Trading Technologies International, Inc. (TT), a global capital markets technology platform services provider, today announced that the firm has expanded its sales team in London with the hiring of Rajiv Shah as Head of Sales, EMEA. Shah, who will lead sales in Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA), has over 25 years of experience in financial technology. Alun Green, TT's EVP and Managing Director, Futures and Options, said: "Rajiv brings terrific and very relevant experience to our growing team in London. He has a proven track record of success in designing and executing sales and business growth strategies within enterprise-grade software firms, building trusted relationships throughout the region. Our flagship futures and options offering is now complemented by services across the trade life cycle and new initiatives in other asset classes, giving our sales team the ability to recommend end-to-end and bespoke solutions to clients." Shah has extensive experience in enterprise technology sales across asset classes for fintech organizations, most recently as Head of Sales, Sell-Side Solutions, EMEA for FlexTrade. Previously, he served as Global Head of Sales for Cosaic, a fintech provider of data visualization and desktop interoperability enterprise software, and prior to that Shah held several senior leadership roles at Fidessa, including Head of Sales and Account Management of the EMEA business across all Fidessa products and services. He earned a Bachelor of Science degree with honors in computer science from Cardiff University in Wales.

Nigerian Exchange Limited (NGX) has introduced Commercial Paper (CP) listings, following approval from the Securities and Exchange Commission, marking another significant expansion of its product suite in a year defined by accelerated innovation. This development deepens Nigeria’s short-term debt market and reinforces NGX’s role as a versatile hub for capital formation. The new listing window enables corporates and issuers to list and trade both conventional and non-interest commercial papers directly on the Exchange, providing investors with enhanced visibility, increased transparency and improved liquidity. It also advances NGX’s broader strategy of diversifying its offerings and strengthening the architecture of the domestic capital market. Commenting on the launch, Temi Popoola, Group Managing Director and CEO of NGX Group, commended the Securities and Exchange Commission for its commitment to enabling market advancement and fostering healthy competition across the ecosystem. He stated: “The introduction of Commercial Paper listings is a pivotal step in our strategy to position NGX as a comprehensive capital-markets infrastructure that accelerates capital formation across Africa. As we continue strengthening the foundations of a transparent, technology-driven and inclusive marketplace, our focus remains on building a system that supports sustainable growth, enhances market resilience and unlocks new opportunities for the broader economy.” Commercial Papers (CPs) are short-term, unsecured debt instruments issued by corporates to finance working capital needs and other short-term obligations. Typically maturing within 270 days, CPs are issued at a discount and redeemed at face value upon maturity offering corporates a cost-effective alternative to bank loans and providing investors with attractive short-term investment opportunities.  Also speaking on the development, Jude Chiemeka, CEO, Nigerian Exchange Limited, stated: “The introduction of Commercial Paper listings represents a major advancement in our mission to provide a full spectrum of capital-raising solutions for businesses. This platform enhances transparency in the debt market and supports corporates seeking efficient access to funding outside traditional banking channels, while offering investors credible short-term investment options. NGX will continue to engage with corporates, intermediaries, and investors to deepen liquidity and participation in Nigeria’s debt capital market.” Olufemi Shobanjo, CEO of NGX Regulation Limited, added that strong oversight will remain central as the market evolves. “Our priority is to maintain high standards of disclosure, promote accountability and safeguard investor confidence while contributing to market deepening,” he emphasised. With the inclusion of commercial papers, NGX now offers an integrated environment spanning equities, fixed income, ETFs, derivatives and short-term debt advancing its ambition to be a one-stop marketplace for capital across asset classes.

In this speech, Phil Evans focuses on the UK’s upcoming implementation of the market risk element of Basel 3.1. He reviews the UK’s stated goals for this work, and also looks forward to areas for the Prudential Regulation Authority to review in the future. Speech Many thanks for having me along. It is great to be here at ISDA. I’ll cover three broad things on Basel 3.1 today. First, where do we stand in our implementation in the UK. Second, a reminder of what we’re trying to achieve with the new FRTB rules. And third, something on the areas in FRTB where we might need to look a little closer in due course. I’ll finish by broadening a little and looking beyond FRTB, although many would say there is nothing else in life. First, on where things stand. Basel 3.1 remains a key part of the post crisis reforms. Risk measurement, fundamentally, needs to be accurate. And we had lost confidence in this post GFC, including because of the variability across firms in risk weights that comes from using modelled approaches. That concern speaks to getting Basel 3.1 done as soon as possible. But if Basel 3.1 feels to you like the project that comes quite close to never ending, believe me when I say that ‘I sympathize’. It is in everyone’s interests now that its implementation is finished as soon as possible, so that we can all move on, with the benefits of the new regime safely tucked away. We have the vast majority of our rules in the UK entering force in January 2027, and for those there will not be any further substantive changes to what we have already published. For those, firms should be preparing now. They will adopt legal force when the Treasury makes the SI that allows us to finalise those rules, and we will publish the final rules in Q1 next year. That will give firms a year to prepare before they need to report to us on the new regime, and allow us to undertake the necessary Pillar 2a reset that we promised, to make the Basel 3.1 approach complete and avoid any double counting with the more accurate risk weights generated by Pillar 1. As I’ve said a few times now, this approach to avoiding double counting has been a fundamental principle for us since the start on Basel 3.1, with no need to hold capital twice against the same risk. The only part of the regime in our proposals entering force after January 2027 is the modelled part of the market risk rules – the FRTB – which enters force in January 2028. That is to allow us to finalise those in light of any developments in other jurisdictions, including the US and the EU. The FRTB applies to truly global and cross border business, and so there is real value in having consistency across major jurisdictions. My sense is that both the US and EU are making good progress in their plans. That brings me to my second topic of the FRTB and why we have it. The big point is FRTB was called fundamental for a reason. I would argue there were three main GFC related issues it was trying to fix: There was a trading book / banking book boundary which was too subjective, leaving the door open to an uneven treatment across firms and for risks to end up in a part of the capital framework that isn’t designed to deal with them. That has been addressed in the FRTB with a much clearer boundary. The existing internal model approach missed important risks, for example the different levels of liquidity of trading book positions, and was a bit of a smashing together of elements that have been added to the rulebook over time as and when we spotted gaps in the framework. This has been made more coherent now in the FRTB. There was not a standardised approach that acts as a risk sensitive alternative to modelling, meaning big banks had little choice but to use models. And that means supervisors couldn’t realistically challenge firms, and ultimately stop firms from using modelled approaches, even if the models weren’t performing well. The FRTB greatly improves the standardised approach. So we wanted to fix those issues by having a better-defined boundary between the trading book and the banking book, have a new standardised approach that proves to be a credible alternative to modelling, and having built a credible SA, set a firmer and higher bar for modelling to improve standards. This includes recognising that some risks can’t be modelled well and therefore need capital add-ons. That, of course, is an approach we have been taking with UK firms for some time now, and so is not a particularly new element for the UK, and less of a big change here. All of this adds up to being an important shift. A key goal – implicit in the new framework – is that modelling should be perfectly achievable for good models, but banks should not just assume they can always use models regardless of whether those models are good, and up to scratch. That brings me to my third topic of how well does the FRTB measure up to those aims? Well, it’s a little difficult to fully explore this given it isn’t in force yet. But firms do know the direction of travel, and have been working on preparing, which does give us some information. But perhaps the place to start with this topic is a brief description of how we got to where we are today. Post GFC, we had identified a range of high-level issues, as I’ve just described, that needed fixing. The Basel Committee set the appropriate working group, chaired by my excellent colleague Derek Nesbitt, to work in identifying fixes. Perhaps more so than in other parts of the rulebook, it appears quite possible in the market risk world to be able to identify changes and fixes that look good on paper and should work well, but generate a different outcome in practice. The early efforts of this Basel group were criticised for being misplaced in practice by industry, so Derek’s group made very extensive use of industry expertise in designing the new rules. Meaning that the new FRTB had a very heavy dose of industry input in its design, and industry wisdom. So it should work well. But as I said, what works on paper, even when designed with industry input, is not guaranteed to be perfect in practice, as annoying as that is. What do early preparations of firms tell us how well the FRTB achieves the aims I outlined earlier. Well, I think the two of the aims are broadly in good shape. We do have a much better defined and clearer boundary established, and the new standardized approaches are more risk sensitive. But it’s the other aim around modelling where some questions seem to be lingering. To be clear, the aims for the modelling component – the new IMA – are good. And many of the most significant improvements, such as moving to a single, new type of model for the market risk component, and the improved way that liquidity is incorporated into it, seem to work well. But the question that is emerging for a small number of parts of the framework, such as the P&L Attribution Test, is have we put the bar for modelling at the right level and is it too complex? As I’ve already argued, despite much of the design of the IMA reflecting firms feedback as the standard was re-worked, that in and of itself is not a guarantee that it will work well in practice. In truth, as is often the case with changes that look good on paper, it needs some data and in practice experience to really assess that. And there, the struggle has been to get good quality and convincing data. The good news is that is now starting to come through, as firms invest in getting models ready. This investment in getting ready is important, so that we can understand what can be fixed just by a bit of persistence, and what might need to be fixed through possible changes. Meaning it is looking easier to check whether the bar is where we had intended it to be. And its for that reason that, in the early part of the Summer, we announced we would be implementing our entire Basel 3.1 package in January 2027, as previously announced, but we consulted on postponing the IMA modelled approach until January 2028. In the meantime, the idea is that firms can stay on their current market risk models. This would also allow time for greater clarity to emerge in other jurisdictions on their own implementation in this area as well, as consistency really matters. We will publish our final approach on that consultation with the rest of the final package in Q1 next year, meaning that we are on track for our January 2027 implementation date for the main package. As with all of our Basel 3.1 package, we have tried to write the FRTB rules in as clear a way as we can. But there is no avoiding that they are quite involved. And no matter how clearly we try and write the rules, there will be aspects that firms want to clarify with us. By this, I don’t mean re-opening. We need a strong focus on getting the package across the line now, rather than continually re-opening. But clarifying is a distinct and very legitimate need. To accommodate this, in the PRA we’ve launched a new series of Banking Policy Roundtables. There are three per year, rotating the organization of them across UK finance, ISDA/AFME, and the building societies association. These particular roundtables have had the aim of grouping clarifying questions, and we’ve just had a very successful one organized by ISDA and AFME covering market risk. That’s all I have time to cover on market risk. Let me finish with the briefest of tours of the horizon. The meta headline is that we remain very SCGO focused. We have been doing a lot this year. Following through on Mansion House with PRA initiatives. For example, to assist firms, through the ‘scale up’ unit in the PRA and the wider concierge service for firms new to the UK. We’ve also made commitments, with KPIs, to make regulatory transactions like authorisations, SMCR applications and model approvals speedier and more agile. Outside of Mansion House, we’ve launched deeper review of SMCR and modernized a range of MREL related thresholds so the regime keeps pace with the times. And all of that is on top of earlier initiatives covering Basel 3.1 where I think our implementation of the global standard is very proportionate, our strong and simple regime for small firms, securitization reform, remuneration reform, and many initiatives from my colleagues working on insurance reforms. My purpose there is not to blind you with a long list. It is to get across a sense that it is a very big focus for us, that we have been and continue to take very seriously. The big thing I didn’t include in that list, but is very much a big focus right now, and so I’ve pulled it out separately, is the capital refresh project being run by FPC and PRC. I don’t have anything to say on that here given it is separate to our Basel 3.1 work. But we released our analysis and where we have got to in the December Financial Stability Report, today in fact. But I can say it has, and will continue given the next steps, to occupy a lot of bandwidth in the PRA as we look to do the best evidence-based job we can in order to do it justice. Thank you very much for listening.

