Euronext, the leading European capital market infrastructure, today signed the Armed Forces Covenant with the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence. This is the fifth partnership signed by Euronext with local military reserves in Europe. With these partnerships, Euronext reaffirms its commitment to European resilience and strategic autonomy. These partnerships extend the initiatives related to Energy, Security and Geostrategy, the “New ESG”, launched by Euronext on 6 May 2025 to strengthen European strategic autonomy. This set of initiatives led by Euronext enhances the visibility of European companies operating in strategic sectors and provides them with unprecedented tools to meet their financing needs through improved access to capital. These solutions also address the growing demand from asset managers, institutional investors and retail investors for better exposure to high-growth segments through thematic indices. As European strategic autonomy and independence rely on the ability of European citizens to take part in their country’s own defence ecosystem, Euronext has created a support framework for its employees who are already engaged in a reservist commitment, or who wish to take up this opportunity. As of 6 May 2025, Euronext guarantees the continuation of salary and social benefits for preliminary training periods of up to 15 days for all new reservists, and up to 10 days per year for all Euronext employees engaged in a reservist commitment across all the group’s European locations. In countries where a more beneficial local reservist support system exists, the existing framework prevails. To formalise this engagement, Euronext has signed partnerships with five national military reserves.  In London, Euronext signed a partnership with the UK military reserve, the UK Reserve Forces, in the form of the Armed Forces Covenant, on 2 December 2025. The Covenant was cosigned by Brigadier Sam Cates, Deputy Commander HQ London District, in a ceremony that took place in the historic Wellington Room, Horse Guards. The event reflected the deep military ties and security interests that bind the United Kingdom and the countries in which Euronext operates regulated markets. In Amsterdam, Euronext signed a partnership with the Dutch military reserve, the Korps Nationale Reserve, on 12 November 2025. To mark this occasion, Gijs Tuinman, Dutch State Secretary for Defence, sounded the gong at the stock exchange, in the presence of Colonel Ruben Koopman, Head of the Department of Reservists and Society, and Lieutenant Colonel dr. Roland Slegers-Leijsten, Commander of the Korps National Reserve. In Oslo, Euronext signed a partnership with the Norwegian military reserve, the Norwegian Home Guard, on 3 November 2025. The partnership was signed during the annual keynote addresses from the Norwegian Army and the Norwegian Home Guard, in the presence of his Majesty Harald V, King of Norway, Major General Lars Lervik, Chief of the Norwegian Army and Major General Frode Ommundsen, Chief of the Norwegian Home Guard. In Paris, Euronext signed a partnership with the French military reserve, the Garde nationale, on 1 October 2025. General François-Xavier Poisbeau, General Secretary of the French National Guard, presented the main aspects of the partnership, while Baptiste Mercier, Head of Operational Performance at Allianz France, and Coralie Lecouffe, Senior Consultant at Capgemini Invent, shared personal experiences from their engagement as reservists. In Copenhagen, Euronext signed a partnership with the Danish military reserve, InterForce Danmark, on 19 September 2025. Local employees had the opportunity to meet with members of the reservist forces, who shared insights about their experience and highlighted how military reservists support Denmark’s resilience. Stéphane Boujnah, CEO and Chairman of the Managing Board of Euronext, said: "Since September 2025, Euronext has signed partnerships with local military reserves in Denmark, France, Norway, the Netherlands, and now the United Kingdom. Through these five local partnerships in Europe, Euronext reinforces its commitment to strengthen European resilience and strategic autonomy, at a time of rising geopolitical tensions. I am deeply proud of this citizen engagement that enables our colleagues to put their skills and abilities to the service of their countries. These initiatives demonstrate the power of cross-border collaboration and highlight Euronext’s role as a unifying force in Europe’s capital markets.”  

