The new products expand investor access to Trading Central’s proprietary TC Quantamental Rating® via the Solactive TC Quant EU 50 Index and the Solactive TC Quant US 50 Index, offering targeted exposure to quantitatively selected large- and mid-cap equities across Europe and the United States. Following Solactive’s October introduction of indices based on this methodology, Vontobel issued certificates providing an investable gateway to a transparent, rules-based selection of companies screened on a comprehensive blend of fundamental and market-derived signals. At the core of each index is a rules-based composite of 20 underlying factors grouped into Value, Growth, Quality, Momentum, and Income. Factors are computed within country-by-industry cohorts, and securities are ranked on a 0–100 Trading Central’s scale; the top 50 qualify, subject to a maximum of 17 constituents per sector to promote diversification. Constituents are equally weighted and the indices rebalance monthly. The products are listed on the regulated stock exchanges in Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and France: Solactive TC Quant EU 50 Index – ISIN: DE000VH7EW15 / WKN: VH7EW1 Solactive TC Quant US 50 Index – ISIN: DE000VH7EX06 / WKN: VH7EX0 Timo Pfeiffer, Chief Markets Officer at Solactive, commented: “We are pleased to see these indices—where high-IP research and our customized index design around Trading Central’s TC Quantamental Rating® come together—now brought to market as financial products for experienced investors.” Heiko Geiger, Global Head Flow Products Distribution at Vontobel, added: “We are pleased to introduce the Solactive TC Quant 50 indices, which incorporate the Trading Central Quantamental Rating® methodology into Vontobel’s range of investment options. This addition underscores our dedication to offering solutions that adapt to changing market conditions while supporting the medium- to long-term goals of investors.” Alain Pellier, Chief Executive Officer at Trading Central, commented: “Adding financial instruments on Trading Central’s strategies through a major issuer and market-maker on securitized derivatives in Europe like Vontobel consists in a significant though natural evolution of Trading Central services, to support at best the self-directed retail clients in Europe and contribute to their financial autonomy.”

LSEG announces it has purchased the following number of its ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each from Citigroup Global Markets Limited ("Citi") on the London Stock Exchange as part of its share buyback programme, as announced on 04 November 2025. Date of purchase: 20 November 2025 Aggregate number of ordinary shares purchased: 207,500 Lowest price paid per share: 8,346.00p Highest price paid per share: 8,500.00p Average price paid per share: 8,413.01p   LSEG intends to cancel all of the purchased shares. Following the cancellation of the repurchased shares, LSEG has 514,364,625 ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each in issue (excluding treasury shares) and holds 24,051,599 of its ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each in treasury. Therefore, the total voting rights in the Company will be 514,364,625. This figure for the total number of voting rights may be used by shareholders (and others with notification obligations) as the denominator for the calculation by which they will determine if they are required to notify their interest in, or a change to their interest in, the Company under the FCA's Disclosure Guidance and Transparency Rules. In accordance with Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 (the Market Abuse Regulation) (as such legislation forms part of retained EU law as defined in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as implemented, retained, amended, extended, re-enacted or otherwise given effect in the United Kingdom from 1 January 2021 and as amended or supplemented in the United Kingdom thereafter), a full breakdown of the individual purchases by Citi on behalf of the Company as part of the buyback programme can be found at: http://www.rns-pdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/4472I_1-2025-11-20.pdf This announcement does not constitute, or form part of, an offer or any solicitation of an offer for securities in any jurisdiction. Schedule of Purchases Shares purchased:       207,500 (ISIN: GB00B0SWJX34) Date of purchases:      20 November 2025 Investment firm:         Citi Aggregate information: Venue Volume-weighted average price Aggregated volume Lowest price per share Highest price per share London Stock Exchange 8,413.01 207,500 8,346.00 8,500.00 Turquoise        

Notice Type: Exchange Notice ID: 1870.112025 2025 Nadex will observe the following modified holiday schedule for the week of November 24, 2025: Monday, November 24, 2025: The Exchange will observe regular business hours. Weekly contracts listed on this date will have a settlement date of Friday of the current week, with the exception of any contracts not available for trading on Friday, which will have a settlement date of Wednesday of the current week; Tuesday, November 25, 2025: The Exchange will observe regular business hours. Wednesday, November 26, 2025: The Exchange will observe regular business hours. No Daily Currency Binary contracts which would have an expiration trade date of November 27, 2025 will be listed on this date. Thursday, November 27, 2025: Industry Event - Live Presentations - NAICS 711 will observe their regular schedule. The Exchange will only list Crypto currency related products during Thursday’s trade date. All other non-Crypto Currency related products will NOT be listed during Thursday’s trade date. Friday, November 28, 2025: The Exchange will list non-Cryptos products starting at 8:00am ET. Nadex will observe the following modified schedule: Trading in US 500, US Tech 100, US SmallCap 2000, and Wall St 30 contracts will open at 8:00am ET and close at 1:15pm ET; Intraday 2-hour contracts which normally expire at 2:00pm, 3:00pm, and 4:00pm ET will not be offered on this day; Intraday 20-minute binary contracts which normally expire at 1:20, 1:40, 2:00, 2:20, 2:40, 3:00, 3:20, 3:40, and 4:00 will not be offered on this day; Trading in Crude Oil contracts will open at 8:00am ET and close at 2:30pm ET; Trading in Gold contracts will open at 8:00am ET and close at 1:30pm ET; All Currency contracts listed on this day will open at 8:00am ET or their regular open times. Daily Currency Binary contracts will not be available for trading on Friday, with the exception of the 3:00pm ET close time contract which will open at 8:00am ET and close at 3:00pm ET. Additionally, 2-Hour Intraday Currency Binary contracts with a 4:00pm ET expiration time will not be listed on this day. No 5-Minute Intraday Currency Binary contracts which would expire after 3:00pm ET will be listed on this day. Nadex will return to its regular listing schedule for trade date November 30, 2025. Please note, Nadex’s Market Maker Agreement previously identified the following products and time periods as Illiquid Markets: All Intraday 5-Minute, Intraday 2-Hour, Daily, and Weekly, Foreign Currency Binary contracts available for trading, at times the Exchange is open, between the hours of 2:00pm ET and 3:00am ET. Additionally, in regard to the Foreign Currency Binary contracts, Nadex authorized Market Makers operating pursuant to a Market Maker Agreement will be relieved of their quoting obligations relating to size on trade date Friday, November 28, 2025, from 8:00am to 2:00pm ET. A Market Maker(s) that elects to quote in any Intraday 5-Minute, 2-Hour, Daily, and Weekly Currency Binary markets during this period will be required to comply with the spread obligations set forth in its Market Maker Agreement. Lastly, Nadex is extending the Illiquid Markets coverage to Cryptocurrency products for trade dates November 27, 2025, through November 28, 2025. As such, Nadex authorized Market Makers operating pursuant to a Market Maker Agreement will be relieved of their quoting obligations relating to size on trade dates November 27, 2025, and November 28, 2025, from 6:00pm ET on calendar date November 26, 2025, through 5:00pm ET on calendar date November 28, 2025. A Market Maker(s) that elects to quote in any Crypto Currency markets during this period will be required to comply with the spread obligations set forth in its Market Maker Agreement. Please refer to the Holiday Product Schedule Guidelines for specific product trading hours. Should you have any questions or require further information, please contact the Compliance Department. Should you have any questions or require further information, please contact the Compliance Department.

The processing and publication of the Weekly Swaps Report was interrupted from October 1 – November 12 due to a lapse in federal appropriations. Following a return to normal operations, the CFTC will resume publication of the Weekly Swaps Reports in chronological order. Beginning November 14, 2025, the report will be published at an increased frequency until the normal schedule is resumed.Additional information on the Weekly Swaps Report. Archive Explanatory Notes Swaps Report Data Dictionary Release Schedule Released: Weekly on Mondays at 3:30 p.m.