Cboe Global Markets, Inc. (Cboe: CBOE), the world's leading derivatives and securities exchange network, announced today that Craig Donohue, Chief Executive Officer, Jill Griebenow, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, and Rob Hocking, Executive Vice President and Global Head of Derivatives, will present at the Goldman Sachs Financial Services Conference in New York City on Tuesday, December 9 at 9:20 a.m. ET. The live webcast and replay of the presentation will be accessible at ir.cboe.com, under Events and Presentations. The archived webcast is expected to be available within an hour of the presentation.

The Financial Markets Authority (FMA) - Te Mana Tātai Hokohoko – has welcomed the European Commission decision to recognise New Zealand’s legal and supervisory framework for financial benchmarks as equivalent to the European Union’s. Together with the FMA’s decision to issue New Zealand Financial Benchmark Facility Limited (NZFBF) a benchmark administrator’s licence this week, this means that the NZ Bank Bill Rate benchmark (BKBM) can continue to be used in the EU from 1 January 2026. FMA General Counsel Liam Mason said: “This is a significant outcome for New Zealand, and for all financial institutions and businesses that trade between New Zealand and the European Union that use the BKBM in their commercial transactions. “It means that the more than EUR 50 billion of financial instruments currently in use in the EU that reference the New Zealand Bank Bill Rate benchmark can continue to be used without disruption from 1 January 2026. “This benchmark is used as a base interest rate in financial contracts to calculate interest as part of commercial transactions – for example by holders of interest rate swaps. “Without this decision, these financial instruments cannot legally reference the BKBM. It means the businesses and organisations would need to find an alternative EU-based benchmark for their transactions, which is not feasible. “This step marks the close of a multi-year effort to have New Zealand’s benchmark recognised in the European Union, including introducing a bespoke licensing regime to comply with the updated EU benchmark regulatory requirements. “In this latest phase, the FMA and MBIE worked closely with NZFBF, the sole benchmark provider in New Zealand, to provide the Commission with critical advice on the size and significance of the benchmark,” said Mr Mason. Commission adopts equivalence decision for New Zealand's financial benchmarks - Finance

Please see attached NZX Limited shareholder metrics for November 2025. Downloads NZX Shareholder Metrics - November 2025

Special Announcement: The processing and publication of Commitments of Traders data were interrupted from October 1 – November 12 due to a lapse in federal appropriations. Following a return to normal operations, the CFTC has resumed publication of the Commitments of Traders reports in chronological order. A revised release schedule depicts the intended COT Report publication dates for the data associated with the original publication date. The reports for the week of October 21, 2025 are now available. Report data is also available in the CFTC Public Reporting Environment (PRE), which allows users to search, filter, customize and download report data.  Additional information on Commitments of Traders (COT) | CFTC.gov Historical Viewable Historical Compressed Revised 2025 Release Schedule CFTC Public Reporting Environment (PRE) PRE User Guide PRE Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Comptroller Jonathan V. Gould today testified on the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s (OCC) activities before the Committee on Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives. In his testimony, the Comptroller discussed the OCC’s work to reset its risk tolerance and refocus supervision on material financial risks so banks may better support a thriving economy. He highlighted the agency’s efforts to eliminate debanking from the federal banking system, improve capital standards, and implement the GENIUS Act. Mr. Gould also discussed addressing agency operations. Related Link Written Testimony (PDF)

Good afternoon, and welcome to ISDA’s annual Trading Book Capital event – thanks for joining us today, and thank you to Deloitte for sponsoring. This event has become an annual fixture in the ISDA calendar, and you may have noticed that it nearly always takes place in early December. When the days are at their shortest, the cold is beginning to bite and the Christmas lights are turned on, thoughts are turning to 2026 – plans, hopes and dreams. As I prepared these remarks, I was thinking about what we in ISDA’s Risk and Capital team are dreaming of for next year. I’m sure that if Mariah Carey were to remix her 1994 classic, she could think of no punchier lyrics than these: “I don’t want a lot for Christmas… I just want an appropriate, risk-sensitive capital framework”. While I’m thankfully not planning a career move into festive musical remixes, I do want to talk briefly about why we’re doubling down on our commitment to appropriate, risk-sensitive capital requirements as we move into 2026. Healthy economies and successful companies rely on deep and liquid markets to access funding, hedge their risks and build resilience to withstand external shocks. If banks are hit with disproportionate capital requirements, their ability to provide liquidity will be impaired and economic growth will be constrained. That’s why we’ll continue to advocate for an appropriate capital framework around the world. For the major jurisdictions that have still to complete the implementation of Basel III, it’s clear that 2026 is going to be a crunch year. In the US, regulators are revising the Basel III endgame proposal in response to industry feedback, and we expect to see a new proposal in the coming months. In the EU, the European Commission launched a targeted consultation last month on changes to the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB) that would bring some short-term relief in key areas. These would include a set of temporary adjustments to the standardized and internal models approaches and the application of a multiplier, which negatively affected banks could use to limit the increase in their capital requirements for three years. As a general principle, we think long-term solutions are needed to ensure lasting risk sensitivity, rather than relying on temporary measures. The consultation closes on January 6 and we’re working with our members to develop a response. Here in the UK, the Basel 3.1 framework is due to be implemented at the start of 2027, although the Prudential Regulation Authority has proposed delaying the rollout of internal models until the following year. This brings me to the reduced viability of internal models under the FRTB, which we think should be a major concern for policymakers. Last year, we undertook a survey that showed only 10 out of 26 banks plan to use internal models for a reduced scope of trading desks under the FRTB. That’s a big change that we don’t think is in line with what the Basel Committee originally intended. Such a big shift away from internal models could lead to herd behavior and drive concentrations in particular assets. It will mean less diversity in models and less alignment between risk and capital – a direct contradiction of Mariah’s hopes for Christmas. We’ve recommended changes to improve the incentives to use internal models, which would require the recalibration of some parts of the FRTB, including the profit & loss attribution test, the risk factor eligibility test and non-modellable risk factors. The good news is that we’ve had positive engagement with policymakers on these issues, particularly in the US. There is still work to be done to ensure the viability of internal models, but we’re hopeful that revisions to the Basel III endgame will include positive changes in this area. Whether banks use standardized approaches or internal models, it is critical that those capital models are implemented accurately and consistently. That’s why ISDA developed its Capital Models Benchmarking initiative, which has enabled firms around the world to implement and validate regulatory capital models with an unparalleled level of efficiency, accuracy and consistency. Originally designed for the standardized approach, this initiative has now been extended to support internal models and we’ll hear more on that later this afternoon. As market participants have navigated a series of unexpected shocks in recent years, they’ve also recognized the need to prepare for future climate-related shocks. In particular, the possible impact of natural disasters or changes in climate policy on traded assets hasn’t historically been an area where firms have been able to lean on established best practice. That has now started to change, thanks to ISDA’s conceptual framework for climate scenario analysis in the trading book and the follow-up work we’ve done to design and model specific scenarios. This year, ISDA has produced market risk shocks associated with the short-term scenarios developed by the Network for Greening the Financial System and we’ll publish a new paper on this early next year. Like ISDA’s benchmarking initiative, our climate scenario analysis framework is a mutualized solution that responds to a shared industry challenge. We look forward to further advancing both services in the years ahead. I hope these remarks have given a sense of why ISDA’s hopes for next year are consistent with what we have always strived for. Risk-sensitive capital might not scan seamlessly into the lyrics of a classic festive tune, but it really is all we want for Christmas. Documents (1)for Trading Book Capital: Basel III Implementation and Latest Industry Trends: Mark Gheerbrant Welcome Remarks Trading Book Capital Basel III Implementation and Latest Industry Trends Mark Gheerbrant Welcome Remarks(pdf)

“Now is the time to modernize our capital framework to unleash economic growth for American businesses and consumers across the country.” A coalition of leading business trade organizations urged prudential regulators to examine and modernize large bank capital requirements to ensure they support consumers, businesses, and the U.S. economy. The organizations, which represent a wide range of stakeholders, including small businesses, manufacturers, and farmers, highlighted the negative impact of inappropriately calibrated requirements on economic growth and American competitiveness, and applauded the ongoing efforts to improve the capital framework. A review of 13 economic studies found that increased capital requirements can cost the economy $100 billion to $150 billion per year and result in $2.3 trillion in lost economic productivity over 30 years. “We greatly appreciate the work being undertaken by bank regulators to modernize capital rules to unleash economic growth and support various industries and sectors across the country. Specifically, common sense adjustments to Basel III Endgame, the GSIB Surcharge, stress testing, and leverage requirements will improve access to credit and reduce the costs of goods and services for American businesses and consumers, ensuring the U.S. economy can continue to thrive and grow,” the trade organizations said. The statement for the record was signed by the Financial Services Forum, American Bankers Association, American Cotton Shippers Association, American Farm Bureau Federation, Bank Policy Institute, Business Roundtable, Commodity Markets Council, Consumer Bankers Association, Futures Industry Association, International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Mortgage Bankers Association, National Association of Manufacturers, National Association of REALTORS®, The Real Estate Roundtable, Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, and U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Read the full statement for the record here.

The Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) is warning Ontario investors that the following companies are not registered to deal or advise in securities in Ontario: Marketsca aka MarketsHelp Efinanceproltd Lastclickseo Bank-bit Trends Financial Group TrayDai Wefunder Inc. TradeWealth At the OSC, we issue investor warnings and alerts about possible harmful or illegal activity in progress, and maintain a warning list of companies or individuals performing activities that may pose a risk to investors. A full list of OSC investor warnings and alerts is available on the OSC’s website. Investors can sign up for email notifications when new warnings and alerts are issued and can follow the OSC’s X feed at @OSC_News  Ontarians who have been approached by any of the individuals or firms listed above, or any other unregistered company or individual, are advised to contact the OSC Contact Centre at 1-877-785-1555 or via email at inquiries@osc.gov.on.ca Always check the registration of any person or business trying to sell you an investment or give you investment advice. This can be done by visiting the Check Before You Invest or the Crypto businesses pages on the OSC website. The mandate of the OSC is to provide protection to investors from unfair, improper or fraudulent practices, to foster fair, efficient and competitive capital markets and confidence in the capital markets, to foster capital formation, and to contribute to the stability of the financial system and the reduction of systemic risk. Investors are urged to check the registration of any persons or company offering an investment opportunity and to review the OSC investor materials available at https://www.osc.ca.

