Singapore Exchange Derivatives Trading Limited (SGX-DT) is based in Singapore. It is licensed by the FMA under the Financial Markets Conduct Act as an overseas regulated market. The Monetary Authority Singapore (MAS) is SGX-DT’s primary regulator.    In 2021, the New Zealand dairy derivatives contracts were migrated from NZX to SGX-DT.     We are required to review and report on how well SGX-DT is meeting its licensed market operator obligations. We may carry out this review at any time but must do so at least annually. SGX-DT obligations review 2025 This report covers the FMA’s review of SGX-DT for the period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025.  Download the 2025 SGX-DT market operator obligations review [PDF 601KB]   Executive summary About this report Singapore Exchange Derivatives Trading Limited (SGX-DT) is based in Singapore. It is licensed by the Financial Markets Authority – Te Mana Tātai Hokohoko (FMA) under section 317 of the Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 (FMC Act) as an overseas regulated market. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) is SGX-DT’s primary regulator. SGX-DT is licensed to operate the SGX-DT Dairy Derivatives Market. On 21 November 2021, the New Zealand dairy derivatives contracts were migrated from the NZX Limited (NZX) to SGX-DT.   The FMC Act requires the FMA to carry out a review and report on how well SGX-DT is meeting its licensed market operator obligations. We may carry out this review at any time but must do so at least annually.   This report covers the FMA’s review of SGX-DT for the period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025 (‘the review period’). This is our fourth review of SGX-DT since its licence came into effect on 13 September 2021. How we approached this review SGX-DT is primarily regulated by MAS, and we did not receive notification of issues or changes to the financial products during the review period. For these reasons we have relied on MAS’s oversight and its ongoing satisfaction with SGX-DT’s compliance. We have considered feedback from MAS, a self-assessment report from SGX-DT, governance and risk management arrangements at SGX-DT, reporting received from SGX-DT during the review period, and the operation of the market in general. We employ a risk-based approach to monitoring, and while this review is of SGX-DT’s overall compliance with its licensed market operator obligations, we have exercised judgement in selecting the areas of focus, and the level and detail of work performed in each. This report highlights our main findings and observations from the review and, as with any risk-based approach, has inherent limitations. Overall assessment We are satisfied that SGX-DT continued to comply with its licensed market operator obligations during the review period. Our conclusion is largely based on MAS’s oversight, which found no information to suggest non-compliance.   Some key observations of the review period include: no material changes to the arrangements under which the market is operating.  ongoing compliance with respect to regulatory obligations.  the market remains fit for purpose, and trading volumes continued to increase.  continued operational performance from a technical perspective.  We thank SGX-DT staff for their assistance in providing valuable information for this review.   Focus areas Compliance and oversight Monitoring and oversight by primary regulator SGX-DT is primarily regulated by MAS. We engaged with MAS to understand its continued monitoring and oversight arrangements, as well as its assessment of SGX-DT’s overall compliance during the review period. As in prior years, MAS continues to consider SGX-DT to be a systemically important entity and has a comprehensive monitoring and oversight regime carried out through on-site inspections, off-site inspections and external reviews. Working with internal and external auditors, as well as SGX-DT’s compliance units, MAS maintains regular oversight through its monitoring of SGX-DT’s operations and compliance with relevant regulations. In addition, MAS maintains consistent dialogue with SGX-DT, at the management level and with relevant business functions. MAS also monitors SGX-DT’s response to any findings and has arrangements in place to ensure notification of issues such as outages or potential market volatility are made as soon as they arise. From its ongoing supervision of SGX-DT, MAS confirmed it does not have regulatory concerns with SGX-DT’s ability to operate an approved exchange in Singapore and SGX-DT continues to be in good standing with MAS.  Market suitability As a means of assessing continued market suitability, we considered any changes made to the products and the operation of the market, initiatives to ensure the market remains fit for purpose for market participants and any concerns raised by the market participants or end users as to the market’s operation. There were no notable changes to financial products or the operation of the market. To ensure continued suitability of the market, the SGX-NZX Dairy Committee was established during the review period, tasked with providing guidance and facilitating collaboration within the dairy industry, thereby providing insights into key challenges affecting the dairy industry and supporting the development of products that meet the evolving needs of the market. We also sought feedback on any issues or queries raised by a key end user in New Zealand in relation to the suitability of dairy derivative products offered for NZ retail investors on SGX-DT, including the operation and access to the market. No issues or queries were raised by this end user in relation to the market. We were satisfied the market continued to be fit for purpose and that consideration is being given to market participant and end user feedback. Operational performance of the market The review period featured ongoing noticeable interest in dairy derivatives, indicating that the market continues to perform well. During the review period, open interest and average daily trading volume amounted to 190,396 lots and 2,929 lots respectively, a 22% and 14% rise compared to the same period in 2024. The performance of the system was stable, with no market disruptions experienced during the review period, including no material changes made to the arrangements to operate the market. The number of trading alerts triggered for dairy derivatives contracts decreased to 697 during the review period, compared to 992 in the previous period, with no market anomalies observed in the trading of dairy derivatives by the Surveillance team at SGX-DT. In addition, no investigations were undertaken for market misconduct or breaches of the exchange rules, with no disciplinary proceedings conducted by the Enforcement unit during the review period. We were satisfied with how the market operated during the review period and identified no concerns in relation to its performance.   Appendix: Our role in reviewing SGX-DT Our role The FMA is an Independent Crown Entity. Our purpose is to promote and facilitate the development of fair, efficient and transparent financial markets. Under the FMC Act, we are required to review, at least annually, how well a licensed market operator is meeting its obligations. We are also required to publish a written report of the review. If we consider, after carrying out a review, that a licensed market operator has failed or is failing to meet any one or more of its market operator obligations, we may, by written notice, require the licensed market operator to submit an action plan to the FMA. Market operator obligations In the FMC Act, ‘market operator obligations’, for an overseas entity such as SGX-DT, means: the general obligations in respect of licensed markets (section 314):  to ensure, to the extent that is reasonably practicable, that each of its licensed markets is a fair, orderly and transparent market  to have adequate arrangements for notifying disclosures made to it from participants in its markets, and for continuing to make those disclosures available  to have adequate arrangements for handling conflicts between its commercial interests and the need to ensure its markets operate in a fair, orderly and transparent manner  to have adequate arrangements for monitoring the conduct of participants in its markets  to have adequate arrangements for enforcing compliance with market rules  to have sufficient resources (including financial, technological and human resources) to operate its licensed markets properly  an obligation to give the FMA an annual self-assessment of compliance with its obligations (section 337)  an obligation to act on the directions of the FMA or the Minister, if the operator is found to be failing to meet any of its obligations (sections 340 to 342)  any obligation imposed as a condition of a market operator’s licence. Our approach to oversight of SGX-DT A market operator that is authorised and regulated in an overseas country may be licensed under the FMC Act if certain conditions are met. A key requirement is that the home jurisdiction responsible for regulating and supervising the market operator should provide a level of investor protection and market integrity that is comparable to the FMC Act. This allows us to rely on the overseas regulator to assess and monitor the capability and compliance of the market operator. SGX-DT’s market operator obligations are outlined in the FMC Act, as noted above. SGX-DT must also report to MAS annually on how it complies with its market operator obligations. MAS may assess at any time how well SGX-DT is complying with any or all of the obligations. The FMA and MAS are both signatories of the IOSCO Memorandum of Understanding (MMOU), which sets out the principles for mutual assistance and exchange of information between regulatory agencies that are party to the MMOU. This allows the FMA to request, and MAS to share, information relating to SGX-DT’s operations. A key component of our review was to request and review information from MAS on SGX-DT’s compliance with its Singapore-based obligations, and whether SGX-DT was of good standing in its home jurisdiction. We requested information on: MAS’s ongoing oversight of SGX-DT.  any matters or concerns raised with SGX-DT and how they were addressed.  MAS’s overall view of SGX-DT’s compliance with its market operator obligations.  For the purposes of this review, we also reviewed and considered: SGX-DT’s self-assessment report on its compliance with its obligations under the FMC Act.  a summary of MAS’s engagements with SGX-DT.  activity monitored during the review period, including market changes such as rule settings, new products launched and governance changes for example.  other engagements and correspondence between FMA and SGX-DT during the review period, including with New Zealand end-users. 

