ASIC has released updated regulatory guidance on industry codes of conduct in the financial services and credit sectors.The updates to Regulatory Guide 183 Codes of conduct for the financial services and credit sectors (RG 183): reflect legislative reform since the guidance was last updated in 2013, clarify ASIC’s role in relation to industry codes, and the criteria and process for code approval, and simplify and streamline the guidance. These updates follow consultation with stakeholders through Consultation Statement 26 Proposed update to RG 183 (CS 26). Stakeholders were broadly supportive of the proposed updates.A copy of the non-confidential submissions made to ASIC and an outline of our response is available below. Background It is not mandatory for any industry in the financial services or credit sectors to develop a code. Where a code exists, it does not require ASIC’s approval. However, seeking and obtaining ASIC’s approval is a signal that the code is one that consumers can have confidence in and rely on. RG 183 provides guidance on ASIC’s role in relation to codes, the criteria for code approval by ASIC, and the process for obtaining (and retaining) ASIC’s approval for a code. Download Regulatory Guide 183 Codes of conduct for the financial services and credit sectors (RG 183) More information ASIC proposes updates to guidance for industry codes of conduct Consultation Statement 26 Proposed update to RG 183 (CS 26) Summary of feedback to CS 26 and ASIC’s response

The Federal Reserve’s proposed 2026 stress test scenarios reflect a welcome effort to enhance transparency and public accountability, the Bank Policy Institute, American Bankers Association, Financial Services Forum, Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, International Swaps and Derivatives Association and Institute of International Bankers said in a comment letter submitted today. The associations commend the Fed for, for the first time, publishing its proposed 2026 stress test scenarios for public comment and for articulating a more detailed scenario design policy, including guides and a macro model that describe how key variables are calibrated. These actions respond constructively to longstanding calls for the Fed to bring its stress testing models and scenarios into the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice-and-comment framework and reflect a serious effort to increase public insight into the process. Still, the scenarios, which in many cases replicate scenarios from past stress tests and were established before the new Fed guidelines, would benefit from some revisions. For example, the scenarios and associated models that the Federal Reserve uses to design the scenarios often compress the timelines of observed stress periods to achieve peak-level stress calibrations over a shorter number of quarters than is reflected in historical precedents. Open questions remain on how the Fed will exercise its discretion on scenario design in practice. Greater clarity and firmer guardrails on how that discretion is applied year to year would further bolster the framework’s credibility and ensure that bank capital requirements are based on a coherent and plausible foundation. “The Enhanced Transparency NPR and the publication of the Proposed 2026 Scenarios for public comment represent an improvement in the overall transparency and accountability of the Federal Reserve’s stress testing processes. However, the proposed framework would grant inordinate discretion to the Federal Reserve, without requiring sufficient explanation for its design choices year-to-year,” the associations stated in the letter. Background. The Fed on Oct. 24, 2025, issued proposals to increase transparency and accountability in the stress testing process, in line with BPI and co-plaintiffs’ 2024 legal challenge, which called for the Fed to subject its stress testing scenarios and models to public comment under the Administrative Procedure Act.* Today’s comment letter responds to the proposed 2026 stress test scenarios. A separate comment letter will address the Fed’s broader proposal on the revised framework, including the stress test models and scenario design. The Fed extended the comment deadline on this proposal to Feb. 21, 2026. Why It Matters. The proposed framework will drive how the central bank establishes binding capital requirements that determine the cost of credit in the economy. The design choices underpinning models and scenarios ultimately drive the cost of loans and financing. With insufficient explanation of design choices, the stress tests could continue to produce volatile results year-to-year, distorting the cost of financial intermediation. The stress testing framework is not the sole driver of banks’ capital requirements. Given the interplay between stress tests and other parts of the capital framework, the importance of coherent stress test scenarios is critical. Transparency is not simply about disclosing more information, but also about explaining how that information is used in decision-making so that stakeholders can understand and, where appropriate, comment on the choices the Fed makes in scenario design. A clearer articulation of the link between the disclosed guides and models for the final scenario paths would further strengthen the credibility of the framework. Specific Concerns. The associations highlight several instances where more explanation would be beneficial in the proposed scenarios. For example: The Fed has chosen to calibrate variables for which it retains flexibility near or in the upper one-third of their ranges of severity. It does not explain how it arrived at this severe calibration. The 2026 severely adverse scenario also results in severe shocks across asset classes simultaneously without appearing to take into account the recent dynamics in these markets. The trajectories of several of the modeled variables reflect deviations from the macroeconomic model that are not described. The Global Market Shock, a market risk element applied to banks with large trading operations, provides a significant level of discretion in its methodology. The effect of the Federal Reserve’s chosen percentile level for a specific shock may translate to vastly different severities of the shocks, with direct effects on binding capital requirements for the covered banks. Further explanation is warranted on how the Fed will select the severities of these shocks each year. The associations urge the Fed to build on its progress by providing more detail on how it will choose points within the permitted ranges for key variables, including how current economic and financial conditions, historical experience and model outputs inform those choices. * This legal challenge was filed in December 2024 by the Bank Policy Institute, the American Bankers Association, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Ohio Bankers League and the Ohio Chamber of Commerce.