Euronext, the leading European capital market infrastructure, today signed the Armed Forces Covenant with the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence. This is the fifth partnership signed by Euronext with local military reserves in Europe. With these partnerships, Euronext reaffirms its commitment to European resilience and strategic autonomy. These partnerships extend the initiatives related to Energy, Security and Geostrategy, the “New ESG”, launched by Euronext on 6 May 2025 to strengthen European strategic autonomy. This set of initiatives led by Euronext enhances the visibility of European companies operating in strategic sectors and provides them with unprecedented tools to meet their financing needs through improved access to capital. These solutions also address the growing demand from asset managers, institutional investors and retail investors for better exposure to high-growth segments through thematic indices. As European strategic autonomy and independence rely on the ability of European citizens to take part in their country’s own defence ecosystem, Euronext has created a support framework for its employees who are already engaged in a reservist commitment, or who wish to take up this opportunity. As of 6 May 2025, Euronext guarantees the continuation of salary and social benefits for preliminary training periods of up to 15 days for all new reservists, and up to 10 days per year for all Euronext employees engaged in a reservist commitment across all the group’s European locations. In countries where a more beneficial local reservist support system exists, the existing framework prevails. To formalise this engagement, Euronext has signed partnerships with five national military reserves.  In London, Euronext signed a partnership with the UK military reserve, the UK Reserve Forces, in the form of the Armed Forces Covenant, on 2 December 2025. The Covenant was cosigned by Brigadier Sam Cates, Deputy Commander HQ London District, in a ceremony that took place in the historic Wellington Room, Horse Guards. The event reflected the deep military ties and security interests that bind the United Kingdom and the countries in which Euronext operates regulated markets. In Amsterdam, Euronext signed a partnership with the Dutch military reserve, the Korps Nationale Reserve, on 12 November 2025. To mark this occasion, Gijs Tuinman, Dutch State Secretary for Defence, sounded the gong at the stock exchange, in the presence of Colonel Ruben Koopman, Head of the Department of Reservists and Society, and Lieutenant Colonel dr. Roland Slegers-Leijsten, Commander of the Korps National Reserve. In Oslo, Euronext signed a partnership with the Norwegian military reserve, the Norwegian Home Guard, on 3 November 2025. The partnership was signed during the annual keynote addresses from the Norwegian Army and the Norwegian Home Guard, in the presence of his Majesty Harald V, King of Norway, Major General Lars Lervik, Chief of the Norwegian Army and Major General Frode Ommundsen, Chief of the Norwegian Home Guard. In Paris, Euronext signed a partnership with the French military reserve, the Garde nationale, on 1 October 2025. General François-Xavier Poisbeau, General Secretary of the French National Guard, presented the main aspects of the partnership, while Baptiste Mercier, Head of Operational Performance at Allianz France, and Coralie Lecouffe, Senior Consultant at Capgemini Invent, shared personal experiences from their engagement as reservists. In Copenhagen, Euronext signed a partnership with the Danish military reserve, InterForce Danmark, on 19 September 2025. Local employees had the opportunity to meet with members of the reservist forces, who shared insights about their experience and highlighted how military reservists support Denmark’s resilience. Stéphane Boujnah, CEO and Chairman of the Managing Board of Euronext, said: "Since September 2025, Euronext has signed partnerships with local military reserves in Denmark, France, Norway, the Netherlands, and now the United Kingdom. Through these five local partnerships in Europe, Euronext reinforces its commitment to strengthen European resilience and strategic autonomy, at a time of rising geopolitical tensions. I am deeply proud of this citizen engagement that enables our colleagues to put their skills and abilities to the service of their countries. These initiatives demonstrate the power of cross-border collaboration and highlight Euronext’s role as a unifying force in Europe’s capital markets.”  

