-up prices for the Bank of England to be mindful of the settlement prices the CCP would have been likely to establish under the counterfactual scenario. The Panel discussed how independence of a valuer would be determined, which the Treasury confirmed the legislation would clarify. One Panel member asked how the legislation would interact with the Bank of England’s exercise of the power to defer a clearing member’s obligations. The Bank of England noted that its intended approach in exercising this power would be for deferred obligations to be included in the calculation of the actual treatment in resolution (unless doing so would itself have generated a loss distribution under the actual treatment which would materially deviate from the loss distribution which would have been achieved under the counterfactual scenario). The Treasury noted that this valuation issue was complex and would likely be subject to further arrangements made by the Treasury when any compensation scheme was established following a resolution. One Panel member queried how realistic the counterfactual assumption was that an insolvency practitioner could liquidate all the CCP’s cleared instruments immediately, and at a single price at the point the CCP entered insolvency. The Bank of England noted that this assumed liquidation of positions would be recorded through the cancelling of the positions cleared by the CCP (rather than through trading), with the insolvency practitioner having discretion to determine the fair market price at which such book-entry terminations would have hypothetically occurred. Another Panel member queried the relationship between the pre- and post-resolution valuations, noting that considerable time may elapse between these two processes. The Treasury noted that the proposed legislation covered post-resolution valuation only – and that pre- and post-resolution valuations have different considerations. Nonetheless, the Treasury acknowledged that there is some overlap between them and that post-resolution independent valuers would accordingly ‘have regard’ to the pre-resolution valuation. Another Panel member asked if the UK’s NCWO valuation arrangements would follow equivalent EU legislation. The Treasury noted that the proposed UK approach had been developed through a ‘first principles’ approach, however, that there of course may be some similarities. 4. Next steps – agenda item 4 The Treasury requested Panel members provide written comments on the legislation’s policy intent by 10 October 2025. The Treasury confirmed that a draft statutory instrument alongside draft amendments to the CCP resolution code of practice would be provided to Panel members for review in due course. The Bank noted that it would meanwhile also test with CCPs some of the counterfactual assumptions made on insolvency rules. The Bank of England’s approach to determining commercially reasonable payments for contracts subject to a statutory tear up in CCP resolution: Bank of England ↩

ETFGI reports Actively Managed ETFs globally Hit New US$2.15 Trillion Record Amid 71 Straight Months of net Inflows at the end of February. During February the actively managed ETFs industry globally gathered net inflows of US$91.15 billion, bringing year-to-date net inflows to a record US$167.58 billion, according to ETFGI's February 2026 Active ETF industry landscape insights report, an annual paid-for research subscription service. ETFGI, is a 14 year old leading independent research and consultancy firm renowned for its expertise in subscription research, consulting services, 6 annual ETFGI Global ETFs Insights Summits, and ETF TV on global ETF industry trends. (All dollar values in USD unless otherwise noted.) Highlights• Global assets in actively managed ETFs climbed to a new record of $2.15 trillion at the end of February, surpassing the prior high of $2.04 trillion set in January 2026.• Assets are up 11.6% year‑to‑date, rising from $1.92 trillion at year‑end 2025.• Actively managed ETFs attracted $91.15 billion in net inflows during February.• YTD net inflows of $167.58 billion mark the highest on record, ahead of $103.29 billion in 2025 and the previous record of $46.07 billion in 2024.