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) today released enforcement actions taken against national banks and federal savings associations (banks), and individuals currently and formerly affiliated with banks the OCC supervises. The OCC uses enforcement actions against banks to require the board of directors and management to take timely actions to correct the deficient practices or violations identified. The OCC does not have any enforcement actions against banks to release in November. The OCC uses enforcement actions against an institution-affiliated party (IAP) to deter, encourage correction of, or prevent violations, unsafe or unsound practices, or breaches of fiduciary duty. Enforcement actions against IAPs reinforce the accountability of individuals for their conduct regarding the affairs of a bank. The term “institution-affiliated party,” or IAP, is defined in 12 USC 1813(u) and includes bank directors, officers, employees, and controlling shareholders. Orders of Prohibition prohibit an individual from any participation in the affairs of a bank or other institution as defined in 12 USC 1818(e)(7). The OCC has taken the following actions against IAPs: Order of Prohibition against Amy Jo Reid, former Senior Vice President and Director for Purchasing at Associated Bank, N.A., Green Bay, Wisconsin, for using the bank’s purchasing cards for personal transactions totaling at least $411,000 and providing false documents and information to deceive the bank into paying for these personal expenses. (Docket No. AA-ENF-2025-50) Personal Cease-and-Desist Order against Claudia Russ Anderson, former Community Bank Group Risk Officer of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Sioux Falls, South Dakota, in connection with the bank’s longstanding sales practices misconduct. (Docket No. AA-EC-2019-81) The OCC terminates enforcement actions when a bank has demonstrated compliance with all articles of an enforcement action; or when the OCC determines that articles deemed “not in compliance” have become outdated or irrelevant to the bank’s current circumstances; or when the OCC incorporates the articles deemed “not in compliance” into a new action. Termination actions include: Order Terminating the Cease and Desist Order against Blue Ridge Bank, N.A., Martinsville, Virginia, dated January 24, 2024 (Docket No. AA-ENF-2023-68). The terminated order addressed violations of law, rule, or regulation related to the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)/anti-money laundering (AML) and unsafe or unsound practices, including those related to capital, liquidity risk management, and information technology controls. (Docket No. AA-ENF-2025-58). Order Terminating the Formal Agreement with The First National Bank of St. Ignace, St. Ignace, Michigan, dated January 19, 2024 (Docket No. AA-CE-2024-1). The Formal Agreement addressed unsafe or unsound practices, including those related to capital planning, capital stress testing, and strategic planning, and a violation of law, rule, or regulation related to payment of dividends. (Docket No. AA-CE-2025-56) To receive alerts for news releases announcing public OCC enforcement actions, subscribe to OCC Email Updates. All OCC public enforcement actions taken since August 1989 are available for download by viewing the searchable enforcement actions database at https://apps.occ.gov/EASearch. Related Link Enforcement Action Types

CME Group, the world's leading derivatives marketplace, and CF Benchmarks, the leading provider of cryptocurrency benchmark indices, today announced plans to launch two new bitcoin volatility indices on December 2 – the CME CF Bitcoin Volatility Index - Real Time (BVX) and the CME CF Bitcoin Volatility Index - Settlement (BVXS). These indices represent forward-looking, market-based measures of how the market expects the price of bitcoin to fluctuate over a 30-day constant maturity time horizon. The indices are not tradable futures products, but they serve as transparent indicators of the implied volatility embedded in CME Group's regulated, deeply liquid options on Bitcoin futures and Micro Bitcoin futures contracts. "With nearly $46 billion in equivalent notional value traded in 2025, our Bitcoin options now serve as the benchmark for gauging how the market views overall bitcoin volatility," said Giovanni Vicioso, CME Group Global Head of Cryptocurrency Products. "As the crypto market continues to mature, we're seeing more and more institutional investors enter the space who are looking for sophisticated tools to meet their investing needs – and they're looking to manage their risk with trusted, regulated venues like CME Group. The BVX and BVSX Indices are valuable tools for market participants to navigate shifting market conditions and sentiment so they can better calibrate their trading strategies." "The launch of the CME CF Bitcoin Volatility Indices is a major milestone for the crypto asset class," said Sui Chung, CEO of CF Benchmarks. "The index gives investors a measure of bitcoin volatility expectations, a vital indicator of institutional sentiment towards bitcoin, as well as the broader asset class. Liquid benchmarks are vital market infrastructure, and the launch of these indices underscores the deepening maturity of the bitcoin options market, and the more sophisticated tools investors now have available to manage and tailor their risk exposures." The BVX is calculated and published every second between 7 a.m. and 4 p.m. Central, and the BVXS is calculated and published at 4pm London time. For more information on these products, please visit www.cmegroup.com/cryptobenchmarks.

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission today announced the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered a final judgement against Safeguard Metals LLC and Jeffrey Ikahn (aka Jeffrey Santulan and Jeffrey Hill) ordering them to pay $25.6 million in restitution to victims and a $25.6 million civil monetary penalty for operating a nationwide, precious metals fraud.The CFTC obtained the order Sept. 30 in coordination with 30 state securities regulatory agencies that are members of the North American Securities Administrators Association.“This resolution shows the impact the CFTC and state regulatory agencies have when joining forces to combat fraud and is a testament to the hard work of staff at the CFTC and our state regulator co-plaintiffs,” said Charles Marvine, Acting Chief of the Division of Enforcement’s Retail Fraud and General Enforcement Task Force. Previously, the court entered a consent order that found the defendants liable for running a nationwide fraudulent scheme that took in approximately $68 million from more than 450 customers – most of them elderly or retirement-aged. According to the order, the defendants lured customers with false claims about the risk of their traditional retirement investments and then sold them silver coins and other precious metals at inflated prices by misrepresenting their price markups.  These undisclosed markups caused customers substantial and immediate losses. The consent order also barred the defendants from future violations of the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations, as well as various state laws and regulations as charged in the complaint. It further prohibited them from trading or registering with the CFTC and the participating states. [See CFTC Press Release No. 8812-23].These rulings resolve the CFTC and state regulators’ February 2022 enforcement action. [See CFTC Press Release No. 8489-22].In a separate case brought by the Securities Exchange Commission, the court ordered the defendants to pay $25.6 million in disgorgement and a $25.6 million civil monetary penalty SEC v. Safeguard Metals, Case No. 2:22-cv-00693 JFW (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2025). Amounts paid in either the SEC or CFTC actions will be offset by the amounts owed in the other. Orders requiring repayment to victims may not always result in the recovery of any or all funds, as wrongdoers may lack sufficient assets. The agency will continue to fight vigorously to protect customers and hold wrongdoers accountable.The CFTC and NASAA thank the SEC for its help.The following NASAA state regulatory agencies were CFTC’s co-plaintiffs in this action and the CFTC thanks them for their assistance: Alabama Securities Commission; Arizona Corporation Commission; Arkansas Securities Department; California Department of Financial Protection & Innovation; State of Connecticut Department of Banking; State of Florida, Office of Financial Regulation; State of Hawaii, Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs; Idaho Department of Finance; Office of the Secretary of State, Illinois Securities Department; Indiana Securities Division; Iowa Insurance Commissioner Douglas M. Ommen; Kentucky Department of Financial Institutions; State of Maryland Ex Rel the Maryland Securities Commissioner; Attorney General Dana Nessel on Behalf of the People of the State of Michigan; Mississippi Secretary of State; Missouri Commissioner of Securities; Nebraska Department of Banking & Finance; Securities Division New Mexico Regulation and Licensing Department; The People of the State of New York by Letitia James, Attorney General of the State of New York; North Carolina Department of the Secretary of State; Ohio Department of Commerce, Division of Securities; Oklahoma Department of Securities; State of Oregon Department of Consumer and Business Services and Attorney General Dan Rayfield; South Carolina Attorney General Alan Wilson; South Dakota Department of Labor & Regulation; Commissioner of the Tennessee Securities Department of Commerce and Insurance; Utah Division of Securities; Vermont Department of Financial Regulation; Washington State Department of Financial Institutions; and the State of Wisconsin.The CFTC DOE staff responsible for this action are Steve Turley, Christopher Reed, and Charles Marvine, along with former staff members Jeff Le Riche, Clemon Ashley, and Paul Fluke. CFTC’s Precious Metals Customer Fraud AdvisoryThe CFTC has issued several customer-protection fraud advisories, including the Precious Metals Fraud Advisory, which alerts customers to precious metals fraud and lists simple ways to spot precious metals scams.Report suspicious activities or information, such as possible violations of commodity trading laws to the Division of Enforcement via a toll-free hotline 866-FON-CFTC (866-366-2382) or file a tip or complaint online or contact the Whistleblower Office. Whistleblowers are eligible to receive between 10 and 30 percent of the monetary sanctions collected, paid from the Customer Protection Fund financed through monetary sanctions paid to the CFTC by violators of the CEA. RELATED LINKS Order: Final Judgement: Safeguard Metals LLC, et al Statement of Decision: Safeguard Metals LLC, et al