The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Examinations today released its 2026 examination priorities. The Division publishes its annual examination priorities to provide transparency to registrants and investors about the topics that the Division plans to focus on in the new fiscal year and to encourage firms to direct their compliance efforts on areas of potentially heightened risk. “Examinations are an important component to accomplishing the agency’s mission, but they should not be a ’gotcha’ exercise,” said SEC Chairman Paul S. Atkins. “Today’s release of examination priorities should enable firms to prepare to have a constructive dialogue with SEC examiners and provide transparency into the priorities of the agency’s most public-facing division.” The Division examines SEC-registered investment advisers, investment companies, broker-dealers, clearing agencies, and self-regulatory organizations, among others, for compliance with federal securities laws. The annual publication of the examination priorities furthers the SEC’s mission and aligns with the Division’s four pillars to promote and improve compliance, prevent fraud, monitor risk, and inform policy. “In this increasingly complex and changing financial and regulatory environment, we strive to improve compliance in a way that that is both transparent and practical,” said Keith Cassidy, Acting Director of the Division of Examinations. “Fiscal year 2026 marks an important time for the Division to build on our strengths, advance our mission with renewed focus, and ensure that our examination program continues to protect the investing public and support fair and orderly capital markets.” For fiscal year 2026, in addition to conducting examinations in core areas such as fiduciary duty, standards of conduct, and the custody rule, the Division will also examine for compliance with new rules, such as the 2024 amendments to Regulation S-P. As with previous years, the Division will prioritize examinations of newly registered advisers and investment companies to empower and encourage building robust compliance programs. The 2026 examination priorities cover a broad landscape of potential risks to investors that firms should consider as they review and strengthen their compliance programs. They are not, however, an exhaustive list of all the areas the Division will focus on in the upcoming year. The scope of any examination includes analysis of other risk factors such as an entity’s history, operations, and products and services. Resources 2026 Priorities

Thank you to the Society for the honor of addressing your annual meeting.1 In doing a little research on the SPE's history, I noted that one goal cited by the business economists who founded this group was creating a forum to discuss the divergence between real-world challenges and economic theory. That task is pressing when business profits, losses, and the jobs of employees are on the line, and the stakes are also high for economic policymakers, who face those very challenges today. Economies are confoundingly difficult to understand because, in a sense, they are the largest and most complex things ever created by humans. Economists try to make sense of this complicated world and explain in logical and clear terms how to understand it. We develop rigorous theories that yield testable hypotheses, and we test those hypotheses to see if they are supported or rejected by the data. Being both an economist and economic policymaker, my objective today is to follow in that tradition and use economic theory and various types of data to describe my outlook for the U.S. economy and my views on the appropriate course of monetary policy. It may seem odd to come all the way to London to speak about the U.S. economy, but I hope it will be of interest—and I did warn the organizers about what I would talk about. Monetary policymakers like to use forward guidance to avoid surprises. Formulating my outlook has been complicated recently by the 43-day government shutdown, including the agencies that produce key economic data. As I will argue, I believe the challenge presented by this missing data has been overstated in many quarters. Policymakers and forecasters are not "flying blind" or "in a fog." While it is always nice to have more data, as economists, we are skilled at using whatever available data there is to formulate forecasts. Despite the government shutdown, we have a wealth of private and some public-sector data that provide an imperfect but perfectly actionable picture of the U.S. economy. So, what is that data telling us? First, that the labor market is still weak and near stall speed. Second, that inflation through September continued to show relatively small effects from tariffs and support the hypothesis that tariffs are having a one-off effect raising price levels in the U.S. and are not a persistent source of inflation. Accounting for estimated tariff effects, underlying inflation is relatively close to the Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) 2 percent target. Third, despite realized inflation running close to 3 percent and above target for five years, medium- and longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored. And, lastly, even excluding the temporary effects of the shutdown, growth in real gross domestic product (GDP) has likely slowed in the second half of 2025 from its fast pace in the second quarter. This reading of the data leads me, at this moment, to support a cut in the FOMC's policy rate at our next meeting on December 9 and 10 as a matter of risk management. As I will discuss in more detail, risk management, in fact, provides some practical guidance in dealing with two questions that seem to have flummoxed some people: Is the job-creation slowdown in the U.S. this year mostly supply or demand related, and how should monetary policy respond? Before I delve into the outlook, I'd like to say a bit more about data availability. The official sources delayed by the U.S. government shutdown are important but by no means the only source of information for Fed policymakers about the economy. At any time, my colleagues and I rely on a range of data to form our views on economic conditions and the outlook. That can be "hard" data, such as official government statistics, or "soft" data, gleaned from surveys or conversations with a variety of people. Often, different sources of data are consistent with each other, but at critical times they can conflict. When that happens, it takes our skills as economists to reconcile this conflict. Let me cite two examples of my own experience to illustrate this point. First, back in 2022, the Fed was combating rampant inflation, and this required large and rapid increases in our policy rate. Standard Phillips curve models predicted that this would cause a sharp slowdown in economic growth and high unemployment. However, I had more trust in the Beveridge curve, which relates the unemployment rate to the job vacancy rate, as my guide to thinking about how the labor market would respond to these large rate hikes. I argued that we were on the steep part of the Beveridge curve, which meant that we could tighten policy and that the brunt of the effect would be borne by a decline in job vacancies, and crucially, not by the higher unemployment many predicted. A critical assumption I made was that a spike in layoffs would not occur. This assumption was controversial, since previous hard data showed that this was not the typical outcome. But all of my business contacts at that time were telling me about their struggles to find and keep workers since the COVID-19 pandemic and that they had no intention of letting workers go if aggregate demand eased. This "soft" data helped convince me that my view of the labor market was correct, and subsequent "hard" data confirmed my theoretical prediction. The second example of reconciling conflicting data is from this past summer. From late spring through June, the soft data, including anecdotes from business contacts, suggested the labor market was in a "no hire, no fire" equilibrium. Firms repeatedly said they were holding off on hiring for a variety of reasons. Yet the hard data at that time indicated a robust job market, with job creation rising from a monthly average of 110,000 in the first quarter to 150,000 in the second quarter. It was clear to me that, once again, something wasn't quite right with the labor market despite the official data. After the June FOMC meeting, I said that the labor market was more fragile than the hard data indicated and that the Committee needed to cut the policy rate to head off substantial weakening in the labor market.2 This was clearly an out-of-consensus view that raised more than a few eyebrows. But when the July jobs report was released on August 1, the second-quarter jobs numbers were revised down dramatically—from an average of 150,000 per month to 64,000 a month, which vindicated my view. So, once again, the soft data gave a better signal of the state of the labor market than the hard data. Now let me turn to the outlook, and I will start with U.S. economic activity. In my last speech, I discussed an apparent conflict between some forecasts of GDP growth in the second half of 2025 and the story that the labor market is weakening.3 In the absence of more official data but with additional private-sector forecasts and surveys, it now appears to me that economic activity is not accelerating and, therefore, is tracking more closely with the weak labor market data than appeared to be the case when I spoke on October 16. For example, private-sector forecasts, as seen by the median of respondents to the Blue Chip survey, are pointing to real GDP growth for the second half of this year that will be close to the modest first-half pace and a significant slowing from the pace of last year. Of course, one factor lowering economic growth in the fourth quarter is the shutdown, which lasted longer than many expected. I continue to assume that any loss in real GDP growth in the fourth quarter will boost growth by roughly the same amount early next year. But besides that one-off boost from the shutdown, a possible warning about future economic activity is coming from a survey of consumer sentiment conducted by the University of Michigan. While over the decades this survey has not been closely correlated with near-term spending, large and persistent drops in consumer sentiment have occurred heading into recessions. In the United States, personal consumption expenditures are about 70 percent of GDP, so a slowdown in spending has dramatic implications for GDP growth. The Michigan survey is down significantly since July and fell unexpectedly sharply in October to near its record low reading. The dour view expressed by consumers, which may have been affected by the shutdown, lines up with what I am hearing from U.S. businesses, which report slackening demand from middle- and lower-income consumers. One interesting detail from that survey is that deteriorating consumer sentiment was widespread among different demographic groups, with the exception of those who own stocks. While the booming