Record of the Financial Policy Committee meetings on 25 November 2025 and 1 December Headline judgements and policy actions Risks to financial stability have increased during 2025. Global risks remain elevated and material uncertainty in the global macroeconomic outlook persists. Key sources of risk include geopolitical tensions, fragmentation of trade and financial markets, and pressures on sovereign debt markets.  In the FPC’s judgement, many risky asset valuations remain materially stretched, particularly for technology companies focused on Artificial Intelligence (AI). The role of debt financing in this sector is increasing quickly as AI-focused firms seek large scale infrastructure investment. Deeper links between AI firms and credit markets, and increasing interconnections between those firms, mean that, should an asset price correction occur, losses on lending could increase financial stability risks. Credit spreads remain compressed by historical standards. Two recent high-profile corporate defaults in the US have intensified focus on potential weaknesses in risky credit markets previously flagged by the FPC. These include high leverage, weak underwriting standards, opacity, complex structures and the degree of reliance on rating agencies. While the impact of these specific defaults has been limited, a diverse range of financial market participants were exposed. It is important that market participants have a clear understanding of their exposures, including in stress scenarios where correlations and losses can shift outside historical norms, that underwriting standards are robust, and that they do not over-rely on credit ratings as a substitute for carrying out due diligence. Public debt-to-GDP ratios in many advanced economies have continued to rise this year. Governments globally face spending pressures, given the context of changing demographics and geopolitical risk, potentially constraining their capacity to respond to future shocks. Significant shocks to the global economic or fiscal outlook, should they materialise, could be amplified by vulnerabilities in market-based finance (MBF), such as leveraged positions in sovereign debt markets. As an open economy with a large financial centre, the UK is exposed to global shocks, that could transmit through multiple, interconnected channels. Stress in one market, such as a sharp asset price correction or correlation shift, could spillover into other markets. Simultaneous de-risking by banks and non-banks can lead to fire sales, widening spreads and tightening financing conditions for UK households and corporates. Market participants should ensure their risk management incorporates such scenarios. UK household and corporate aggregate indebtedness remains low. The UK banking system is well capitalised, maintains robust liquidity and funding positions, and asset quality remains strong. The results of the 2025 Bank Capital Stress Test demonstrate that the UK banking system is able to continue to support growth even if economic and financial conditions turned out to be materially worse than expected. As part of ensuring the UK banking sector is both resilient and able to support growth, the FPC has reviewed its assessment of the appropriate level of capital requirements for the UK banking system. The Committee judges that the appropriate benchmark for the system-wide level of Tier 1 capital requirements is now around 13% of risk-weighted assets (RWAs) (equivalent to a Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio of around 11%), 1 percentage point lower than its previous benchmark of around 14%. That judgement is consistent with the evolution in the financial system since the FPC’s first assessment in 2015, including a fall in banks’ average risk weights, a reduction in the systemic importance of some banks, and improvements in risk measurement. The Committee has also identified areas for further work, including on buffer usability, the implementation of the leverage ratio in the UK, and initiatives by the Bank to respond to feedback on interactions, proportionality, and complexity. In response to the Chancellor’s request on the FPC’s November 2024 remit letter, the FPC has assessed and identified areas where the financial sector could contribute further to supporting sustainable growth. This work has focused on: facilitating long-term investment in productive assets; fostering technological innovation; and the supply of debt or equity finance to high-growth firms (HGFs), which make an outsized contribution to economic growth and employment growth. The FPC supports: the changes made by the PRA to Solvency II to encourage investment in productive assets by UK insurers (noting the industry’s commitment to invest £100 billion in UK productive assets over 10 years); work to ease impediments to HGFs accessing funding; and efforts by authorities and industry to deliver practical advancements in the UK financial system’s adoption of innovative technology. The FPC has maintained the UK countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) rate at 2%. Although the global risk environment remains elevated, UK household and corporate aggregate indebtedness remains low. The easing of credit conditions since the FPC's Q3 meeting has been in line with the macroeconomic outlook, with some additional easing in the mortgage market related to policy developments. The Committee supports the Bank’s plans for a private markets system-wide exploratory scenario (SWES). This would deepen understanding of the private markets ecosystem, including how firms' behaviours in stress might interact and whether these interactions could amplify stress across the financial system and pose risks to UK financial stability and the provision of finance to the UK real economy. Heightened geopolitical tensions and continued advances in technology have underlined the critical importance of operational resilience to the provision of vital services to households and businesses. The Committee supports further actions to be taken by firms and financial market infrastructures (FMIs) to build resilience to operational disruption. The Committee welcomes the Bank's recent consultation paper setting out its proposed regulatory regime for sterling-denominated systemic stablecoins. The regime should aim to support responsible innovation in payments and money and avoid a disorderly transition as this new form of money is adopted. 1: The Financial Policy Committee (FPC) seeks to ensure the UK financial system is prepared for, and resilient to, the wide range of risks it could face, so that it is able to absorb rather than amplify shocks, and serve UK households and businesses, thus supporting stability and long-term growth in the UK economy. 2: The Committee met on 25 November 2025 to agree its view on the outlook for UK financial stability. The FPC discussed the risks faced by the UK financial system and assessed the resilience of the system to those risks. On that basis, the Committee agreed its intended policy actions. 3: The Committee met subsequently on 1 December 2025, with the Prudential Regulation Committee (PRC), to confirm its response to the final results of the 2025 Bank Capital Stress Test. The overall risk environment 4: The FPC discussed recent developments in financial markets; global vulnerabilities; UK household and corporate debt vulnerabilities; and the resilience of the UK banking sector and market-based finance. The FPC’s judgements for these areas would be set out in the December 2025 Financial Stability Report (FSR). Contributing to sustainable growth 5: The Committee agreed that maintaining financial stability was a necessary foundation for sustainable economic growth. Periods of financial instability – such as the global financial crisis (GFC) – had negatively impacted the provision of vital services to households and businesses in the UK and weighed on output and productivity growth. In contrast, a stable financial system supports lower risk and term premia, lowering the cost of borrowing and improving incentives to invest in long-term productive investment. 6: The FPC primarily contributes to sustainable economic growth by maintaining financial stability through identifying, monitoring and addressing systemic risks to the UK financial sector, as required under its statutory objective. The Committee also has a secondary objective of supporting the Government’s economic policy, including in relation to growth and employment. The FPC judged that these objectives were complementary over the medium to long-term: financial stability was necessary for sustainable growth, and sustainable growth supported financial stability. 7: The Committee noted that over the past 15 years, UK labour productivity growth had been low by historical standards and relative to some other advanced economies. The financial sector plays a role in contributing to productivity growth by providing vital services to UK households and businesses, including the provision of financing for investment in capital and technology. But there are a broader range of factors across the economy at play, such as trade conditions, scientific and technological innovation and human capital. 8: The Committee agreed that factors other than financial regulation had been the primary driver of low investment and so low productivity. The volume of lending to the UK real economy had not decreased as a share of GDP in the long run, and the increased diversification of the UK financial system had enhanced the supply of productive finance to the real economy. 9: The Committee observed that lending to UK households and corporates had in the past fluctuated due to changes in financial and macroeconomic conditions. Incentives in the financial system in the past had led to unsustainable lending growth in boom times followed by periods of deleveraging during the resulting downturn. However, post-GFC regulation had increased bank resilience. Combined with the FPC’s use of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) in stressOpens in a new window, this had enabled the banking sector to continue to support households and businesses through recent shocks to the economy. 10: In working to advance its primary objective, the FPC would continue to take steps to ensure that its resilience-building policies were implemented efficiently in a way that supported sustainable growth as the financial system evolved. How the UK financial sector can better contribute to sustainable economic growth 11: In November 2024, via the Committee’s annual remit letterOpens in a new window, the Chancellor asked the FPC to undertake work to assess and identify areas where there is potential to increase the ability of the financial system to contribute to sustainable economic growth and potential solutions to the impediments the sector might face in doing so. The Committee discussed the conclusions of this work. 12: The Committee had agreed in its April 2025 Record that its work in response to the Chancellor’s commission would focus on improving the long-term productive growth capacity of the economy by identifying barriers to the provision of credit and vital services to the real economy by the financial services sector. The FPC had focused on the provision of finance to high growth firms (HGFs) because they made an outsized contribution to economic and employment growth in the UK and globally. 13: The FPC agreed that HGFs faced growing challenges in accessing domestic finance. The FPC identified three impediments to the supply of debt or equity finance to HGFs. First, HGFs found it progressively more difficult to raise funds as funding rounds got larger, due to an underdeveloped domestic funding landscape. Second, HGF finance could be an extremely complex funding ecosystem for funders and founders to navigate. And third, many HGFs had little tangible collateral, and HGFs struggled to secure lending using intellectual property (IP) as collateral due to valuation and recovery constraints. 14: In addition, the FPC noted that UK pension funds and insurers faced barriers in supporting long-term capital investment in the UK economy. The Committee identified the impediments to the investment of long-term capital by pension funds and insurers. First, UK Defined Contribution (DC) pension schemes were smaller in scale and allocated less to riskier assets than international peers. Second, UK insurers reported a lack of opportunities to invest domestically that align with their expertise and risk and reward targets.  15: The FPC noted the package of measures announced by HM Treasury in the Budget. The Committee also underscored the importance of considering greater use of public-private partnership funding initiatives to channel financing to HGFs and the broader population of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to support productivity improvements. The FPC noted the key role the British Business Bank could play in this context, building on the experience of a number of other countries with similar organisations. 16: The FPC also identified issues in the financial sector’s responsible adoption of innovative technology. First, the technology cost of building and maintaining resilience against cyber threats was challenging for new and small FinTechs. Many cyberattacks target third-party suppliers – which FinTechs often aspire to become – as a point of entry into larger corporates. The costs of cyberattacks could be large, and elevated geopolitical tensions and continued advances in technology had increased the potential for operational incidents to disrupt the provision of vital services (see below). Second, the UK’s payments infrastructure needed to keep pace with innovation to support economic activity. Seamless and frictionless payments are critical to economic activity. Coordinated action and investment was needed to create the next generation of payment infrastructure that drives innovation, supports competition, and ensures security.  17: Having considered the above, the Committee concluded that it would: Support the changes made by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) to Solvency II to encourage investment in productive assets by UK insurers. This included reforms to the Matching Adjustment (MA) regime – and the investment in UK productive assets the UK insurance industry had indicated those reforms would enable – and its introduction of a Matching Adjustment Investment Accelerator (MAIA).  As part of this, the FPC noted the UK insurance industry’s commitment to invest £100 billion in UK productive assets over 10 years. Support work led by other authorities to ease impediments to HGFs accessing funding. This included the use of public-private partnership funding initiatives to channel financing to HGFs and the broader populations of SMEs, and engaging with the working group established as part of HMG's Industrial Strategy with the aim of removing barriers to IP-backed lending.  Support efforts by authorities and industry to deliver practical advancements in the UK financial system’s adoption of innovative technology, including through the National Payments Vision, the Bank’s AI Consortium and the Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA) AI Lab’s Live Testing service. 18: Given the importance of sustainable economic growth to the FPC’s objectives, the FPC would closely monitor progress on these issues and remained committed to identifying further ways in which it could deliver on its objective to support economic growth.  19: Further details on the FPC’s findings in relation to sustainable growth would be published in the December 2025 FSR. The FPC’s assessment of bank capital requirements 20: The FPC revisited its assessment of the appropriate benchmark level of capital requirements for the banking system. Details of the assessment would be published in a Financial Stability in Focus (FSIF), published alongside the December FSR. The FPC welcomed feedback and evidence from a broad range of stakeholders on it and on the issues identified for further assessment. 21: The Committee judged that the updated appropriate benchmark for the system-wide level of Tier 1 capital requirements was now around 13% of RWAs (equivalent to a CET1 ratio of around 11%), 1 percentage point lower than its previous benchmark of around 14%. That judgement was consistent with the evolution in the financial system since the FPC’s first assessment in 2015, including a fall in banks’ average risk weights, a reduction in the systemic importance of some banks, and improvements in risk measurement. Given the reduction in the FPC’s benchmark, banks should have greater certainty and confidence in using their capital resources to lend to UK households and businesses. 22: The FPC's system-wide Tier 1 benchmark excluded firm-specific PRA buffers, and requirements set by overseas authorities such as the international component of the CCyB. Within the banking system there would be a distribution of capital requirements in practice reflecting individual banks’ business models, their level of systemic importance, the degree of gaps and mismeasurement in their risk weighted assets, and the PRA’s view of firm-specific risks. 23: In undertaking its review, the FPC had considered how capital requirements had evolved since previous assessments, and feedback it had received from industry and other stakeholders. The FPC noted that: Average risk-weights had fallen as banks had changed the composition and riskiness of their balance sheets. Systemic buffers were lower than envisaged in 2015 as some banks had decreased in systemic importance. The implementation of Basel 3.1 on 1 January 2027 would improve risk measurement, allowing the PRA to reduce Pillar 2A minimum requirements by around ½ percentage point. 24: The FPC considered that the inbuilt responsiveness of nominal capital requirements in the UK banking system – to falls in average risks weights, decreases in UK banks’ systemic importance, and improvements in the measurement of risk weights – reflected desirable flexibility in the capital framework. Flexibility in the framework meant that capital requirements could continue to respond to developments in underlying structural and cyclical factors in future, including if risk levels were to change. 25: UK banks had tended to have capital headroom over regulatory minimum and buffer requirements. Such headroom varied considerably across banks and over time. Currently, banks in aggregate had CET1 capital resources of about 2% of RWAs over their requirements. While the PRA and FPC had no requirements – formal or informal – for capital headroom, banks maintain this additional capital for a number of reasons, including a perceived lack of buffer usability. 26: The FPC also considered how the level of capital requirements in the UK compared to international peers. Comparing capital requirements across jurisdictions was challenging given differences in how risks were captured in different regulatory frameworks – for example, the UK and EU regulatory frameworks captured some risks through Pillar 2 capital add-ons, while the US framework under law instead tended to apply higher risk weights. 27: The level of risk-based capital requirements for large banks in the UK was broadly similar to that in the euro area. And analysis that attempted to adjust for some key differences in the way risks were captured between the UK and US suggested that the level in the UK was lower than that in the US. That said, UK requirements appeared to be higher than in other jurisdictions for some more specific aspects and cohorts, particularly leverage ratio requirements for large domestically focused banks. 28: The Committee considered that the change in its benchmark was consistent with its view that the banking sector could support long-term growth in the real economy in both current and adverse economic environments. This was supported by the results of the 2025 Bank Capital Stress Test, which demonstrated that the UK banking system could continue to support the economy even if economic and financial conditions turned out materially worse than expected. 29: The FPC had considered updated evidence related to its previous judgements on the economic costs and benefits of capital and reviewed external academic studies that provided independent estimates of appropriate capital levels: The FPC reaffirmed that its previous judgements related to the positive impact of post-crisis reforms remained appropriate. Those judgements were related to credible and effective resolution arrangements, effective supervision, structural reform such as the implementation of ring-fencing, and the Committee’s active use of the time-varying countercyclical capital buffer. Together, these judgements materially reduced the FPC’s assessment of the appropriate level of capital in 2015. Updated analysis suggested that the macroeconomic costs of bank capital may have declined as the spread between banks’ cost of equity and the average cost of their debt had fallen. At the same time, various developments may have impacted the macroeconomic benefits of bank capital. Global vulnerabilities, including risks associated with sovereign indebtedness, had increased. But conversely, the indebtedness of UK households and businesses had fallen, and banks’ underwriting standards had improved. Analysis of the net macroeconomic impact of capital requirements suggested that the Committee’s updated 13% benchmark was within, albeit towards the lower end of, the range of capital requirements that were likely to maximise the benefits to long-term growth. The FPC’s updated benchmark was also at the lower end of the range of optimal capital levels estimated in the external academic literature. Analysis also suggested that reducing structural capital requirements materially below the FPC’s updated benchmark of 13% (unless due to further improvements in risk measurement that allow overlaps to be removed from Pillar 2A requirements) could be associated with significant reductions in long-run expected GDP through the costs of greater instability, especially if those reductions in capital were to undermine the credibility of the resolution regime as a result of lower overall loss-absorbing capacity. Materially lower capital levels could also lead to higher risk premia on bank funding costs, which would in turn feed through to higher borrowing costs and lower investment by businesses. 