SEC Headquarters100 F St. NEWashington D.CDec 15, 20251:00PM – 5:00PM ET Add to Calendar REGISTER   The SEC's Crypto Task Force will host a public roundtable to facilitate an in-depth discussion on policy matters related to financial surveillance and privacy. Registration is for in-person attendance only. The event will be webcast. Information on the agenda and panelists will be available soon.

The Qatar Stock Exchange (QSE) announces that a major shareholder in Ooredoo has successfully completed a fully marketed secondary public offering of 160,480,320 shares—representing 5.01% of the company’s issued share capital—to a group of qualified investors. The total value of the transaction exceeded QAR 2 billion. The detailed data related to the special transactions involving Ooredoo shares is as follows: Number of Transactions Price (QAR) Number of Shares Transaction Value (QAR) 126 12.50 160,480,320 2,006,004,000   This successful offering will increase Ooredoo’s free float to approximately 27% of the issued share capital, thereby enhancing the liquidity of the company’s shares on the Qatar Stock Exchange. The transaction is also expected to support and accelerate the company’s weighting upgrades within the MSCI and FTSE indices, in which Ooredoo is already a constituent. This transaction marks the first fully marketed secondary public offering executed on the Qatar Stock Exchange. Its successful implementation reflects the ongoing commitment of the Qatar Financial Markets Authority (QFMA) and the Qatar Stock Exchange to adopting international best practices that are widely applied across leading global capital markets. The introduction of this offering mechanism on QSE expands the range of investment options available to institutional investors, aligning with their diverse strategies and facilitating faster access to the Qatari market. It is also expected to deepen the market, improve liquidity levels, and increase the proportion of free-float (freely tradable) shares available for trading on QSE. Ooredoo obtained all necessary approvals for this transaction. Investors may find detailed information related to the offering on the company’s website and on the Qatar Stock Exchange website via the following link: click here In closing, the Qatar Stock Exchange extends its sincere appreciation to the Qatar Financial Markets Authority and EDAA Qatar for their efforts and valuable contributions, which were instrumental in the successful execution of this important initiative on the Exchange. Number of Transactions

The Qatar Stock Exchange (QSE) successfully concluded its New York Roadshow on 17–18 November 2025, hosted at Bank of America in New York City. The two-day event showcased Qatar’s leading blue-chip listed companies to a high-profile audience of global institutional investors, resulting in more than 80 one-on-one meetings with major buy-side firms. The delegation highlighted the depth, resilience, and diversity of Qatar’s equity market, reinforcing the competitiveness of the nation’s publicly listed companies. The roadshow provided a platform for participating companies to showcase their performance, growth outlook, and market fundamentals. Over the course of the event, investors held a series of one-on-one and group meetings with Qatari corporates, reflecting strong international interest in Qatar’s capital market. The New York Roadshow forms part of QSE’s broader efforts to enhance international investor engagement in line with Qatar National Vision 2030 and the objectives of the third Financial Sector Strategy, which emphasize deeper financial markets, stronger global connectivity, and diversified economic development. By collaborating with Bank of America, QSE continues to facilitate constructive dialogue between listed companies and global market participants, supporting greater visibility for Qatar’s capital market across major financial centers. The event also underscored the close alignment between QSE and its listed companies, demonstrating a shared commitment to transparency, effective engagement, and long-term market development.