stock market is supporting spending by a narrow band of well-off consumers, it does not reflect financial conditions for most Americans, and that is a vulnerability for the economy. The rise in the stock market is substantially driven by artificial intelligence (AI)–related businesses that only account for a small share of employment.4 Even while AI's share of stock market growth and corporate profits grew significantly from 2021 through 2024, employment in AI-related firms held steady at less than 3 percent of nonfarm employment. While I believe AI will create jobs in the medium term, the AI boom on Wall Street isn't doing so yet. A factor that I believe will weigh on spending in the coming months is that most households are facing strains in purchasing large assets, such as housing and autos, in part because of the expense. While home price increases have slowed recently and even declined in some parts of the country, prices rose significantly in the past few years. That is especially true for lower-value homes, which is making it harder for first-time buyers. Although mortgage rates have declined a bit this year, they are still above 6 percent and much higher than the average for the decade or so before rates began rising in 2022. Housing affordability is near a record low. Since 2020, the income needed to afford a median priced home has risen by 50 percent, while median income through 2024 was up about 26 percent.5 And while the growth of mortgage debt has slowed, that in part reflects how high mortgage rates are weighing on demand for mortgages. Turning to auto loan growth, it has been relatively weak this year, likely reflecting a combination of weak demand from households and pressures in car affordability. To a greater extent than housing, the cost of purchasing an auto mostly reflects the price, but interest rates play a factor in the monthly payment. Auto loan rates continue to be elevated relative to their average in the years before the pandemic. For example, in 2019, the average five-year loan carried a 5.3 percent interest rate, whereas the average is now 7.6 percent.6 Reflecting the combination of higher auto prices and interest rate expenses, the weeks of median income needed to purchase an average new vehicle remains elevated, rising from 32.8 weeks in November 2019 to 37.4 weeks in September this year.7 To sum up, I consider the costs of housing and autos to be an ongoing challenge for consumers, especially lower- and middle-income consumers. This is likely weighing on spending growth and would become a more acute problem if the labor market continues to weaken. Now let me turn to inflation, which, even with the delay in price data is the more straightforward side of the FOMC's dual mandate to discuss. Twelve-month consumer price index inflation through September was 3 percent, and estimates are that inflation based on personal consumption expenditures—the FOMC's targeted measure—was about 2.8 percent. Tariff effects have been smaller than many forecasters expected and the fraction borne by consumers will only modestly boost inflation—an effect that has been quite gradual so far because of the slow drawdown of inventories that was built up in anticipation of tariffs. Despite inflation that has been above target for five years, inflation expectations are well anchored in the medium and longer run. To me, this shows that financial markets understand that they need to look through one-time price-level shocks and that they have confidence the FOMC will achieve its 2 percent target in the medium term. With the evidence of slower economic growth and the prospect of only modest wage increases from the weak labor market, I don't see any factors that would cause an acceleration of inflation. Let me now focus on the side of the FOMC's economic mandate that has more of my attention—maximum employment. In the absence of federal data on the labor market, states have continued to report on initial and continuing unemployment insurance claims and private-sector sources have continued to publish their data as well. While there are methodological differences in these private data—some of it that is less than comprehensive and some that does not meet the strictest statistical standards—the private data do contain useful information. According to the Labor Department, we know that job creation in the U.S. stalled from May through August, and with expected revisions that have been previewed and will become official next year, it is likely that employment actually fell over that period. A private-sector measure of job creation that has continued since August, produced by the payroll services firm ADP, mirrored the drop in official data from May through August, reporting a monthly average of 27,000 jobs created over that period, compared to the 143,000 a month that ADP counted for the six months up to May. While the ADP data are quite volatile and have some other shortcomings that make them less reliable than government statistics, I do think these data are telling us something. And in September and October, ADP reported that businesses created a net total of only 6,500 jobs a month. And the latest weekly data are even weaker. Slowing labor demand is also being echoed in surveys of employers and workers. There has been a steady decline this year in the Conference Board index of job availability reported by employers. Fewer small businesses are saying it is hard to fill jobs according to the National Federation of Independent Business. Meanwhile, job postings by Indeed continued to drift lower in October. A new survey of large employers found that these companies are predicting that 2026 will be the worst job market for new college graduates since the pandemic year of 2021, when the unemployment rate was around 6 percent at graduation time.8 One series of government labor market data that we do have, continuing state-level claims for unemployment benefits, have risen, on net, in recent weeks and are running above levels in 2023 and 2024, although they are still fairly low by historical standards. This increase reflects the fact that it is taking unemployed individuals longer to find jobs than in the recent past. This is consistent with the well-known news lately about large corporate layoffs. Such announcements are anecdotes and may not be fully reflected, at least yet, in initial unemployment claims. But the numbers are eyepopping. The staffing firm Challenger, Gray & Christmas reported announcements of 153,000 job cuts in September and around 1 million so far in 2025, which is up 65 percent from 2024. By all accounts, many businesses may be cutting jobs, or allowing levels to fall by attrition, in connection with actual or anticipated productivity gains from AI. As you may know, there is a vigorous debate in the U.S. about whether the low job-creation numbers are the result of declining labor supply or declining labor demand. Simply looking at job-creation numbers isn't sufficient to answer the question—one must look at other data that correspond to these changes. To help sort things out, let's think about a standard supply and demand diagram. Consider a situation where there is a decline in labor supply that is greater than a decline in labor demand. This would shift the supply curve inward more than the demand curve. The result would be a reduction in employment, which is what we have seen. But it would also lead to upward pressure on wages due to labor shortages. We should also see an increase in job vacancies and a higher quits rate as workers chase higher-paying jobs. Furthermore, workers should be reporting that job availability is increasing, and firms should be saying that it's becoming more difficult to hire workers. Now consider the opposite situation: a contraction in labor demand that is greater than the decline in labor supply. Again, this would lead to a reduction in employment. But it would also correspond to downward pressure on wages from an excess supply of labor as well as declines in vacancies and quit rates; workers would be reporting that job availability is falling, and firms would be saying that hiring is getting easier. So, which of these two situations are the data telling me we are in? It is clear to me that the data are saying that there has been a greater reduction in demand than supply. I'm not seeing or hearing stories of an acceleration in wage growth, an increase in job openings, or a rise in the quits rate. The overwhelming share of the data I have cited so far supports the weaker demand story. There is definitely a reduction in supply, but, to me, that is masking the extent of the reduction in demand that I am concerned about. When outcomes are uncertain, policymakers must manage the risks, and the evidence is pointing toward a greater risk that low job creation is predominantly demand driven. This has implications for monetary policy. So let's talk about the implications of this hard and soft data. With underlying inflation close to the FOMC's target and evidence of a weak labor market, I support cutting the Committee's policy rate by another 25 basis points at our December meeting. For reasons I have explained, I am not worried about inflation accelerating or inflation expectations rising significantly. My focus is on the labor market, and after months of weakening, it is unlikely that the September jobs report later this week or any other data in the next few weeks would change my view that another cut is in order. I worry that restrictive monetary policy is weighing on the economy, especially about how it is affecting lower-and middle-income consumers. A December cut will provide additional insurance against an acceleration in the weakening of the labor market and move policy toward a more neutral setting. 1. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee. 2. For a discussion of the tension in the hard and soft labor market data, see Christopher J. Waller (2025), "The Case for Cutting Now," speech delivered at the Money Marketeers of New York University, New York, New York, July 17.  3. See Christopher J. Waller (2025), "Cutting Rates in the Face of Conflicting Data," speech delivered at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, New York, October 16.  4. Between 2021 and 2024, the workforce of AI-related firms stayed at levels equivalent to less than 3 percent of the entire U.S. nonfarm labor employment—that is, a small number of firms are accounting for an increasingly larger share of corporate profits but are not growing their share of labor demand at a commensurate pace. Return to text 5. See https://tinyurl.com/3sr3cxae. Also see https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEPAINUSA646N  6. See "Finance Rate on Consumer Installment Loans at Commercial Banks, New Autos 60 Month Loan," Federal Reserve Economic Data.  7. See Cox Automotive (2025), "September Incentives Hit High, but Record Prices Keep New-Vehicle Affordability Tight," October 15, https://www.coxautoinc.com/insights-hub/sept-2025-vai.  8. See Lindsay Ellis (2025), "Companies Predict 2026 Will Be the Worst College Grad Job Market in Five Years," Wall Street Journal, November 13. 