30: The FPC had also considered whether the capital framework might warrant adjustment to make it more effective, efficient and proportionate in the future, and to address any unintended consequences. 31: Significant steps were already being taken to address feedback and improve the efficiency and proportionality of the framework. The FPC had approached the assessment of capital requirements proactively and had identified further broad, material categories of issues in which it supported further work to assess whether changes could make the capital framework more effective, efficient and proportionate. The FPC would expect banks to use any such changes as a means to increase their support of households and businesses in the real economy. 32: Working with the PRA and international authorities, the FPC would work to enhance further the usability of regulatory buffers and so reduce banks’ incentives to have capital in excess of regulatory requirements and buffers. Regulatory capital buffers made up just under half of risk-weighted capital requirements. These buffers were explicitly intended to be usable to help banks absorb losses in stress while maintaining the provision of services to the real economy in a downturn – by reducing incentives for banks to deleverage in order to defend their capital position. Experience and a range of research suggested, however, that banks were reluctant in practice to use their buffers, which might have contributed to the size of banks’ management buffers above leverage ratio requirements. 33: The FPC would review the implementation of the leverage ratio in the UK, to ensure that it functioned as intended. When the FPC introduced the leverage ratio as a complement to the risk-weighted framework in 2015, it was envisaged that risk-weighted requirements would form the binding constraint for a majority of UK banks most of the time. Over time however, the falls in average risk weights had meant that the leverage ratio was becoming binding – or close to binding – for a greater number of lenders. 34: While there were reasons for the differences in application of the leverage ratio in the UK and some other countries, including previous macroprudential decisions by the FPC to apply buffers alongside Basel minimum standards, international comparisons also pointed to some potentially important areas to consider for reform. As a result, the FPC would review how the leverage ratio had been implemented in the UK, how it was operating in practice, how it was interacting with other policies such as ring-fencing, and whether this matched the original intention of the framework. For example, the FPC would explore the extent to which the leverage ratio had become more binding as a result of underlying reductions in the riskiness of banks’ exposures. The Committee intended to prioritise reviewing the UK’s approach to regulatory buffers in leverage ratio requirements. 35: The FPC supported initiatives by the Bank to respond to feedback on interactions, proportionality, and complexity in the capital framework. This included further work to consider how the capital requirements that are related to domestic exposures interact. Capital requirements that were related to domestic exposures included the UK CCyB, O-SII buffers, and Pillar 2A requirements for geographic credit concentration risk, which each served different purposes in the capital framework, but were all calibrated based on measures of domestic lending. The FPC and the PRA intended to draw on several sources of information when conducting this work including on the impact of systemic failures and credit concentration, and banks’ stress test results. Other initiatives included: Further work to develop a systematic approach for updating regulatory thresholds that define which different parts of the regulatory framework apply to firms. The PRA’s contribution to the government’s review of ring-fencing. The government had made clear its intention to maintain the ring-fencing regime to protect financial stability and safeguard depositors, while at the same time driving meaningful reform of the regime as part of plans to focus on growth and the release capital for productive investment in the UK. The PRA would also review the application of the Basel 3.1 output floor at the ring-fenced sub-group level, based on evidence and experience of its implementation. It would do so after Basel 3.1 is implemented but before full weighting of the output floor in 2030. Reviewing feedback on the capital requirements for mortgages under internal ratings-based models, to ensure the framework enables an optimal channelling of finance to creditworthy households. Industry had previously raised concerns that Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) requirements were particularly difficult to meet for smaller and newer lenders. While aimed at exploring ways to address challenges faced by medium-sized firms, some policy changes would also affect larger lenders. 36: The FPC had previously judged that the introduction of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 should not lead to an unwarranted increase in capital requirements. In response, and following engagement with industry, the Bank had made changes to the stress test relative to previous concurrent stress tests that were appropriate to make alongside the earlier provisioning under the IFRS 9 accounting standard. The FPC judged these changes had been effective in avoiding an unwarranted increase in capital arising from the interaction of IFRS 9 and the stress test, and made the test simpler and aligned with the accounting standard that would apply in an actual stress. The Bank therefore intended to maintain these changes for future tests (see below). 37: The FPC, along with the PRA, was interested in the views of a broad range of stakeholders – including UK lenders, think-tanks, industry groups, investors and academics – on the material covered in the accompanying FSIF on the FPC’s assessment of bank capital requirements, and welcomed feedback and evidence on the issues identified for further assessment. The Bank would engage in structured evidence gathering sessions in early 2026. 38: Further details of the FPC’s assessment would be published in an FSIF, alongside the December 2025 FSR. Results of the 2025 Bank Capital Stress Test 39: The Committee discussed the results of the 2025 Bank Capital Stress Test, which indicated that the major UK banks had the capacity to continue to support the economy through a stress scenario that incorporated a severe global aggregate supply shock, high advanced-economy inflation, higher global interest rates, deep and simultaneous recessions in the UK and global economies, with materially higher unemployment, and sharp falls in asset prices. 40: The stress test was not a forecast of macroeconomic and financial conditions in the UK or abroad. Rather, it was intended to be a coherent ‘tail risk’ scenario designed to be severe and broad enough to allow the FPC and PRC to assess the resilience of UK banks to a range of adverse shocks. The results of the stress test are used to form a view of the resilience of the banking sector and individual banks in it as part of the FPC and PRC’s broader framework for financial stability and safety and soundness. 41: The stress test results showed that the aggregate CET1 ratio reduced by 3.5 percentage points to the low point of the test. That left aggregate headroom to regulatory minima and systemic buffers at the low point of the stress of 3.2 percentage points CET1 (the equivalent of around £60 billion). Most of this headroom arose from banks beginning the test with capital in excess of regulatory minima and buffer requirements. 42: However, the FPC had noted as part of its capital review that there were impediments to banks using their buffers in practice, which could have been contributing to bank’ incentives to maintain capital in excess of regulatory requirements. The FPC and PRC did not oblige firms to maintain buffers in excess of regulatory requirements. All elements of capital buffers that had been built up by banks existed to be used to support households and businesses during stress. The existence of usable buffers allowed banks to absorb losses without breaching minimum requirements, enabling them to meet the demand for credit from creditworthy households and businesses in the face of severe adverse shocks. As part of the next phase of its capital review (see above) the FPC would explore further steps that could be taken to enhance the usability of buffers. 43: At the individual firm level, all participating banks and building societies remained above their CET1 risk-weighted and Tier 1 leverage minimum regulatory requirements, and no bank was required to strengthen its capital position as a result of the test. 44: The results of the test supported the FPC’s judgement that banks’ current levels of capital were sufficient to support the real economy. They showed that the UK banking system had the capacity to support UK households and businesses, even if economic, financial and business conditions became substantially worse than expected. 45: As in previous stress tests, banks’ resilience relied in part on their ability in stress to cut dividend payments, employee variable remuneration, and coupon payments on additional Tier 1 instruments, as well as other management actions taken in response to the stress. The FPC judged it important for investors to be aware that banks would take such actions as necessary if such a stress were to materialise. 46: The 2025 Bank Capital Stress Test was the first stress test since the end of transitional arrangements for the IFRS 9 accounting standard, introduced in 2018. In 2018, the FPC had stated that it would seek an enduring treatment for IFRS 9 in the stress test that avoided an unwarranted increase in capital requirements. Reflecting the increased resilience for a given level of capital provided by the earlier recognition of losses under IFRS 9, and following a review of the calibration of the stress tests, the Bank had implemented a number of changes relative to previous stress tests. These changes were designed to be consistent with an unchanged FPC and PRC risk tolerance for the resilience of the UK banking system. 47: In March, the Bank committed to using this year’s test to assess the impact of these changes. The FPC judged that the changes had avoided an unwarranted increase in capital requirements and made the test simpler and more aligned with historical advanced economy stresses in terms of the size and timing of the shocks. It intended to maintain these changes for future stress tests and expected to return to assessing resilience against the benchmark of minimum capital requirements and systemic risk buffers.  Further details would be set out in Box E of the FSR. 48: Further details of the 2025 Bank Capital Stress Test and the approach to IFRS 9 would be published in the December 2025 FSR. 49: Alongside the results of the Bank Capital Stress Test the FPC also welcomed the results of the Life Insurance Stress Test, published on 17 and 24 November.footnote[1] The results of the test indicated that the sector was resilient to a severe financial market stress scenario that incorporated a decline in risk-free interest rates, falls in equity and property prices, along with widening spreads and subsequent defaults and downgrades. The UK countercyclical capital buffer rate 50: The FPC discussed its setting of the UK CCyB rate. The Committee’s principal aim in setting the UK CCyB rate was to help ensure that the UK banking system was able to absorb severe but plausible shocks without an unwarranted restriction in essential services, such as the supply of credit, to the UK real economy. Setting the UK CCyB rate enabled the FPC to adjust the capital requirements of the UK banking system to the changing scale of risk of losses on banks’ UK exposures over the course of the financial cycle. The approach therefore included an assessment of financial vulnerabilities and banks’ capacity to absorb such losses, including the potential impact of shocks. 51: In considering the appropriate setting of the UK CCyB rate, the FPC discussed its judgements around underlying vulnerabilities that could amplify economic shocks. While the global risk environment remained elevated, UK household and corporate aggregate indebtedness remains low. The easing of credit conditions since the FPC's October meeting had been in line with the macroeconomic outlook, with some additional easing in the mortgage market related to policy developments. 52: The FPC observed that UK banks’ resilience to these risks continued to be supported by strong asset quality and strong capital positions. There was no evidence that banks were restricting lending to protect their capital positions. As noted above, the results of the 2025 Bank Capital Stress Test suggested that the major UK banks could continue to support UK households and businesses even if economic, financial and business conditions became substantially worse than expected. 53. In view of these considerations, the FPC decided to maintain the UK CCyB rate at 2%. Maintaining a neutral setting of the UK CCyB rate in the region of 2% would help to ensure that banks continued to have capacity to absorb unexpected future shocks without an unwarranted restriction in essential services, such as the supply of credit, to the UK real economy. In considering the appropriate setting of the UK CCyB rate the Committee had taken account of its latest assessment of bank capital requirements (see above). 54: The Committee would continue to monitor the evolution of financial conditions closely to ensure the setting of the CCyB remained appropriate. Private markets 55: The Committee discussed how the role and size of private markets had grown significantly over the past decade, including in the UK, and continued to evolve. The FPC noted the benefits of growth in private markets for the UK real economy, including via diversifying sources of funding for UK businesses and supporting their growth. While resilient to date, the private market ecosystem had not been tested through a broad-based macroeconomic stress at its current size. As previously set out by the FPC, key vulnerabilities associated with private markets could arise from the widespread use of leverage (both by private market funds and their portfolio companies), opacity in valuations, complexity of structures, the extent of reliance on rating agencies, and the interconnection with other risky credit markets. The rapid growth of private markets, increasing interconnections with banks and insurers, and significant data gaps made it difficult to assess fully the potential for systemic risks. 56: The FPC supported the Bank’s plans for a system-wide exploratory scenario (SWES) exercise focused on the private markets ecosystem that would be run in collaboration with a group of banks and non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) active in these markets. The exercise would explore potential risks and dynamics associated with private markets and related risky public credit markets through understanding the actions taken by banks and NBFIs active in private markets in response to a shock, and how these actions might interact at a system level. It would also aim to understand better whether these interactions could amplify stress across the financial system and pose risks to UK financial stability and the provision of finance to the UK real economy. 57: The Committee noted that the exercise was not a test of the resilience of the individual firms that would participate in the exercise. Its focus would be system-wide, exploring the resilience of the provision of private market and related public market finance to the UK corporate sector. Enhancing the transparency of any system-wide dynamics in a stress should help private market participants to better manage the risks they face and allow the Bank, FCA, The Pensions Regulator (TPR) and international authorities to make better-informed judgements about the risks in that ecosystem. 58: The Bank would conduct this exploratory exercise under the guidance of the FPC and the PRC, working closely with, and with the full support of, the PRA, the FCA and TPR. Operational resilience 59: The FPC had previously discussed how heightened geopolitical tensions and continued advances in technology had underlined the critical importance of operational resilience to the provision of vital services to households and businesses. This supported the need for firms and financial market infrastructures (FMIs) to continue to build resilience to operational disruption. The FPC met jointly with the PRC, the Financial Markets Infrastructure Committee and the FCA to discuss the UK’s approach to enhancing the operational resilience of the UK financial system given the heightened threat landscape, and the increasing pace of technological change. They agreed the importance of continued co-ordination on these issues. 60: The FPC judged that geopolitical and technological developments further increased the likelihood that operational incidents could affect the provision of vital services such as wholesale and retail payments, clearing and settlement, and other activity such as custody services. Not only could disruption to vital service provision affect the ability of financial sector participants, households and businesses to manage risk, transact or access financing, it could also undermine confidence in the financial system, and therefore negatively affect saving, investment, and economic growth. Cyberattacks and severe operational disruption also had the potential to impact firms’ own revenues and valuations. 61: Therefore, the FPC supported further actions to be taken by firms and FMIs to build resilience to operational disruption, including to emerging risks from AI, quantum computing, and more broadly as the risk environment continued to evolve.   62: The Committee agreed that the appropriate management of high-impact operational risks by critical firms and FMIs was essential for system-wide operational resilience. Therefore, the FPC welcomed work by microprudential regulators to continue to strengthen the regulatory framework for operational resilience.   63: In taking steps to build resilience, firms and FMIs should recognise the role they play in supporting confidence in the financial system, and how disruption to vital services could negatively affect saving, investment and economic growth. For example, FMIs and the largest firms were required to take account of risks to UK financial stability when identifying their important business services. To support this, the Thematic findings from the 2024 Cyber Stress TestOpens in a new window provided tools to facilitate discussion of financial stability between subject matter experts from a range of disciplines, as well as illustrative examples of mitigation actions firms and FMIs could take.   64: Boards of firms and FMIs should work with authorities to use the findings of sector-wide exercises and stress tests such as SIMEX and the Cyber and Operational Resilience Stress Test to improve their understanding of actions they can take to mitigate impacts on financial stability. Given the interconnected nature of the global financial system, the FPC supported further international engagement on operational resilience. 65. As part of its broader framework on operational resilience, the Committee would also continue to monitor the implementation and outcomes of the critical third parties (CTPs) regime and looked forward to further progress in this area. 66: Further details of the Bank’s approach to operational resilience would be set out in the structural changes in the UK financial system chapter of the December 2025 FSR. Stablecoins 67: The FPC welcomed the publication of the Bank’s recent consultation paper setting out its proposed regulatory regime for sterling-denominated systemic stablecoins. In its 2025 Q2 Record the FPC had noted the financial stability benefits of having a regulatory framework that was proportionate to risks, allowed for some degree of alignment with other jurisdictions and supported firms setting up in the UK. 68: The Committee noted that the proposals were built on feedback received to the November 2023 Discussion Paper and reflected the Bank’s role in maintaining public trust in money as innovation in payments accelerated. The FPC supported the outcomes the Bank wanted to achieve in this space: avoiding a disorderly transition to widespread adoption of systemic stablecoins that undermined financial and monetary stability as well as access to credit, while at the same time, promoting innovation in payments and money. The following members of the Committee were present at 25 November and 1 December Policy meetings: Andrew Bailey, Governor Nathanaël Benjamin Stephen Blyth Sarah Breeden Jon Hall Randall Krosznerfootnote[2] Clare Lombardelli Liz Oakes Dave Ramsden Nikhil Rathi Carolyn Wilkins Sam Woods Gwyneth Nurse attended the 25 November meeting as the Treasury member in a non-voting capacity.footnote[3] Aggregate results were published on 17 November with firm-specific results published on 24 NovemberOpens in a new window. Randall Kroszner was unavoidably unable to attend the meeting with the PRC on 1 December to confirm the results of the 2025 Bank Capital Stress Test. He communicated his views to the Governor beforehand. Gwyneth Nurse was unavoidably unable to attend the meeting with the PRC on 1 December to confirm the results of the 2025 Bank Capital Stress Test. Lowri Khan attended in her place.