Record of the Financial Policy Committee meetings on 25 November 2025 and 1 December Headline judgements and policy actions Risks to financial stability have increased during 2025. Global risks remain elevated and material uncertainty in the global macroeconomic outlook persists. Key sources of risk include geopolitical tensions, fragmentation of trade and financial markets, and pressures on sovereign debt markets.  In the FPC’s judgement, many risky asset valuations remain materially stretched, particularly for technology companies focused on Artificial Intelligence (AI). The role of debt financing in this sector is increasing quickly as AI-focused firms seek large scale infrastructure investment. Deeper links between AI firms and credit markets, and increasing interconnections between those firms, mean that, should an asset price correction occur, losses on lending could increase financial stability risks. Credit spreads remain compressed by historical standards. Two recent high-profile corporate defaults in the US have intensified focus on potential weaknesses in risky credit markets previously flagged by the FPC. These include high leverage, weak underwriting standards, opacity, complex structures and the degree of reliance on rating agencies. While the impact of these specific defaults has been limited, a diverse range of financial market participants were exposed. It is important that market participants have a clear understanding of their exposures, including in stress scenarios where correlations and losses can shift outside historical norms, that underwriting standards are robust, and that they do not over-rely on credit ratings as a substitute for carrying out due diligence. Public debt-to-GDP ratios in many advanced economies have continued to rise this year. Governments globally face spending pressures, given the context of changing demographics and geopolitical risk, potentially constraining their capacity to respond to future shocks. Significant shocks to the global economic or fiscal outlook, should they materialise, could be amplified by vulnerabilities in market-based finance (MBF), such as leveraged positions in sovereign debt markets. As an open economy with a large financial centre, the UK is exposed to global shocks, that could transmit through multiple, interconnected channels. Stress in one market, such as a sharp asset price correction or correlation shift, could spillover into other markets. Simultaneous de-risking by banks and non-banks can lead to fire sales, widening spreads and tightening financing conditions for UK households and corporates. Market participants should ensure their risk management incorporates such scenarios. UK household and corporate aggregate indebtedness remains low. The UK banking system is well capitalised, maintains robust liquidity and funding positions, and asset quality remains strong. The results of the 2025 Bank Capital Stress Test demonstrate that the UK banking system is able to continue to support growth even if economic and financial conditions turned out to be materially worse than expected. As part of ensuring the UK banking sector is both resilient and able to support growth, the FPC has reviewed its assessment of the appropriate level of capital requirements for the UK banking system. The Committee judges that the appropriate benchmark for the system-wide level of Tier 1 capital requirements is now around 13% of risk-weighted assets (RWAs) (equivalent to a Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio of around 11%), 1 percentage point lower than its previous benchmark of around 14%. That judgement is consistent with the evolution in the financial system since the FPC’s first assessment in 2015, including a fall in banks’ average risk weights, a reduction in the systemic importance of some banks, and improvements in risk measurement. The Committee has also identified areas for further work, including on buffer usability, the implementation of the leverage ratio in the UK, and initiatives by the Bank to respond to feedback on interactions, proportionality, and complexity. In response to the Chancellor’s request on the FPC’s November 2024 remit letter, the FPC has assessed and identified areas where the financial sector could contribute further to supporting sustainable growth. This work has focused on: facilitating long-term investment in productive assets; fostering technological innovation; and the supply of debt or equity finance to high-growth firms (HGFs), which make an outsized contribution to economic growth and employment growth. The FPC supports: the changes made by the PRA to Solvency II to encourage investment in productive assets by UK insurers (noting the industry’s commitment to invest £100 billion in UK productive assets over 10 years); work to ease impediments to HGFs accessing funding; and efforts by authorities and industry to deliver practical advancements in the UK financial system’s adoption of innovative technology. The FPC has maintained the UK countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) rate at 2%. Although the global risk environment remains elevated, UK household and corporate aggregate indebtedness remains low. The easing of credit conditions since the FPC's Q3 meeting has been in line with the macroeconomic outlook, with some additional easing in the mortgage market related to policy developments. The Committee supports the Bank’s plans for a private markets system-wide exploratory scenario (SWES). This would deepen understanding of the private markets ecosystem, including how firms' behaviours in stress might interact and whether these interactions could amplify stress across the financial system and pose risks to UK financial stability and the provision of finance to the UK real economy. Heightened geopolitical tensions and continued advances in technology have underlined the critical importance of operational resilience to the provision of vital services to households and businesses. The Committee supports further actions to be taken by firms and financial market infrastructures (FMIs) to build resilience to operational disruption. The Committee welcomes the Bank's recent consultation paper setting out its proposed regulatory regime for sterling-denominated systemic stablecoins. The regime should aim to support responsible innovation in payments and money and avoid a disorderly transition as this new form of money is adopted. 1: The Financial Policy Committee (FPC) seeks to ensure the UK financial system is prepared for, and resilient to, the wide range of risks it could face, so that it is able to absorb rather than amplify shocks, and serve UK households and businesses, thus supporting stability and long-term growth in the UK economy. 2: The Committee met on 25 November 2025 to agree its view on the outlook for UK financial stability. The FPC discussed the risks faced by the UK financial system and assessed the resilience of the system to those risks. On that basis, the Committee agreed its intended policy actions. 3: The Committee met subsequently on 1 December 2025, with the Prudential Regulation Committee (PRC), to confirm its response to the final results of the 2025 Bank Capital Stress Test. The overall risk environment 4: The FPC discussed recent developments in financial markets; global vulnerabilities; UK household and corporate debt vulnerabilities; and the resilience of the UK banking sector and market-based finance. The FPC’s judgements for these areas would be set out in the December 2025 Financial Stability Report (FSR). Contributing to sustainable growth 5: The Committee agreed that maintaining financial stability was a necessary foundation for sustainable economic growth. Periods of financial instability – such as the global financial crisis (GFC) – had negatively impacted the provision of vital services to households and businesses in the UK and weighed on output and productivity growth. In contrast, a stable financial system supports lower risk and term premia, lowering the cost of borrowing and improving incentives to invest in long-term productive investment. 6: The FPC primarily contributes to sustainable economic growth by maintaining financial stability through identifying, monitoring and addressing systemic risks to the UK financial sector, as required under its statutory objective. The Committee also has a secondary objective of supporting the Government’s economic policy, including in relation to growth and employment. The FPC judged that these objectives were complementary over the medium to long-term: financial stability was necessary for sustainable growth, and sustainable growth supported financial stability. 7: The Committee noted that over the past 15 years, UK labour productivity growth had been low by historical standards and relative to some other advanced economies. The financial sector plays a role in contributing to productivity growth by providing vital services to UK households and businesses, including the provision of financing for investment in capital and technology. But there are a broader range of factors across the economy at play, such as trade conditions, scientific and technological innovation and human capital. 8: The Committee agreed that factors other than financial regulation had been the primary driver of low investment and so low productivity. The volume of lending to the UK real economy had not decreased as a share of GDP in the long run, and the increased diversification of the UK financial system had enhanced the supply of productive finance to the real economy. 9: The Committee observed that lending to UK households and corporates had in the past fluctuated due to changes in financial and macroeconomic conditions. Incentives in the financial system in the past had led to unsustainable lending growth in boom times followed by periods of deleveraging during the resulting downturn. However, post-GFC regulation had increased bank resilience. Combined with the FPC’s use of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) in stressOpens in a new window, this had enabled the banking sector to continue to support households and businesses through recent shocks to the economy. 10: In working to advance its primary objective, the FPC would continue to take steps to ensure that its resilience-building policies were implemented efficiently in a way that supported sustainable growth as the financial system evolved. How the UK financial sector can better contribute to sustainable economic growth 11: In November 2024, via the Committee’s annual remit letterOpens in a new window, the Chancellor asked the FPC to undertake work to assess and identify areas where there is potential to increase the ability of the financial system to contribute to sustainable economic growth and potential solutions to the impediments the sector might face in doing so. The Committee discussed the conclusions of this work. 12: The Committee had agreed in its April 2025 Record that its work in response to the Chancellor’s commission would focus on improving the long-term productive growth capacity of the economy by identifying barriers to the provision of credit and vital services to the real economy by the financial services sector. The FPC had focused on the provision of finance to high growth firms (HGFs) because they made an outsized contribution to economic and employment growth in the UK and globally. 13: The FPC agreed that HGFs faced growing challenges in accessing domestic finance. The FPC identified three impediments to the supply of debt or equity finance to HGFs. First, HGFs found it progressively more difficult to raise funds as funding rounds got larger, due to an underdeveloped domestic funding landscape. Second, HGF finance could be an extremely complex funding ecosystem for funders and founders to navigate. And third, many HGFs had little tangible collateral, and HGFs struggled to secure lending using intellectual property (IP) as collateral due to valuation and recovery constraints. 14: In addition, the FPC noted that UK pension funds and insurers faced barriers in supporting long-term capital investment in the UK economy. The Committee identified the impediments to the investment of long-term capital by pension funds and insurers. First, UK Defined Contribution (DC) pension schemes were smaller in scale and allocated less to riskier assets than international peers. Second, UK insurers reported a lack of opportunities to invest domestically that align with their expertise and risk and reward targets.  15: The FPC noted the package of measures announced by HM Treasury in the Budget. The Committee also underscored the importance of considering greater use of public-private partnership funding initiatives to channel financing to HGFs and the broader population of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to support productivity improvements. The FPC noted the key role the British Business Bank could play in this context, building on the experience of a number of other countries with similar organisations. 16: The FPC also identified issues in the financial sector’s responsible adoption of innovative technology. First, the technology cost of building and maintaining resilience against cyber threats was challenging for new and small FinTechs. Many cyberattacks target third-party suppliers – which FinTechs often aspire to become – as a point of entry into larger corporates. The costs of cyberattacks could be large, and elevated geopolitical tensions and continued advances in technology had increased the potential for operational incidents to disrupt the provision of vital services (see below). Second, the UK’s payments infrastructure needed to keep pace with innovation to support economic activity. Seamless and frictionless payments are critical to economic activity. Coordinated action and investment was needed to create the next generation of payment infrastructure that drives innovation, supports competition, and ensures security.  17: Having considered the above, the Committee concluded that it would: Support the changes made by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) to Solvency II to encourage investment in productive assets by UK insurers. This included reforms to the Matching Adjustment (MA) regime – and the investment in UK productive assets the UK insurance industry had indicated those reforms would enable – and its introduction of a Matching Adjustment Investment Accelerator (MAIA).  As part of this, the FPC noted the UK insurance industry’s commitment to invest £100 billion in UK productive assets over 10 years. Support work led by other authorities to ease impediments to HGFs accessing funding. This included the use of public-private partnership funding initiatives to channel financing to HGFs and the broader populations of SMEs, and engaging with the working group established as part of HMG's Industrial Strategy with the aim of removing barriers to IP-backed lending.  Support efforts by authorities and industry to deliver practical advancements in the UK financial system’s adoption of innovative technology, including through the National Payments Vision, the Bank’s AI Consortium and the Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA) AI Lab’s Live Testing service. 18: Given the importance of sustainable economic growth to the FPC’s objectives, the FPC would closely monitor progress on these issues and remained committed to identifying further ways in which it could deliver on its objective to support economic growth.  19: Further details on the FPC’s findings in relation to sustainable growth would be published in the December 2025 FSR. The FPC’s assessment of bank capital requirements 20: The FPC revisited its assessment of the appropriate benchmark level of capital requirements for the banking system. Details of the assessment would be published in a Financial Stability in Focus (FSIF), published alongside the December FSR. The FPC welcomed feedback and evidence from a broad range of stakeholders on it and on the issues identified for further assessment. 21: The Committee judged that the updated appropriate benchmark for the system-wide level of Tier 1 capital requirements was now around 13% of RWAs (equivalent to a CET1 ratio of around 11%), 1 percentage point lower than its previous benchmark of around 14%. That judgement was consistent with the evolution in the financial system since the FPC’s first assessment in 2015, including a fall in banks’ average risk weights, a reduction in the systemic importance of some banks, and improvements in risk measurement. Given the reduction in the FPC’s benchmark, banks should have greater certainty and confidence in using their capital resources to lend to UK households and businesses. 22: The FPC's system-wide Tier 1 benchmark excluded firm-specific PRA buffers, and requirements set by overseas authorities such as the international component of the CCyB. Within the banking system there would be a distribution of capital requirements in practice reflecting individual banks’ business models, their level of systemic importance, the degree of gaps and mismeasurement in their risk weighted assets, and the PRA’s view of firm-specific risks. 23: In undertaking its review, the FPC had considered how capital requirements had evolved since previous assessments, and feedback it had received from industry and other stakeholders. The FPC noted that: Average risk-weights had fallen as banks had changed the composition and riskiness of their balance sheets. Systemic buffers were lower than envisaged in 2015 as some banks had decreased in systemic importance. The implementation of Basel 3.1 on 1 January 2027 would improve risk measurement, allowing the PRA to reduce Pillar 2A minimum requirements by around ½ percentage point. 24: The FPC considered that the inbuilt responsiveness of nominal capital requirements in the UK banking system – to falls in average risks weights, decreases in UK banks’ systemic importance, and improvements in the measurement of risk weights – reflected desirable flexibility in the capital framework. Flexibility in the framework meant that capital requirements could continue to respond to developments in underlying structural and cyclical factors in future, including if risk levels were to change. 25: UK banks had tended to have capital headroom over regulatory minimum and buffer requirements. Such headroom varied considerably across banks and over time. Currently, banks in aggregate had CET1 capital resources of about 2% of RWAs over their requirements. While the PRA and FPC had no requirements – formal or informal – for capital headroom, banks maintain this additional capital for a number of reasons, including a perceived lack of buffer usability. 26: The FPC also considered how the level of capital requirements in the UK compared to international peers. Comparing capital requirements across jurisdictions was challenging given differences in how risks were captured in different regulatory frameworks – for example, the UK and EU regulatory frameworks captured some risks through Pillar 2 capital add-ons, while the US framework under law instead tended to apply higher risk weights. 27: The level of risk-based capital requirements for large banks in the UK was broadly similar to that in the euro area. And analysis that attempted to adjust for some key differences in the way risks were captured between the UK and US suggested that the level in the UK was lower than that in the US. That said, UK requirements appeared to be higher than in other jurisdictions for some more specific aspects and cohorts, particularly leverage ratio requirements for large domestically focused banks. 28: The Committee considered that the change in its benchmark was consistent with its view that the banking sector could support long-term growth in the real economy in both current and adverse economic environments. This was supported by the results of the 2025 Bank Capital Stress Test, which demonstrated that the UK banking system could continue to support the economy even if economic and financial conditions turned out materially worse than expected. 29: The FPC had considered updated evidence related to its previous judgements on the economic costs and benefits of capital and reviewed external academic studies that provided independent estimates of appropriate capital levels: The FPC reaffirmed that its previous judgements related to the positive impact of post-crisis reforms remained appropriate. Those judgements were related to credible and effective resolution arrangements, effective supervision, structural reform such as the implementation of ring-fencing, and the Committee’s active use of the time-varying countercyclical capital buffer. Together, these judgements materially reduced the FPC’s assessment of the appropriate level of capital in 2015. Updated analysis suggested that the macroeconomic costs of bank capital may have declined as the spread between banks’ cost of equity and the average cost of their debt had fallen. At the same time, various developments may have impacted the macroeconomic benefits of bank capital. Global vulnerabilities, including risks associated with sovereign indebtedness, had increased. But conversely, the indebtedness of UK households and businesses had fallen, and banks’ underwriting standards had improved. Analysis of the net macroeconomic impact of capital requirements suggested that the Committee’s updated 13% benchmark was within, albeit towards the lower end of, the range of capital requirements that were likely to maximise the benefits to long-term growth. The FPC’s updated benchmark was also at the lower end of the range of optimal capital levels estimated in the external academic literature. Analysis also suggested that reducing structural capital requirements materially below the FPC’s updated benchmark of 13% (unless due to further improvements in risk measurement that allow overlaps to be removed from Pillar 2A requirements) could be associated with significant reductions in long-run expected GDP through the costs of greater instability, especially if those reductions in capital were to undermine the credibility of the resolution regime as a result of lower overall loss-absorbing capacity. Materially lower capital levels could also lead to higher risk premia on bank funding costs, which would in turn feed through to higher borrowing costs and lower investment by businesses. 