CFTC's Weekly Swaps Report has been updated, and is now available: http://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/SwapsReports/index.htm.Additional information on the Weekly Swaps Report. Archive Explanatory Notes Swaps Report Data Dictionary Release Schedule Released: Weekly on Mondays at 3:30 p.m.

The Division of Corporation Finance has thoroughly considered its role in the Rule 14a-8 process for the 2025-2026 proxy season. Due to current resource and timing considerations following the lengthy government shutdown and the large volume of registration statements and other filings requiring prompt staff attention, as well as the extensive body of guidance from the Commission and the staff available to both companies and proponents, the Division has determined to not respond to no-action requests for, and express no views on, companies’ intended reliance on any basis for exclusion of shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8, other than no-action requests to exclude a proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(1). Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j), companies that intend to exclude shareholder proposals from their proxy materials must still notify the Commission and proponents no later than 80 calendar days before filing a definitive proxy statement. We remind companies and proponents, however, that this requirement is informational only, there is no requirement that companies seek the staff’s views regarding their intended exclusion of a proposal, and no response from the staff is required.[1] In light of recent developments regarding the application of state law and Rule 14a-8(i)(1) to precatory proposals,[2] the Division has determined that there is not a sufficient body of applicable guidance for companies and proponents to rely on. As such, the Division will continue to review and express its views on no-action requests related to Rule 14a-8(i)(1) until such time as it determines there is sufficient guidance available to assist companies and proponents in their decision-making process. Although the Division will not respond substantively to submissions regarding companies’ intent to exclude shareholder proposals other than no-action requests related to Rule 14a-8(i)(1), we recognize that a company may wish to receive some form of a response to its notification that it intends to exclude a proposal from its proxy materials. Accordingly, if a company wishes to receive a response for any proposal that it intends to exclude pursuant to a basis other than Rule 14a-8(i)(1), the company or its counsel must include, as part of its notification pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j), an unqualified representation that the company has a reasonable basis to exclude the proposal based on the provisions of Rule 14a-8, prior published guidance,[3] and/or judicial decisions. In those situations, the Division will respond with a letter indicating that, based solely on the company’s or counsel’s representation, the Division will not object if the company omits the proposal from its proxy materials.[4] In providing its response, the Division will not evaluate the adequacy of the representation or express a view on the basis or bases the company intends to rely on in excluding the proposal. Accordingly, a company’s Rule 14a-8(j) notification should be limited to the information required by the rule as well as an unqualified representation that the company has a reasonable basis to exclude the proposal. This announcement applies to the current proxy season (October 1, 2025 – September 30, 2026) as well as no-action requests received before October 1, 2025 to which the Division has not yet responded. Companies that have already submitted a request relying on a basis for exclusion other than Rule 14a-8(i)(1) and that wish to receive a response from the Division should submit a notice that includes the representation described above. In those cases, the time of the initial submission will apply for purposes of the 80-day requirement in Rule 14a-8(j). Notices submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j) must be submitted to the Division using our online Shareholder Proposal Form. Questions about this announcement should be directed to the Division of Corporation Finance’s Office of Chief Counsel at shareholderproposals@sec.gov or 202-551-3500. The Division of Investment Management is responsible for responding to Rule 14a-8 requests related to investment companies. The staff of the Division of Investment Management will follow a substantially similar process as set forth above. Any notices submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j) related to investment companies must be submitted to the Division of Investment Management by email to IMshareholderproposals@sec.gov. Questions about this announcement concerning investment companies should be directed to the Division of Investment Management’s Disclosure Review and Accounting Office at IMshareholderproposals@sec.gov or 202-551-6921. [1] See Statement of Informal Procedures for the Rendering of Staff Advice With Respect to Shareholder Proposals, Release No. 34-12599 (July 7, 1976) [41 FR 29989 (July 20, 1976)]. [2] See Paul S. Atkins, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Keynote Address at the John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance’s 25th Anniversary Gala, Oct. 9, 2025, available at: https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/atkins-10092025-keynote-address-john-l-weinberg-center-corporate-governances-25th-anniversary-gala. [3] Prior staff responses to Rule 14a-8 no-action requests are not binding and reflect only informal staff views. The absence of a prior staff response indicating that the staff agreed that there was some basis to exclude a particular type of proposal does not mean that companies cannot form a reasonable basis to exclude the proposal. Likewise, a prior staff response indicating that the staff was unable to concur with a company’s view that a proposal may be excluded does not mean that companies cannot form a reasonable basis to exclude the same or a similar proposal. [4] Staff responses to no-action requests and Rule 14a-8(j) notifications are not binding on the Commission or other Divisions and Offices and do not preclude the Commission from taking enforcement action in appropriate circumstances.

By Announcement today, the Division of Corporation Finance has apparently determined that, as a matter of “resource and timing considerations,” it will not respond to no-action requests for relief under Rule 14a-8. But, this Announcement is more of a giveaway to issuers than an exercise in resource allocation. And, more directly, it is an act of hostility toward shareholders. For example, although the Announcement headlines that staff will not issue no-action relief to companies seeking to exclude shareholder proposals this proxy season—staff is purportedly being neutral and staying out of the mix—the Announcement later allows that, if a company really wants the SEC’s blessing and asks nicely (think, “pretty pretty please”), then all the company needs to do is cite to a rule provision and the Division will issue “no objection” relief. The Division will take the company’s request at face value—(“the Division will not evaluate the adequacy of the representation or express a view on the basis or bases the company intends to rely on in excluding the proposal”). And, notwithstanding that the Division will not do any substantive review of the company’s representations or interpretations, “the Division will respond with a letter indicating that, based solely on the company’s or counsel’s representation, the Division will not object if the company omits the proposal from its proxy materials.” It is one thing to announce that the Division is not in the business of issuing no-action letters due to resource constraints. It is another thing entirely to pronounce—tell us what you want us to say and we’ll bless it. Indeed, the Division will “not object” even if it would have disagreed with the company’s analysis had it substantively reviewed the submission. And, the Division will apparently “not object” even if the representations are unreasonable on their face or contain misrepresentations or omissions. Why should the Division “not object” when a submission is clearly objectionable? Today’s missive will give the false impression that the Division is “not objecting” to a company’s position because it agrees with the grounds of the submission; when in fact the Division is “not objecting” because staff have been ordered to rubber stamp those submissions irrespective of their content. Further, the Announcement carves out one exception to the “no-action” entitlement to companies—for so called “precatory” or non-binding proposals. The reason for this exception is “recent developments regarding the application of state law and Rule 14a-8(i)(1)” for which there is “not a sufficient body of applicable guidance.” But the Announcement does not cite any changes in law. (Spoiler alert – that is because there have not been any). What has changed is institutional policy. The Chairman has indicated in a recent speech that if a company obtains an opinion of counsel that precatory proposals are not a proper subject for shareholder action under Delaware state law, then he has “high confidence that the SEC staff will honor that position.”[1] The Chairman’s speech is a not-so-implicit invitation for any lawyer (knowledgeable or not) to write an opinion favorable to their client, and then the Division will give its seal of approval to jettison a sweeping slate of shareholder proposals. The speech leaves the uncanny impression that the Commission is now anointing itself the newest Vice Chancellor on the Delaware Court of Chancery, effectively creating new state law (which it can then itself bless), to carry out an agenda that affords companies sweeping rights to reject shareholder proposals without impediment or regard for precedent. Finally, the Announcement states that no-action relief has become superfluous because there is an “extensive body of guidance from the Commission and the staff available to both companies and proponents.” But later, it notes that “[p]rior staff responses to Rule 14a-8 no-action requests are not binding and reflect only informal staff views.” The message of course is that when the Division does speak, in carrying out this Commission’s pedagogy, it is allowed to cherry-pick and determine which guidance it finds most helpful to the current agenda (and companies are apparently invited to do the same). Today’s Announcement is a Trojan horse. It cloaks itself in neutrality by expressing that the Division will not weigh in on any company’s exclusion of shareholder proposals, but then it hands companies a hall pass to do whatever they want. It effectively creates unqualified permission for companies to silence investor voices (with “no objection” from the Commission). This is the latest in a parade of actions by this Commission that will ring the death knell for corporate governance and shareholder democracy, deny voice to the equity owners of corporations, and elevate management to untouchable status. In a neutral way, of course. [1] See Chairman Paul S. Atkins, Keynote Address at the John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance’s 25th Anniversary Gala (Oct. 9, 2025).