“Wildlife laundering poses a serious risk to national and international security, causing environmental and socioeconomic harms and creating opportunities for organised crime and conflict actors.” This is according to An Illusion of Legality: Wildlife Laundering in Colombia and Mexico, a new RUSI report by Jennifer Scotland and  https://www.rusi.org/people/weeden which says rogue traders and criminal organisations − including drug-trafficking cartels and armed groups – are exploiting supposedly legitimate wildlife industries to launder illicit profits and mask the illegal origins of high-value species, including big cats, caimans, sharks and poison frogs. This groundbreaking analysis shows how, in Colombia and Mexico, breeding farms, wildlife sanctuaries, commercial traders and seafood companies are used to disguise the extraction, transport and export of illegally harvested species, as part of a global illegal wildlife market estimated to be worth US$20 billion annually. The report says that big cats in Mexico − including lions, tigers and jaguars − face significant wildlife-laundering risks through poorly regulated wildlife sanctuaries, which can be used as fronts for illegal trade, under the guise of rescue or rehabilitation. Large shipments of big cats from Mexican sanctuaries to overseas facilities have raised international concern, underscoring vulnerabilities created by weak oversight, limited inspections, and potential collusion between operators and corrupt officials. In Colombia, the report identifies how the large-scale trade in caiman skins for the fashion industry has been highly exposed to wildlife laundering, with roughly one-third of exports between 1990 and 2016 reportedly illegally wild-sourced. The report finds that strict controls on the breeding of other endangered species has driven the trade underground, causing them to be smuggled out of Colombia and integrated into ‘legal’ breeding operations in other countries. Poison frogs – sourced by rural Colombian harvesters for as little as $0.50 – can fetch up to US$850 in international hobbyist markets, demonstrating how wildlife laundering benefits fraudulent breeders at the expense of vulnerable communities. The report further describes how some armed groups have used illegal pirarucu fishing to launder drug-trafficking proceeds, moving fish across borders – sometimes alongside cocaine – to circumvent national controls. Similar criminal convergence is found in Mexico’s shark fin and sea cucumber trades, where large-scale buyers and exporters with suspected cartel links have laundered illegally harvested products into legal supply chains in the US and Asia. Jennifer Scotland, the lead author of the report, said: “Our report shows how rogue actors and organised crime groups subvert the legal trade in endangered wildlife to further their own gains, harming biodiversity and undermining economic opportunities for local communities. To mitigate these harms, wildlife laundering needs to be taken much more seriously.” Ruth Helena Alves da Mota, Content Partnership Manager at LSEG Risk Intelligence, which supported RUSI’s independent research, said: “The findings underscore that combating wildlife laundering requires a collective effort – particularly intelligence sharing across borders, sectors, and disciplines are critical to dismantling transnational networks and ensuring that legal markets do not become safe havens for illegal trade.” Key Findings Organised crime groups – including cartel-linked actors – use legal businesses to launder wildlife. The report says: “Corporate entities… can be used by rogue traders and organised criminal groups… to exploit regulatory and enforcement gaps and launder illegally sourced species.” Wildlife laundering is under-detected and rarely treated as a serious crime. “Documented cases – let alone follow-up criminal investigations – remain few and far between.” Weak enforcement capacity enables criminal infiltration of supply chains.“Wildlife laundering… is predominantly enabled by weak enforcement capacity and limited resources.” Cartels exploit regulatory loopholes and cross-border asymmetries. “Opportunities for illicit actors to engage in wildlife laundering are facilitated by regulatory asymmetries, legal loopholes, informalities across the sector and limited enforcement of fishing regulations.” Key Recommendations Close loopholes used by criminal groups to disguise illegal activity. “Preventive reforms could target known loopholes, including those highlighted in this paper.” Classify wildlife trafficking as a predicate offence for money laundering.“By making wildlife trafficking a predicate offence for money laundering… authorities could disrupt the financial infrastructure that sustains trafficking networks.” Strengthen international cooperation and destination-country due diligence.“Greater accessibility of information around CITES permits would strengthen oversight… and make it easier… to detect fraudulent paperwork.” Expand the use of technological tools to expose criminal laundering methods. “Advances in technology offer the potential to address a number of traceability and species identification challenges that facilitate wildlife laundering.” Conclusion Wildlife laundering in Colombia and Mexico is not only a conservation issue but a security threat that enables organised crime and conflict actors to diversify their income streams, legitimise illicit proceeds and deepen their influence across rural communities and transnational markets. By revealing how legal businesses can be manipulated to conceal illegal wildlife flows, the report underscores the urgent need for a systemic shift in enforcement and regulatory strategies. Tackling wildlife laundering effectively requires authorities to target corporate structures, disrupt financial networks, strengthen international coordination and recognise wildlife laundering as a serious transnational crime. Wildlife laundering cases remain rarely detected, let alone investigated as organised criminal activity. Irregularities in licensed wildlife businesses are typically handled as administrative breaches, obscuring the role of cartel financiers, corrupt officials and corporate intermediaries who profit from the trade. The authors argue that unless authorities adopt a more robust, cross-border and intelligence-led approach, wildlife laundering will continue to provide criminal groups with a lucrative, low-risk revenue stream that deepens insecurity, threatens biodiversity and undermines community livelihoods. Background Jennifer Scotland is a Research Analyst in RUSI’s Organised Crime and Policing group, specialising in environmental crime, illicit economies and conflict dynamics in Latin America and Africa. Anne-Marie Weeden is a Senior Research Fellow at RUSI and leads the Environmental Crime Programme.  An Illusion of Legality: Wildlife Laundering in Colombia and Mexico, draws on 30 semi-structured interviews with officials, experts and practitioners across Colombia, Mexico and international bodies as well as a literature review, open-source data, and right-to-information requests to Colombian authorities.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Lynn, let me start by thanking you for your generous introduction and for hosting this event at the Exchange. My thanks as well to the market participants here today. And of course, I am grateful to see my counterparts from across the Administration. Thank you all for being here and for your understanding that the views I express today are in my capacity as Chairman and do not necessarily reflect those of the SEC as an institution or of my fellow Commissioners. There are few places more fitting to consider the future of the American financial system than this one. The New York Stock Exchange is a cathedral of capital markets, replete with the rhythms and rituals that allocate resources toward socially valued uses. Listen closely, and you can hear the hum of human ingenuity that has long echoed within these walls. Echoes that ring loudly around us today. Step outside these doors, meanwhile, and the neighborhood itself narrates the American story. A short walk in any direction brings you to landmarks like Federal Hall, where Washington took his oath and Congress established the Treasury; to the buttonwood tree under whose ancestor two dozen stockbrokers established the forerunner of this exchange; and to the cobblestone streets that were a cradle of commerce long before Manhattan’s skyscrapers rose above them. The square mile that surrounds us is less a place than a prologue—an opening chapter in a story that is now ours to continue. *** Of course, in seven months, that story will reach a rare milestone when our Republic marks its 250th year. A quarter millennium ago, a band of revolutionaries declared that rights are neither permissions to be earned nor privileges to be revoked. They claimed the right to govern themselves, yes, but also the right to provide for themselves. To work, to venture, and to prosper off of their own effort. To pursue happiness and property. Indeed, our founders sought agency as much in the halls of power as in the marketplace of ideas. Anniversaries of this magnitude demand more than ceremony. They ask something of us. They invite us to reflect, of course but no less, to resolve. To ensure that the future that we shape will prove worthy of the legacy that we inherit. *** Allow me, then, to take a few moments to revisit how that legacy began. Before the United States was a nation, it was an investment. The first permanent English settlements in this hemisphere were financed through joint-stock enterprises that allowed people to pool together capital and share in the risk and reward of an uncertain venture. The Virginia Company, for example—the first major British securities offering aimed at the Americas—funded the Jamestown settlement through share subscriptions, investors of which anticipated returns through land, trade, and dividends. Decades later, a similar structure funded the settlement that became this great city, foreshadowing New York’s destiny as the global capital of securities markets. Indeed, what is now modern-day Manhattan originated as a corporate investment project. We have with us this morning a copy of the company’s original stock offering—New Amsterdam’s birth certificate—and a tangible reminder that Manhattan itself was built on the premise that prosperity flows from mobilizing capital toward its most productive uses. That premise, of course—and the financial system that it engendered—is rooted in still older foundations dating back to the Glorious Revolution, when Parliament wrested arbitrary power from the Crown and established the principle that property rights would be protected, contracts enforced, and the state bound by predictable rules rather than royal whim. Britain became a financial powerhouse by creating the conditions in which markets could flourish. Our founders inherited that worldview and then forged a more perfect union—perhaps none more than Hamilton, across from whose burial site we assemble today. Hamilton understood that markets, structured properly, can unleash the might of American dynamism as no monarch or government ministry possibly could. After all, a free market is a hallmark of a free people. And as Dr. Ludwig von Mises described so well, “if history could teach us anything, it would be that private property is inextricably linked with civilization.” So in Federalist 11, Hamilton praises the “adventurous spirit” which animates the “commercial character of America”—“that unequalled spirit of enterprise, which signifies the genius of the American Merchants and Navigators, and which is in itself an inexhaustible mine of national wealth,” and then he heralds its potential to make America the “admiration and envy of the world.” Hamilton saw in that “adventurous spirit” a precocious young nation whose people could produce their own prosperity. To be sure, he believed that the government must create stable rules, maintain public credit, and reliably enforce contracts. But within that framework, the securities markets would emerge to unlock the most daring mobilization of capital in human history. The canals that tied the interior to the coasts were financed by state bonds. The railroads that stitched together a continent required investment on a scale that the world had never seen, creating secondary markets, auditing standards, and the modern corporate governance structure in the process. The steel that built our cities, the oil that powered our factories, and the electricity that illuminated our homes were all made possible by domestic and foreign investors willing to stake their capital on an idea of America still in formation. Of course, we must recognize with humility when we, as a country, failed to uphold some of our most basic founding principles. But by the turn of the twentieth century, millions of Americans owned securities and had a framework for the achievement of their ambitions. Indeed, the wealth accumulated through the financial markets became an accelerant of social mobility. As the century unfolded, and competing ideologies sought to engineer economic strength from the top down, ours was a model that steadily proved its value on the global stage. The Soviet and communist system of central planning, coercion, mass murder, seizing private property, and suppressing private enterprise, for example, collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions, while the American approach empowered its citizens to innovate, to invest, and to build wealth within predictable and enforceable legal frameworks. To redraw boundaries of the possible by inventing the telephone and the phonograph. The assembly line and the airplane. The semiconductor that made computing ubiquitous. Internet protocols that connected the world and GPS technology that then plotted it. Social media platforms that carry information at the speed of thought. And now, the new frontier of AI that is transforming the way that we live and work. Across this long sweep of innovation, a pattern emerges with clarity: the great leaps of American life were always produced by a willingness to tolerate and accept risks within a system that rewards those who take them. Our prosperity is no accident of history—nor is our primacy assured in the future. The twentieth century was a triumph of economic freedom over doctrines that sought to constrain it. But principles do not preserve themselves. Freedom is not a relic that we inherit so much as a responsibility that we assume. And in recent years, our regulatory frameworks have veered from the founding ideals that helped the United States to once stand without peer as the world’s destination for public companies. *** For context, Congress, beginning in 1933 with the Securities Act, passed a series of legislation to address the fraudulent and manipulative activity that Wall Street engaged in prior to the crash. Congress’s enactment of the securities laws at the federal level sought to provide more clarity in the markets in the name of rebuilding public confidence in them. After all, markets require trust, and trust requires transparency. Shortly before the Securities Act became law, President Franklin Roosevelt explained his vision for this seminal statute in a message to Congress.[1] He rejected the idea that the federal government should be a merit regulator, which is the notion that the government approves an offering of securities as sound for public investment because it expects their value to increase. Instead, President Roosevelt sought to protect investors through a disclosure-based regulatory regime—the idea that companies offering securities to the public should provide all the important information about those securities. In short, the Securities Act preserved the Hamiltonian model by incentivizing capital to flow to opportunity based on the judgment of investors. In the same message to Congress, President Roosevelt explained that “[t]he purpose of the [Securities Act] is to protect the public with the least possible interference with honest business.” But as the generations passed, the federal government’s natural tendency asserted itself. Rules have multiplied faster than the problems that they were intended to solve—and in its drift away from original congressional intent, the State has sought to substitute its discernment for that of market participants. *** Shortly after I left the SEC as a staff member in the mid-1990s, there were more than 7,000 companies listed on the U.S. exchanges, from small-cap innovators to giants of industry. Yet by the time that I returned as Chairman earlier this year, that number had fallen by roughly 40 percent. What happened during those decades tells a cautionary tale of regulatory creep. A tale that tells us that the path to public ownership has become narrower, costlier, and overly burdened with rules that often create more friction than benefit. These trends have eroded American competitiveness; locked average investors out of some of the most dynamic companies; and pushed entrepreneurs to seek capital elsewhere, either in the private markets or on foreign shores. This decline was not inevitable—nor, is it now irreversible.  While there are many SEC rules and practices that have amassed over the decades and are ripe for reform, perhaps none epitomize regulatory creep more so than the voluminous disclosure requirements contained in the Commission’s rulebook today. *** Over the years, and particularly over the past two decades, special interest groups, politicians, and—at times—the SEC itself have weaponized the disclosure regime that Congress created for our marketplace, in an effort to advance social and political agendas that stray far from the SEC’s mission of facilitating capital formation; protecting investors; and ensuring fair, orderly, and efficient markets. These decades of accretive rulemakings have produced reams of paperwork that can do more to obscure than to illuminate. Today’s lengthy annual reports and proxy statements impose substantial costs on companies because they consume significant time from boards and management, and require armies of specialized lawyers, accountants, and consultants to prepare. Despite these costs, investors sometimes do not benefit from the information because they struggle to parse and understand it—or find it so intimidating because of the volume and density that they ignore it One of my priorities as Chairman is to reform the SEC’s disclosure rules with two goals in mind. First, the SEC must root its disclosure requirements in the concept of financial materiality. Second, these requirements must scale with a company’s size and maturity. With respect to the first goal, the Supreme Court enunciated an objective standard for materiality and explained that information is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in making an investment decision.[2] Achieving this goal necessitates restraint and care from both the SEC when it promulgates a rule and from Congress when it directs the Commission to mandate disclosure on a particular subject. Our capital markets thrive not through the volume of disclosures, but the clarity and importance of them to investors. In writing for the Court, Justice Thurgood Marshall cautioned, “[s]ome information is of such dubious significance that insistence on its disclosure may accomplish more harm than good...and if the standard of materiality is unnecessarily low…shareholders [may be buried] in an avalanche of trivial information—a result that is hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking.”[3] In heeding this warning to avoid information overload for investors, our disclosure regime is most effective when the SEC provides, as FDR advocated, the minimum effective dose of regulation needed to elicit the information that is material to investors, and we allow market forces to drive the disclosure of any additional aspects of their operations that may be beneficial to investors. In contrast, an ineffective disclosure regime would be one where the SEC requires that all companies provide the same information without the ability to tailor the disclosure to their specific circumstances, with the only view that such information should be “consistent and comparable” across companies. Indeed, even with today’s numerous disclosure requirements, companies still provide additional information, such as non-GAAP numbers or key performance metrics, that are tailored to a company’s business or industry and are driven more by investor demand than the SEC’s rulebook. When the SEC’s disclosure regime has been hijacked to require information unmoored from materiality, investors do not benefit. In his recent and final Thanksgiving letter to shareholders, Warren Buffett highlighted a prime example of this hazard.[4] Any summary I give cannot do justice to Mr. Buffett’s own words. So, I quote for you the following excerpt from his letter: During my lifetime, reformers sought to embarrass CEOs by requiring the disclosure of the compensation of the boss compared to what was being paid to the average employee. Proxy statements promptly ballooned to 100-plus pages compared to 20 or less earlier. But the good intentions didn’t work; instead they backfired. Based on the majority of my observations – the CEO of company “A” looked at his competitor at company “B” and subtly conveyed to his board that he should be worth more. Of course, he also boosted the pay of directors and was careful who he placed on the compensation committee. The new rules produced envy, not moderation. The ratcheting took on a life of its own. I share Mr. Buffett’s observations and concerns, which is why earlier this year, the SEC held a roundtable that brought together companies, investors, law firms, and compensation consultants to discuss the current state of the agency’s executive compensation disclosure rules and potential reforms. Somewhat to my surprise, there was universal agreement among the panelists that the length and complexity of executive compensation disclosure have limited its usefulness and insight to investors. We need a re-set of these and other SEC disclosure requirements, and this roundtable was one of the first steps to execute my goal of ensuring that materiality is the north star of the SEC’s disclosure regime. My other priority with respect to the SEC’s disclosure rules is to scale the requirements with the company’s size and maturity as a public company. Balancing disclosure obligations with a company’s ability to bear the burdens of compliance is particularly important where Congress has directed the SEC to promulgate a disclosure rule whose costs may have a disproportionate impact on some companies. Of course, this approach is hardly a novel concept. The Commission first provided tailored disclosure requirements for smaller public companies in 1992, during my first tour of duty at the SEC as a staff member. Two decades later, Congress, through the bipartisan JOBS Act, gave certain newly public companies an “IPO on-ramp” and permitted them to comply with some of the SEC’s disclosure requirements on a delayed basis. It is time to revisit these concepts that have proven effective and merit expansion. As part of this effort, the SEC should give strong consideration to the thresholds that separate “large” companies, which are subject to all of the SEC disclosure rules, and “small” companies that are subject to only some of them. The last comprehensive reform to these thresholds took place in 2005. This dereliction of regulatory upkeep has resulted in a company with a public float of as low as $250 million being subject to the same disclosure requirements as a company that is one hundred times its size. For newly public companies, the SEC should consider building upon the “IPO on-ramp” that Congress established in the JOBS Act. For example, allowing companies to remain on the “on-ramp” for a minimum number of years, rather than forcing them off as soon as the first year after the initial offering, could provide companies with greater certainty and incentivize more IPOs, especially among smaller companies. American entrepreneurs built the most dynamic economy in history in part by taking their companies public—and sharing the rewards with workers, savers, and investors. That partnership is worth reviving. If we want the next generation of innovators to choose our public markets, we need disclosure that is calibrated for a company’s size and maturity; that is driven by market demands; and to the extent mandated by the SEC, that is rooted in materiality and not whimsical social or political agendas. Of course, disclosure reform is just one of three pillars of my plan to make IPOs great again. A second pillar involves de-politicizing shareholder meetings and returning their focus to voting on director elections and significant corporate matters. Finally, we must also reform the litigation landscape for securities lawsuits to eliminate frivolous complaints, while maintaining an avenue for shareholders to continue to bring forth meritorious claims. At the SEC, we have been hard at work on executing this plan, and we look forward to soon sharing the progress that is taking shape. Raising capital through an IPO should not be a privilege reserved for those few “unicorns.” More and more, public investments are concentrated in a handful of companies that are generally in the same one or two industries. Our regulatory framework should provide companies in all stages of their growth and from all industries with the opportunity for an IPO, particularly an IPO that represents a capital raising mechanism for the company, instead of a liquidity event for insiders. *** Now, the reforms that I have just outlined are a worthwhile and necessary beginning. They will help capital flow faster and more freely to its highest and best use, which is to say toward human initiative and ingenuity. And they will help to guide the SEC back to the bedrock pecuniary fundamentals on which our mandate is based. But these are only the first steps in a broader effort to realign our markets with their most fundamental purpose, which is to place the full measure of American might where it belongs: in the hands of our citizens instead of the regulatory state. As we look forward to America’s 250th year, let us remember that no nation has ever entrusted so much agency to the individual—and no nation has been so plentifully rewarded for it. And yet, even as the weight of history and evidence affirm this truth, some in our society have come to question whether the capital markets remain the most reliable engine for upward mobility. They presume that the politically prescribed allocation of capital is superior to that of free market forces. They call to “seize the means of production.” They contend, often through artful, alliterative slogans, that decisions made by the government are more efficient and more just than those made by the governed. They ask, “Can capitalism propel people past the circumstances of their birth or background?” Can it reflect our highest values? I, for one, believe emphatically that it can—and history has proven it. For, at its best, capital is the instrument through which an individual can marshal the resources of a free society in pursuit of shared prosperity. It is the instrument through which we can create value in the lives of others by creating value in our own. Indeed, our markets are a deeply moral enterprise because they are a mutually beneficial one. Because every exchange holds the potential to lift both parties. Because our markets affirm the dignity of the human spirit and liberate its potential to invent, to build, to innovate, and to flourish as no other alternative can. This is precisely why our work at the Securities and Exchange Commission matters. Because when our capital markets are strong, they amplify that sense of dignity on a global scale. Because no force has lifted more people from poverty, widened more paths to opportunity, or solved more of society’s most intractable problems than capital investments through our capital markets. In the coming months, we will pursue the reforms that I have discussed today, and several others, with the urgency and care that they command. We will work closely with Congress and the Administration. We will listen carefully to market participants and to investors. And we will proceed steadily with the confidence that comes from standing on sound principles and a clear mandate. But above all, we will proceed with the resolve worthy of a people ever agitating to be prosperous. *** In closing, I believe that our capital markets are more than the mechanisms of finance—they are, at their core, expressions of our national character. A character that has compelled generations of Americans to take risks and to reap the rewards. To innovate endlessly and restlessly. To believe that the future is ours to make.  So as America’s 250th anniversary approaches, the question before us is not whether our entrepreneurs have the capacity to reinvigorate our capital markets, but whether we, as regulators, have the will. In this new day at the SEC, and under President Trump’s leadership, I am pleased to report that we do. Indeed, I am confident that we will preserve the promise of our capital markets for the next quarter millennium and well beyond. I trust that we will summon anew the enterprising spirit that Hamilton divined would be the source of our strength. And I believe that we will ensure that the American story, which began in many ways just steps outside, is preserved not by memory or speeches alone, but by the courage of those who are determined to chart its next chapter. Thank you very much for your time today. You all have been a patient and indulgent audience. And I look forward to the work ahead of us. Thank you. [1] President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on Federal Supervision of Investment Securities (Mar. 29, 1933), available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/message-congress-federal-supervision-investment-securities [2]See, e.g., TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). [3]Id. at 448-449. [4] Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (Nov. 10, 2025), available at https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/news/nov1025.pdf.