• February marked the 71st consecutive month of net inflows. “The S&P 500 declined by 0.76% in February and was up 0.68% year‑to‑date in 2026. Developed markets excluding the U.S. rose 6.03% during February and were up 12.55% year‑to‑date, with Korea (up 20.11%) and Luxembourg (up 16.61%) recording the strongest gains among developed markets for the month. Emerging markets increased by 2.47% in February and were up 8.11% year‑to‑date, led by Thailand (up 19.48%) and Taiwan (up 11.63%),” said Deborah Fuhr, Managing Partner, Founder, and Owner of ETFGI. Growth in assets in the actively managed ETFs industry as of end of February The actively managed ETFs industry globally has 4,864 ETFs, with 6,574 listings, assets of $2.15 Tn, from 682 providers listed on 47 exchanges in 37 countries at the end of February. Dimensional is the largest active provider in terms of assets with $286.31 Bn, reflecting 13.3% market share; JP Morgan Asset Management is second with $268.70 Bn and 12.5% market share, followed by iShares with $128.49 Bn and 6.0% market share. The top three providers, out of 682, account for 31.8% of Global Active ETF AUM, while the remaining 679 providers each have less than 6% market share. Net inflows Actively managed ETFs attracted $91.15 billion in net inflows during February. Equity-focused actively managed ETFs listed globally attracted $41.48 billion in net inflows during February, bringing year‑to‑date inflows to $84.29 billion—well above the $51.42 billion gathered by this point in 2025. Fixed income–focused actively managed ETFs saw $42.69 billion in net inflows in February, lifting YTD inflows to $71.19 billion, compared with $43.23 billion in net inflows at the same point in 2025. Substantial inflows can be attributed to the top 20 active ETFs/ETPs by net new assets, which collectively gathered$38.64 Bn during February. ProShares GENIUS Money Market ETF (IQMM US) gathered $18.25 Bn, the largest individual net inflow. Top 20 actively managed ETFs/ETPs by net new assets February 2026 Source: ETFGI data sourced from ETF/ETP sponsors, exchanges, regulatory filings, Thomson Reuters/Lipper, Bloomberg, publicly available sources and data generated in-house. Note: This report is based on the most recent data available at the time of publication. Asset and flow data may change slightly as additional data becomes available. Investors have tended to invest in Fixed Income actively managed ETFs/ETPs during February.

Heightened market volatility stemming from US tariff policies, combined with increasing demand for intelligence on AI-driven industry transformation, contributed to Data Vendors recording $49.2 billion in revenue in 2025, representing a 6.5% annual increase. The confluence of real-time risk evaluation requirements, heightened demand for specialized private market valuation data, and the proliferation of AI suggests that record revenue growth among data providers is likely to continue unabated. The financial market data industry posted another record year in 2025, with global spending climbing 6.5% to $49.2 billion, reflecting a broader shift away from static end-of-day reporting and toward real-time analytics, alternative data, and AI-powered intelligence. Although real-time trading and data spending accounted for the largest share of total revenues at over 35%, strong demand for Portfolio Management & Analytics and Pricing, Reference and Valuation data drove spending. Although News was the smallest product type, it did have the most significant YoY increase at 7.4%. Growth was primarily concentrated in Asia at 7.4%, with EMEA at 7.0% and the Americas at 5.8%. Market data spending in the Americas accounted for 50.30% of the global total, with EMEA at 31.5% and Asia at 18.2%. Bloomberg, LSEG, and S&P Global Market Intelligence maintained their position as the most prominent global market data vendors. SIX Financial reported the sharpest revenue growth rate in 2025, followed by Moody’s Analytics, Dow Jones, LSEG. Financial market data demand in 2025 was propelled by critical Artificial Intelligence integration needs and real-time risk evaluation amid heightened volatility. The focus has moved from static end-of-day reporting to real-time analytics and alternative data sources, increasingly powered by AI-driven insights. Surging demand, limited competition among data suppliers, and intricate licensing terms have made it difficult for financial institutions to control costs and maintain compliance with data usage requirements. Despite ongoing financial pressures on customers, the market data industry's robust 2025 performance signals continued growth ahead. Financial market data has proven largely inelastic - a fixture in company budgets that endures regardless of broader market conditions. Whether markets are rising or falling, demand for data shows no signs of slowing.