I am pleased to join you once again to provide an update on the digital euro. This is my seventh exchange of views with this Committee on the topic. We are making progress on both legislative and technical preparations, bringing us closer to ensuring that central bank money can continue to serve Europe’s citizens, businesses and economy in the digital era. The EU Council aims to agree on its general approach to the draft legislation by the end of the year,[1] and you are working to define the European Parliament’s position. At the Euro Summit in October, euro area leaders reiterated the strategic importance of the digital euro. They stressed the importance of swiftly completing legislative work and accelerating other preparatory steps.[2] To ensure technical readiness, the ECB’s Governing Council recently decided to move to the next phase of the digital euro project.[3] As we continue to prepare for the potential issuance of a digital euro, I would like to address some recurring questions head-on. In the public debate, I frequently hear four questions in particular: Why do we need another payment solution? Are you not putting banks’ business models at risk? Would the digital euro replace cash? Could it be used to control people and interfere with their privacy? Let me address each of them in turn. Digital cash First, why do we need a digital euro? The simple answer is: to extend the benefits of cash to digital payments. Cash has multiple benefits: it is our sovereign money, issued by an EU institution, the European Central Bank. It is accepted throughout the euro area. It is easy to use, free of charge and inclusive, and it protects privacy. Research shows that consumers value these features.[4] But we cannot use cash – and enjoy its benefits – for digital payments. Online payments are a case in point. They now account for more than a third of our day-to-day purchases. For consumers, the absence of cash for online transactions – and digital transactions more broadly – reduces their options and thus their freedom in deciding how to pay. For merchants, this means less negotiating power and higher costs for accepting digital payments, ultimately resulting in lower margins for them and higher prices for consumers. The digital euro aims to address these issues by offering a digital form of cash. And there is demand for it. In a survey conducted by the Eurosystem, 66% of Europeans, after being introduced to the digital euro, expressed interest in trying it.[5] Merchants, meanwhile, have emphasised the potential of the digital euro to make it easier and cheaper for them to accept digital payments.[6] But for Europe in particular, there is an additional, specific and critically important reason: not having a digital form of cash puts our strategic autonomy at risk. 25 years on from the launch of the euro, we still do not have a European payment solution that enables people to pay digitally throughout the euro area for all day-to-day payments. The fragmentation of the payments market means that the euro area depends on the “kindness of strangers” for retail digital transactions. And we have hard data to demonstrate this. 15 out of 20 euro area countries do not currently have a domestic solution that is used significantly for digital payments in shops, and over half do not have a widely accepted domestic solution for e-commerce payments.[7] Even those domestic card schemes that provide a European alternative in some countries still rely on non-European card schemes for cross-border transactions within the euro area. Today, international card schemes settle two-thirds of card-based transactions in the euro area. So, we have a clear problem, to which the digital euro offers a clear solution. The digital euro will provide a digital form of cash that will complement the banknotes and coins we are familiar with, thereby ensuring that we can keep payments – both physical and digital – working at all times, without depending on decisions made outside Europe. The digital euro will be a European digital payment solution built on European infrastructure – all the providers we have selected are EU nationals controlled by EU nationals.[8] And it will ensure that the euro remains the single unit of account, protecting our monetary sovereignty even with the expansion of stablecoins – which are currently mostly denominated in foreign currencies – and unbacked crypto-assets. Preserving banks’ business models and enhancing the payment services they can offer Let me now turn to the implications for banks. The digital euro will allow them to preserve their business models and enhance the payment services they can offer. From the outset, we have envisaged that the digital euro would be distributed through banks. This is because they play a key role in financing the euro area economy and in the transmission of monetary policy. We have designed the digital euro in a way that ensures that banks will not be disintermediated. Like cash, digital euro holdings will not be remunerated. They will also be capped to avoid any risk of excessive deposit outflows, while a link to commercial bank accounts will ensure that people can pay and be paid seamlessly with digital euro, even for large amounts. Our recent technical assessments confirm that introducing the digital euro would not undermine financial stability.[9] What about the costs and benefits for banks’ payment business? With international card schemes, banks lose fees. With big tech mobile payment solutions, they lose fees and data. And in the future, with stablecoins – which do not face holding limits – they would lose fees, data and stable retail deposits. With the digital euro, however, the compensation model will ensure that banks benefit whenever a payment via one of these solutions is replaced by a digital euro transaction. This is because the Eurosystem will not charge scheme or settlement fees, creating savings that can be distributed among banks and merchants. Moreover, the digital euro will strengthen banks’ bargaining power vis-à-vis international card schemes. In addition, the digital euro will allow banks to enhance and scale up their payment services at a reduced cost. It will provide an open acceptance network and standards that private European initiatives, such as Wero and the European Payments Alliance, can leverage to increase their commercial appeal and achieve pan-European reach.[10] These providers will also be able to integrate the digital euro seamlessly into their existing payment solutions, for instance digital wallets, or co-badge it on physical cards.[11] Let me reiterate: there is no competition between public and private solutions. Rather, we envisage a mutually beneficial cooperation that makes Europe’s strategic autonomy in the retail payments market more achievable and credible. On the cost side, we have found that the digital euro investment costs for banks are likely to be significantly lower than some external studies have suggested and correspond to approximately 3.4% of significant banks’ annual IT upgrade budgets over a period of four years. The total investment costs are expected to be broadly comparable to those estimated for the revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2), and well below those for the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA).[12] Complementing physical cash, not replacing it Turning to concerns about the future of cash, we have been very clear that the digital euro will complement cash, not replace it – so that everyone is free to choose how they pay. In line with our Eurosystem cash strategy, we are working to ensure that physical cash continues to be available and accepted across the euro area as both a means of payment and a store of value. Cash is central bank money – euro banknotes are issued by the ECB. So we have no interest in discontinuing the issuance of cash. On the contrary, it is at the heart of our mandate. In fact, we are working on the third series of euro banknotes. The ongoing euro banknote redesign, which will bring improved security features, demonstrates that the ECB is committed to the future of cash. We have also been vocal supporters of strengthening the legal tender status of cash, which is an essential part of the Single Currency Package proposed by the European Commission and will help preserve the benefits of cash that I have already mentioned. We want people to be able to continue using cash in both physical and digital form, as they prefer. Protecting privacy and freedom The digital euro will also protect Europeans’ privacy and freedom – concerns that it could be used as a surveillance tool are unfounded. First, the offline functionality of the digital euro will offer cash-like privacy: when money moves from one wallet to another, the transaction details will be known only to the payer and the payee. No existing payment method offers comparable privacy levels, besides cash. Second, for online payments, the Eurosystem will not be able to identify the payer or the payee. We will use state-of-the-art technology to pseudonymise and encrypt all data, so we will not see any personal information – just codes representing the payer, the payee and the transaction amount, which only their banks will be able to link with their respective identities. Even for these codes there will be very strict rules on who can access them for the purpose of running the system. And we will make sure this can be audited. We will be supervised by independent data protection authorities to ensure that we comply with EU data protection law. We want them to see what we are doing, and we want to make sure that everybody knows we do as we say we will do. We will also remain open to exploring privacy-enhancing techniques in the future so that we can adopt more advanced technologies as soon as they are ready to be implemented – a necessity in a system that has to run one billion transactions every day. Third, checks to prevent fraud, money laundering and the financing of terrorism will be performed by banks, as is already the case. Fourth, the digital euro will never be programmable money: it will not be possible to restrict its use to predefined purposes. In other words, there will be no built-in limitations on where, when or for what it can be used. Finally, nobody will be forced to use the digital euro – it will only offer an additional payment option. Those who still harbour concerns will be able to continue using physical cash or other means of payment. The digital euro will be like physical cash, but in digital form. It will enhance Europeans’ freedom to choose how they pay, offering an additional option for all digital payments throughout the euro area. Delivering on the digital euro Delivering on the digital euro hinges on both legislative and technical readiness. The legislation will play a central role in securing the digital euro’s benefits. In particular, mandatory distribution and legal tender status are key to ensuring that the digital euro is accessible to everyone and accepted for any digital payment. Moreover, the digital euro’s online and offline functionalities will complement one another, combining the convenience of digital payments with the resilience and accessibility of cash – allowing the digital euro to be used in any situation, from e-commerce platforms to remote areas without network coverage. On our side, we are working on ensuring we are technically ready for the potential issuance of the digital euro. Building on the work we have done so far[13], the new phase of the digital euro project will be focused on developing the necessary technical capacity. The ECB Governing Council’s final decision on whether to issue a digital euro will only be taken once the legislation has been adopted. Assuming that European co-legislators adopt the Regulation on the establishment of the digital euro in the course of next year, a pilot exercise and initial transactions could take place as of mid-2027, and the digital euro could be ready for first issuance in 2029. Conclusion Let me conclude. The introduction of the digital euro is not merely a technical undertaking – it is a vital, forward-looking step to ensure that central bank money continues to serve Europeans in an increasingly digital world. The digital euro will complement euro banknotes and coins, extending the benefits of cash to digital payments. It will give the euro area a sovereign, universally accepted digital means of payment. And it will make it easier for private European solutions to expand their reach. Consumers, merchants and banks all stand to benefit. And Europe’s dependencies on non-European providers will be reduced, strengthening our resilience, autonomy and economic security. The longer we wait, the longer it will take for these benefits to materialise. The ECB will continue to support the legislative deliberations with technical input and provide transparent updates on the progress of the digital euro project. To that end, we have published additional supporting material as an annex to my statement today. Thank you for your attention. Annexes 17 November 2025 Slides See “Eurogroup, 19 September 2025”. See “Statement of the Euro Summit, meeting in inclusive format”, 20 March 2025, and “Statement of the Euro Summit, meeting in inclusive format”, 23 October 2025. See ECB (2025), “Eurosystem moving to next phase of digital euro project”, press release, 30 October. See ECB (2025), Progress on the preparation phase of a digital euro – Closing progress report, 30 October.  ibid. See EuroCommerce (2024), “EU businesses’ competitiveness impacted by current cards payments landscape – a call for urgent action”, Position paper, 8 July; and Ipsos (2025), ECB digital euro user research, 30 October. See Table 1 in ECB (2025), Progress on the preparation phase of a digital euro – Closing progress report, October. A domestic solution that is used significantly is defined as a solution with an estimated market share exceeding 10% within the respective use case, though other domestic options may also be technically present. In the absence of reliable data on the acceptance of domestic payment solutions by country and use case, the classification is based on the use of a domestic payment solution. “EU national” means any legal entity with registered offices in an EU Member State or any natural person that has the nationality of an EU Member State. “Control” means the ability to exercise a decisive influence on an undertaking, directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediate undertakings. Control can take any of the following forms: (i) the direct or indirect holding of more than 50% of the nominal value of the issued share capital in the legal entity concerned, or of a majority of the voting rights of the shareholders or associates of that entity; (ii) the direct or indirect holding, in fact or in law, of decision-making powers in the legal entity concerned. See ECB (2025), “ECB selects digital euro service providers”, press release, 2 October. In response to requests by the co-legislators, the ECB has conducted a detailed assessment of the potential financial stability impact of various hypothetical holding limits. Our analysis confirms that the use of the digital euro for day-to-day payments would not undermine financial stability. Even under an extremely conservative and highly unlikely crisis scenario, the stability of the financial system would remain intact. See ECB (2025), “Technical data on the financial stability impact of the digital euro”, October. See ECB (2025), Fit of the digital euro in the payment ecosystem – Report on the dedicated Euro Retail Payments Board (ERPB) technical workstream, October. In both instances, the digital euro could be the “fall-back” that enables full pan-European reach while preserving the market share of domestic or regional schemes where and to the extent that they are accepted. In the voluntary co-branding scenario, the private sector schemes could be the preferred brand wherever they are accepted, and the digital euro would be the fall-back solution wherever the private sector scheme is not (yet) accepted. This would be a low-cost form of interoperability between domestic/regional solutions and the digital euro, ensuring that the user always pays with a European solution. It could reduce the dependency on international card schemes, essentially meaning they would be required only for non-EU payments. See the annexes to ECB (2025), Fit of the digital euro in the payment ecosystem, Report on the dedicated Euro Retail Payments Board (ERPB) technical workstream, 30 October. Based on our technical analysis, the total investment costs required by banks could range from €1 billion to €1.44 billion annually over a four-year period. This estimate is consistent with the European Commission’s impact assessment, significantly below the costs incurred during the implementation of the SEPA, and five to six times lower than the figures presented in a study by PwC. See PwC (2025), Digital Euro Cost Study, June. See also ECB (2025), A view on recent assessments of digital euro investment costs for the euro area banking sector, October. The conclusion of the preparation phase marks an important milestone in the digital euro project. In the preparation phase we moved towards refining the practical design of the digital euro, building on the insights gained during the investigation phase conducted from 2020 to 2023. Key achievements include (i) the development of the draft digital euro scheme rulebook, (ii) the selection of providers for digital euro components and related services, (iii) the successful running of an innovation platform for experimentation with market participants, as well as (iv) the investigation by a technical workstream into the fit of the digital euro in the payment ecosystem. See ECB (2025), “Eurosystem moving to next phase of digital euro project”, press release, 30 October.