CME Group, the world's leading derivatives marketplace, today announced that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has approved the registration of a new securities clearing house, CME Securities Clearing Inc. With launch expected in Q2 2026, CME Group will operate CME Securities Clearing to help market participants comply with the SEC clearing mandate for U.S. Treasury transactions (as of December 31, 2026) and Repo transactions (as of June 30, 2027). "Expanded clearing capacity and capital efficiencies are critical for all market participants working to comply with the U.S. Treasury clearing mandate," said Terry Duffy, CME Group Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. "We are pleased to provide a solution for clearing both done-with and done-away execution as we continue to extend industry-leading cross-margining with FICC." For more information on CME Securities Clearing Inc., please visit here.

Kaizen, a leading provider of regulatory compliance solutions for global financial institutions, is pleased to announce the appointment of James Crow as Chief Technology Officer (CTO).  James joined Kaizen in April 2025 as Head of Engineering and has been promoted in recognition of his outstanding contribution to the company’s technology vision and delivery. Prior to joining Kaizen, James spent the majority of his career at London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG) building and scaling the UnaVista platform and services; most recently, he served as UnaVista’s Chief Information Officer (CIO), responsible for change, testing and technology operations.   In his new role, James will lead Kaizen’s technology strategy and oversee the expansion of the Kaizen Hub, a unique portal providing leading compliance and RegTech solutions to tier-one financial institutions. He will also drive innovation to support the company’s growth plans and product roadmap, ensuring Kaizen remains at the forefront of regulatory-reporting technology, providing scalable, secure and high-performance solutions for clients worldwide.  “I’m thrilled to step into the CTO role at Kaizen,” said James Crow. “Having experienced Kaizen’s commitment to innovation and client-centric delivery in regulatory reporting and data quality, I look forward to working closely with our team to solve the problems for our clients and the industry as a whole, as well as engineering solutions that elevate our platform and service offering.”  Dario Crispini, CEO of Kaizen, added: “We are delighted to appoint James as our Chief Technology Officer. His proven experience in building and scaling mission-critical regulatory reporting platforms, combined with his hands-on and detail-driven approach, makes James the perfect leader to advance our technology capabilities as we expand our global market presence. We look forward to his technology leadership in driving our next phase of growth.”  James’s appointment comes at a pivotal moment for Kaizen as the company continues to extend its reach across the regulatory reporting and compliance space and deepen its technology offering and expertise for global financial institutions. 

November brought the highest farmer sentiment reading since June, with the Purdue University/CME Group Ag Economy Barometer jumping 10 points from October to 139. The increase was driven primarily by producers' more optimistic outlook for the future, as the Future Expectations Index climbed 15 points to 144, while the Current Conditions Index dipped 2 points to 128. November's survey is the first conducted after the late-October announcement of a U.S.-China trade pact that includes provisions to expand U.S. agricultural exports and revealed a notable improvement in producers' confidence in future export opportunities. Sentiment also received support from a sharp rise in crop prices between mid-October and mid-November. The barometer survey took place Nov. 10-14. Producers were more optimistic about their farms' financial performance in November, with the Farm Financial Performance Index increasing by 14 points to 92. The percentage of producers expecting better financial results this year grew to 24%, up from 16% in October. A sharp rise in crop prices from mid-October to mid-November was a key driver of the expectation for better financial performance. For example, eastern Corn Belt prices for fall delivery of corn and soybeans increased 10% and 15%, respectively, during that period. The stronger financial outlook in the crop sector compensated for a weaker outlook in the livestock sector, where declining cattle prices weighed on financial expectations. Despite the improved farm financial outlook, the Farm Capital Investment Index fell 6 points to 56, with only 16% of respondents indicating that now is a good time to make major investments in their operations. "Producers became more optimistic about U.S. agricultural trade prospects in November. That coincided with a rise in crop prices, which led to farmers' improved expectations for their farms' financial performance and an improvement in farmer sentiment," said Michael Langemeier, the barometer's principal investigator and director of Purdue's Center for Commercial Agriculture. Producers were more optimistic about future agricultural trade prospects in November. In response to a question included in every barometer survey since January 2019, just 7% of respondents said they expect U.S. agricultural exports to weaken over the next five years, down from 14% in October and 30% in March. In a related question, 47% of corn producers indicated they expect soybean exports to increase over the next five years, while 8% anticipate a decline. The stronger trade outlook likely contributed to the overall improvement in sentiment observed in November. A majority of producers in November reported that they still expect to receive a supplementary support payment from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, similar to the 2019 Market Facilitation Program (MFP). However, confidence in receiving the payment fell sharply in November: Only 16% of respondents said an MFP payment was "very likely," down from 62% in September. Still, when combining the "likely" and "very likely" categories, just over three-fourths of producers (76%) said they expect an MFP payment, compared to 83% in September. Regarding how they plan to use an MFP payment, 58% of respondents said they would use it to "pay down debt," up from 52% in October. For the second month in a row, the Short-Term Farmland Value Expectations Index increased, reaching 116 in November, which is 3 points higher than October and 10 points above September. Farmers' long-term outlook on farmland values also improved, with the Long-Term Farmland Value Expectations Index increasing by 4 points to a record high of 165. The November survey also asked corn producers about their expectations for 2026 cash rental rates. Nearly three-fourths of respondents (74%) said they expect rental rates to remain roughly the same as this year, consistent with responses from the July and August surveys. The relatively strong outlook for cash rent further supports farmland values. "The record-high reading of the Long-Term Farmland Value Expectations Index indicates that farmers retain an optimistic long-run outlook for agriculture," Langemeier said. "Although rising crop prices and improved trade prospects have bolstered optimism, producers remain cautious in their investment and production decisions, reflecting the short-term uncertainty they face." The November survey asked corn producers about possible changes to their production practices in 2026 due to expected weak operating margins. Among those producers planning to make adjustments, two practices were highlighted most often: switching to lower-cost seed traits or varieties and reducing phosphorus applications. Producers followed up by pointing to reductions in corn seeding rates and nitrogen application rates as potential changes. Still, a substantial portion of producers (40%) said they do not plan to make any changes to their corn production practices in 2026. Recent barometer surveys have included questions on farmers' attitudes toward 2025 policy shifts. A majority of respondents in November (59%) and October (58%) said they expect U.S. tariffs to ultimately strengthen the agricultural economy. This is lower than last spring, when 70% of respondents anticipated that tariffs would have a long-term positive effect. The percentage of producers expressing uncertainty about the long-term impact of U.S. tariff policy has risen in recent months. In October, 16% of respondents said they were uncertain, rising slightly to 17% in November, roughly double the 8% reported in April and May. Meanwhile, two-thirds of farmers (67%) in the November survey said the U.S. is headed in the "right direction," down from 72% in October. About the Purdue University Center for Commercial AgricultureThe Center for Commercial Agriculture was founded in 2011 to provide professional development and educational programs for farmers. Housed within Purdue University's Department of Agricultural Economics, the center's faculty and staff develop and execute research and educational programs that address the different needs of managing in today's business environment.

Transaction Network Services (TNS) has expanded its global market data infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific (APAC) region with connectivity to Tokyo Financial Exchange (TFX), one of Japan’s leading derivatives exchanges. This collaboration provides TNS customers with direct access to TFX, delivered anywhere across TNS’ global network backbone.The addition of TFX completes TNS’ connectivity across all major Japanese exchanges and offers domestic and international firms comprehensive, managed access to Japan from a single provider.“Completing our coverage across all Japanese exchanges is a milestone that strengthens our offering in one of the world’s largest financial centers,” said Jeff Mezger, Vice President of Product Management, TNS. “This expansion further cements TNS as a one-stop shop for global trading access.”With the new TFX connection, TNS now delivers its full suite of services in Japan, including hosting, data, and connectivity. TNS’ Japanese exchange portfolio also includes Japannext and the Japan Exchange Group (JPX), which encompasses the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), Osaka Exchange (OSE), and Tokyo Commodity Exchange (TOCOM).“Partnering with TNS opens new doors for TFX by providing exposure to its robust network of global market participants,” said Ryosuke Seo, Director of Wholesale Business Department, TFX. “This collaboration positions TFX to expand its international footprint and deliver greater access and efficiency to traders worldwide.”This expansion is a key part of TNS’ continued investment in the APAC region. Mezger added: “One of our key priorities is strengthening TNS’ presence and partnerships across Asia. Japan is a key hub for regional and global trading activity, and our connection to TFX reinforces TNS’ long-term commitment to supporting customers’ success in these dynamic markets.”

From 8 December 2025, international investors will be able to open type "In" accounts with Russian professional market participants on Moscow Exchange. The Moscow Exchange Group has implemented these innovations to streamline operations involving international investors and protect their holdings, consistent with the provisions of Decree No. 436 "On Guarantees for International Investors". MOEX's clearing members will be allowed to open proprietary type "In" accounts, client accounts, and trust management accounts for non-resident clients who comply with the provisions of the Decree. The "In" type is assigned upon client registration and cannot be changed thereafter. Using type "In" accounts, international investors will be able to make anonymous trades on Moscow Exchange in all Russian stocks, bonds, and fund units in the Central Order Book (T+1 settlement cycle) and derivatives on the FX and Precious Metals Markets, enter into repo transactions, make deposits with the central counterparty, and participate in primary distributions. Non-resident clients will be given access to the Derivatives Market at a later stage. Transfers of securities and funds are only permitted between type "In" accounts. Moscow Exchange would like to stress the necessity for professional participants to conform to current legal regulations concerning type "In" accounts. Implementation of legislative initiatives under Decree 436 dated 1 July 2025 "On Guarantees for Foreign Investors" Mandatory labelling of legal entities of the Russian Federation and Republic of Belarus Action matrix for trd_restr attribute in the Unified Client Registration and TS Registration of members' clients Moscow Exchange (MOEX) is Russia’s largest exchange operating the country’s only multifunctional trading platform for equities, bonds, derivatives, currencies, money market instruments and commodities. The Moscow Exchange Group provides a full range of trade and post-trade services through its ownership of the central securities depository (National Settlement Depository) and the clearing center (National Clearing Centre), which serves as the central counterparty for MOEX markets. Read more on the Moscow Exchange: https://www.moex.com/n95768

November ADV reached 33.1 million contracts Record Cryptocurrency ADV of 424,000 contracts CME Group, the world's leading derivatives marketplace, today reported its second-highest monthly average daily volume (ADV) of 33.1 million contracts in November, an increase of 10% year-over-year. The company's monthly ADV record was set in April 2025 with 35.9 million contracts. Market statistics are available in greater detail at https://cmegroupinc.gcs-web.com/monthly-volume. November 2025 ADV across asset classes includes: Interest Rate ADV of 17.5 million contracts Equity Index ADV of 8.9 million contracts Energy ADV of 2.6 million contracts Agricultural ADV of 2.1 million contracts Metals ADV of 1.3 million contracts Foreign Exchange ADV of 746,000 contracts Record Cryptocurrency ADV of 424,000 contracts ($13.2 billion notional) Additional November 2025 product highlights compared to November 2024: Interest Rate ADV Record Ultra U.S. Treasury Bond futures ADV of 746,000 contracts 5-Year U.S. Treasury Note futures ADV increased 2% to 2.8 million contracts SOFR options ADV increased 18% to 1.6 million contracts 30 Day Fed Funds futures ADV increased 56% to 675,000 contracts Equity Index ADV increased 39% Micro E-mini Nasdaq 100 futures ADV increased 72% to 2.2 million contracts Micro E-mini S&P 500 futures ADV increased 80% to 1.6 million contracts E-Mini Nasdaq 100 futures ADV increased 28% to 682,000 contracts Energy ADV Henry Hub Natural Gas options ADV increased 18% to 326,000 contracts NY Heating Oil futures ADV increased 32% to 225,000 contracts Agricultural ADV increased 8% Corn futures ADV increased 2% to 514,000 contracts Soybean Meal futures ADV increased 4% to 201,000 contracts Metals ADV increased 52% Micro Gold futures ADV increased 235% to 476,000 contracts Silver futures ADV increased 22% to 108,000 contracts Micro Silver futures ADV increased 238% to 75,000 contracts Cryptocurrency ADV increased 78% Micro Ether futures ADV increased 176% to 229,000 contracts Ether futures ADV increased 127% to 24,000 contracts Micro Products ADV Micro E-mini Equity Index futures and options ADV of 4 million contracts represented 45.3% of overall Equity Index ADV and Micro WTI Crude Oil futures accounted for 2% of overall Energy ADV International ADV increased 6% to 9.8 million contracts, with EMEA ADV up 3% to 7.2 million contracts, APAC ADV up 13% to 2.2 million contracts and Latin America ADV up 16% to 193,000 contracts BrokerTec U.S. Repo average daily notional value (ADNV) increased 17% to $386 billion and European Repo ADNV increased 1% to €304 billion Customer average collateral balances to meet performance bond requirements for rolling 3-months ending October 2025 were $135.2 billion for cash collateral and $160.3 billion for non-cash collateral