Three UK-listed companies currently have disclosed net short positions of more than 10%, compared with none at any point in 20251 20 UK-listed companies currently have disclosed net short positions of more than 5%, compared with just two at any point in 20252 Consumer sector is the most heavily shorted2 New analysis of publicly disclosed FCA net short positions by global law firm White & Case LLP reveals that short-selling has returned to the UK market with a vengeance. Three UK-listed companies have net short positions of more than 10%, as at 23 March 2026, compared with none at any point in 20251. Additionally, 20 UK-listed companies have net short positions of more than 5%, as at 23 March 20262, compared with just two at any point in 20253. Among these 20 companies, the consumer sector appears to be the most heavily shorted2. The analysis comes amid recent high-profile short-selling activity. Viceroy Research published a note on Close Brothers arguing that the specialist lender had not set aside enough money to cover potential liabilities from the car finance scandal, while Wizz Air was targeted by short-sellers after warning that it would be impacted by the Iran conflict. Commenting, Patrick Sarch, Head of UK Public M&A at global law firm White & Case LLP, said: “Only when the tide goes out do you discover who's not wearing shorts - and indeed who is being shorted. “We predicted at the end of 2025 that 2026 would see a significant increase in shorting shares in UK companies and this research vindicates that prediction. “The opportunities for short-sellers are more attractive now than they have been for many years. Global stock markets have experienced a relatively long decade-plus bull market with strengthening equity valuations, and although the UK remains more moderately priced relative to other markets, UK stocks had been at record highs until the recent geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and were not generally undervalued relative to each other. “However, markets are beginning to come off these highs following the recent reallocation out of AI-driven stocks and heightened macro uncertainty. As individual valuations come under pressure, investors are increasingly taking a closer look at those UK-listed companies whose equity stories appear too good to be true and whose fundamentals don’t support their valuations. “Despite this recent uptick in short-selling activity, short-selling has always played a healthy role in capital markets, supporting price discovery, liquidity, transparency, good governance and market discipline. Short-sellers are often sophisticated investors who produce extensive and well-researched theses on companies, and many have played a crucial role in exposing fraud at companies such as Wirecard and Home REIT.” What issuers should do White & Case is talking to a number of listed companies about what they can do to mitigate these risks – it does not act for short-sellers attacking UK listed companies. The best way to prevent becoming vulnerable is to be proactive and transparent. A number of potentially vulnerable companies have an internal investor engagement or audit committee that meets quarterly to review and assess vulnerabilities and risks, including accounting policies, revenue recognition, provisions, disclosure, related party issues and undisclosed vulnerabilities. The investor engagement function should serve as the harshest internal critic, regularly challenging Boards and management teams and relaying feedback from the market. Issuers should also demonstrate strong governance and transparency and seek investor and analyst views on strengths and weaknesses. It is often possible for us to anticipate issues which a short-seller may focus on. The most effective prevention is for the company to drive the narrative by consistently and proactively explaining its “equity story” or value proposition to investors, supported by objective evidence where possible, and to be honest and transparent about its weaknesses and risks. Where the market first hears about negative news or misunderstood liabilities from a bear attacker, the company is on the back foot and may be in trouble. Trust in management and the Board’s oversight is immediately lost and can be very hard to regain, while the share price is impacted and the stock is negatively rerated until there is a strong basis for rehabilitation. Companies should work with advisers to prepare a short-selling defence manual that includes key details of who responds, how, when and with what evidence, and scenario planning for the most foreseeable attacks. It is crucial to rehearse these defence plans so people know what to do in the first minute and hour in the event of an attack – which may be combined with other events, such as a cyber-attack, profit warning, C-suite succession issue or a relevant market disruption. Issuers should also be ready to commission independent reviews - accounting, legal and forensic – and engage regulators if manipulation is suspected. Regulatory irony: deregulation just as short-selling ramps up There’s an added irony to all this – just as shorting activity is surging in the UK, the FCA is finalising rule changes that would reduce market transparency by removing the requirement for short-sellers to disclose their identities and replacing this with an anonymised, aggregated issuer-level figure. This is intended to reduce inhibitions on short-selling. That may well be good for the market as a whole, but may make it hard for specific companies to respond and easier for short-sellers to make a negative impact on their share price. About the analysis This analysis is based on publicly disclosed FCA net short positions as at 23 March 2026 and historical disclosures available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/markets/short-selling/notification-disclosure-net-short-positions. FCA public disclosures exclude short positions below the 0.5% public disclosure threshold. 2026 figures are based on aggregate disclosed net short positions by issuer as at 23 March 2026. 2025 comparisons are based on the maximum aggregate disclosed net short position reached by each issuer at any point during 2025. Notes The three UK-listed companies with disclosed net short positions of more than 10% as at 23 March 2026 are: Wizz Air Holdings — 15.21% Greggs — 13.43% Ibstock — 13.21% The 20 UK-listed companies with disclosed net short positions of more than 5% as at 23 March 2026 a  Wizz Air Holdings — 15.21% Greggs — 13.43% Ibstock — 13.21% B&M European Value Retail — 8.49% WH Smith — 8.47% NCC Group — 8.01% Autotrader Group — 8.01% Future — 7.70% Ocado Group — 7.47% Land Securities — 6.81% Kingfisher — 6.67% Tate & Lyle — 6.59% Whitbread — 6.50% Domino’s Pizza Group — 6.29% WPP — 6.27% J Sainsbury — 6.02% easyJet — 5.91% GB Group — 5.67% Vistry Group – 5.64% Flutter Entertainment – 5.05% The only two UK-listed companies whose aggregate disclosed net short positions exceeded 5% at any point during 2025 were Indivior plc and Pennon Group plc.