The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the EU’s financial markets regulator and supervisor, today published the results of a peer review which assessed the supervision of depositaries, in particular their oversight and safekeeping obligations. Overall, the peer review found that the foundational frameworks for the supervision of depositaries are in place. However, it also found notable divergences across jurisdictions in terms of the depth and maturity of supervisory approaches. While some NCAs demonstrated highly developed and granular practices, others displayed areas for improvement.  In addition, there were several transversal findings, including: The need for supervisory engagement to be more frequent and proportionate to the associated risk, given the concentration of depositaries within the markets of the assessed NCAs and their potential systemic significance. Concerns regarding the depth and intrusiveness of the supervisory assessments of several NCAs with respect to depositaries entrusting third parties with significant tasks, bearing in mind the obligation of depositaries to perform control-related activities autonomously.  The peer review focused on five jurisdictions: Czechia (CNB), Ireland (CBoI), Italy (Bank of Italy), Luxembourg (CSSF), Sweden (SFSA) and examined the supervisory and enforcement practices of these National Competent Authorities (NCAs) across key areas of depositary business activities.  Next steps The objective of peer reviews is to promote consistent and effective supervisory practices across the EU and high-quality supervisory outcomes, as well as to foster a level playing field among NCAs. In that context, the report intends to aid all NCAs in their supervision of depositaries, and it is particularly relevant considering the ongoing discussion on the importance of the investment management sector to European capital markets. ESMA will continue promoting further discussion on the supervision of depositaries and will follow up on the recommendations in the report in due course. elated Documents DateReferenceTitleDownloadSelect 17/11/2025 ESMA42-2004696504-8176 Peer Review on the supervision of depositary obligations

The FCA has filed an application with the High Court, asking it to lift the suspension on the bond consolidated tape contract award. If the High Court were to lift this suspension, it would allow the FCA to sign a contract with Etrading Software (ETS), so it can move forward with delivering the tape and defending the legal challenge in parallel. The tape will provide a single and reliable view of the UK bond market. It will enable investors to make informed decisions and help maintain the UK’s position as a highly competitive and compelling place to invest and grow. It is in the public interest to deliver the important benefits of the tape as soon as possible. It is the FCA's position that the legal challenge, which it consider to be without merit, should not get in the way of that. The FCA will submit its formal defence to the legal challenge by the end of the week. The FCA will continue to engage data contributors and users, alongside ETS. The FCA wants to provide clarity to industry that it ismoving forward as quickly as possible, so market participants can prepare for the tape. Further information The FCA undertook a fair, competitive 2-stage process to ensure the provider could deliver a high-quality tape and the best value for money, including: A quality stage to ensure the provider could meet regulatory requirements and service obligations, including on financial resources, resiliency, data availability and service speed. A price auction to determine which bidder, based on the quality commitments made in stage 1, could offer the best price to users of the tape.

An amendment to MIAX Options, MIAX Pearl Options, MIAX Emerald Options, and MIAX Sapphire Options Rules 402, which allows the listing and trading of options on interests in Commodity-Based Trusts, has been deemed approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission as of November 17, 2025.For more information regarding the rule amendments, please refer to the following Regulatory Circulars: MIAX Options RC 2025-90 MIAX Pearl Options RC 2025-91 MIAX Emerald Options RC 2025-90 MIAX Sapphire Options RC 2025-111

Please be advised the MIAX Options Exchange, MIAX Pearl Options Exchange, MIAX Emerald Options Exchange, MIAX Sapphire Options Exchange and MIAX Pearl Equities Exchange will be closed on Thursday, November 27, 2025 in observance of the Thanksgiving Holiday.On Friday, November 28, 2025, the MIAX Exchanges will have an abbreviated trading session.   All Option Classes will close 3 hours early, 1:00 p.m. and 1:15 p.m. ET. MIAX Pearl Equities will end the Regular Trading Session at 1:00 p.m. ET and end the Late Trading Session at 5:00 p.m. ET.  

In his remarks at FIA Expo today, FIA President and CEO Walt Lukken announced the names of six new members of the FIA Hall of Fame. The new members will be honored at an awards ceremony during FIA's 51st International Futures Industry Conference in Boca Raton, Florida, on 8-11 March 2026."We established the FIA Hall of Fame to recognize the people who have made key contributions to the global listed and cleared derivatives industry during their careers," said Lukken. "The 2026 group of inductees are proven leaders and role models who have demonstrated a lifetime of achievement. We are honored to present them with this recognition."The following leaders will join the Hall of Fame: Gerry Corcoran, Chief Executive Officer of R.J. O'Brien Agnes Koh, Chief Risk Officer of SGX Group William McCoy, former Managing Director & Counsel and Global Head of Commodities Legal Coverage at Morgan Stanley Peter Reitz, Chief Executive Officer of the European Energy Exchange Mark Spanbroek, former Chairman and Co-Founder of the European Principal Traders Association and former Partner of Getco Baroness Kay Swinburne, Former Member of the European Parliament, British politician and life peer  Members of the Hall of Fame come from both the private and public sectors and are chosen by a distinguished panel comprised of existing FIA Hall of Fame members and global industry executives. They are selected based on their lifetime contributions to the industry, with a focus on demonstrated leadership, innovative and impactful achievement, break-through accomplishment, industry collaboration, volunteerism and dedication.While members reflect the diverse nature of the industry with unique backgrounds and experiences, one thing that unites them all is a passionate determination to build strong, healthy, safe and competitive markets.The Hall of Fame was established in 2005 on FIA’s 50th anniversary. Learn more about the FIA Hall of Fame.  