The Financial Markets Authority (FMA) - Te Mana Tātai Hokohoko – has cancelled the Financial Advice Provider licence of Christchurch-based Hope Group Limited (HGL). HGL has held a full financial advice provider licence and provided personal risk insurance advice (life and health insurance, income protection insurance, trauma and disability insurance) to retail clients.     Louise Unger, FMA Executive Director, Response and Enforcement, said HGL’s cancellation followed the termination of its distribution agreement with the impacted insurer, and the FMA’s subsequent inquiry into its affairs.    Following the notification from the impacted insurer, the FMA reviewed 14 insurance policy applications submitted by HGL’s sole director and financial adviser, Mr Junpu Wang, on behalf of 13 customers. The inquiries identified serious conduct issues resulting in material breaches of obligations. Specifically, the conduct included: Submitting second policy applications for existing clients using incorrect or false customer information to conceal that the policies were duplicates  Completing an authority to accept a direct debit form on behalf of a client without obtaining the client’s authentic signature  Failing to obtain client consent for both first and second policies (with the same or similar cover) to remain active during a significant period, causing clients to pay two premiums.   Misleading clients by recommending second policies to benefit from lower premiums under a promotional offer, despite clients being ineligible (e.g., already existing policyholders) Failing to ensure clients understood the advice provided. In some cases, clients were incorrectly advised that a new policy was needed because their existing policy would become more expensive after 24 months; in two cases, clients were told to take out a new policy to obtain a second luxury item – despite being ineligible for that benefit.    “Mr Wang deliberately misled impacted clients to take out second policies after the 24-month clawback period for the sole purpose to obtain commission payments from the insurer,” said Ms Unger. In doing so, HGL and Mr Wang obtained $37,374 in upfront commissions. In addition, clients paid two premiums for the same or similar cover while both policies remained active for up to 27 weeks, resulting in overpayments totalling $5,342.34. “HGL and Mr Wang’s actions represent a serious and deliberate departure from the standards expected of a licensed financial advice provider. “Mr Wang has not accepted his conduct, all allegations have been denied and attempts made to blame another financial adviser who was never engaged by HGL at the time the applications were submitted,” said Ms Unger. “The cancellation of HGL’s licence is critical to ensuring we protect consumers and the integrity of the market. A key function of the FMA is to ensure the quality of financial advice and financial advice services – which is clearly missing here. “A public notification helps the FMA to raise awareness about standards we expect, deter future contraventions by other market participants, and publicly express disapproval for contraventions under the FMC Act and the relevant regulations.” The insurer has contacted all impacted clients and made arrangements to ensure they are supported. In addition, HGL and Mr. Wang have been deregistered from the Financial Service Providers Register (FSPR), and the matter had been reported to the Police.