Solactive is pleased to announce its continued collaboration with E Fund Management (Hong Kong) Co., Limited (“E Fund HK”) through the launch of the E Fund (HK) Solactive Asia Semiconductor Select Index ETF, which tracks the Solactive Asia Semiconductor Select Index. Following the recent launch of the E Fund (HK) Solactive Biopharma Select Index ETF, this new product further expands the collaboration between E Fund HK and Solactive in thematic equity strategies. The product is designed to reflect the performance of leading semiconductor companies across Hong Kong and East Asia, highlighting the importance of the semiconductor industry within the global technology ecosystem. Semiconductors play a critical role in enabling technological innovation across areas such as artificial intelligence, cloud computing, advanced manufacturing, and next-generation mobility solutions. As demand for high-performance computing and digital infrastructure continues to increase, Asian markets remain central to global semiconductor production and supply chains. This environment underlines the relevance of thematic index solutions providing exposure to companies operating within these structural industry trends. The Solactive Asia Semiconductor Select Index aims to represent the performance of 30 companies primarily engaged in semiconductor manufacturing as well as semiconductor equipment and services across Hong Kong and other eligible East Asian markets. The index follows a transparent and rules-based methodology, selecting the top 15 eligible securities listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and 15 securities from other eligible East Asian markets based on total market capitalization. Components are weighted according to free-float market capitalization, subject to a maximum weight of 10% per constituent, while maintaining a regional allocation of 65% to Hong Kong securities and 35% to other East Asian markets. The ETF was listed on March 26, 2026, on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange with the ticker code “3486.HK”. Timo Pfeiffer, Chief Markets Officer at Solactive, commented: "We are pleased to further strengthen our partnership with E Fund Management with the launch of the E Fund (HK) Solactive Asia Semiconductor Select Index ETF. The recent collaborations reflect our commitment to supporting our clients with index solutions designed to address evolving market segments and client requirements." Sharon Wang, Chief Executive Officer at E Fund HK, commented: "We are very pleased with the successful launch of the E Fund (HK) Solactive Asia Semiconductor Select Index ETF. Asia serves as the core hub of the global semiconductor supply chain, accounting for significant proportion of worldwide chip production capacity. This index provides one-stop access to Asia's leading semiconductor companies, with precise coverage of the main semiconductor production regions in Asia. The synergistic clustering of Asia's semiconductor industries — combining strengths and complementing each other's competitive advantages — positions the sector to remain a sustained beneficiary with a highly promising industry outlook."

Scope Prime, the award-winning institutional liquidity brand of Rostro Group, has completed the full institutional rollout of DIGIXAU, its 24/7 gold CFD product designed to give clients continuous exposure to gold price movements beyond traditional market hours.  Built to extend trading into evenings and weekends, DIGIXAU allows institutional clients to hedge positions, trade and adjust gold exposure, and manage risk in real time as macroeconomic and geopolitical events unfold 24/7.  Daniel Lawrance, Chief Executive Officer at Scope Prime, commented:  “Amid unprecedented global economic uncertainty, access to safe-haven assets has never been more important. DIGIXAU provides what traditional gold products cannot — the ability to trade and manage positions at any time, including weekends. As more market-moving events occur outside standard hours, uninterrupted access is increasingly critical. Recent enhancements to our crypto CFD liquidity, pricing and depth have enabled us to deliver this product across our full institutional client base.”  DIGIXAU is designed to give institutional clients continuous gold price exposure in a CFD format, addressing growing demand for access outside of the traditional weekly trading window. It complements Scope Prime’s existing gold offering by extending availability through weekends, enabling clients to respond immediately to market developments without waiting for markets to reopen. 