Thank you, Reena. It is an honor to be back at Georgetown and at the Psaros Center.1 I have spent a significant amount of time on and around this campus, including when I served as a congressional intern early in my career. Perhaps in fate's way of foreshadowing, one of the topics I researched that summer was the Glass-Steagall Act. Turns out that it was handy to learn about at a young age. Financial stability is a focal point of my attention at the Board of Governors, since I serve as chair of the Board's Committee on Financial Stability. Allow me to start by saying that the financial system remains resilient, supported by strong balance sheets among households and businesses and high capital levels across the banking system. Earlier this month, the Fed issued the most recent version of our semiannual Financial Stability Report. That report affirmed the system is resilient, while also noting some of the same risks and vulnerabilities we have seen in recent reports. My remarks will center on three areas of vulnerabilities: asset valuations; the structural shift in lending to private companies, away from traditional bank loans and toward private credit arrangements; and the growing role of hedge funds as investors in the U.S. Treasury market. Finally, I will turn to a longer-term issue—the potential for the use of generative artificial intelligence (AI) in financial market trading that could both increase and decrease financial stability. Let's begin by putting financial-system vulnerabilities into context. The Federal Reserve promotes financial stability in order to support the achievement of its dual mandate of promoting maximum employment and price stability. That is, achieving maximum employment and price stability depends on a stable financial system. We know from history, whether from the distant past—the Great Depression—or from the recent past—the Great Financial Crisis or the Great Recession—that financial crises typically lead to large job losses and high unemployment.2 However, given the complexity of the financial system, it is sometimes hard to see the connection between the system and everyday life. Living and teaching in Michigan during the Great Recession, I saw firsthand how the financial system's fragility contributed directly to job losses. One example is how the default of Lehman Brothers contributed, via a chain of events, to declines in employment in Michigan. Lehman's failure in September 2008 led a money market fund to "break the buck"—the fall in the value of its assets meant it could no longer redeem shares for the $1 that investors expected to receive—prompting a run on the funds. In turn, the funds pulled back from riskier assets, including asset-backed commercial paper. But the major auto finance companies depended on that commercial paper to finance loans to consumers; hence, they came under stress.3 With less credit available, auto sales plummeted, and Michigan was hit very hard. Many people—including some of my family members, my students' and colleagues' family members, friends, and neighbors—lost their jobs and experienced significant hardship. The Michigan unemployment rate exceeded 14 percent in 2009, while the national unemployment rate peaked at 10 percent in 2009. Correspondingly, foreclosures more than tripled in Michigan between 2006 and 2010, and home values in Michigan sank 33 percent over the same period. I tell this story, not because I fear we are on the brink of a financial crisis, but because I think it is worth emphasizing why resilience of the financial system matters for the real economy—a point I have made since writing my dissertation—and for everyday Americans' lives. A stable and resilient financial system supports employment and stable prices and ensures families and businesses can function effectively in the economy. That is why policymakers work diligently to understand the functioning of the financial system and is one reason we publish a financial stability report twice a year. And, of course, the story emphasizes the need to maintain resilience in the financial system. Asset ValuationsWith that background, allow me to turn to the financial system vulnerabilities I consider to be most salient currently, beginning with asset valuations. When we evaluate asset valuations, we do not look at the actual levels of asset prices. Rather, we look at their levels relative to fundamentals and whether their levels relative to fundamentals are high by historical standards.4 As noted in the Financial Stability Report, our assessment of asset valuations is that they are, on the whole, elevated relative to historical benchmarks in a number of markets, including equity markets, corporate bond markets, leveraged loan markets, and housing markets. To be sure, this is not investment advice. Indeed, it is neither my role nor my desire to offer any comment on the merits of different asset valuations. Our role at the Fed is to simply observe that expected compensation for risk is low relative to history—and that might revert, stay low, or even go lower. And situations of elevated valuations are quite common. Asset valuations have been stretched many times since the 2009 trough. I consider any potential financial system vulnerability through the lens of how it might constrain the Federal Reserve's ability to attain its dual-mandate goals of maximum employment and price stability. Currently, my impression is that there is an increased likelihood of outsized asset price declines. However, given the system's overall resilience, I do not see the kinds of weaknesses that played out so painfully in the Great Recession, and, thus, I do not see potential asset price declines as posing risks to the financial system. Private CreditAnother potential vulnerability worth watching is the growth of private credit. Fed staff estimate that, over the past five years, private credit has roughly doubled. Whenever we observe such rapid growth in credit over such a short period of time, it draws our attention. I use the term private credit to describe loans to privately held businesses that originate from nonbank entities. Privately held businesses are companies without publicly traded stock that generally lack access to public capital markets for debt or equity finance. The growth in nonbank lending to privately held businesses has increased credit access. As a result, private businesses that have difficulty securing a loan from a bank can continue to grow their businesses with loans from private credit providers. In one of its simplest forms, private credit involves a straightforward intermediation chain. Investors with very long investment horizons and no particular need for liquidity invest in a private credit vehicle, such as a private credit fund or business development company (BDC), which then extends loans to private businesses. Such investments are usually locked up or ineligible for redemption for five to seven years, or even longer. At its best, private credit vehicles conduct due diligence and monitor the loans on behalf of the investors. Private credit vehicles tend to have a strong incentive to monitor these loans and can flexibly respond to emerging distress. This careful monitoring is important, because private businesses are not subject to the same public scrutiny—auditing and disclosure standards—as their public counterparts. This model has the potential to enhance financial stability and expand economic growth, since it matches longer-maturity loans with longer-term funding and allows firms to get the financing they need on favorable terms. Default rates have also been low and returns high. Nonetheless, we should expand the lens and inspect this funding vehicle more closely. We have also seen more complex intermediation chains involving more leveraged players, such as banks and insurance companies, emerge in recent years.5 Some private firms may also have multiple sources of funding. The increased complexity and the interconnections with leveraged financial entities create more channels through which unexpected losses in private credit could spread to the broader financial system. What do recent trends in the sector suggest about the potential for such losses and financial stability risks? I do not currently see the potential for private credit to contribute to an unexpected credit crunch in the same way that the asset-backed commercial paper market did in 2008. However, it is well worth keeping a close eye on developments here. Default rates remain low, but they are a backward-looking measure and could also reflect increased usage of payment-in-kind arrangements, or PIKs; loan amendments; and distressed exchanges. Recent private business bankruptcies in the auto sector also revealed unexpected losses and exposure across a broad range of financial entities, including banks, hedge funds, and specialty finance companies. Should we expect to see more? There are some reasons to interpret the recent failures as outliers. I do not assess the current risks from private credit to be a threat to financial stability. The businesses that failed recently may have been more exposed to changes in trade and immigration policy, made more use of off-balance sheet financing, or been of poorer credit quality than other private businesses. Therefore, it is difficult to infer general lessons from these specific cases. Yet, history teaches us a lesson here. The likelihood of observing additional cases like those recently in the news increases when size of exposure and level of complexity in these arrangements are not transparent, when a sector experiences periods of rapid growth, and when these arrangements have not been through a full credit cycle (boom and bust). Accordingly, I will continue to focus on ensuring that we understand developments in this sector and how these lending arrangements are evolving over time. Hedge Fund Footprint in Treasury MarketsAnother vulnerability I am following carefully is the footprint of hedge funds in the U.S. Treasury market. This footprint has grown substantially over the past few years and recently just exceeded its previous, pre-pandemic peak. My focus relates to the potential for transmitting stress to the U.S. Treasury market, which is critical to the functioning of our financial system. The U.S. Treasury market is the largest and most liquid financial market in the world. Treasury securities, by serving as a source of safe and liquid assets, enable the efficient and stable flow of capital across the global financial system. The Treasury market averages around $900 billion in transactions per day, with transactions on high-volume days around $1.5 trillion per day in recent years.6 The smooth operation of U.S. Treasury markets is also critical for the transmission and implementation of monetary policy. Hedge funds' holdings of Treasury cash securities—that is, Treasury bills, notes, and bonds—have increased from representing about 4.6 percent of total Treasury securities outstanding in the first quarter of 2021 to representing 10.3 percent in the first quarter of this year, just above its pre-pandemic peak of 9.4 percent.7 This represents significant growth in the scale of liquidations that could result, if hedge funds were to sharply reduce their Treasury positions because of changing market conditions. We witnessed such an episode at the start of the pandemic during the "dash for cash" when sales of Treasuries by a broad range of market participants increased dramatically and all at once.8 The sensitivity of hedge fund Treasury positions to shifting market conditions depends on the Treasury trading strategies that hedge funds are pursuing. Staff analysis suggests that the vast majority of hedge fund Treasury positions involve relative value trading strategies, of which there are many types. These trades exploit relative price differences between related securities—pairs or combinations of Treasury cash securities, Treasury derivatives, or interest rate derivatives. To be sure, outside of episodes of stress, relative value trades substantially improve the efficiency and liquidity of Treasury securities and related markets. Yet, during episodes of stress, the unwinding of crowded positions in such trades could magnify instability in these markets. Relative value trading strategies typically share key features that create potential Treasury market vulnerabilities.9 For example, relative value trades are highly leveraged to amplify returns from small price differentials, with these trades generally funded with repo that is shorter term than the maturity of the trade, resulting in maturity mismatch. As a result, these strategies are exposed to significant funding risks that could arise from instability in repo markets. Relative value trades that involve derivative contracts—such as the cash-futures basis trade and the swap-spread trade—are further exposed to margin calls when additional liquidity is required to satisfy increased minimum margin requirements. Such adverse funding shocks can result from episodes of market volatility or from moves in relative prices that are disadvantageous to the trade. Sudden funding shocks can then prompt an unwinding of hedge fund positions, resulting in significant Treasury security sales and the potential for market liquidity strains. Increased volatility and losses due to changes in relative prices can also lead hedge funds to choose to exit trades for risk-management reasons, also resulting in large Treasury security sales.10 All of these features of relative value strategies can make Treasury market liquidity conditions—and, in the extreme, market functioning—more vulnerable to stress. Note that it is not inevitable that episodes of market volatility will induce an unwinding of relative value trades and, indeed, instances of one of these