DIGITEC provides mission-critical pricing technology, workflow automation and market data solutions to leading global financial institutions. The partnership with EMH Partners will support DIGITEC in accelerating product innovation, global expansion and data-driven workflow automation in FX Swaps and related OTC markets. Funds advised by EMH Partners, have completed a significant minority investment in DIGITEC, the market standard for FX Swaps pricing technology and workflow automation. The founding Joost family will retain majority ownership and continue to lead the company. Founded in 1980, DIGITEC enables banks and financial institutions to price, manage and distribute liquidity in FX Swaps and related OTC instruments. DIGITEC’s flagship product, the D3 Pricing Engine, is a high-performance, low-latency platform relied upon by many of the world’s top FX-trading institutions. The company also operates the Swaps Data Feed (SDF) – developed in partnership with 360T – which provides high-quality, interbank-grade FX swaps market data, alongside complementary workflow solutions including the D3 OMS. DIGITEC’s long-standing commitment to product excellence and engineering rigour has been recognised through multiple industry awards, such as World’s Best Solution for FX Swaps (Euromoney FX Awards 2025), The World’s Best Technology Provider for Swaps (Euromoney FX Awards 2024) and Best Sell-Side OTC Trading Initiative (Sell-Side Technology Awards 2024). Headquartered in Hamburg with offices in London and Singapore, DIGITEC serves a global client base – including more than half of the world’s top 50 FX-trading banks – helping them streamline pricing infrastructure, liquidity provision and FX swaps workflows. “Our technology sits at the core of how global banks price and trade FX Swaps,” said Peer Joost, CEO of DIGITEC. “Partnering with EMH Partners allows us to accelerate our long-term roadmap — expanding our data products, scaling our cloud and workflow automation solutions, and driving innovation that reshapes how OTC markets operate. As a family-owned and family-run business, we are especially delighted to partner with a founder-owned and founder-led fund whose values and entrepreneurial spirit align so closely with our own.” “DIGITEC combines engineering excellence with a uniquely strong position in a structurally growing market,” said Jens Zuber, Partner at EMH Partners. “We look forward to partnering with  Peer and the DIGITEC team to scale the platform, deepen its product leadership and support the company’s ambition to define the next generation of FX Swaps technology.” The Joost family will remain majority shareholder. Financial terms were not disclosed. Deutsche Bank and LUPP + PARTNER acted as advisers to DIGITEC, Milbank and Houlihan Lokey supported EMH Partners.

CLS, a financial market infrastructure group delivering settlement, processing and data solutions across the global FX ecosystem, announced today that Standard Chartered, a leading international cross-border bank, has gone live on CLSNet, its automated bilateral payment netting calculation service for over 120 currencies. CLSNet standardizes and automates post-trade matching and netting processes, delivering risk mitigation, liquidity optimization and operational efficiencies for currency flows outside of CLSSettlement, including emerging market and developing economy (EMDE) currencies and same-day trades. Adoption of CLSNet has continued to grow significantly, with the service recording an average daily netted value1 of USD169 billion in the first half of 2025, up 18% compared to the same period in 2024. The CLSNet community now includes the top 12 global banks, alongside a growing roster of regional banks, funds, corporates and non-bank financial institutions. As settlement risk in the FX market remains a focus, particularly in EMDE currencies and other growing segments, market participants are looking for ways to mitigate risk effectively via automated post-trade services such as CLSNet. The service reduces payments exposed to settlement risk by centralizing, standardizing and automating the netting calculation process. Demand for CLSNet continues to grow, particularly among financial institutions seeking to align with the best practices outlined in Principle 35 of the FX Global Code.2 Alongside Standard Chartered, several Asian banks are joining the service. CTBC, the Hong Kong branch of a Taiwanese commercial bank, has gone live on CLSNet, meanwhile Maybank, a Malaysian bank, and Taishin, one of the largest commercial banks in Taiwan, have also committed to joining the CLSNet network to mitigate settlement risk within Asian currencies, particularly USD/CNH. Lisa Danino-Lewis, Chief Growth Officer, CLS commented: “We are delighted to welcome Standard Chartered, CTBC, Maybank and Taishin to the CLSNet community. We are seeing increased demand for proven solutions to address the challenges facing the FX market. As more participants join CLSNet, the resulting network effect will deliver even greater risk reduction and efficiency benefits for all users.” Tony Hall, Global Head, Markets Trading and XVA, Standard Chartered commented: “Standard Chartered is proud to join CLSNet, reaffirming our commitment to strong risk management, liquidity efficiency and operational excellence in FX. This step aligns with our role as a signatory to the Global FX Code and our ambition to be the leading Emerging Markets FX house. By leveraging CLSNet capabilities, we’ll deliver safer, faster and more efficient post-trade processing—freeing up intraday liquidity and reducing settlement risk for our clients. Another stride towards world-class infrastructure, smarter execution, and market leadership.”      Netted value refers to bilateral net payment amounts calculated by CLSNet. Principle 35 states, inter alia:  Where practicable, Market Participants should eliminate Settlement Risk, for example by using settlement services that provide PvP settlement. Where Settlement Risk cannot be eliminated, Market Participants should reduce the size and duration of their Settlement Risk as much as practicable. The netting of FX settlement obligations (in particular the use of automated netting systems) is encouraged.

I am deeply honored to have been asked to speak here today about the remarkable legacy of George Shultz. Just to be clear, I will not address current economic conditions or monetary policy. I have been an admirer of George Shultz since my college years. I saw him then and now as a great role model, as I mentioned a few months ago when delivering the Baccalaureate address to Princeton's class of 2025, 50 years after my own graduation.1 As I told the graduates, when I faced the world after college, I had no real plan, but knew that I wanted to combine a private-sector career with public service. I had in mind a few well-known public figures of the era, especially George Shultz, whose picture was on the wall of the Princeton eating club of which both of us were members. George may also have caught my attention because my dad was a labor lawyer who represented one of the major steel companies in collective bargaining. Like George, my father had both a belief in the collective bargaining process and a deep respect for workers. I followed George's career with interest through the years. It didn't occur to me that I would ever have the honor of meeting him. But I did meet him after I joined the Fed in 2012, as I visited Stanford from time to time. I remember energetic economic discussions at group lunches in his conference room at Hoover. George was also kind enough to host John Taylor, Michael, and me for a chilly round of golf on a rainy March day. Today, our focus is on George's extraordinarily broad economic accomplishments. I also want to celebrate the remarkable man and policymaker that he was. Several things stand out for me. He was a man who combined strong principles and unshakeable integrity with common sense and a practical, problem-solving approach to policy. He had a deep belief in the wisdom of markets and a desire to let them work whenever possible without government direction. That theme runs through many issues we will discuss, including collective bargaining, wage and price controls, and exchange rates. But he was not an absolutist and saw that there are sometimes market failures that should be addressed by public policy. As one of the most successful policymakers of his era, George brought the intellectual rigor of an academic to the practical, constrained, messy work of policymaking. Through four cabinet appointments, he dealt with many of the great issues of his day, with remarkable success. And he kept at it long after leaving public office, making important contributions on health care reform, climate change and nuclear disarmament. He may be less well known for this, but George Shultz was deeply concerned about racial discrimination in the workplace and our society more broadly. He consistently and effectively used his positions of authority to increase opportunities for minorities. He later noted that there was both a moral and an economic basis for this. He stuck to his principles while also treating people with honesty and respect, including those with whom he had policy disagreements.2 Labor leaders welcomed his appointment as Secretary of Labor. As many of his contemporaries remarked, faced with divergent views and difficult issues, he was extraordinarily good at steering people toward agreement. A key part of that strategy was to let the parties reach the final agreement themselves. That way, they owned the agreement and were more likely to honor it. His friendships and collaborations were beyond number, and knew no partisan bounds. He often said that trust is the coin of the realm, and that good things were only possible where there was mutual trust.3 His integrity provided the basis for that trust. All of those who aspire to serve the public can learn from his example. 1. See Jerome H. Powell (2025), "Baccalaureate Remarks," (PDF) speech delivered at Princeton University, Princeton, N.J., May 25.  2. See Charles Moritz, ed. (1970), Current Biography Yearbook 1969 (New York: The H.W. Wilson Company). Shultz's background as a mediator served him well in economic policymaking, and Paul Volcker would later say of Shultz, "Time and again he would work with almost inhuman patience to bring a group to agreement upon a decision all could support, at times submerging his own preferences"; see Philip Taubman (2023), In the Nation's Service: The Life and Times of George P. Shultz (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press), p. 23.  3. Shultz summed up his views in this area in the mottoes "Trust is the coin of the realm" and "Respect your adversaries"; see George P. Shultz (2016), Learning from Experience (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press). 

Universiti Utara Malaysia (“UUM”) made a clean sweep of the top three spots at the recent Bursa Inter-Varsity Stock Challenge (“BISC”) 2025 Grand Finale. After a tightly contested final round, Chong Jia Hong emerged as Champion while Ponny Ling Hsing Yu and Bryan Lim Wei Chin were named first and second runners-up, respectively. The nationwide challenge, which ran from August to November 2025, attracted 850 teams and nearly 1,300 students from 10 universities1 in an immersive stock trading competition.  Organised by Bursa Malaysia since 2022, the annual BISC aims to cultivate informed, confident and responsible future investors. By simulating real-world investing in a riskfree environment, participants gain early hands-on experience whilst sharpening their analytical skills. Dato’ Fad’l Mohamed, Chief Executive Officer of Bursa Malaysia, said: “This year’s strong participation reflects not only rising interest in the stock market among the youth, but also their determination to challenge themselves, master financial knowledge and apply investing concepts. Such enthusiasm reinforces the importance of BISC as part of Bursa Malaysia’s ongoing efforts to educate and empower the next generation of informed investors in an engaging yet structured approach.” Three-phase Competition Structure and Mentorship To maximise learning outcomes, BISC 2025 featured three phases, with each phase building on the previous to simulate the full cycle of investing. evaluated based on analytical depth, originality, and accuracy, covering areas such as catalysts, sensitivity analysis, financial performance and valuation. Phase 2 – Virtual Portfolio: Equipped with a virtual initial capital of RM100,000 per team, participants traded eligible listed securities in a simulated environment on MyBURSA, complete with transaction-related fees and stamp duty, to replicate real trading.  Phase 3 – Grand Finale: The top 20 teams presented their portfolio strategies and results to a panel of industry judges. This phase tested the participants’ real understanding, presentation skills and poise under pressure as they defended their investment decisions to seasoned market professionals. Throughout the three-month challenge period, participants received continuous guidance and mentorship from participating brokerage firms — Affin Hwang Investment Bank, AmInvestment Bank, CGS International Securities Malaysia, Maybank Investment Bank and RHB Investment Bank — who provided expert advice, professional resources and practical insights to deepen their understanding of market dynamics. “Participating in BISC 2025 was a meaningful experience for me. The competition offered a chance to put a trading strategy to the test under conditions that felt close to the real market. Along the way, it became clear where the approach worked and where it needed refining, all without taking on any actual risk. The exposure and hands-on learning have been invaluable in building confidence to continue growing as an investor,” said Chong Jia Hong from Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM), the Champion of BISC Grand Finale 2025. As part of Bursa Malaysia's commitment to promoting inclusive capital market and investor empowerment, initiatives such as BISC play an essential role in expanding the nation's retail investor base and nurturing a more knowledgeable and financially savvy investment community. Encouraged by the success of BISC 2025, Bursa Malaysia will continue positioning this annual competition as a cornerstone initiative for strengthening financial literacy among youth.  The Exchange invites interested universities and students to participate in the next edition of BISC 2026. Learn more at: https://my.bursamalaysia.com/bisc Appendix I The participating universities are: International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) INTI International College (INTI) Management and Science University (MSU) Universiti Malaya (UM) Universiti Malaysia Sabah (UMS) Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia (USIM) Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM) Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman (UTAR) Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM) Refer to Appendix I for the list of participating universities.