The Securities Commission Malaysia (SC) today announced the establishment of the ICM Innovation Lab (FIKRALab), a structured co-creation and applied R&D platform to develop new Islamic capital market (ICM) products and instruments.  The FIKRALab, an initiative under the Capital Market Masterplan 2026–2030, aims at advancing Malaysia’s ICM, anchored on Maqasid al-Shariah and guided by Halal-Toyyib.  Through the FIKRALab, the SC seeks to catalyse the development of Maqasid al-Shariahdriven ICM products and services that deliver ethical objectives, real economic value and broader social impact.  These innovations are intended to uphold the essentials of human well-being — faith, life, intellect, lineage and wealth — while aligning capital with productive economic activity and advancing shared, sustainable prosperity. The FIKRALab builds on the SC’s long-standing efforts to nurture ICM innovation. These efforts began with FIKRA, Malaysia’s Islamic fintech accelerator programme, and later enhanced through FIKRA ACE, a targeted facilitation, industry engagement and ecosystem connectivity focusing on fintech1.  The FIKRALab expands the ecosystem development beyond fintech-centric ICM innovation, enabling deeper collaboration and co-creation between the SC and the industry in ideation, research, product design and pilot testing. It focuses particularly in developing new instruments and solutions that align with Maqasid al-Shariah.   Expected outcomes of the FIKRALab include the development of new ICM use cases, products and infrastructure that demonstrate clear value-based outcomes, stronger industry-regulator engagement and enhanced market confidence in innovation, anchored by Maqasid and supported by the industry. A key feature of the FIKRALab is Maqasid al-Shariah Clinics, a structured approach  that includes curated engagement by the SC and a knowledge symposium with experts in identified domains to assess and enhance existing ICM products.  Through these clinics, the SC will work with industry players, Shariah advisers and other identified subject matter experts to strengthen the value propositions of current ICM instruments, reinforce real-economy linkages and deliver greater social and economic impact. The FIKRALab will be undertaken in phases, beginning with a pilot project currently conducted by the SC in collaboration with a financial institution. This pilot project seeks to develop an innovative instrument aimed at unlocking Shariah-derived income within mixed-activity groups.  The subsequent phase is anticipated to commence in Q4 2026, when applications for the first FIKRALab cohort will be opened. Cohort applications are expected to be conducted annually, with different focus areas for each cycle.  The focus areas for the first cohort will include new generation ICM products and services that offers entirely new value propositions, Islamic social finance and social capital, as well as sustainability and transition finance.  Innovators, financial institutions, technology providers, academia and ecosystem partners with ideas or proposals for ICM product innovation are invited to register their interest and engage with the SC via FIKRAlab@seccom.com.my from now until 30 September 2026.  Further details will be announced in due course. FIKRA was launched in 2021 as part of the SC’s initiative to enhance the ICM ecosystem. In continuation, the enhanced FIKRA ACE was launched in 2023 as a three-year initiative to facilitate the development of Islamic fintech through a structured approach.  

London Stock Exchange Group plc (LSEG) announces today that it has purchased the following number of its ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each on the London Stock Exchange from Morgan Stanley & Co. International Plc (Morgan Stanley) as part of its share buyback programme, as announced on 26 February 2026: Ordinary Shares Date of purchase: 25 March 2026 Number of ordinary shares purchased: 352,244 Highest price paid per share: 8,608.00p Lowest price paid per share: 8,398.00p Volume weighted average price per share: 8,516.81p   LSEG intends to cancel all of the purchased shares.  Following the cancellation of the repurchased shares, LSEG has 498,978,719 ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each in issue (excluding treasury shares) and holds 21,451,599 of its ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each in treasury. Therefore, the total voting rights in the Company will be 498,978,719. This figure for the total number of voting rights may be used by shareholders (and others with notification obligations) as the denominator for the calculation by which they will determine if they are required to notify their interest in, or a change to their interest in, the Company under the FCA's Disclosure Guidance and Transparency Rules. In accordance with Article 5(1)(b) of Market Abuse Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 (as it forms part of the law of the United Kingdom by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as implemented, retained, amended, extended, re-enacted or otherwise given effect in the United Kingdom from 1 January 2021 and as amended or supplemented in the United Kingdom thereafter) a full breakdown of the individual trades made by the Morgan Stanley on behalf of the Company as part of the buyback programme can be found at: http://www.rns-pdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/1539Y_1-2026-3-25.pdf This announcement does not constitute, or form part of, an offer or any solicitation of an offer for securities in any jurisdiction. Schedule of Purchases Shares purchased: 352,244 Date of purchases: 25 March 2026 Investment firm: Morgan Stanley & Co. International Plc                   Aggregate Information: Venue Volume weighted average price Aggregated Volume Lowest price per share Highest price per share XLON 8,512.89p 326,239 8,398.00p 8,608.00p TRQX 8,566.04p 26,005 8,480.00p 8,606.00p