trades unwinding are rare. As you know, the swap-spread trade—a relative value trade between Treasury securities and interest rate swaps—experienced an unwinding during April's heightened market volatility, because the relative prices of securities at the core of the trade moved in ways that became unfavorable to the trade. Nonetheless, other relative value trades remained fully intact. This was especially notable for the cash-futures basis trade, reflecting the fact that conditions in repo markets remained orderly throughout the episode.11 Notwithstanding, the paucity of sizable relative value trade unwindings remains a potential impetus for market liquidity strains. AI Use in Financial ServicesThe potential implications of rapid advancements in AI for financial stability constitute my final topic today. Just as the scientific revolutions in chemistry and biology brought both life-saving medicines and more potent weapons, the recent advancements in AI have prompted forecasts that run the gamut from utopia to doomsday. How do theory and limited evidence inform us thus far about the potential impact of AI on financial stability? To structure our thinking, I would like to briefly consider one aspect of this question: the use of AI in algorithmic trading in financial markets and the implications for financial stability. Certainly, sophisticated computer-driven trading algorithms are not new. Traders have been using machine learning and other advanced statistical tools for decades. Trading in many important financial markets is now heavily reliant on algorithms.12 But the adoption of generative AI in trading is different and brings new challenges. Unlike pre-programmed algorithms with limited flexibility, generative AI is able to quickly review large amounts of data and then autonomously deploy trading strategies that could be opaque to humans. Used without careful testing and human oversight, generative AI may create risks that are difficult to monitor or mitigate. The use of generative AI in trading may also improve on current algorithmic trading activity, especially if the less rigid models prove able to adjust in ways that stabilize rather than destabilize prices. There is early evidence for both. Correlated trading and herdingResearchers are only starting to study whether the use of generative AI in trading leads to more or less correlated trading. Nonetheless, research so far offers some useful insights. Theory and empirical evidence show that independent but simultaneous actions by high-frequency trading (HFT) algorithms in response to a common signal can indeed generate excess volatility and mispricing, thereby reducing market efficiency.13 Not all algorithms are created equal. Studies have also shown instances when correlated trading by HFTs improved price discovery without increasing volatility.14 Research also shows widespread use of popular arbitrage strategies helped eliminate mispricing across fragmented markets.15 In other words, correlated trading by algorithms can, at times, also benefit market quality and efficiency. A recent experimental study by Fed economists demonstrates that algorithmic strategies relying on generative AI may also be less prone to herding behavior—by which I mean ignoring private information and imitating others—than human traders. In this experiment, the AI agents were less influenced by the cognitive biases that sometimes drive human investment decisions.16 Collusion, market manipulation, and concentrationResearchers have also pointed to the risk that generative AI could engage in collusion and market manipulation, rigging the system to favor those employing the technology. Recent theoretical studies find that some AI-driven trading algorithms can indeed learn to collude without explicit coordination or intent, potentially impairing competition and market efficiency.17 However, others observe that the possibility of collusion rests on the assumption that all traders use very similar algorithms. They argue that algorithmic traders have strong incentives to differentiate their trading strategies, because noncollusion can be highly profitable when others collude.18 Thus, according to these views, the likelihood of tacit algorithmic collusion arising in real-world financial markets is very small. Beyond collusion, there is also the troubling possibility that AI trading systems could learn to manipulate markets. A recent theoretical study shows that self-learning, profit-maximizing algorithms can unintentionally discover spoofing strategies—that is, placing large orders they never intend to execute just to create false impressions of market demand.19 Potentially, some new AI systems could operate with greater opacity, execute more complex trades, and better hide manipulative intent than old-fashioned dishonest human traders. Additionally, there are growing concerns that results obtained from complex AI models may be difficult to explain or rationalize by human experts—the "black box" problem.20 The inability to fully audit trades executed by algorithms makes surveillance by trading venues and regulators more challenging. The good news here is that major electronic trading platforms are also rapidly adopting advanced machine learning techniques to detect market manipulation and collusive behavior.21 Thanks to improving surveillance capabilities, AI technology could ultimately strengthen market integrity and enhance market liquidity. Trading venues are also taking steps to mitigate the risk stemming from the "black box" problem associated with AI-enabled trading algorithms. For example, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) recently reminded its members that they must be able to fully explain and reproduce any decisions or actions taken by their algorithms on the CME market.22 Such initiatives may limit the deployment of generative AI and other stochastic algorithms for direct trade execution on major trading venues. Last but not least, the debate is also growing as to whether the adoption of generative AI in trading algorithms may increase concentration due to high investment barriers (as seen with one liquidity provider using 25,000 GPUs and building billion-dollar infrastructure) or decrease concentration by democratizing access to sophisticated capabilities previously limited to large institutions.23 Taken together, areas to watch carefully have emerged, as well as potential ways we will benefit from this new technology. ConclusionBack to my broader themes, the financial system remains resilient. Yet, vulnerabilities from elevated asset values, growth and complexity in private credit markets, and the potential for hedge fund activity to contribute to Treasury market dislocation warrant attention. These emerging vulnerabilities also occur against a backdrop of very significant technological change. These innovations may ultimately improve financial stability but also involve transitions and potential challenges that may require thoughtful and deliberate navigation. My focus going forward will be on working with my colleagues to navigate these opportunities and vulnerabilities to ensure the financial system remains strong and resilient. Thank you. 1. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee.  2. Financial crises can also lead to deflation, which can have further feedback on the financial system due to deflation leading to increases in the real burden of debt that can, in turn, prompt business (and household) bankruptcies, reducing their spending and production. This reduced economic activity can then lead to layoffs and further declines in prices—that is, a deflationary spiral. This process occurred in the U.S. in the 1930s after the Great Depression and also occurred in Japan in the 1990s after their banking crisis. For summaries of these two episodes, see John C. Williams (2009), "The Risk of Deflation," FRBSF Economic Letter 2009-12 (San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, March).  3. See Ralf R. Meisenzahl (2017), "Auto Financing During and After the Great Recession," FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, June 22).  4. See Tobias Adrian, Daniel Covitz, and Nellie Liang (2015), "Financial Stability Monitoring," Annual Review of Financial Economics, vol. 7 (December), pp. 357–95.  5. See Jose Berrospide, Fang Cai, Siddhartha Lewis-Hayre, and Filip Zikes (2025), "Bank Lending to Private Credit: Size, Characteristics, and Financial Stability Implications," FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May 23); and Sydney Carlino, Nathan Foley-Fisher, Nathan Heinrich, and Stéphane Verani (2025), "Life Insurers' Role in the Intermediation Chain of Public and Private Credit to Risky Firms," FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, March 21).  6. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2025), "Treasury Daily Aggregate Statistics" (accessed November 17, 2025).  7. Hedge funds' Treasury holdings data can be found on the Board's website: https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/efa/efa-hedge-funds.htm. The market value of privately held Treasury debt can be found at https://www.dallasfed.org/research/econdata/govdebt.  8. See Daniel Barth and R. Jay Kahn (2025), "Hedge Funds and the Treasury Cash-Futures Basis Trade," Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 155 (October), 103823; Mathias S. Kruttli, Phillip J. Monin, Lubomir Petrasek, and Sumudu W. Watugala (2025), "LTCM Redux? Hedge Fund Treasury Trading, Funding Fragility, and Risk Constraints," Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 169 (July), 104017; and Andreas Schrimpf, Hyun Song Shin, and Vladyslav Sushko (2020), "Leverage and Margin Spirals in Fixed Income Markets during the Covid-19 Crisis," BIS Bulletin 2 (Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements, April).  9. See Emil N. Siriwardane, Adi Sunderam, and Jonathan Wallen (2025), "Segmented Arbitrage," The Journal of Finance, vol. 80 (5), pp. 2543–90; and Jefferson Duarte, Francis A. Longstaff, and Fan Yu (2007), "Risk and Return in Fixed-Income Arbitrage: Nickels in Front of a Steamroller?" The Review of Financial Studies, vol. 20 (3), pp. 769–811. See also Ayelen Banegas and Phillip Monin (2023), "Hedge Fund Treasury Exposures, Repo, and Margining," FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September 8). 10. See Kruttli, Monin, Petrasek, and Watugala, "LTCM Redux? Hedge Fund Treasury Trading, Funding Fragility, and Risk Constraints"(see note 8).  11. See Roberto Perli (2025) "Recent Developments in Treasury Market Liquidity and Funding Conditions," remarks at the 8th Short-Term Funding Markets Conference, Washington, May 9.  12. See Andrei A. Kirilenko and Andrew W. Lo (2013), "Moore's Law versus Murphy's Law: Algorithmic Trading and Its Discontents," Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 27 (2), pp. 51–72; and Maureen O'Hara (2015), "High Frequency Market Microstructure," Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 116 (2), pp. 257–70.  13. See Robert A. Jarrow and Philip Protter (2012), "A Dysfunctional Role of High Frequency Trading in Electronic Markets," International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance, vol. 15 (3), 1250022.  14. See Alain P. Chaboud, Benjamin Chiquoine, Erik Hjalmarsson, and Clara Vega (2014), "Rise of the Machines: Algorithmic Trading in the Foreign Exchange Market," Journal of Finance, vol. 69 (5), pp. 2045–84; and Evangelos Benos, James Brugler, Erik Hjalmarsson, and Filip Zikes (2017), "Interactions Among High-Frequency Traders," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 52 (4), pp. 1375–402.  15. See Albert Menkveld and Bart Zhou Yueshen (2019), "The Flash Crash: A Cautionary Tale about Highly Fragmented Markets," Management Science, vol. 65 (10), pp. 4470–88; and Dobrislav Dobrev and Ernst Schaumburg (2016), High-Frequency Cross-Market Trading and Market Volatility," Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Liberty Street Economics (blog), February 17. 16. See Anne Lundgaard Hansen and Seung Jung Lee (2025), "Financial Stability Implications of Generative AI: Taming the Animal Spirits," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2025-090 (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September).  17. See Álvaro Cartea, Patrick Chang, Mateusz Mroczka, and Roel Oomen (2022), "AI Liquidity Provision in OTC Markets," Quantitative Finance, vol. 22 (12), pp. 2171–204; and Winston Wei Dou, Italy Goldstein, and Yan Li (2025), "AI-Powered Trading, Algorithmic Collusion, and Price Efficiency," NBER Working Paper Series 34054 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, July).  18. See Laura Veldkamp (2024), "Discussion of 'AI-Powered Trading, Algorithmic Collusion, and Price Efficiency,'" NBER Summer Institute 2024: Asset Pricing, Cambridge, Mass., July 11–12.  19. See Álvaro Cartea, Patrick Chang, and Gabriel García-Arenas (2025), "Spoofing and Manipulating Order Books with Learning Algorithms," available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4639959.  20. See Alessio Azzuti, Wolf-Georg Ringe, and H. Siegfried Stiel (2022), "Machine Learning, Market Manipulation and Collusion on Capital Markets: Why the 'Black Box' Matters," University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, vol. 43 (1), pp. 79–135.  21. See Pedro Gurrola-Perez and Kaitao Lin (2024), "An Analysis of Market Manipulation Definitions round the World," working paper (London: World Federation of Exchanges, June).  22. See the CME Group's "Market Regulation Advisory Notice" at https://www.cmegroup.com/content/dam/cmegroup/notices/market-regulation/2024/07/CME-Group-RA2403-5.pdf.  23. See Anna Irrera and Justina Lee (2025), "Billionaire Trader Alex Gerko's XTX to Build €1 Billion Data Hub," Bloomberg, January 22. 