30: The FPC had also considered whether the capital framework might warrant adjustment to make it more effective, efficient and proportionate in the future, and to address any unintended consequences. 31: Significant steps were already being taken to address feedback and improve the efficiency and proportionality of the framework. The FPC had approached the assessment of capital requirements proactively and had identified further broad, material categories of issues in which it supported further work to assess whether changes could make the capital framework more effective, efficient and proportionate. The FPC would expect banks to use any such changes as a means to increase their support of households and businesses in the real economy. 32: Working with the PRA and international authorities, the FPC would work to enhance further the usability of regulatory buffers and so reduce banks’ incentives to have capital in excess of regulatory requirements and buffers. Regulatory capital buffers made up just under half of risk-weighted capital requirements. These buffers were explicitly intended to be usable to help banks absorb losses in stress while maintaining the provision of services to the real economy in a downturn – by reducing incentives for banks to deleverage in order to defend their capital position. Experience and a range of research suggested, however, that banks were reluctant in practice to use their buffers, which might have contributed to the size of banks’ management buffers above leverage ratio requirements. 33: The FPC would review the implementation of the leverage ratio in the UK, to ensure that it functioned as intended. When the FPC introduced the leverage ratio as a complement to the risk-weighted framework in 2015, it was envisaged that risk-weighted requirements would form the binding constraint for a majority of UK banks most of the time. Over time however, the falls in average risk weights had meant that the leverage ratio was becoming binding – or close to binding – for a greater number of lenders. 34: While there were reasons for the differences in application of the leverage ratio in the UK and some other countries, including previous macroprudential decisions by the FPC to apply buffers alongside Basel minimum standards, international comparisons also pointed to some potentially important areas to consider for reform. As a result, the FPC would review how the leverage ratio had been implemented in the UK, how it was operating in practice, how it was interacting with other policies such as ring-fencing, and whether this matched the original intention of the framework. For example, the FPC would explore the extent to which the leverage ratio had become more binding as a result of underlying reductions in the riskiness of banks’ exposures. The Committee intended to prioritise reviewing the UK’s approach to regulatory buffers in leverage ratio requirements. 35: The FPC supported initiatives by the Bank to respond to feedback on interactions, proportionality, and complexity in the capital framework. This included further work to consider how the capital requirements that are related to domestic exposures interact. Capital requirements that were related to domestic exposures included the UK CCyB, O-SII buffers, and Pillar 2A requirements for geographic credit concentration risk, which each served different purposes in the capital framework, but were all calibrated based on measures of domestic lending. The FPC and the PRA intended to draw on several sources of information when conducting this work including on the impact of systemic failures and credit concentration, and banks’ stress test results. Other initiatives included: Further work to develop a systematic approach for updating regulatory thresholds that define which different parts of the regulatory framework apply to firms. The PRA’s contribution to the government’s review of ring-fencing. The government had made clear its intention to maintain the ring-fencing regime to protect financial stability and safeguard depositors, while at the same time driving meaningful reform of the regime as part of plans to focus on growth and the release capital for productive investment in the UK. The PRA would also review the application of the Basel 3.1 output floor at the ring-fenced sub-group level, based on evidence and experience of its implementation. It would do so after Basel 3.1 is implemented but before full weighting of the output floor in 2030. Reviewing feedback on the capital requirements for mortgages under internal ratings-based models, to ensure the framework enables an optimal channelling of finance to creditworthy households. Industry had previously raised concerns that Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) requirements were particularly difficult to meet for smaller and newer lenders. While aimed at exploring ways to address challenges faced by medium-sized firms, some policy changes would also affect larger lenders. 36: The FPC had previously judged that the introduction of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 should not lead to an unwarranted increase in capital requirements. In response, and following engagement with industry, the Bank had made changes to the stress test relative to previous concurrent stress tests that were appropriate to make alongside the earlier provisioning under the IFRS 9 accounting standard. The FPC judged these changes had been effective in avoiding an unwarranted increase in capital arising from the interaction of IFRS 9 and the stress test, and made the test simpler and aligned with the accounting standard that would apply in an actual stress. The Bank therefore intended to maintain these changes for future tests (see below). 37: The FPC, along with the PRA, was interested in the views of a broad range of stakeholders – including UK lenders, think-tanks, industry groups, investors and academics – on the material covered in the accompanying FSIF on the FPC’s assessment of bank capital requirements, and welcomed feedback and evidence on the issues identified for further assessment. The Bank would engage in structured evidence gathering sessions in early 2026. 38: Further details of the FPC’s assessment would be published in an FSIF, alongside the December 2025 FSR. Results of the 2025 Bank Capital Stress Test 39: The Committee discussed the results of the 2025 Bank Capital Stress Test, which indicated that the major UK banks had the capacity to continue to support the economy through a stress scenario that incorporated a severe global aggregate supply shock, high advanced-economy inflation, higher global interest rates, deep and simultaneous recessions in the UK and global economies, with materially higher unemployment, and sharp falls in asset prices. 40: The stress test was not a forecast of macroeconomic and financial conditions in the UK or abroad. Rather, it was intended to be a coherent ‘tail risk’ scenario designed to be severe and broad enough to allow the FPC and PRC to assess the resilience of UK banks to a range of adverse shocks. The results of the stress test are used to form a view of the resilience of the banking sector and individual banks in it as part of the FPC and PRC’s broader framework for financial stability and safety and soundness. 41: The stress test results showed that the aggregate CET1 ratio reduced by 3.5 percentage points to the low point of the test. That left aggregate headroom to regulatory minima and systemic buffers at the low point of the stress of 3.2 percentage points CET1 (the equivalent of around £60 billion). Most of this headroom arose from banks beginning the test with capital in excess of regulatory minima and buffer requirements. 42: However, the FPC had noted as part of its capital review that there were impediments to banks using their buffers in practice, which could have been contributing to bank’ incentives to maintain capital in excess of regulatory requirements. The FPC and PRC did not oblige firms to maintain buffers in excess of regulatory requirements. All elements of capital buffers that had been built up by banks existed to be used to support households and businesses during stress. The existence of usable buffers allowed banks to absorb losses without breaching minimum requirements, enabling them to meet the demand for credit from creditworthy households and businesses in the face of severe adverse shocks. As part of the next phase of its capital review (see above) the FPC would explore further steps that could be taken to enhance the usability of buffers. 43: At the individual firm level, all participating banks and building societies remained above their CET1 risk-weighted and Tier 1 leverage minimum regulatory requirements, and no bank was required to strengthen its capital position as a result of the test. 44: The results of the test supported the FPC’s judgement that banks’ current levels of capital were sufficient to support the real economy. They showed that the UK banking system had the capacity to support UK households and businesses, even if economic, financial and business conditions became substantially worse than expected. 45: As in previous stress tests, banks’ resilience relied in part on their ability in stress to cut dividend payments, employee variable remuneration, and coupon payments on additional Tier 1 instruments, as well as other management actions taken in response to the stress. The FPC judged it important for investors to be aware that banks would take such actions as necessary if such a stress were to materialise. 46: The 2025 Bank Capital Stress Test was the first stress test since the end of transitional arrangements for the IFRS 9 accounting standard, introduced in 2018. In 2018, the FPC had stated that it would seek an enduring treatment for IFRS 9 in the stress test that avoided an unwarranted increase in capital requirements. Reflecting the increased resilience for a given level of capital provided by the earlier recognition of losses under IFRS 9, and following a review of the calibration of the stress tests, the Bank had implemented a number of changes relative to previous stress tests. These changes were designed to be consistent with an unchanged FPC and PRC risk tolerance for the resilience of the UK banking system. 47: In March, the Bank committed to using this year’s test to assess the impact of these changes. The FPC judged that the changes had avoided an unwarranted increase in capital requirements and made the test simpler and more aligned with historical advanced economy stresses in terms of the size and timing of the shocks. It intended to maintain these changes for future stress tests and expected to return to assessing resilience against the benchmark of minimum capital requirements and systemic risk buffers.  Further details would be set out in Box E of the FSR. 48: Further details of the 2025 Bank Capital Stress Test and the approach to IFRS 9 would be published in the December 2025 FSR. 49: Alongside the results of the Bank Capital Stress Test the FPC also welcomed the results of the Life Insurance Stress Test, published on 17 and 24 November.footnote[1] The results of the test indicated that the sector was resilient to a severe financial market stress scenario that incorporated a decline in risk-free interest rates, falls in equity and property prices, along with widening spreads and subsequent defaults and downgrades. The UK countercyclical capital buffer rate 50: The FPC discussed its setting of the UK CCyB rate. The Committee’s principal aim in setting the UK CCyB rate was to help ensure that the UK banking system was able to absorb severe but plausible shocks without an unwarranted restriction in essential services, such as the supply of credit, to the UK real economy. Setting the UK CCyB rate enabled the FPC to adjust the capital requirements of the UK banking system to the changing scale of risk of losses on banks’ UK exposures over the course of the financial cycle. The approach therefore included an assessment of financial vulnerabilities and banks’ capacity to absorb such losses, including the potential impact of shocks. 51: In considering the appropriate setting of the UK CCyB rate, the FPC discussed its judgements around underlying vulnerabilities that could amplify economic shocks. While the global risk environment remained elevated, UK household and corporate aggregate indebtedness remains low. The easing of credit conditions since the FPC's October meeting had been in line with the macroeconomic outlook, with some additional easing in the mortgage market related to policy developments. 52: The FPC observed that UK banks’ resilience to these risks continued to be supported by strong asset quality and strong capital positions. There was no evidence that banks were restricting lending to protect their capital positions. As noted above, the results of the 2025 Bank Capital Stress Test suggested that the major UK banks could continue to support UK households and businesses even if economic, financial and business conditions became substantially worse than expected. 53. In view of these considerations, the FPC decided to maintain the UK CCyB rate at 2%. Maintaining a neutral setting of the UK CCyB rate in the region of 2% would help to ensure that banks continued to have capacity to absorb unexpected future shocks without an unwarranted restriction in essential services, such as the supply of credit, to the UK real economy. In considering the appropriate setting of the UK CCyB rate the Committee had taken account of its latest assessment of bank capital requirements (see above). 54: The Committee would continue to monitor the evolution of financial conditions closely to ensure the setting of the CCyB remained appropriate. Private markets 55: The Committee discussed how the role and size of private markets had grown significantly over the past decade, including in the UK, and continued to evolve. The FPC noted the benefits of growth in private markets for the UK real economy, including via diversifying sources of funding for UK businesses and supporting their growth. While resilient to date, the private market ecosystem had not been tested through a broad-based macroeconomic stress at its current size. As previously set out by the FPC, key vulnerabilities associated with private markets could arise from the widespread use of leverage (both by private market funds and their portfolio companies), opacity in valuations, complexity of structures, the extent of reliance on rating agencies, and the interconnection with other risky credit markets. The rapid growth of private markets, increasing interconnections with banks and insurers, and significant data gaps made it difficult to assess fully the potential for systemic risks. 56: The FPC supported the Bank’s plans for a system-wide exploratory scenario (SWES) exercise focused on the private markets ecosystem that would be run in collaboration with a group of banks and non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) active in these markets. The exercise would explore potential risks and dynamics associated with private markets and related risky public credit markets through understanding the actions taken by banks and NBFIs active in private markets in response to a shock, and how these actions might interact at a system level. It would also aim to understand better whether these interactions could amplify stress across the financial system and pose risks to UK financial stability and the provision of finance to the UK real economy. 57: The Committee noted that the exercise was not a test of the resilience of the individual firms that would participate in the exercise. Its focus would be system-wide, exploring the resilience of the provision of private market and related public market finance to the UK corporate sector. Enhancing the transparency of any system-wide dynamics in a stress should help private market participants to better manage the risks they face and allow the Bank, FCA, The Pensions Regulator (TPR) and international authorities to make better-informed judgements about the risks in that ecosystem. 58: The Bank would conduct this exploratory exercise under the guidance of the FPC and the PRC, working closely with, and with the full support of, the PRA, the FCA and TPR. Operational resilience 59: The FPC had previously discussed how heightened geopolitical tensions and continued advances in technology had underlined the critical importance of operational resilience to the provision of vital services to households and businesses. This supported the need for firms and financial market infrastructures (FMIs) to continue to build resilience to operational disruption. The FPC met jointly with the PRC, the Financial Markets Infrastructure Committee and the FCA to discuss the UK’s approach to enhancing the operational resilience of the UK financial system given the heightened threat landscape, and the increasing pace of technological change. They agreed the importance of continued co-ordination on these issues. 60: The FPC judged that geopolitical and technological developments further increased the likelihood that operational incidents could affect the provision of vital services such as wholesale and retail payments, clearing and settlement, and other activity such as custody services. Not only could disruption to vital service provision affect the ability of financial sector participants, households and businesses to manage risk, transact or access financing, it could also undermine confidence in the financial system, and therefore negatively affect saving, investment, and economic growth. Cyberattacks and severe operational disruption also had the potential to impact firms’ own revenues and valuations. 61: Therefore, the FPC supported further actions to be taken by firms and FMIs to build resilience to operational disruption, including to emerging risks from AI, quantum computing, and more broadly as the risk environment continued to evolve.   62: The Committee agreed that the appropriate management of high-impact operational risks by critical firms and FMIs was essential for system-wide operational resilience. Therefore, the FPC welcomed work by microprudential regulators to continue to strengthen the regulatory framework for operational resilience.   63: In taking steps to build resilience, firms and FMIs should recognise the role they play in supporting confidence in the financial system, and how disruption to vital services could negatively affect saving, investment and economic growth. For example, FMIs and the largest firms were required to take account of risks to UK financial stability when identifying their important business services. To support this, the Thematic findings from the 2024 Cyber Stress TestOpens in a new window provided tools to facilitate discussion of financial stability between subject matter experts from a range of disciplines, as well as illustrative examples of mitigation actions firms and FMIs could take.   64: Boards of firms and FMIs should work with authorities to use the findings of sector-wide exercises and stress tests such as SIMEX and the Cyber and Operational Resilience Stress Test to improve their understanding of actions they can take to mitigate impacts on financial stability. Given the interconnected nature of the global financial system, the FPC supported further international engagement on operational resilience. 65. As part of its broader framework on operational resilience, the Committee would also continue to monitor the implementation and outcomes of the critical third parties (CTPs) regime and looked forward to further progress in this area. 66: Further details of the Bank’s approach to operational resilience would be set out in the structural changes in the UK financial system chapter of the December 2025 FSR. Stablecoins 67: The FPC welcomed the publication of the Bank’s recent consultation paper setting out its proposed regulatory regime for sterling-denominated systemic stablecoins. In its 2025 Q2 Record the FPC had noted the financial stability benefits of having a regulatory framework that was proportionate to risks, allowed for some degree of alignment with other jurisdictions and supported firms setting up in the UK. 68: The Committee noted that the proposals were built on feedback received to the November 2023 Discussion Paper and reflected the Bank’s role in maintaining public trust in money as innovation in payments accelerated. The FPC supported the outcomes the Bank wanted to achieve in this space: avoiding a disorderly transition to widespread adoption of systemic stablecoins that undermined financial and monetary stability as well as access to credit, while at the same time, promoting innovation in payments and money. The following members of the Committee were present at 25 November and 1 December Policy meetings: Andrew Bailey, Governor Nathanaël Benjamin Stephen Blyth Sarah Breeden Jon Hall Randall Krosznerfootnote[2] Clare Lombardelli Liz Oakes Dave Ramsden Nikhil Rathi Carolyn Wilkins Sam Woods Gwyneth Nurse attended the 25 November meeting as the Treasury member in a non-voting capacity.footnote[3] Aggregate results were published on 17 November with firm-specific results published on 24 NovemberOpens in a new window. Randall Kroszner was unavoidably unable to attend the meeting with the PRC on 1 December to confirm the results of the 2025 Bank Capital Stress Test. He communicated his views to the Governor beforehand. Gwyneth Nurse was unavoidably unable to attend the meeting with the PRC on 1 December to confirm the results of the 2025 Bank Capital Stress Test. Lowri Khan attended in her place.