ASIC has released updated regulatory guidance on industry codes of conduct in the financial services and credit sectors.The updates to Regulatory Guide 183 Codes of conduct for the financial services and credit sectors (RG 183): reflect legislative reform since the guidance was last updated in 2013, clarify ASIC’s role in relation to industry codes, and the criteria and process for code approval, and simplify and streamline the guidance. These updates follow consultation with stakeholders through Consultation Statement 26 Proposed update to RG 183 (CS 26). Stakeholders were broadly supportive of the proposed updates.A copy of the non-confidential submissions made to ASIC and an outline of our response is available below. Background It is not mandatory for any industry in the financial services or credit sectors to develop a code. Where a code exists, it does not require ASIC’s approval. However, seeking and obtaining ASIC’s approval is a signal that the code is one that consumers can have confidence in and rely on. RG 183 provides guidance on ASIC’s role in relation to codes, the criteria for code approval by ASIC, and the process for obtaining (and retaining) ASIC’s approval for a code. Download Regulatory Guide 183 Codes of conduct for the financial services and credit sectors (RG 183) More information ASIC proposes updates to guidance for industry codes of conduct Consultation Statement 26 Proposed update to RG 183 (CS 26) Summary of feedback to CS 26 and ASIC’s response

The Federal Reserve’s proposed 2026 stress test scenarios reflect a welcome effort to enhance transparency and public accountability, the Bank Policy Institute, American Bankers Association, Financial Services Forum, Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, International Swaps and Derivatives Association and Institute of International Bankers said in a comment letter submitted today. The associations commend the Fed for, for the first time, publishing its proposed 2026 stress test scenarios for public comment and for articulating a more detailed scenario design policy, including guides and a macro model that describe how key variables are calibrated. These actions respond constructively to longstanding calls for the Fed to bring its stress testing models and scenarios into the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice-and-comment framework and reflect a serious effort to increase public insight into the process. Still, the scenarios, which in many cases replicate scenarios from past stress tests and were established before the new Fed guidelines, would benefit from some revisions. For example, the scenarios and associated models that the Federal Reserve uses to design the scenarios often compress the timelines of observed stress periods to achieve peak-level stress calibrations over a shorter number of quarters than is reflected in historical precedents. Open questions remain on how the Fed will exercise its discretion on scenario design in practice. Greater clarity and firmer guardrails on how that discretion is applied year to year would further bolster the framework’s credibility and ensure that bank capital requirements are based on a coherent and plausible foundation. “The Enhanced Transparency NPR and the publication of the Proposed 2026 Scenarios for public comment represent an improvement in the overall transparency and accountability of the Federal Reserve’s stress testing processes. However, the proposed framework would grant inordinate discretion to the Federal Reserve, without requiring sufficient explanation for its design choices year-to-year,” the associations stated in the letter. Background. The Fed on Oct. 24, 2025, issued proposals to increase transparency and accountability in the stress testing process, in line with BPI and co-plaintiffs’ 2024 legal challenge, which called for the Fed to subject its stress testing scenarios and models to public comment under the Administrative Procedure Act.* Today’s comment letter responds to the proposed 2026 stress test scenarios. A separate comment letter will address the Fed’s broader proposal on the revised framework, including the stress test models and scenario design. The Fed extended the comment deadline on this proposal to Feb. 21, 2026. Why It Matters. The proposed framework will drive how the central bank establishes binding capital requirements that determine the cost of credit in the economy. The design choices underpinning models and scenarios ultimately drive the cost of loans and financing. With insufficient explanation of design choices, the stress tests could continue to produce volatile results year-to-year, distorting the cost of financial intermediation. The stress testing framework is not the sole driver of banks’ capital requirements. Given the interplay between stress tests and other parts of the capital framework, the importance of coherent stress test scenarios is critical. Transparency is not simply about disclosing more information, but also about explaining how that information is used in decision-making so that stakeholders can understand and, where appropriate, comment on the choices the Fed makes in scenario design. A clearer articulation of the link between the disclosed guides and models for the final scenario paths would further strengthen the credibility of the framework. Specific Concerns. The associations highlight several instances where more explanation would be beneficial in the proposed scenarios. For example: The Fed has chosen to calibrate variables for which it retains flexibility near or in the upper one-third of their ranges of severity. It does not explain how it arrived at this severe calibration. The 2026 severely adverse scenario also results in severe shocks across asset classes simultaneously without appearing to take into account the recent dynamics in these markets. The trajectories of several of the modeled variables reflect deviations from the macroeconomic model that are not described. The Global Market Shock, a market risk element applied to banks with large trading operations, provides a significant level of discretion in its methodology. The effect of the Federal Reserve’s chosen percentile level for a specific shock may translate to vastly different severities of the shocks, with direct effects on binding capital requirements for the covered banks. Further explanation is warranted on how the Fed will select the severities of these shocks each year. The associations urge the Fed to build on its progress by providing more detail on how it will choose points within the permitted ranges for key variables, including how current economic and financial conditions, historical experience and model outputs inform those choices. * This legal challenge was filed in December 2024 by the Bank Policy Institute, the American Bankers Association, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Ohio Bankers League and the Ohio Chamber of Commerce.

The Financial Markets Authority (FMA) - Te Mana Tātai Hokohoko – has cancelled the Financial Advice Provider licence of Christchurch-based Hope Group Limited (HGL). HGL has held a full financial advice provider licence and provided personal risk insurance advice (life and health insurance, income protection insurance, trauma and disability insurance) to retail clients.     Louise Unger, FMA Executive Director, Response and Enforcement, said HGL’s cancellation followed the termination of its distribution agreement with the impacted insurer, and the FMA’s subsequent inquiry into its affairs.    Following the notification from the impacted insurer, the FMA reviewed 14 insurance policy applications submitted by HGL’s sole director and financial adviser, Mr Junpu Wang, on behalf of 13 customers. The inquiries identified serious conduct issues resulting in material breaches of obligations. Specifically, the conduct included: Submitting second policy applications for existing clients using incorrect or false customer information to conceal that the policies were duplicates  Completing an authority to accept a direct debit form on behalf of a client without obtaining the client’s authentic signature  Failing to obtain client consent for both first and second policies (with the same or similar cover) to remain active during a significant period, causing clients to pay two premiums.   Misleading clients by recommending second policies to benefit from lower premiums under a promotional offer, despite clients being ineligible (e.g., already existing policyholders) Failing to ensure clients understood the advice provided. In some cases, clients were incorrectly advised that a new policy was needed because their existing policy would become more expensive after 24 months; in two cases, clients were told to take out a new policy to obtain a second luxury item – despite being ineligible for that benefit.    “Mr Wang deliberately misled impacted clients to take out second policies after the 24-month clawback period for the sole purpose to obtain commission payments from the insurer,” said Ms Unger. In doing so, HGL and Mr Wang obtained $37,374 in upfront commissions. In addition, clients paid two premiums for the same or similar cover while both policies remained active for up to 27 weeks, resulting in overpayments totalling $5,342.34. “HGL and Mr Wang’s actions represent a serious and deliberate departure from the standards expected of a licensed financial advice provider. “Mr Wang has not accepted his conduct, all allegations have been denied and attempts made to blame another financial adviser who was never engaged by HGL at the time the applications were submitted,” said Ms Unger. “The cancellation of HGL’s licence is critical to ensuring we protect consumers and the integrity of the market. A key function of the FMA is to ensure the quality of financial advice and financial advice services – which is clearly missing here. “A public notification helps the FMA to raise awareness about standards we expect, deter future contraventions by other market participants, and publicly express disapproval for contraventions under the FMC Act and the relevant regulations.” The insurer has contacted all impacted clients and made arrangements to ensure they are supported. In addition, HGL and Mr. Wang have been deregistered from the Financial Service Providers Register (FSPR), and the matter had been reported to the Police.

Key points Australian investors rely on the expertise and integrity of everyone in the investment chain to secure their financial future. ASIC’s primary concern is minimising the risk of harm for Australian investors and consumers. To ensure better outcomes for investors, ASIC has prioritised tackling poor practices in private credit and holding those responsible for Shield and First Guardian to account. Good afternoon. I'd like to acknowledge the Traditional Owners of the land on which we meet today, the Dharug and Gundungurra people and pay my respects to Elders past and present. I extend that respect to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people here today. Thank you to Conexus for the invitation to speak today. It’s great to be back at the Researcher Forum and to have the opportunity to update you on ASIC’s priorities. A few weeks ago, I spoke to a room of financial literacy educators about the importance of equipping Australians with the knowledge they need to confidently navigate the financial system. I made the point that when it comes to financial decisions, people can sometimes be vulnerable to exploitation, because for many of the decisions they make, they have less financial knowledge or experience than the person or firm on the other side of the transaction. And when it comes to investment decisions, that knowledge imbalance is even greater, with bigger consequences if something goes wrong. Even the most sophisticated investors are reliant on the expertise – and the integrity - of others when making major investment decisions. Financial advisers, fund managers, research houses – all of you here today – all play a role, either directly or indirectly, in influencing how investors choose to invest their money. And so, it’s important, as the theme of today’s forum suggests, that we have ‘world-class investment governance and research’. It’s what Australian investors want and deserve, and it’s what ASIC expects. In pursuing this expectation, our primary concern is to minimise the risk of harm to consumers and investors. You’ll see this reflected across our regulatory and enforcement priorities. There are two enforcement priorities I want to talk about today, both of which relate directly to the work many of you do. The first is holding those responsible for the Shield and First Guardian collapses to account. And the second – to crack down on poor practice in private credit. Pursuing accountability for Shield and First Guardian Let me start with Shield and First Guardian – partly because those matters combined represent one of our biggest priorities at the moment – and partly because they have implications for everybody working in the advice and investment ecosystem. If you wonder why this is relevant to you, the numbers should make it clear. With more than 11,000 investors impacted and close to $1 billion of retirement savings put at risk, this is the most egregious example of consumer harm that I have seen in my time at ASIC. And the people affected are Australians who were trying to do the right thing to boost their retirement savings and were instead lured into switching their super into high-risk investments. These weren’t people rolling the dice in some get-rich-quick gamble. These were people making considered decisions which they believed to be in their financial interests. People like Gary, in his early 60s and looking forward to retirement[1]. Gary was aware that his existing super fund wasn’t performing as well as it had been.  He was contacted by a comparison site, which put him on to financial advisers who set him up with a self-managed super fund and invested all his funds into First Guardian. He stands to lose almost $700,000. Or Juan[2], a 41-year old at risk of losing his entire super, after being convinced to roll all his savings into First Guardian. These are shocking stories, and there are thousands like them. Each of them involving financial losses with a very human cost. And there is a long chain of participants involved. Lead generators, including data brokers and telemarketers Financial advisers, and financial advice firms Superannuation trustees, like Macquarie, Equity Trustees, Diversa and Netwealth Research houses Auditors And of course, the fund operators themselves. We believe all hold some degree of culpability. ASIC’s first priority in both the Shield and First Guardian matters has been to preserve assets so that they can be recovered for investors while our investigations are continuing. We’ve: issued stop orders to prevent ongoing harm obtained asset-freezing orders sought the appointment of receivers and liquidators obtained travel restraints cancelled financial services licenses; and banned financial advisers. We’ve instituted proceedings against Macquarie, Equity Trustees, Interprac Financial Planning, and SQM Research. In a significant win for some investors, Macquarie has committed to repaying investors 100% of the net cash they invested in Shield through Macquarie’s wrap platform. Importantly for those in the room today, our action against SQM Research is the first we have taken against a research house. It is our view that SQM Research prepared reports containing misleading representations and its processes fell short of expected standards when it published “Favourable” ratings for Shield. More generally, it is our view that research houses should serve as gatekeepers against poor quality investments or unsuitable products. They need to do all things necessary to ensure that they go about their work efficiently, honestly and fairly. And they need to avoid issuing ratings or commentary that can’t be justified by evidence. In addition to the proceedings I have already mentioned, we are also seeking leave to commence proceedings against MWL Financial Services, a former MWL director and Imperial Capital Group – a lead generator – for allegedly operating a scheme resulting in hundreds of clients investing superannuation into Shield. At this point in time, we have 10 separate Federal Court proceedings against 18 defendants, and there is more to come. As I mentioned, holding those responsible for the collapse of the Shield and First Guardian Master Funds to account is one of our enforcement priorities - and our investigations are ongoing. While this has some time to play out, there are lessons to be learned now.  As I mentioned at the outset, Australian investors are reliant on the chain of financial experts behind their investments - financial advisers, research houses, investment platforms, superannuation trustees, advice licensees. When every part of that chain fulfils its role – with its multiple layers of knowledge, expertise, duties and obligations – the system works as it should. Investors can be confident that they will be offered products that are safe, and appropriate for them and their financial goals. But when there are failures in that chain – far too often it is investors who pay the price. The failures involved in Shield and First Guardian have highlighted some potential regulatory gaps. These include: the regulation of lead generators, whose activities may not be adequately captured by the anti-hawking provisions the super switching process the obligations of super trustees who provide platform products; and the regulation of managed investment schemes, which ASIC has previously identified as a priority for reform. We welcome the Government’s commitment to exploring sensible reforms that can better protect consumers in the future, and we are committed to working with the Government to identify what would be most effective, based on what we have uncovered through our investigations. Improving practices in private credit I’d now like to turn to private credit.   ASIC recognises that private credit – done well – plays an important role in Australia’s financial system. It’s an important source of funding for sectors that are under-served by the traditional banking sector, and it provides diversification and choice for borrowers and investors alike. According to one estimate, private credit in Australia is now valued at more than $200 billion[3]. While this amount is not systemically important, the same source estimates that private credit has grown 500 per cent[4] over the past 10 years. And with increasing investment in private credit via superannuation, that growth seems likely to continue. That’s why it’s important that we are alert to the potential risks. Here in Australia, we have a higher concentration of private credit lending to the property sector, including loans to higher risk development and construction. Over time, this could amplify the system-wide vulnerability related to residential property identified by APRA in last month’s system-wide stress test.   Private credit at current volumes is untested in a stress scenario and we are already seeing a wide variance in practices across the sector. A lack of transparency across the sector is a particular concern. Australia lags behind our international peers in terms of the data that we as a regulator have access to. We have neither the breadth, depth, or frequency of data needed to monitor and supervise retail and wholesale funds confidently.  Countries like Singapore, Canada, and the UK with similar regulatory frameworks have greater access to more reliable and recurrent data on private markets. Given that our domestic private credit growth outstrips that seen in many of these countries, we would like to see this data gap addressed to enable ASIC to more confidently supervise funds. Earlier this year, we undertook a surveillance of 28 retail and wholesale private credit funds to assess how fund managers are managing the risks that underpin investor confidence and market operation. We released the findings of that surveillance a few weeks ago in Report 820. We observed some better practices, but we also identified areas that fell short of expectations, including practices that are potentially in breach of the law. Areas for improvement include governance and transparency; fees and interest rates; valuation methodologies; liquidity; and credit management. Today, I’ll focus on three areas that will be relevant to many in the room because they are key to how researchers understand and evaluate private credit funds: The use of terminology Fee and interest disclosure; and Valuations Terminology I’ll start with the use of terminology. In our review, we found market-wide inconsistencies in terminology that make it difficult for investors to compare the nature and risks of private credit funds. Fund operators and investment managers defined and applied terms such as ‘default’ and ‘investment grade’ differently. Such inconsistent use of terms makes it difficult for investors to meaningfully compare loan default or arrears levels across funds. There were also variabilities in how funds described their underlying assets. Some funds primarily categorised their assets using terms that describe the ranking or seniority of the security – for example ‘first mortgage’ and ‘mezzanine’. Other funds categorised their assets with reference to direct lending, securitised loans or the use of funding – for example ‘commercial real estate development’. Concerningly, we found that asset descriptions sometimes failed to include clear information that would help investors understand the risks of the assets held by a fund. For example, a failure to disclose that loans will fund higher-risk real estate construction and development. Or that the fund primarily invests in unsecured loans. Again, this inconsistency makes it difficult for investors and advisers to accurately compare funds and make informed choices about what products they are investing in and the risks associated with them. The adoption of consistent industry terminology – or at least a clear explanation of key terms – would be an important step towards greater transparency for investors.  Fee and interest disclosure Transparency was also an issue when it came to fee and interest disclosure. Of the 28 funds we reviewed, only four published information about the interest rates or range of interest rates charged to borrowers. If these rates are accurately disclosed, investors are better able to judge the riskiness of the investment. Conversely, where borrowers pay fees on top of interest that are not disclosed, this masks a clear signal about the level of risk involved in the lending. Only two retail funds quantified the interest earned from their assets and borrower fees and disclosed the retained amounts as part of their wider management fee in the product disclosure statement. Only one wholesale fund passed on to investors the full economic benefits of interest earned from its assets and income earned from borrower fees. To enable investors to better assess the true cost of investing in a fund, fund managers and trustees should disclose ALL revenue they earn in connection with their funds. Clear and accurate disclosure enables investors to understand what they are paying for, directly and indirectly, and to better judge whether they are being appropriately compensated for the associated risk. Valuations The final area that I wanted to touch on is valuations. Investors rely on fair valuations to assess performance and make informed investment decisions. Private assets in particular are subject to heightened valuation risks, due to infrequent trading and limited price discovery. Many of the private credit funds we reviewed were open-ended funds, with regular monthly or quarterly redemption periods. For open-ended funds in times of stress, failure to adjust valuations in a timely manner could allow some fund members to exit at a higher price, at the expense of the remaining investors. Some of the poorer valuation practices we observed involved infrequent valuations, incomplete or absent valuation policies, insufficient independence and inconsistent approaches to valuing collateral. Where valuations are not accurate, reliable, timely or comparable, this raises serious questions about the ability of investors – and indeed researchers – to assess the performance of a fund. To guide fund managers in uplifting their practices, our report outlines ten guiding principles for private credit ‘done well’. The principles provide guidance on the three areas that I’ve mentioned - terminology, fee disclosure and valuations - as well as other areas like design and distribution, organisational capability, liquidity and governance. Each of these principles is grounded in the law. And we will be monitoring how well private credit funds adhere to them. I mentioned earlier that poor private credit practices are an enforcement priority for ASIC in 2026. We have already issued stop orders on several target market determinations and one PDS due to poor disclosure and distribution. And in instances of more egregious conduct, we have commenced enforcement investigations. We have also announced the second phase of our private credit surveillance. On the retail side, this surveillance will look at disclosures of fees and margins, and the distribution practices of private credit funds to retail investors, with a specific focus on the adviser channel.  We want to understand how retail private credit funds are distributed and, when distributed through advisers, test the quality of their advice. On the wholesale side, there are plans to look at fees, margin structures and conflicts of interest in the management of wholesale private credit funds, with a particular focus on real estate lending. Through this ongoing program of work, which will hopefully be complemented by industry efforts to lift standards, we hope that private credit will increasingly be done well in Australia, with benefits to individual investors and the broader economy. Conclusion I mentioned at the start that ASIC is focussed on minimising harm to consumers and investors. That’s a responsibility we all share. Whatever role you play in the investment ecosystem, you can help to ensure that consumers who engage in investing, within or outside superannuation, are presented with products that are safe, appropriate, and aligned with their best interests. When that occurs, it not only means better outcomes for individuals, it is also fundamental to building and maintaining trust in the system. Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today. I’m now happy to take some questions.   [1] First Guardian, Shield superannuation disasters expose deep flaws in Australia's $4.3 trillion retirement system - ABC News [2] First Guardian collapse leaves thousands at risk of losing super as ASIC freezes director assets - ABC News [3] REP 814 Private credit in Australia [4] REP 823 Advancing Australia’s evolving capital markets: Discussion paper response report | ASIC