Commenting on Bitcoin’s recent mass-liquidation, Hina Sattar Joshi, Director at TP ICAP, Digital Assets, said: “Volatility has not been limited to equity markets – economic uncertainty and the recent tech sector sell-offs have had a direct and immediate impact on the price of Bitcoin. After the summer’s exuberance, this month, the cryptocurrency experienced a $19 billion liquidation and continued the most sustained declines in price since Donald Trump’s inauguration. “While in the longer term, volatility may be temporary and digital asset markets stand to benefit from a more supportive regulatory environment, in the short term, there are three factors that institutions trading digital assets should be monitoring. “First, are the potential pitfalls presented by market structure. Bitcoin’s recent mass-liquidation underscores the risk of keeping assets on-exchange and the dangers of auto-liquidation mechanisms. This event has highlighted the importance of infrastructure that separates custody and execution. “Second, Digital Asset Treasury Companies (DATCs), which currently hold around 4% of all Bitcoin and 3.1% of all Ether, are displaying signs of weakness and adding to market stress. When DATCs’ holdings trade below net asset value, leverage and credit tightness can lead to a sell-off, straining liquidity on exchanges. “Third, the politicisation of cryptocurrencies. As political parties around the world adopt cryptocurrencies as an economic and political tool – whether creating Bitcoin reserves or encouraging the adoption of cryptocurrencies in other ways – political engagement increasingly has the potential to impact price action. “Some of these issues are related to the rapid rise of cryptocurrencies, from a niche interest to a mainstream asset class. While the current market is characterised by reduced leverage and less speculative movement, when uncertainty clears, we expect activity to be reignited by clearer regulation, fresh capital inflows, and renewed investor confidence.”

  Transfer tools enable the orderly resolution of failing banks, preserving critical functions without taxpayer loss. Transfer tools are an important component of the FSB’s Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes. They ensure the continuity of critical functions by transferring parts – or all – of a failed bank to a private-sector purchaser or a bridge entity, while ensuring that losses are absorbed by shareholders and creditors rather than taxpayers. The 2023 banking turmoil showed how these tools can provide authorities with more options in a crisis. The paper sets out how authorities operationalise whole-bank and partial transfers, starting with the definition of the transfer perimeter. It outlines arrangements for operational continuity, such as transitional service agreements and management of third‑party contracts, and approaches to marketing the transfer perimeter under tight timelines and confidentiality. The paper explains how loss absorption, in line with the creditor hierarchy, is ensured via write-down and conversion or an estate claims process liquidating the residual entity. The paper describes the establishment and operation of bridge entities and highlights key challenges for cross-border execution of transfer tools. The case studies included in this paper illustrate some of the operational topics and practices to enhance preparedness to deploy transfer tools effectively. Transfer of parts of the failed bank and closure of the residual entity  

Nasdaq (NDAQ) today announces that J.P. Morgan SE has chosen to list its Warrants and Certificates on Nasdaq, targeting the Nordic markets. Nasdaq Nordic has offered listing and trading in Warrants and Certificates since 1995 and is the market leader in all Nordic countries with 76 percent of all transactions being executed on Nasdaq’s platform. “With over 40,000 listings and an average daily trading volume of 100 million euros and 51 000 transactions, Nasdaq Nordic continues to lead the market for Warrants and Certificates. Welcoming J.P. Morgan SE as a new issuer strengthens our position and expands opportunities for investors across the Nordic region. Their global footprint aligns with our mission to modernize markets and deliver innovative solutions for investors” says Helena Wedin, Head of ETF & ETP, Nasdaq European Markets. J.P. Morgan SE plans to list a broad range of exchange-traded products, through a partnership with Nordnet Markets. The products will be available through Nordnet’s platform to investors across Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Norway with a product range that caters to all market views — across product types, underlying assets, long/short positions, and specific strike levels. “We are thrilled to partner with J.P. Morgan as the new issuer for Nordnet Markets.Together we will continue to provide Nordnet's customers with a diverse range of exchange-traded products and market opportunities, giving them greater flexibility and choice for their portfolios. This partnership highlights our commitment to constantly evolving our platform, bringing best-in-class financial products and services to our users.” says Rasmus Järborg, Chief Product Officer & Deputy CEO, Nordnet. “This partnership with Nordnet, a leading platform in the Nordic market, will enable us to leverage our market leading platform into the Nordic region by providing Nordnet’s clients with access to our ETPs across 4 countries.,” says Marcel Langer, Head of ETP Sales for Europe. 

LSEG announces it has purchased the following number of its ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each from Citigroup Global Markets Limited ("Citi") on the London Stock Exchange as part of its share buyback programme, as announced on 04 November 2025. Date of purchase: 14 November 2025 Aggregate number of ordinary shares purchased: 207,500 Lowest price paid per share: 8,644.00p Highest price paid per share: 8,792.00p Average price paid per share: 8,732.69p   LSEG intends to cancel all of the purchased shares. Following the cancellation of the repurchased shares, LSEG has 515,193,762 ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each in issue (excluding treasury shares) and holds 24,051,599 of its ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each in treasury. Therefore, the total voting rights in the Company will be 515,193,762. This figure for the total number of voting rights may be used by shareholders (and others with notification obligations) as the denominator for the calculation by which they will determine if they are required to notify their interest in, or a change to their interest in, the Company under the FCA's Disclosure Guidance and Transparency Rules. In accordance with Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 (the Market Abuse Regulation) (as such legislation forms part of retained EU law as defined in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as implemented, retained, amended, extended, re-enacted or otherwise given effect in the United Kingdom from 1 January 2021 and as amended or supplemented in the United Kingdom thereafter), a full breakdown of the individual purchases by Citi on behalf of the Company as part of the buyback programme can be found at: http://www.rns-pdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/6821H_1-2025-11-14.pdf This announcement does not constitute, or form part of, an offer or any solicitation of an offer for securities in any jurisdiction. Schedule of Purchases Shares purchased:       207,500 (ISIN: GB00B0SWJX34) Date of purchases:      14 November 2025 Investment firm:         Citi Aggregate information: Venue Volume-weighted average price Aggregated volume Lowest price per share Highest price per share London Stock Exchange 8,732.69 207,500 8,644.00 8,792.00 Turquoise        

Solactive is pleased to announce its continued collaboration with Betashares with the launch of the Betashares Global Shares Ex US ETF. This launch marks the milestone of Betashares introducing its 100th ETF to the market, further expanding its comprehensive range of investment solutions. The ETF tracks the Solactive GBS Developed Markets ex United States ex Australia Large & Mid Cap AUD Index, providing investors with diversified exposure to large- and mid-cap companies across developed markets, excluding the United States and Australia. Developed markets outside the United States and Australia continue to play a crucial role in the global economy, representing significant investment opportunities across Europe, Japan, Canada, and other advanced economies. Amid a shifting global macroeconomic landscape and evolving regional growth dynamics, investors are increasingly seeking international diversification to balance portfolios and capture opportunities among established global leaders outside the U.S. market. The Solactive GBS Developed Markets ex United States ex Australia Large & Mid Cap AUD Index is part of the Solactive Global Benchmark Series (GBS), a comprehensive framework for global equity market coverage. The index includes over 900 large- and mid-cap companies from developed markets, excluding those assigned to the United States and Australia. It uses a transparent, free-float market capitalization weighting methodology to ensure broad market representation and ease of replication. The ETF was launched on 11 November on the Australian Securities Exchange under the ticker code “EXUS”.  Timo Pfeiffer, Chief Markets Officer at Solactive, commented: “We’re excited to deepen our collaboration with BetaShares through this latest ETF tracking our GBS Developed Markets ex US ex Australia Index. This launch underscores our shared commitment to delivering transparent, efficient, and globally diversified benchmark solutions. The Solactive GBS series continues to provide a robust foundation for cost-effective global equity exposure.” Announcing the launch of the new ETF, Alex Vynokur, Chief Executive Officer at Betashares, commented: “At a time when equity market concentration is elevated in both US and Australian equities, EXUS will help investors address this overweight position in their portfolios, as well as offering the tax efficiency of investing in an Australian-domiciled ETF which holds shares directly.