“Wildlife laundering poses a serious risk to national and international security, causing environmental and socioeconomic harms and creating opportunities for organised crime and conflict actors.” This is according to An Illusion of Legality: Wildlife Laundering in Colombia and Mexico, a new RUSI report by Jennifer Scotland and  https://www.rusi.org/people/weeden which says rogue traders and criminal organisations − including drug-trafficking cartels and armed groups – are exploiting supposedly legitimate wildlife industries to launder illicit profits and mask the illegal origins of high-value species, including big cats, caimans, sharks and poison frogs. This groundbreaking analysis shows how, in Colombia and Mexico, breeding farms, wildlife sanctuaries, commercial traders and seafood companies are used to disguise the extraction, transport and export of illegally harvested species, as part of a global illegal wildlife market estimated to be worth US$20 billion annually. The report says that big cats in Mexico − including lions, tigers and jaguars − face significant wildlife-laundering risks through poorly regulated wildlife sanctuaries, which can be used as fronts for illegal trade, under the guise of rescue or rehabilitation. Large shipments of big cats from Mexican sanctuaries to overseas facilities have raised international concern, underscoring vulnerabilities created by weak oversight, limited inspections, and potential collusion between operators and corrupt officials. In Colombia, the report identifies how the large-scale trade in caiman skins for the fashion industry has been highly exposed to wildlife laundering, with roughly one-third of exports between 1990 and 2016 reportedly illegally wild-sourced. The report finds that strict controls on the breeding of other endangered species has driven the trade underground, causing them to be smuggled out of Colombia and integrated into ‘legal’ breeding operations in other countries. Poison frogs – sourced by rural Colombian harvesters for as little as $0.50 – can fetch up to US$850 in international hobbyist markets, demonstrating how wildlife laundering benefits fraudulent breeders at the expense of vulnerable communities. The report further describes how some armed groups have used illegal pirarucu fishing to launder drug-trafficking proceeds, moving fish across borders – sometimes alongside cocaine – to circumvent national controls. Similar criminal convergence is found in Mexico’s shark fin and sea cucumber trades, where large-scale buyers and exporters with suspected cartel links have laundered illegally harvested products into legal supply chains in the US and Asia. Jennifer Scotland, the lead author of the report, said: “Our report shows how rogue actors and organised crime groups subvert the legal trade in endangered wildlife to further their own gains, harming biodiversity and undermining economic opportunities for local communities. To mitigate these harms, wildlife laundering needs to be taken much more seriously.” Ruth Helena Alves da Mota, Content Partnership Manager at LSEG Risk Intelligence, which supported RUSI’s independent research, said: “The findings underscore that combating wildlife laundering requires a collective effort – particularly intelligence sharing across borders, sectors, and disciplines are critical to dismantling transnational networks and ensuring that legal markets do not become safe havens for illegal trade.” Key Findings Organised crime groups – including cartel-linked actors – use legal businesses to launder wildlife. The report says: “Corporate entities… can be used by rogue traders and organised criminal groups… to exploit regulatory and enforcement gaps and launder illegally sourced species.” Wildlife laundering is under-detected and rarely treated as a serious crime. “Documented cases – let alone follow-up criminal investigations – remain few and far between.” Weak enforcement capacity enables criminal infiltration of supply chains.“Wildlife laundering… is predominantly enabled by weak enforcement capacity and limited resources.” Cartels exploit regulatory loopholes and cross-border asymmetries. “Opportunities for illicit actors to engage in wildlife laundering are facilitated by regulatory asymmetries, legal loopholes, informalities across the sector and limited enforcement of fishing regulations.” Key Recommendations Close loopholes used by criminal groups to disguise illegal activity. “Preventive reforms could target known loopholes, including those highlighted in this paper.” Classify wildlife trafficking as a predicate offence for money laundering.“By making wildlife trafficking a predicate offence for money laundering… authorities could disrupt the financial infrastructure that sustains trafficking networks.” Strengthen international cooperation and destination-country due diligence.“Greater accessibility of information around CITES permits would strengthen oversight… and make it easier… to detect fraudulent paperwork.” Expand the use of technological tools to expose criminal laundering methods. “Advances in technology offer the potential to address a number of traceability and species identification challenges that facilitate wildlife laundering.” Conclusion Wildlife laundering in Colombia and Mexico is not only a conservation issue but a security threat that enables organised crime and conflict actors to diversify their income streams, legitimise illicit proceeds and deepen their influence across rural communities and transnational markets. By revealing how legal businesses can be manipulated to conceal illegal wildlife flows, the report underscores the urgent need for a systemic shift in enforcement and regulatory strategies. Tackling wildlife laundering effectively requires authorities to target corporate structures, disrupt financial networks, strengthen international coordination and recognise wildlife laundering as a serious transnational crime. Wildlife laundering cases remain rarely detected, let alone investigated as organised criminal activity. Irregularities in licensed wildlife businesses are typically handled as administrative breaches, obscuring the role of cartel financiers, corrupt officials and corporate intermediaries who profit from the trade. The authors argue that unless authorities adopt a more robust, cross-border and intelligence-led approach, wildlife laundering will continue to provide criminal groups with a lucrative, low-risk revenue stream that deepens insecurity, threatens biodiversity and undermines community livelihoods. Background Jennifer Scotland is a Research Analyst in RUSI’s Organised Crime and Policing group, specialising in environmental crime, illicit economies and conflict dynamics in Latin America and Africa. Anne-Marie Weeden is a Senior Research Fellow at RUSI and leads the Environmental Crime Programme.  An Illusion of Legality: Wildlife Laundering in Colombia and Mexico, draws on 30 semi-structured interviews with officials, experts and practitioners across Colombia, Mexico and international bodies as well as a literature review, open-source data, and right-to-information requests to Colombian authorities.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Lynn, let me start by thanking you for your generous introduction and for hosting this event at the Exchange. My thanks as well to the market participants here today. And of course, I am grateful to see my counterparts from across the Administration. Thank you all for being here and for your understanding that the views I express today are in my capacity as Chairman and do not necessarily reflect those of the SEC as an institution or of my fellow Commissioners. There are few places more fitting to consider the future of the American financial system than this one. The New York Stock Exchange is a cathedral of capital markets, replete with the rhythms and rituals that allocate resources toward socially valued uses. Listen closely, and you can hear the hum of human ingenuity that has long echoed within these walls. Echoes that ring loudly around us today. Step outside these doors, meanwhile, and the neighborhood itself narrates the American story. A short walk in any direction brings you to landmarks like Federal Hall, where Washington took his oath and Congress established the Treasury; to the buttonwood tree under whose ancestor two dozen stockbrokers established the forerunner of this exchange; and to the cobblestone streets that were a cradle of commerce long before Manhattan’s skyscrapers rose above them. The square mile that surrounds us is less a place than a prologue—an opening chapter in a story that is now ours to continue. *** Of course, in seven months, that story will reach a rare milestone when our Republic marks its 250th year. A quarter millennium ago, a band of revolutionaries declared that rights are neither permissions to be earned nor privileges to be revoked. They claimed the right to govern themselves, yes, but also the right to provide for themselves. To work, to venture, and to prosper off of their own effort. To pursue happiness and property. Indeed, our founders sought agency as much in the halls of power as in the marketplace of ideas. Anniversaries of this magnitude demand more than ceremony. They ask something of us. They invite us to reflect, of course but no less, to resolve. To ensure that the future that we shape will prove worthy of the legacy that we inherit. *** Allow me, then, to take a few moments to revisit how that legacy began. Before the United States was a nation, it was an investment. The first permanent English settlements in this hemisphere were financed through joint-stock enterprises that allowed people to pool together capital and share in the risk and reward of an uncertain venture. The Virginia Company, for example—the first major British securities offering aimed at the Americas—funded the Jamestown settlement through share subscriptions, investors of which anticipated returns through land, trade, and dividends. Decades later, a similar structure funded the settlement that became this great city, foreshadowing New York’s destiny as the global capital of securities markets. Indeed, what is now modern-day Manhattan originated as a corporate investment project. We have with us this morning a copy of the company’s original stock offering—New Amsterdam’s birth certificate—and a tangible reminder that Manhattan itself was built on the premise that prosperity flows from mobilizing capital toward its most productive uses. That premise, of course—and the financial system that it engendered—is rooted in still older foundations dating back to the Glorious Revolution, when Parliament wrested arbitrary power from the Crown and established the principle that property rights would be protected, contracts enforced, and the state bound by predictable rules rather than royal whim. Britain became a financial powerhouse by creating the conditions in which markets could flourish. Our founders inherited that worldview and then forged a more perfect union—perhaps none more than Hamilton, across from whose burial site we assemble today. Hamilton understood that markets, structured properly, can unleash the might of American dynamism as no monarch or government ministry possibly could. After all, a free market is a hallmark of a free people. And as Dr. Ludwig von Mises described so well, “if history could teach us anything, it would be that private property is inextricably linked with civilization.” So in Federalist 11, Hamilton praises the “adventurous spirit” which animates the “commercial character of America”—“that unequalled spirit of enterprise, which signifies the genius of the American Merchants and Navigators, and which is in itself an inexhaustible mine of national wealth,” and then he heralds its potential to make America the “admiration and envy of the world.” Hamilton saw in that “adventurous spirit” a precocious young nation whose people could produce their own prosperity. To be sure, he believed that the government must create stable rules, maintain public credit, and reliably enforce contracts. But within that framework, the securities markets would emerge to unlock the most daring mobilization of capital in human history. The canals that tied the interior to the coasts were financed by state bonds. The railroads that stitched together a continent required investment on a scale that the world had never seen, creating secondary markets, auditing standards, and the modern corporate governance structure in the process. The steel that built our cities, the oil that powered our factories, and the electricity that illuminated our homes were all made possible by domestic and foreign investors willing to stake their capital on an idea of America still in formation. Of course, we must recognize with humility when we, as a country, failed to uphold some of our most basic founding principles. But by the turn of the twentieth century, millions of Americans owned securities and had a framework for the achievement of their ambitions. Indeed, the wealth accumulated through the financial markets became an accelerant of social mobility. As the century unfolded, and competing ideologies sought to engineer economic strength from the top down, ours was a model that steadily proved its value on the global stage. The Soviet and communist system of central planning, coercion, mass murder, seizing private property, and suppressing private enterprise, for example, collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions, while the American approach empowered its citizens to innovate, to invest, and to build wealth within predictable and enforceable legal frameworks. To redraw boundaries of the possible by inventing the telephone and the phonograph. The assembly line and the airplane. The semiconductor that made computing ubiquitous. Internet protocols that connected the world and GPS technology that then plotted it. Social media platforms that carry information at the speed of thought. And now, the new frontier of AI that is transforming the way that we live and work. Across this long sweep of innovation, a pattern emerges with clarity: the great leaps of American life were always produced by a willingness to tolerate and accept risks within a system that rewards those who take them. Our prosperity is no accident of history—nor is our primacy assured in the future. The twentieth century was a triumph of economic freedom over doctrines that sought to constrain it. But principles do not preserve themselves. Freedom is not a relic that we inherit so much as a responsibility that we assume. And in recent years, our regulatory frameworks have veered from the founding ideals that helped the United States to once stand without peer as the world’s destination for public companies. *** For context, Congress, beginning in 1933 with the Securities Act, passed a series of legislation to address the fraudulent and manipulative activity that Wall Street engaged in prior to the crash. Congress’s enactment of the securities laws at the federal level sought to provide more clarity in the markets in the name of rebuilding public confidence in them. After all, markets require trust, and trust requires transparency. Shortly before the Securities Act became law, President Franklin Roosevelt explained his vision for this seminal statute in a message to Congress.[1] He rejected the idea that the federal government should be a merit regulator, which is the notion that the government approves an offering of securities as sound for public investment because it expects their value to increase. Instead, President Roosevelt sought to protect investors through a disclosure-based regulatory regime—the idea that companies offering securities to the public should provide all the important information about those securities. In short, the Securities Act preserved the Hamiltonian model by incentivizing capital to flow to opportunity based on the judgment of investors. In the same message to Congress, President Roosevelt explained that “[t]he purpose of the [Securities Act] is to protect the public with the least possible interference with honest business.” But as the generations passed, the federal government’s natural tendency asserted itself. Rules have multiplied faster than the problems that they were intended to solve—and in its drift away from original congressional intent, the State has sought to substitute its discernment for that of market participants. *** Shortly after I left the SEC as a staff member in the mid-1990s, there were more than 7,000 companies listed on the U.S. exchanges, from small-cap innovators to giants of industry. Yet by the time that I returned as Chairman earlier this year, that number had fallen by roughly 40 percent. What happened during those decades tells a cautionary tale of regulatory creep. A tale that tells us that the path to public ownership has become narrower, costlier, and overly burdened with rules that often create more friction than benefit. These trends have eroded American competitiveness; locked average investors out of some of the most dynamic companies; and pushed entrepreneurs to seek capital elsewhere, either in the private markets or on foreign shores. This decline was not inevitable—nor, is it now irreversible.  While there are many SEC rules and practices that have amassed over the decades and are ripe for reform, perhaps none epitomize regulatory creep more so than the voluminous disclosure requirements contained in the Commission’s rulebook today. *** Over the years, and particularly over the past two decades, special interest groups, politicians, and—at times—the SEC itself have weaponized the disclosure regime that Congress created for our marketplace, in an effort to advance social and political agendas that stray far from the SEC’s mission of facilitating capital formation; protecting investors; and ensuring fair, orderly, and efficient markets. These decades of accretive rulemakings have produced reams of paperwork that can do more to obscure than to illuminate. Today’s lengthy annual reports and proxy statements impose substantial costs on companies because they consume significant time from boards and management, and require armies of specialized lawyers, accountants, and consultants to prepare. Despite these costs, investors sometimes do not benefit from the information because they struggle to parse and understand it—or find it so intimidating because of the volume and density that they ignore it One of my priorities as Chairman is to reform the SEC’s disclosure rules with two goals in mind. First, the SEC must root its disclosure requirements in the concept of financial materiality. Second, these requirements must scale with a company’s size and maturity. With respect to the first goal, the Supreme Court enunciated an objective standard for materiality and explained that information is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in making an investment decision.[2] Achieving this goal necessitates restraint and care from both the SEC when it promulgates a rule and from Congress when it directs the Commission to mandate disclosure on a particular subject. Our capital markets thrive not through the volume of disclosures, but the clarity and importance of them to investors. In writing for the Court, Justice Thurgood Marshall cautioned, “[s]ome information is of such dubious significance that insistence on its disclosure may accomplish more harm than good...and if the standard of materiality is unnecessarily low…shareholders [may be buried] in an avalanche of trivial information—a result that is hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking.”[3] In heeding this warning to avoid information overload for investors, our disclosure regime is most effective when the SEC provides, as FDR advocated, the minimum effective dose of regulation needed to elicit the information that is material to investors, and we allow market forces to drive the disclosure of any additional aspects of their operations that may be beneficial to investors. In contrast, an ineffective disclosure regime would be one where the SEC requires that all companies provide the same information without the ability to tailor the disclosure to their specific circumstances, with the only view that such information should be “consistent and comparable” across companies. Indeed, even with today’s numerous disclosure requirements, companies still provide additional information, such as non-GAAP numbers or key performance metrics, that are tailored to a company’s business or industry and are driven more by investor demand than the SEC’s rulebook. When the SEC’s disclosure regime has been hijacked to require information unmoored from materiality, investors do not benefit. In his recent and final Thanksgiving letter to shareholders, Warren Buffett highlighted a prime example of this hazard.[4] Any summary I give cannot do justice to Mr. Buffett’s own words. So, I quote for you the following excerpt from his letter: During my lifetime, reformers sought to embarrass CEOs by requiring the disclosure of the compensation of the boss compared to what was being paid to the average employee. Proxy statements promptly ballooned to 100-plus pages compared to 20 or less earlier. But the good intentions didn’t work; instead they backfired. Based on the majority of my observations – the CEO of company “A” looked at his competitor at company “B” and subtly conveyed to his board that he should be worth more. Of course, he also boosted the pay of directors and was careful who he placed on the compensation committee. The new rules produced envy, not moderation. The ratcheting took on a life of its own. I share Mr. Buffett’s observations and concerns, which is why earlier this year, the SEC held a roundtable that brought together companies, investors, law firms, and compensation consultants to discuss the current state of the agency’s executive compensation disclosure rules and potential reforms. Somewhat to my surprise, there was universal agreement among the panelists that the length and complexity of executive compensation disclosure have limited its usefulness and insight to investors. We need a re-set of these and other SEC disclosure requirements, and this roundtable was one of the first steps to execute my goal of ensuring that materiality is the north star of the SEC’s disclosure regime. My other priority with respect to the SEC’s disclosure rules is to scale the requirements with the company’s size and maturity as a public company. Balancing disclosure obligations with a company’s ability to bear the burdens of compliance is particularly important where Congress has directed the SEC to promulgate a disclosure rule whose costs may have a disproportionate impact on some companies. Of course, this approach is hardly a novel concept. The Commission first provided tailored disclosure requirements for smaller public companies in 1992, during my first tour of duty at the SEC as a staff member. Two decades later, Congress, through the bipartisan JOBS Act, gave certain newly public companies an “IPO on-ramp” and permitted them to comply with some of the SEC’s disclosure requirements on a delayed basis. It is time to revisit these concepts that have proven effective and merit expansion. As part of this effort, the SEC should give strong consideration to the thresholds that separate “large” companies, which are subject to all of the SEC disclosure rules, and “small” companies that are subject to only some of them. The last comprehensive reform to these thresholds took place in 2005. This dereliction of regulatory upkeep has resulted in a company with a public float of as low as $250 million being subject to the same disclosure requirements as a company that is one hundred times its size. For newly public companies, the SEC should consider building upon the “IPO on-ramp” that Congress established in the JOBS Act. For example, allowing companies to remain on the “on-ramp” for a minimum number of years, rather than forcing them off as soon as the first year after the initial offering, could provide companies with greater certainty and incentivize more IPOs, especially among smaller companies. American entrepreneurs built the most dynamic economy in history in part by taking their companies public—and sharing the rewards with workers, savers, and investors. That partnership is worth reviving. If we want the next generation of innovators to choose our public markets, we need disclosure that is calibrated for a company’s size and maturity; that is driven by market demands; and to the extent mandated by the SEC, that is rooted in materiality and not whimsical social or political agendas. Of course, disclosure reform is just one of three pillars of my plan to make IPOs great again. A second pillar involves de-politicizing shareholder meetings and returning their focus to voting on director elections and significant corporate matters. Finally, we must also reform the litigation landscape for securities lawsuits to eliminate frivolous complaints, while maintaining an avenue for shareholders to continue to bring forth meritorious claims. At the SEC, we have been hard at work on executing this plan, and we look forward to soon sharing the progress that is taking shape. Raising capital through an IPO should not be a privilege reserved for those few “unicorns.” More and more, public investments are concentrated in a handful of companies that are generally in the same one or two industries. Our regulatory framework should provide companies in all stages of their growth and from all industries with the opportunity for an IPO, particularly an IPO that represents a capital raising mechanism for the company, instead of a liquidity event for insiders. *** Now, the reforms that I have just outlined are a worthwhile and necessary beginning. They will help capital flow faster and more freely to its highest and best use, which is to say toward human initiative and ingenuity. And they will help to guide the SEC back to the bedrock pecuniary fundamentals on which our mandate is based. But these are only the first steps in a broader effort to realign our markets with their most fundamental purpose, which is to place the full measure of American might where it belongs: in the hands of our citizens instead of the regulatory state. As we look forward to America’s 250th year, let us remember that no nation has ever entrusted so much agency to the individual—and no nation has been so plentifully rewarded for it. And yet, even as the weight of history and evidence affirm this truth, some in our society have come to question whether the capital markets remain the most reliable engine for upward mobility. They presume that the politically prescribed allocation of capital is superior to that of free market forces. They call to “seize the means of production.” They contend, often through artful, alliterative slogans, that decisions made by the government are more efficient and more just than those made by the governed. They ask, “Can capitalism propel people past the circumstances of their birth or background?” Can it reflect our highest values? I, for one, believe emphatically that it can—and history has proven it. For, at its best, capital is the instrument through which an individual can marshal the resources of a free society in pursuit of shared prosperity. It is the instrument through which we can create value in the lives of others by creating value in our own. Indeed, our markets are a deeply moral enterprise because they are a mutually beneficial one. Because every exchange holds the potential to lift both parties. Because our markets affirm the dignity of the human spirit and liberate its potential to invent, to build, to innovate, and to flourish as no other alternative can. This is precisely why our work at the Securities and Exchange Commission matters. Because when our capital markets are strong, they amplify that sense of dignity on a global scale. Because no force has lifted more people from poverty, widened more paths to opportunity, or solved more of society’s most intractable problems than capital investments through our capital markets. In the coming months, we will pursue the reforms that I have discussed today, and several others, with the urgency and care that they command. We will work closely with Congress and the Administration. We will listen carefully to market participants and to investors. And we will proceed steadily with the confidence that comes from standing on sound principles and a clear mandate. But above all, we will proceed with the resolve worthy of a people ever agitating to be prosperous. *** In closing, I believe that our capital markets are more than the mechanisms of finance—they are, at their core, expressions of our national character. A character that has compelled generations of Americans to take risks and to reap the rewards. To innovate endlessly and restlessly. To believe that the future is ours to make.  So as America’s 250th anniversary approaches, the question before us is not whether our entrepreneurs have the capacity to reinvigorate our capital markets, but whether we, as regulators, have the will. In this new day at the SEC, and under President Trump’s leadership, I am pleased to report that we do. Indeed, I am confident that we will preserve the promise of our capital markets for the next quarter millennium and well beyond. I trust that we will summon anew the enterprising spirit that Hamilton divined would be the source of our strength. And I believe that we will ensure that the American story, which began in many ways just steps outside, is preserved not by memory or speeches alone, but by the courage of those who are determined to chart its next chapter. Thank you very much for your time today. You all have been a patient and indulgent audience. And I look forward to the work ahead of us. Thank you. [1] President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on Federal Supervision of Investment Securities (Mar. 29, 1933), available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/message-congress-federal-supervision-investment-securities [2]See, e.g., TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). [3]Id. at 448-449. [4] Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (Nov. 10, 2025), available at https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/news/nov1025.pdf.