As previously announced in the Novermber 10, 2025 Alert, the MIAX Options Exchange, MIAX Pearl Options Exchange, MIAX Emerald Options Exchange and MIAX Sapphire Options Exchange will continue the upgrade of its network analytics equipment to improve time measurement precision. The analytics equipment upgrade will be deployed on Monday, November 24, 2025 post-market close for the 1G Shared LL network. No action is required by exchange members related to the upgrades.

Good morning. Katie (Kolchin), thank you for that kind introduction, and congratulations on your first SIFMA conference in this role. You may know that I was a card-carrying member of one of your committees for nearly a decade. We worked at the steady direction of Ann Vlcek, and then T.R. Lazo, professionals of both wisdom and boundless patience. Many of the issues you’ll tackle remain unresolved from those times. I wish you well and look forward to engaging with you and your members. And as the meme goes, may you find committee members who are as dedicated to SIFMA’s policy work as Brett Redfearn is to market data reform. Before I proceed, please accept the usual disclaimer: my remarks today are made in my official capacity as the Commission’s Director of the Division of Trading and Markets and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission, the Commissioners, or members of the Division’s staff. Digital assets rely on distributed networks, cryptographic proofs, consensus mechanisms, and self-executing code. Because no single entity or central intermediary is necessarily involved, these assets are often called “trustless.” And yet, trust is a foundational value of our society—and of our industry, in particular. A key focus of the Commission under Chairman Atkins’ leadership is to rebuild trust across the marketplace. At the same time, the Chairman endeavors to extend that marketplace to integrate “trustless” digital assets, which present promising innovations and efficiencies. The tension inherent in these tasks is worth your reflection. Ganson Purcell was our Division’s second Director. In the wake of the Great Depression, the Commission worked to rebuild trust in a broken marketplace. Often, its work was met with skepticism from various participants, many jealous of another’s perceived position. In a speech at the Boston Stock Exchange on March 3, 1938, Director Purcell observed: “The Securities and Exchange Commission, as you know, has powers which may be of wide economic significance to the various securities markets under its jurisdiction. We are not unaware that there is concern in those markets as to the manner in which the Commission may exercise its powers. That is inevitable. Yet, I have seen worry of that type carried to extreme absurdities. Some of the rumors and reports which gain circulation could be dismissed if they were given but a moment’s serious analysis. For example, the over-the-counter dealers complain that it is our sinister purpose to force trading in their securities on to the smaller exchanges. The smaller exchanges, in turn, complain that we intend to drive trading to the big New York exchanges. And finally, the New York exchanges will tell you that it is our secret desire to drive trading into the over-the-counter markets, which is where we started.  I have also heard the same rumors in reverse order and I imagine you have too.”[1] Director Purcell knew how to build trust during trying times. Nearly four years later, he became the Commission’s sixth Chairman and served for four and a half years – the fourth longest tenure in the agency’s history. In recent years, marketplace trust was again challenged. Unlike the Great Depression, this loss of trust was not caused by a marketplace failure. This time, through poor policy choices, regulation by enforcement, and a lack of good faith engagement, the marketplace trust in the public sector was challenged. This loss was most acute with investors active in digital assets. The Chairman intends to repair this damage. On July 31, Chairman Atkins announced “Project Crypto,” building on the leadership of Commissioner Peirce and the Crypto Task Force, to “help ensure that the United States remains the best place in the world to start a business, develop cutting-edge technologies, and participate in capital markets.”[2] Competition, amongst and between incumbents and innovators, is central to this initiative. Last week, Chairman Atkins made clear that the market will set the path forward: “A reasonable Commission approach to crypto will not by itself decide the fate of the market—or of any particular project. Markets will do that. But it will help to ensure that the United States remains a place where people can experiment and learn, fail and succeed, under rules that are both firm and fair.”[3] Since the summer, the Division has engaged a wide variety of market participants regarding digital assets, across a number of functions such as primary issuance, secondary trading, and custody. Our goal is to advise the Commission on how to facilitate “innovation without arbitrage.” As policy is modernized to accommodate digital assets, I believe neither new entrants nor legacy providers should be advantaged. We should not impose ourselves between commercial competitors. And we should trust market forces as the ultimate arbiter of value. Notwithstanding our posture, the Division has encountered occasional skepticism, and understandable confusion, similar to what Director Purcell described nearly 90 years ago. Today, in place of New York floor brokers, regional market makers, and over-the-counter dealers, we have global exchanges, DeFi platforms, app-based brokers, and non-custodial wallets. The competitive landscape is rapidly changing and global. The commercial stakes could not be higher. I also appreciate that we start from a deficit of trust. Director Purcell had to rebuild trust in a private sector that had squandered it during the Great Depression. Now, it is the public sector that must rebuild trust with industry and the public. I firmly believe that even trustless assets will trade best in a marketplace based on a foundation of trust. Wisely, Director Purcell did not put a regulatory thumb on the scales of marketplace competition. I aim to follow his prudent example. Renew your faith in the Division. Refresh your confidence in the importance of private sector competition and innovation. Rekindle your patriotism, anchored on our nation’s supremacy in global markets. The investing public you serve stands to benefit from the progress you can achieve. Thank you for your time and attention. I look forward to your questions today and continued engagement in the future. [1] Speech: Address Before the Boston Stock Exchange, March 3, 1938 [2] SEC.gov | American Leadership in the Digital Finance Revolution [3] SEC.gov | The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Approach to Digital Assets: Inside “Project Crypto”