Chairman Hill, Ranking Member Waters, and other members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Federal Reserve's supervisory and regulatory activities. My testimony today will focus on two areas. First, the current state of the banking sector, as detailed in the fall 2025 Supervision and Regulation Report, which accompanies my submission to the Committee. Second, progress on my priorities as Vice Chair for Supervision since my confirmation earlier this year. My priorities relate to the efficiency, safety and soundness, and stability of our financial system and the effectiveness and accountability of our regulation and supervision of that system. The financial sector plays a critical role in our economy because it serves as an essential intermediary to channel savings into productive investments and enable the flow of money, credit, and capital throughout the economy. Our supervision and regulation must support a safe and sound banking system that fosters economic growth while also safeguarding financial stability. Banking ConditionsLet me begin by providing an update on banking conditions. As the Supervision and Regulation Report shows, the banking system remains sound and resilient. Banks continue to report strong capital ratios and significant liquidity buffers, which position them well to support economic growth. The overall health of the banking sector is demonstrated by continued growth in lending, a decline in non-performing loans across most categories, and strong profitability. Notably though, nonbank financial institutions continue to increase their share of the total lending market, providing strong competition to regulated banks without facing the same capital, liquidity, and other prudential standards. Regulated banks must be empowered to compete effectively with nonbanks that are challenging banks on both payments and lending. To that end, the Federal Reserve is encouraging banks to innovate to improve the products and services they provide. New technologies can create a more efficient banking sector that expands access to credit while also leveling the playing field with fintech and digital asset companies. We are currently working with the other banking regulators to develop capital, liquidity, and diversification regulations for stablecoin issuers as required by the GENIUS Act. We also need to provide clarity in treatment on digital assets to ensure that the banking system is well placed to support digital asset activities. I think this includes clarity on the permissibility of activities, but also a willingness to provide regulatory feedback on proposed new use cases. As a regulator, it is my role to encourage innovation in a responsible manner, and we must continuously improve our ability to supervise the risks to safety and soundness that innovation presents. Prioritizing Community Banking IssuesOne of the Federal Reserve's goals is to tailor our regulatory and supervisory framework to accurately reflect the risk that different banks pose to the financial system. Community banks are subject to less stringent standards than large banks, but there remains more opportunity to tailor regulations and supervision to the unique needs and circumstances of these banks. We cannot continue to push policies and supervisory expectations designed for the largest banks down to smaller, less risky, and less complex banks. In this regard, I support efforts by Congress to reduce burden on community banks. I support increasing static and outdated statutory thresholds, including asset thresholds, that have not been updated for years. Asset growth due, in part, to inflation over time has resulted in small banks becoming subject to laws and regulations that were intended for much larger banks. I also support improvements to the Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money-laundering framework that will assist law enforcement while minimizing unnecessary regulatory burden that disproportionately falls on community banks. As an example, the thresholds for Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs) and Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) have not been adjusted since they were established, despite decades of significant growth in the economy and financial system. These thresholds should be updated to more effectively focus resources on those transactions and activities that truly are suspicious. Where possible, the Federal Reserve is taking its own actions to further tailor regulatory and supervisory measures to support community banks in more effectively serving their customers and communities. We recently proposed changes to the community bank leverage ratio to provide community banks greater flexibility and optionality in their capital framework while preserving safety and soundness and the capital strength of the banking system. This enables community banks to focus on their core mission: stimulating economic growth and activity through lending to households and businesses. We also recently released new capital options for mutual banks, including capital instruments that could qualify as tier 1 common equity or as additional tier 1 equity. We are open to further refinement of these options and look forward to feedback. It is also time to more effectively tailor the merger and acquisition (M&A) and de novo chartering application processes for community banks. We are exploring streamlining these processes and updating the Federal Reserve Board's (Board's) merger analysis to accurately consider competition among small banks. Now is the time to build a framework for community banks that recognizes their unique strengths and supports their critical role in providing financial services to businesses and families throughout the United States. Effective regulatory frameworks are an essential operational foundation for our ability to effectively supervise financial institutions. We are in the process of conducting our third Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act (EGRPRA) review to eliminate outdated, unnecessary, or overly burdensome rules. My expectation is that—unlike previous EGRPRA reviews—this review will create substantive change. This type of regular assessment should be an ongoing aspect of our work. A proactive approach will ensure that regulations are responsive and adaptable to the evolving needs of, and conditions in, the banking sector. Regulatory Agenda for Large BanksWe are also modernizing and simplifying the Federal Reserve's regulation of large banks. The Board is considering modifications to each of the four pillars of our regulatory capital framework for large banks: stress testing, the supplementary leverage ratio, the Basel III framework, and the global systemically important banking organization (G-SIB) surcharge. Stress testing. The Board recently released a proposal to enhance public accountability and ensure robust outcomes of our stress testing framework and practices. The proposal includes disclosure of the stress test models, the framework for designing stress test scenarios, and the scenarios for the 2026 stress tests. It reduces volatility and balances model robustness and stability with full transparency. It also ensures that any future significant changes to these models will benefit from public input prior to implementation. Supplementary leverage ratio. The banking agencies recently finalized changes to the enhanced supplementary leverage ratio proposal for U.S. G-SIBs.1 These changes help ensure that leverage capital requirements serve primarily as a backstop to risk-based capital requirements, as originally intended. When the leverage ratio generally becomes the binding constraint, it discourages banks and dealers from engaging in low-risk activities, including holding Treasury securities, because the leverage ratio assigns the same capital requirement across both safe and risky assets. Basel III. The Board, together with our federal banking agency colleagues, has taken steps to advance Basel III in the United States. Finalizing Basel III is an important act of closure for the banking sector, reducing uncertainty and providing clarity on capital requirements, enabling banks to make better-informed business and investment decisions. My approach is to address the calibration of the new framework from the bottom up, rather than reverse engineer changes to achieve pre-determined or preconceived approaches to capital requirements. Modernizing capital requirements to support market liquidity, affordable homeownership, and the safety and soundness of banking is an important goal of these changes. In particular, the capital treatment of mortgages and mortgage servicing assets under the U.S. standardized approach has resulted in banks reducing their participation in this important lending activity, potentially curtailing access to mortgage credit. We are considering approaches to more granularly differentiate the riskiness of mortgages with benefits extending to financial institutions of all sizes, not just the largest banks. G-SIB surcharge.  In addition, the Federal Reserve is working to refine the G-SIB surcharge framework in coordination with broader capital framework reform efforts. It is essential that our comprehensive framework strikes the right balance between safety and soundness, ensuring financial stability and promoting economic growth. The surcharge must be carefully calibrated to avoid inadvertently inhibiting the ability of the banking sector to support the broader economy. We must maintain a robust financial system without imposing unnecessary burdens that impede economic growth. SupervisionI will now turn to the Federal Reserve's supervisory program. Over the last seven years, I have consistently emphasized the importance of transparency, accountability, and fairness in supervision. These principles guided my approach as a state banking commissioner, and they continue to guide my approach today. I also remain focused on the Board's responsibility to promote the safe and sound operations of banks and the stability of the U.S. financial system. An effective supervisory framework must focus on those factors that affect a bank's financial condition including material risks to bank operations and to the stability of the broader financial system, not immaterial issues that divert attention from core safety and soundness. It must be risk-based by design, concentrating resources where risks are most consequential and tailoring oversight to each institution's size, complexity, and risk profile. I have consistently supported a risk-focused, tailored approach to supervision and regulations, and it is the direction I have provided to Federal Reserve examiners in recent guidance and also released publicly.2 As part of this effort, the Federal Reserve is also considering a regulation that would clarify the standards for enforcement actions based on an unsafe or unsound practice, Matters Requiring Attention (MRAs), and other supervisory findings based on threats to safety and soundness. Our revised framework will prioritize addressing substantive threats to banks rather than administrative deficiencies. By focusing our supervisory resources on material issues that historically have correlated to bank failures, we create a more effective and efficient oversight system that enhances financial stability. Another step we are taking to address these concerns is through the review of our CAMELS framework, which has been in place since 1979 with minimal modification. The management ("M") component, for example, has been widely criticized as an arbitrary and highly subjective catch-all category. Establishing clear metrics and parameters for all of the components will ensure transparency and objectivity in our supervisory assessments. Bank ratings should reflect overall safety and soundness, not just isolated deficiencies in a single component. Prior to the recent modification of the Large Financial Institution (LFI) ratings system, banks have often been labeled as not "well managed" despite strong capital and liquidity positions. To address this shortcoming, the Board recently finalized revisions to the LFI ratings system that address the mismatch between ratings and overall firm condition. In addition to sharpening the focus on financial risks, updating our ratings frameworks, and refining our supervisory tools, we are also reviewing our supervisory directives, reports and actions. Further, the Board officially ended the practice of using reputational risk in our supervisory program.3 This change addressed legitimate concerns that supervision around an ambiguous concept like reputational risk could improperly influence a bank's business decisions. We are also considering a regulation to prevent Board personnel from encouraging, influencing or compelling banks to debank or refuse to bank a customer due to their constitutionally protected political or religious beliefs, associations, speech or conduct. Let me be clear: banking supervisors should never, and will not under my watch, dictate which individuals and lawful businesses a bank is permitted to serve. Banks must remain free to make their own risk-based decisions to serve individuals and lawful businesses. Thank you, again, for the opportunity to appear before you this morning. As you know, the Federal Reserve is currently in the pre-Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting blackout period during which FOMC members are not permitted to discuss monetary policy. Therefore, unfortunately, I will not be able to discuss monetary policy during today's hearing. With that in mind, I look forward to answering your questions. 1. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Agencies Request Comment on Proposal to Modify Certain Regulatory Capital Standards," press release, June 27, 2025.  2. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Federal Reserve Board Releases Information Regarding Enhancements to Bank Supervision," press release, November 18, 2025.  3. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Federal Reserve Board Announces That Reputational Risk Will No Longer Be a Component of Examination Programs in Its Supervision of Banks," press release, June 23, 2025. 

MarketAxess Holdings Inc. (Nasdaq: MKTX), the operator of a leading electronic trading platform for fixed-income securities, today announced that Chris Concannon, Chief Executive Officer, and Ilene Fiszel Bieler, Chief Financial Officer, will participate in the Goldman Sachs Financial Services Conference on December 9, 2025. Mr. Concannon and Ms. Fiszel Bieler will participate in a fireside chat at 10:00 a.m. ET. The live webcast and replay for the fireside chat will be available on the events and presentations section of the MarketAxess Investor Relations homepage, https://investor.marketaxess.com/events-and-presentations.