CME Group, the world's leading derivatives marketplace, today announced that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has approved the registration of a new securities clearing house, CME Securities Clearing Inc. With launch expected in Q2 2026, CME Group will operate CME Securities Clearing to help market participants comply with the SEC clearing mandate for U.S. Treasury transactions (as of December 31, 2026) and Repo transactions (as of June 30, 2027). "Expanded clearing capacity and capital efficiencies are critical for all market participants working to comply with the U.S. Treasury clearing mandate," said Terry Duffy, CME Group Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. "We are pleased to provide a solution for clearing both done-with and done-away execution as we continue to extend industry-leading cross-margining with FICC." For more information on CME Securities Clearing Inc., please visit here.

Kaizen, a leading provider of regulatory compliance solutions for global financial institutions, is pleased to announce the appointment of James Crow as Chief Technology Officer (CTO).  James joined Kaizen in April 2025 as Head of Engineering and has been promoted in recognition of his outstanding contribution to the company’s technology vision and delivery. Prior to joining Kaizen, James spent the majority of his career at London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG) building and scaling the UnaVista platform and services; most recently, he served as UnaVista’s Chief Information Officer (CIO), responsible for change, testing and technology operations.   In his new role, James will lead Kaizen’s technology strategy and oversee the expansion of the Kaizen Hub, a unique portal providing leading compliance and RegTech solutions to tier-one financial institutions. He will also drive innovation to support the company’s growth plans and product roadmap, ensuring Kaizen remains at the forefront of regulatory-reporting technology, providing scalable, secure and high-performance solutions for clients worldwide.  “I’m thrilled to step into the CTO role at Kaizen,” said James Crow. “Having experienced Kaizen’s commitment to innovation and client-centric delivery in regulatory reporting and data quality, I look forward to working closely with our team to solve the problems for our clients and the industry as a whole, as well as engineering solutions that elevate our platform and service offering.”  Dario Crispini, CEO of Kaizen, added: “We are delighted to appoint James as our Chief Technology Officer. His proven experience in building and scaling mission-critical regulatory reporting platforms, combined with his hands-on and detail-driven approach, makes James the perfect leader to advance our technology capabilities as we expand our global market presence. We look forward to his technology leadership in driving our next phase of growth.”  James’s appointment comes at a pivotal moment for Kaizen as the company continues to extend its reach across the regulatory reporting and compliance space and deepen its technology offering and expertise for global financial institutions. 