LSEG today announced that customers will be able to access its cloud-based historical tick data via Google Cloud’s BigQuery and Vertex AI platform. This integration enables financial institutions to apply AI and machine learning technology directly to LSEG tick history data available on Vertex AI, providing users with actionable, data-backed intelligence to inform trading and risk management. It is the latest milestone in LSEG’s AI strategy – LSEG Everywhere – which is delivering trusted licensed data to scale AI in financial services.  Tim Anderson, LSEG’s Head of Quantitative & Economic Data & Tick History, said: “The integration of LSEG tick history with Vertex AI and BigQuery marks a significant leap forward for financial market participants. By combining LSEG’s deep, first-rate market data with Google Cloud’s advanced AI and data capabilities, customers will have access to cutting-edge data analysis on a scalable, cost-effective platform.” Graham Drury, Director, FSI UK, Google Cloud said: “This collaboration with LSEG is a testament to our commitment to empowering financial institutions with cutting-edge AI and machine learning capabilities. By integrating LSEG tick history with Vertex AI and BigQuery, we're enabling faster, more cost-effective, and deeply insightful analysis of critical market data. This will significantly enhance LSEG's service, ushering in a new era of financial market data intelligence.” Vertex AI is Google Cloud’s fully-managed, unified AI development platform for building and using AI. With Vertex AI, LSEG delivers several key advantages to customers with access to LSEG tick history on Google Cloud:  Accelerated processing:Queries that once took hours can now be executed in seconds, enabling faster iteration and more timely market responses. Agentic AI adoption: Customers can apply complex reasoning and intelligence to derive new insights with AI agents that are grounded in rich historical data and unified proprietary data. Lower operational costs: BigQuery offers efficient data scanning and compute optimization to drive significant cost savings, eliminating the need for costly on-premises AI infrastructure.  Greater accessibility: Natural language interfaces and transparent SQL outputs make advanced analytics accessible to both technical and non-technical users.  Scalable AI adoption: Financial firms of all sizes can deploy sophisticated AI-driven analysis without requiring large-scale infrastructure or manual data wrangling. 

OpenText™ (NASDAQ/TSX: OTEX), a global leader in secure information management for AI, today announced an expanded partnership with Google Cloud to deliver transformative solutions across artificial intelligence (AI), data privacy, and sovereign cloud infrastructure. The collaboration combines OpenText’s enterprise information management expertise with Google Cloud’s AI and infrastructure technologies to help organizations solve complex business challenges with confidence and agility. Gemini Enterprise: Creating Real-World Impact with AI  OpenText will leverage Google’s Gemini models and Vertex AI to drive new AI use cases and deliver a suite of intelligent agents in Gemini Enterprise, empowering customers to tackle high-value business problems in industries such as insurance, financial services, and retail. With Gemini Enterprise, organizations will be able to use AI agents to automate claims processing, enhance fraud detection, drive data compliance, and streamline regulatory reporting—delivering measurable improvements in speed, accuracy, and operational efficiency.  “Our partnership with Google Cloud is rooted in co-innovation,” said Sandy Ono, EVP & Chief Marketing Officer at OpenText. “Together we’re unlocking new possibilities for customers to apply AI in secure, scalable, and industry-specific ways that drive real business outcomes.”  Elevating Data Security with OpenText Voltage and BigQuery  OpenText is also introducing a new data protection solution for the retail sector, which integrates OpenText’s Data Privacy and Protection (Voltage) platform with Google BigQuery. This joint offering delivers advanced encryption and data protection for sensitive data at rest, in transit, and as it feeds AI models—ensuring compliance with evolving privacy regulations.  Sovereign Cloud and AI: Empowering Customers with Control, Choice and Security Across the Globe  To meet the growing importance of data sovereignty, OpenText’s Private Cloud offerings now integrate with Google Cloud’s Sovereign Cloud solutions. This enables organizations in regulated industries to meet stringent compliance requirements while maintaining control over where and how their data is stored and processed.  “OpenText’s commitment to sovereign cloud and sovereign AI is unwavering,” said Shannon Bell, EVP & Chief Digital Officer at OpenText. “Together with Google Cloud, we’re delivering secure, compliant environments that empower customers to innovate with AI on their terms.”  “Google Cloud’s approach to digital sovereignty balances innovation with control, choice, and security,” said Sam Sebastian, Vice President, North America Regions, Google Cloud. “Through our partnership with OpenText, we’re empowering organizations to align their specific business needs, risk profiles, and regulatory requirements.”  This partnership underscores OpenText and Google Cloud’s shared vision for trusted, secure, and scalable AI and cloud solutions that meet the needs of modern enterprises.

The London Metal Exchange (LME) has announced that from mid-2026, it will cease to administer the LBMA Platinum and Palladium prices in order to focus on its core base metals offering.  The LME, in collaboration with LBMA, has engaged with London Platinum and Palladium Market (LPPM) participants on the planned change and is committed to ensuring a smooth and orderly transition to the new administrator once appointed.   Jamie Turner, LME Head of Trading and COO, commented: “Since becoming the pricing administrator for LBMA Platinum and Palladium in 2014, we have sought to be responsive to auction participant requirements and broader market dynamics. Given our strong growth profile and ambitious market development plans in our base metals markets, the PGM auctions no longer represent a core activity for us and, therefore, we believe it is in the best interests of the LME and the market to transition pricing to an alternative venue.” Ruth Crowell, LBMA CEO commented: “LBMA would like to thank LME for the efficient and effective running of the platinum and palladium auctions for over a decade. We are also committed to a smooth transition to a new provider, details to be announced in January 2026.”