KEY POINTS SETCarbon, a corporate carbon data management platform, receives certification from TGO, affirming its credibility and compliance within internationally recognized standards, including CFO, GHG Protocol, and ISSB standards. The platform’s key differentiators include industry-specific GHG activity data templates designed for convenient data collection and multi-entity data synchronization capabilities. SETCarbon serves as a key mechanism in establishing Thailand’s “centralized carbon database”, serving listed companies and banks by bridging the Sustainable Finance ecosystem for easier access to green capital. The Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) has achieved a pivotal milestone in advancing sustainability within Thailand’s capital market as SETCarbon, an integrated corporate carbon data management platform, has received the official certification from the Thailand Greenhouse Gas Management Organization (Public Organization) (TGO) in the “Carbon Footprint for Organization (CFO) Platform” category. This achievement highlights SET’s commitment to driving Thailand’s business sector towards a low-carbon economy. SETCarbon functions as a digital infrastructure aggregating and standardizing greenhouse gas emissions data management across the corporate landscape and features seamless data integration with SET’s e-One Report system. The platform’s key features include industry-specific greenhouse gas (GHG) activity data templates designed for convenient data collection as well as connectivity capabilities enabling data synchronization with multiple entities, including banks and financial institutions, thereby streamlining green finance access and processes for businesses.  SET Senior Executive Vice President Soraphol Tulayasathien emphasized that this national-level certification validates SETCarbon's credibility and the rigor of its carbon accounting methodologies. This accreditation provides all stakeholders, including listed companies and the broader business community, with assurance that SET’s system maintains robust governance, transparency, and alignment with internationally recognized GHG accounting standards including Carbon Footprint for Organization (CFO) framework, GHG Protocol, and ISSB (IFRS S2). This ensures the reliability and usability of Thai corporate emissions data within both domestic and international frameworks. SETCarbon’s key features include: 1) An integrated single-platform system supporting end-to-end GHG data collection, calculation, analysis, and reporting for streamlined and enhanced data management; and 2) National-level standardization which positions SETCarbon as a key mechanism for the development of Thailand’s “centralized carbon database” (Anchor Dataset) and unified data standards across all sectors. This certification carries a three-year validity period and positions SET as one of just seven organizations in Thailand attaining the TGO certification in this category. This accomplishment represents a pivotal advancement in strengthening credibility and confidence as Thai enterprises accelerate their decarbonization journeys towards the net-zero commitment by 2050. Services on the SETCarbon platform operated by SET are available to both listed companies and partner banks, with continuous enhancements planned for the system. Priorities for the next phase of development include Scope 3 emissions capabilities for end-to-end supply chain carbon accounting, the implementation of dashboards to track decarbonization performance against financial metrics, and the deployment of carbon data APIs enabling seamless data connectivity and access among stakeholders. SET will introduce expanded GHG Protocol templates for comprehensive coverage across all industries. Moreover, SET remains committed to fostering partnerships with the public sector and financial institutions to optimize carbon data utilization across the Thai economy and catalyze measurable progress towards sustainability within the Thai capital market.

Today, JPX Market Innovation & Research, Inc. (JPXI), a leading global provider of Japanese financial market data, added “Share Buyback Information Data (TDnet/EDINET)” to J-Quants Pro, a data distribution service offering corporate users insightful data on Japanese financial markets via API, SFTP, and Snowflake. Additionally, estimated earnings announcement times were added to the “Earnings Announcement Dates & Times” dataset. Cashflow statements were also added to the “Financial Summary/Statements (BS/PL/CF)” dataset from October. Share Buyback Information (New Dataset) This dataset offers comprehensive information related to share buybacks for Japanese listed stocks. This offering consists of the following three datasets: Share Buyback Information (TDnet) The following information on share buybacks is promptly distributed following disclosure by the listed company via TDnet. This data enables users to capture a full range of information regarding share buybacks by listed companies. Details of buyback resolutions (number of shares, total amount, period) Status of buybacks (acquisition status for the previous month) Information on the completion of buybacks Share Buyback Information (EDINET) This dataset offers timely updates every 15 minutes on the status of share buybacks disclosed by listed companies via EDINET. This dataset includes daily buyback records for the previous month, which are not available in the TDnet dataset. Off-Auction Share Buyback (ToSTNeT-3) This dataset provides timely information on share buybacks conducted on ToSTNeT-3. Notifications of buybacks via ToSTNeT-3 are delivered after market close on the business day prior to the scheduled purchase, and results of the purchase are distributed at approx. 9:00 a.m. on the day of the transaction.The "Share Buyback Information" dataset covers all Japanese domestic listed companies, acting as a centralized source for information. Historical data is also available, making it suitable for long-term analysis. Addition of Scheduled Earnings Announcement Times Data In response to user requests, estimated earnings announcement time data is being added to the Scheduled Dates for Earnings Announcements dataset.This dataset provides the estimated time of announcement for the upcoming period’s earnings, as inferred by JPX’s proprietary model based on each listed company’s past announcement times. In addition to the time information, we also provide a trading session classification (pre-market, morning session, lunch break, afternoon session, post-market close). This eliminates the need for users to convert announcement times into trading session categories themselves.Users can utilize this estimated time information to further empower risk management related to scheduled earnings announcements. With this addition, the dataset will be renamed “Earnings Announcement Dates & Times." The addition of historical data and a revision to pricing is also planned to accompany this expansion. Please use the contact address below for pricing details.For data specifications, please refer to the following website: About J-Quants Pro Datasets and Available Periods J-Quants Pro allows users to select the specific datasets they need through a convenient monthly subscription.   DatasetData Period Listed Issue Information May 7, 2008~ Trading by Type of Investors January 16, 2008~ Detail Breakdown Trading Data January 4, 2010~ Margin Trading Outstanding (Issues Subject to Daily Publication) May 8, 2008~ Margin Trading Outstanding (Weekly) February 10, 2012~ Financial Summary / Statements (BS/PL/CF) Financial Summary Data: July 7, 2008~Financial Statement Data (BS/PL/CF): January 13, 2009~ Derivatives Trading Volume and Open Interest by Trading Participant / Open Interest by Issue Derivatives Trading Volume by Participant: March 24, 2014~Open Interest by Trading Participant: December 2, 2016~Open Interest by Issue: June 14, 2021~ Earnings Announcement Dates & Times September 2014~ ToSTNeT Super Large Lot February 15, 2008~ Stock Prices (OHLC) May 7, 2008~ Outstanding Short Selling Positions Reported November 7, 2013~ Off-Auction Distribution January 2008~ Off-Auction Share Buyback (ToSTNeT-3) January 2008~ Corporate Action Information Dividends: February 20, 2013~Other Data: May 8, 2015~ TDnet on Snowflake TDnet on Snowflake: Last 12 months~TDnet on Snowflake T+1: Last 12 months (since April 2025 at this moment)TDnet on Snowflake Index: Last 5 years Share Buyback Information (TDnet/EDINET) TDnet: 2012~EDINET: 2019~This dataset includes Off-Auction Share Buyback (ToSTNeT-3) data.   For details on pricing and external distribution, please refer to the following website. Please contact the address below for specific pricing information. Apply for J-Quants Pro If you are interested in accessing the new content or any of J-Quants Pro’s extensive range of other data, please apply via the contact form on the website listed below. Data specifications and sample data are also available. J-Quants Pro Website Note: J-Quants Pro is only offered for corporate use.For individual users, please refer to the J-Quants API service on the following website: J-Quants API Website

The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has imposed a civil penalty of S$137,000 on Mr Ang Yew Jin Eugene (“Mr Ang”) for insider trading in the shares of SGX-listed Alpha Energy Holdings Limited1 (“AEHL”) (together with its subsidiaries, the “Group”).2. On 18 November 2019, AEHL announced that a creditor had declared the entire principal sum of US$64 million owed by the Group as immediately due and payable, following the Group’s default in the partial repayment of a loan (the “Announcement”). The principal sum demanded by the creditor represented approximately ten times the value of current assets held by the Group as of 30 June 2019. After the Announcement, trading of AEHL’s shares was immediately suspended.3. Mr Ang was a non-executive director of AEHL at the material time. By virtue of his position, he knew of the Group’s failure to make repayment. Further, Mr Ang knew that in accordance with the loan agreement, the creditor had a right to demand immediate payment of the entire principal sum when the Group defaulted on its repayment.4. On 13 November 2019, while in possession of such non-public, material information, Mr Ang sold 2,413,300 AEHL shares held in his parents’ trading accounts. By selling the shares ahead of the Announcement, Mr Ang’s parents avoided losses of approximately S$54,900. 5. Mr Ang admitted to contravening the insider trading provision under section 218(2)(a) of the Securities and Futures Act and has paid MAS the civil penalty without court action. Mr Ang has also given a voluntary undertaking not to be a director or be involved in the management of a company for a period of two years2. 6. The civil penalty action against Mr Ang is the result of a joint investigation conducted by the Commercial Affairs Department of the SPF and the MAS, following a referral by the Singapore Exchange Regulation Private Limited. ***** AEHL is now known as Alpha DX Group Limited. Except for any company that may be excluded with MAS’ consent. Additional information (A) The civil penalty regimeA civil penalty action is not a criminal action and does not attract criminal sanctions. The civil penalty regime, designed to complement criminal sanctions and provide a nuanced approach to combat market misconduct, became operational at the beginning of 2004.Under section 232 of the SFA, MAS may enter into an agreement with any person for that person to pay, with or without admission of liability, a civil penalty for contravening any provision of Part 12 of the SFA. The civil penalty may be up to three times the amount of the profit gained or loss avoided by that person as a result of the contravention, subject to a minimum of $50,000 (if the person is not a corporation) or $100,000 (if the person is a corporation).(B) Insider Trading under Section 218(2)(a) Section 218(2)(a) of the SFA prohibits a person who is in possession of materially price-sensitive information concerning a corporation (to which the person is connected), which the person knows is materially price-sensitive and not generally available, from (whether as principal or agent) subscribing for, purchasing, selling, or entering into an agreement to subscribe for, purchase or sell those securities of that corporation.