November brought the highest farmer sentiment reading since June, with the Purdue University/CME Group Ag Economy Barometer jumping 10 points from October to 139. The increase was driven primarily by producers' more optimistic outlook for the future, as the Future Expectations Index climbed 15 points to 144, while the Current Conditions Index dipped 2 points to 128. November's survey is the first conducted after the late-October announcement of a U.S.-China trade pact that includes provisions to expand U.S. agricultural exports and revealed a notable improvement in producers' confidence in future export opportunities. Sentiment also received support from a sharp rise in crop prices between mid-October and mid-November. The barometer survey took place Nov. 10-14. Producers were more optimistic about their farms' financial performance in November, with the Farm Financial Performance Index increasing by 14 points to 92. The percentage of producers expecting better financial results this year grew to 24%, up from 16% in October. A sharp rise in crop prices from mid-October to mid-November was a key driver of the expectation for better financial performance. For example, eastern Corn Belt prices for fall delivery of corn and soybeans increased 10% and 15%, respectively, during that period. The stronger financial outlook in the crop sector compensated for a weaker outlook in the livestock sector, where declining cattle prices weighed on financial expectations. Despite the improved farm financial outlook, the Farm Capital Investment Index fell 6 points to 56, with only 16% of respondents indicating that now is a good time to make major investments in their operations. "Producers became more optimistic about U.S. agricultural trade prospects in November. That coincided with a rise in crop prices, which led to farmers' improved expectations for their farms' financial performance and an improvement in farmer sentiment," said Michael Langemeier, the barometer's principal investigator and director of Purdue's Center for Commercial Agriculture. Producers were more optimistic about future agricultural trade prospects in November. In response to a question included in every barometer survey since January 2019, just 7% of respondents said they expect U.S. agricultural exports to weaken over the next five years, down from 14% in October and 30% in March. In a related question, 47% of corn producers indicated they expect soybean exports to increase over the next five years, while 8% anticipate a decline. The stronger trade outlook likely contributed to the overall improvement in sentiment observed in November. A majority of producers in November reported that they still expect to receive a supplementary support payment from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, similar to the 2019 Market Facilitation Program (MFP). However, confidence in receiving the payment fell sharply in November: Only 16% of respondents said an MFP payment was "very likely," down from 62% in September. Still, when combining the "likely" and "very likely" categories, just over three-fourths of producers (76%) said they expect an MFP payment, compared to 83% in September. Regarding how they plan to use an MFP payment, 58% of respondents said they would use it to "pay down debt," up from 52% in October. For the second month in a row, the Short-Term Farmland Value Expectations Index increased, reaching 116 in November, which is 3 points higher than October and 10 points above September. Farmers' long-term outlook on farmland values also improved, with the Long-Term Farmland Value Expectations Index increasing by 4 points to a record high of 165. The November survey also asked corn producers about their expectations for 2026 cash rental rates. Nearly three-fourths of respondents (74%) said they expect rental rates to remain roughly the same as this year, consistent with responses from the July and August surveys. The relatively strong outlook for cash rent further supports farmland values. "The record-high reading of the Long-Term Farmland Value Expectations Index indicates that farmers retain an optimistic long-run outlook for agriculture," Langemeier said. "Although rising crop prices and improved trade prospects have bolstered optimism, producers remain cautious in their investment and production decisions, reflecting the short-term uncertainty they face." The November survey asked corn producers about possible changes to their production practices in 2026 due to expected weak operating margins. Among those producers planning to make adjustments, two practices were highlighted most often: switching to lower-cost seed traits or varieties and reducing phosphorus applications. Producers followed up by pointing to reductions in corn seeding rates and nitrogen application rates as potential changes. Still, a substantial portion of producers (40%) said they do not plan to make any changes to their corn production practices in 2026. Recent barometer surveys have included questions on farmers' attitudes toward 2025 policy shifts. A majority of respondents in November (59%) and October (58%) said they expect U.S. tariffs to ultimately strengthen the agricultural economy. This is lower than last spring, when 70% of respondents anticipated that tariffs would have a long-term positive effect. The percentage of producers expressing uncertainty about the long-term impact of U.S. tariff policy has risen in recent months. In October, 16% of respondents said they were uncertain, rising slightly to 17% in November, roughly double the 8% reported in April and May. Meanwhile, two-thirds of farmers (67%) in the November survey said the U.S. is headed in the "right direction," down from 72% in October. About the Purdue University Center for Commercial AgricultureThe Center for Commercial Agriculture was founded in 2011 to provide professional development and educational programs for farmers. Housed within Purdue University's Department of Agricultural Economics, the center's faculty and staff develop and execute research and educational programs that address the different needs of managing in today's business environment.

Transaction Network Services (TNS) has expanded its global market data infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific (APAC) region with connectivity to Tokyo Financial Exchange (TFX), one of Japan’s leading derivatives exchanges. This collaboration provides TNS customers with direct access to TFX, delivered anywhere across TNS’ global network backbone.The addition of TFX completes TNS’ connectivity across all major Japanese exchanges and offers domestic and international firms comprehensive, managed access to Japan from a single provider.“Completing our coverage across all Japanese exchanges is a milestone that strengthens our offering in one of the world’s largest financial centers,” said Jeff Mezger, Vice President of Product Management, TNS. “This expansion further cements TNS as a one-stop shop for global trading access.”With the new TFX connection, TNS now delivers its full suite of services in Japan, including hosting, data, and connectivity. TNS’ Japanese exchange portfolio also includes Japannext and the Japan Exchange Group (JPX), which encompasses the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), Osaka Exchange (OSE), and Tokyo Commodity Exchange (TOCOM).“Partnering with TNS opens new doors for TFX by providing exposure to its robust network of global market participants,” said Ryosuke Seo, Director of Wholesale Business Department, TFX. “This collaboration positions TFX to expand its international footprint and deliver greater access and efficiency to traders worldwide.”This expansion is a key part of TNS’ continued investment in the APAC region. Mezger added: “One of our key priorities is strengthening TNS’ presence and partnerships across Asia. Japan is a key hub for regional and global trading activity, and our connection to TFX reinforces TNS’ long-term commitment to supporting customers’ success in these dynamic markets.”

From 8 December 2025, international investors will be able to open type "In" accounts with Russian professional market participants on Moscow Exchange. The Moscow Exchange Group has implemented these innovations to streamline operations involving international investors and protect their holdings, consistent with the provisions of Decree No. 436 "On Guarantees for International Investors". MOEX's clearing members will be allowed to open proprietary type "In" accounts, client accounts, and trust management accounts for non-resident clients who comply with the provisions of the Decree. The "In" type is assigned upon client registration and cannot be changed thereafter. Using type "In" accounts, international investors will be able to make anonymous trades on Moscow Exchange in all Russian stocks, bonds, and fund units in the Central Order Book (T+1 settlement cycle) and derivatives on the FX and Precious Metals Markets, enter into repo transactions, make deposits with the central counterparty, and participate in primary distributions. Non-resident clients will be given access to the Derivatives Market at a later stage. Transfers of securities and funds are only permitted between type "In" accounts. Moscow Exchange would like to stress the necessity for professional participants to conform to current legal regulations concerning type "In" accounts. Implementation of legislative initiatives under Decree 436 dated 1 July 2025 "On Guarantees for Foreign Investors" Mandatory labelling of legal entities of the Russian Federation and Republic of Belarus Action matrix for trd_restr attribute in the Unified Client Registration and TS Registration of members' clients Moscow Exchange (MOEX) is Russia’s largest exchange operating the country’s only multifunctional trading platform for equities, bonds, derivatives, currencies, money market instruments and commodities. The Moscow Exchange Group provides a full range of trade and post-trade services through its ownership of the central securities depository (National Settlement Depository) and the clearing center (National Clearing Centre), which serves as the central counterparty for MOEX markets. Read more on the Moscow Exchange: https://www.moex.com/n95768