The Accelerated Settlement Taskforce and its Technical Group have developed a plan to move to faster settlement of securities trades on financial markets. Documents Draft statutory instrument – The Central Securities Depositories (Amendment) (Intended Settlement Date) Regulations 2026 PDF, 170 KB, 2 pages This file may not be suitable for users of assistive technology. Request an accessible format. If you use assistive technology (such as a screen reader) and need a version of this document in a more accessible format, please email digital.communications@hmtreasury.gov.uk. Please tell us what format you need. It will help us if you say what assistive technology you use. Policy note – Mandating T+1 settlement in the UK HTML Accelerated Settlement Technical Group report PDF, 5.05 MB, 69 pages This file may not be suitable for users of assistive technology. Request an accessible format. If you use assistive technology (such as a screen reader) and need a version of this document in a more accessible format, please email digital.communications@hmtreasury.gov.uk. Please tell us what format you need. It will help us if you say what assistive technology you use. Government response to Technical Group report HTML Accelerated Settlement Taskforce – Terms of Reference from February 2025 HTML Details Update – November 2025 In February 2025, the government committed to legislate to mandate T+1 as the standard settlement period in the UK from 11 October 2027. The government has now published a draft statutory instrument (SI) illustrating how it plans to deliver this, alongside a policy note which explains the approach taken. The government has published this draft SI in advance of laying it in Parliament to aid stakeholder preparations by providing clarity on how the T+1 requirement is intended to apply. The government welcomes any technical comments on the draft SI by 27 February 2026. Pending any technical comments received on the draft, the government intends to lay the final SI in advance of 11 October 2027, allowing ample time for appropriate legislative processes and Parliamentary scrutiny to take place beforehand and to provide early certainty for the sector. February 2025 In December 2022, Charlie Geffen was appointed to chair the Accelerated Settlement Taskforce to explore the potential for faster settlement of securities trades in the UK. The taskforce’s report was published on 28 March 2024, which recommended that the UK should move to a T+1 settlement cycle no later than the end of 2027. Following this, the government appointed Andrew Douglas to chair a Technical Group to take forward the next phase of the work. The group was asked in its Terms of Reference to develop a detailed implementation plan for the UK transition to T+1 and to recommend a date before the end of 2027 for this to take place. The Technical Group’s report was published on 6 February 2025. The report recommends 12 ‘critical’ and 26 ‘highly recommended’ actions to facilitate a successful transition to T+1. It also recommends that the UK move to T+1 on Monday 11 October 2027. On 19 February 2025 the government published its response to this report. The government has accepted all of the recommendations made to it and will legislate to make T+1 the standard settlement cycle in the UK from 11 October 2027. The report makes clear that an aligned move to T+1 across Europe is a highly desirable outcome which would minimise costs for firms. The government is engaging with European partners to support this outcome and notes the growing consensus that 11 October 2027 is an appropriate implementation date. The government has also set out new Terms of Reference for the Accelerated Settlement Taskforce in the final phase of its work to manage and oversee the transition to T+1. The Taskforce will continue to be chaired by Andrew Douglas, with representation from across the financial services industry. For further updates on the progress of this work, please visit the taskforce’s dedicated website.

LSEG announces it has purchased the following number of its ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each from Citigroup Global Markets Limited ("Citi") on the London Stock Exchange as part of its share buyback programme, as announced on 04 November 2025. Date of purchase: 19 November 2025 Aggregate number of ordinary shares purchased: 206,637 Lowest price paid per share: 8,398.00p Highest price paid per share: 8,548.00p Average price paid per share: 8,464.43p   LSEG intends to cancel all of the purchased shares. Following the cancellation of the repurchased shares, LSEG has 514,572,125 ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each in issue (excluding treasury shares) and holds 24,051,599 of its ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each in treasury. Therefore, the total voting rights in the Company will be 514,572,125. This figure for the total number of voting rights may be used by shareholders (and others with notification obligations) as the denominator for the calculation by which they will determine if they are required to notify their interest in, or a change to their interest in, the Company under the FCA's Disclosure Guidance and Transparency Rules. In accordance with Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 (the Market Abuse Regulation) (as such legislation forms part of retained EU law as defined in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as implemented, retained, amended, extended, re-enacted or otherwise given effect in the United Kingdom from 1 January 2021 and as amended or supplemented in the United Kingdom thereafter), a full breakdown of the individual purchases by Citi on behalf of the Company as part of the buyback programme can be found at: http://www.rns-pdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/2588I_1-2025-11-19.pdf This announcement does not constitute, or form part of, an offer or any solicitation of an offer for securities in any jurisdiction.   Schedule of Purchases Shares purchased:       206,637 (ISIN: GB00B0SWJX34) Date of purchases:      19 November 2025 Investment firm:         Citi Aggregate information: Venue Volume-weighted average price Aggregated volume Lowest price per share Highest price per share London Stock Exchange 8,464.43 206,637 8,398.00 8,548.00 Turquoise        

ACER’s 2025 monitoring report on security of EU electricity supply looks at whether Europe had adequate electricity supply in 2024, including risk preparedness, cross-sectoral electricity-gas interactions and the total cost of national support measures such as capacity mechanisms and flexibility schemes that help keep the lights on. What trends did ACER find in 2024? The EU’s interconnected power system helps keep the lights on. In 2024, power outage levels averaged under two hours per year across the EU, and none were due to inadequate electricity supply. Fragmented support measures come with an annual price tag of €11 billion. Almost €11 billion was spent in 2024 across the EU on a fragmented set of nearly 40 security-of-supply measures. Capacity mechanisms are justified if the annual European Resource Adequacy Assessment (ERAA), or alternatively a national assessment, identifies a risk of inadequate supply. Any capacity mechanism must be cleared by the European Commission under State aid rules. These mechanisms rely on a broad range of technologies from dispatchable gas-powered generation to batteries and demand response. Member States can also introduce flexibility measures, again if cleared under EU State aid rules. Capacity mechanisms have yet to become cleaner, gas will still play a role. Only 29% of capacity support was directed to low-emission technologies in 2024, while natural gas will lead in long-term contracts until 2035. Although EU gas demand is expected to fall by 15% by 2035, gas-fired power plants are projected to cover 30% of peak demand. Capacity mechanisms have yet to become more efficient, coordination can help. Capacity auction prices vary more than tenfold across the EU. In 2024, capacity mechanisms cost €6.5 billion (more than double the cost in 2020). Stronger cross-border coordination could reduce additional capacity needs, lowering overall system costs. Limited coordination in Member States’ adoption of capacity and flexibility measures could risk duplication and inefficient investment. Regional and cross-sectoral coordination on risk preparedness remain weak. Only 10% of national risk preparedness plans include joint measures to mitigate the impact of electricity crises and assist neighbouring countries. Cross-sectoral dependencies (i.e. between gas and electricity) are often overlooked. What are ACER’s recommendations? Make capacity mechanisms cleaner by removing barriers to distributed energy, enable demand response and disclose how much capacity support goes to fossil-fuels.  Make capacity mechanisms more efficient, coordinating capacity planning at EU level and reassessing the design of capacity auctions, particularly in markets with consistently high prices. Integrate flexibility measures into capacity mechanisms or better align them to reduce overlaps and inefficiencies. Strengthen regional cooperation on risk preparedness through exchange of best practices, shared templates and joint implementation monitoring. Read more.

Nasdaq (Nasdaq: NDAQ) announces that trading in the shares of Acast AB (ticker name: ACAST) will commence today on the Nasdaq Stockholm Main Market. The company was listed on the Nasdaq First North Premier Growth Market in June 2021. Acast is the 36th company to be admitted to trading on Nasdaq’s Nordic and Baltic markets* in 2025, and the 147th company to transfer from Nasdaq First North Growth Markets to Nasdaq Main Markets in the Nordics over the years. Since 2014, Acast has been creating the world’s most valuable podcast marketplace, building the technology which connects podcast creators, advertisers and listeners. Its marketplace spans over 140,000 podcasts, 3,300 advertisers and one billion quarterly listens. Crucially, those listens are monetized wherever they happen - across any podcasting app or other listening platform. The company operates worldwide and is headquartered in Stockholm, Sweden. "The move to Nasdaq Stockholm Main Market is a decisive step which reflects our operational maturity, commitment to the highest governance standards, and paves the way for increased liquidity and market visibility. This re-listing is important as we continue to focus our strategy on profitable expansion, maximizing our global appeal, and boosting our standing among key partners, investors, and the leading players in the creator economy," says Greg Glenday, CEO of Acast. "We are delighted to welcome Acast to Nasdaq Stockholm’s Main Market and congratulate them on achieving this milestone. Acast has grown rapidly in recent years, becoming a major player within podcasting, and we are proud to see them take this next step to Nasdaq Stockholm’s strong capital markets," says Adam Kostyál, Head of European Listings at Nasdaq and President of Nasdaq Stockholm.*Main markets and Nasdaq First North at Nasdaq Copenhagen, Nasdaq Helsinki, Nasdaq Iceland and Nasdaq Stockholm as well as Nasdaq Baltic.