Key points Australian investors rely on the expertise and integrity of everyone in the investment chain to secure their financial future. ASIC’s primary concern is minimising the risk of harm for Australian investors and consumers. To ensure better outcomes for investors, ASIC has prioritised tackling poor practices in private credit and holding those responsible for Shield and First Guardian to account. Good afternoon. I'd like to acknowledge the Traditional Owners of the land on which we meet today, the Dharug and Gundungurra people and pay my respects to Elders past and present. I extend that respect to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people here today. Thank you to Conexus for the invitation to speak today. It’s great to be back at the Researcher Forum and to have the opportunity to update you on ASIC’s priorities. A few weeks ago, I spoke to a room of financial literacy educators about the importance of equipping Australians with the knowledge they need to confidently navigate the financial system. I made the point that when it comes to financial decisions, people can sometimes be vulnerable to exploitation, because for many of the decisions they make, they have less financial knowledge or experience than the person or firm on the other side of the transaction. And when it comes to investment decisions, that knowledge imbalance is even greater, with bigger consequences if something goes wrong. Even the most sophisticated investors are reliant on the expertise – and the integrity - of others when making major investment decisions. Financial advisers, fund managers, research houses – all of you here today – all play a role, either directly or indirectly, in influencing how investors choose to invest their money. And so, it’s important, as the theme of today’s forum suggests, that we have ‘world-class investment governance and research’. It’s what Australian investors want and deserve, and it’s what ASIC expects. In pursuing this expectation, our primary concern is to minimise the risk of harm to consumers and investors. You’ll see this reflected across our regulatory and enforcement priorities. There are two enforcement priorities I want to talk about today, both of which relate directly to the work many of you do. The first is holding those responsible for the Shield and First Guardian collapses to account. And the second – to crack down on poor practice in private credit. Pursuing accountability for Shield and First Guardian Let me start with Shield and First Guardian – partly because those matters combined represent one of our biggest priorities at the moment – and partly because they have implications for everybody working in the advice and investment ecosystem. If you wonder why this is relevant to you, the numbers should make it clear. With more than 11,000 investors impacted and close to $1 billion of retirement savings put at risk, this is the most egregious example of consumer harm that I have seen in my time at ASIC. And the people affected are Australians who were trying to do the right thing to boost their retirement savings and were instead lured into switching their super into high-risk investments. These weren’t people rolling the dice in some get-rich-quick gamble. These were people making considered decisions which they believed to be in their financial interests. People like Gary, in his early 60s and looking forward to retirement[1]. Gary was aware that his existing super fund wasn’t performing as well as it had been.  He was contacted by a comparison site, which put him on to financial advisers who set him up with a self-managed super fund and invested all his funds into First Guardian. He stands to lose almost $700,000. Or Juan[2], a 41-year old at risk of losing his entire super, after being convinced to roll all his savings into First Guardian. These are shocking stories, and there are thousands like them. Each of them involving financial losses with a very human cost. And there is a long chain of participants involved. Lead generators, including data brokers and telemarketers Financial advisers, and financial advice firms Superannuation trustees, like Macquarie, Equity Trustees, Diversa and Netwealth Research houses Auditors And of course, the fund operators themselves. We believe all hold some degree of culpability. ASIC’s first priority in both the Shield and First Guardian matters has been to preserve assets so that they can be recovered for investors while our investigations are continuing. We’ve: issued stop orders to prevent ongoing harm obtained asset-freezing orders sought the appointment of receivers and liquidators obtained travel restraints cancelled financial services licenses; and banned financial advisers. We’ve instituted proceedings against Macquarie, Equity Trustees, Interprac Financial Planning, and SQM Research. In a significant win for some investors, Macquarie has committed to repaying investors 100% of the net cash they invested in Shield through Macquarie’s wrap platform. Importantly for those in the room today, our action against SQM Research is the first we have taken against a research house. It is our view that SQM Research prepared reports containing misleading representations and its processes fell short of expected standards when it published “Favourable” ratings for Shield. More generally, it is our view that research houses should serve as gatekeepers against poor quality investments or unsuitable products. They need to do all things necessary to ensure that they go about their work efficiently, honestly and fairly. And they need to avoid issuing ratings or commentary that can’t be justified by evidence. In addition to the proceedings I have already mentioned, we are also seeking leave to commence proceedings against MWL Financial Services, a former MWL director and Imperial Capital Group – a lead generator – for allegedly operating a scheme resulting in hundreds of clients investing superannuation into Shield. At this point in time, we have 10 separate Federal Court proceedings against 18 defendants, and there is more to come. As I mentioned, holding those responsible for the collapse of the Shield and First Guardian Master Funds to account is one of our enforcement priorities - and our investigations are ongoing. While this has some time to play out, there are lessons to be learned now.  As I mentioned at the outset, Australian investors are reliant on the chain of financial experts behind their investments - financial advisers, research houses, investment platforms, superannuation trustees, advice licensees. When every part of that chain fulfils its role – with its multiple layers of knowledge, expertise, duties and obligations – the system works as it should. Investors can be confident that they will be offered products that are safe, and appropriate for them and their financial goals. But when there are failures in that chain – far too often it is investors who pay the price. The failures involved in Shield and First Guardian have highlighted some potential regulatory gaps. These include: the regulation of lead generators, whose activities may not be adequately captured by the anti-hawking provisions the super switching process the obligations of super trustees who provide platform products; and the regulation of managed investment schemes, which ASIC has previously identified as a priority for reform. We welcome the Government’s commitment to exploring sensible reforms that can better protect consumers in the future, and we are committed to working with the Government to identify what would be most effective, based on what we have uncovered through our investigations. Improving practices in private credit I’d now like to turn to private credit.   ASIC recognises that private credit – done well – plays an important role in Australia’s financial system. It’s an important source of funding for sectors that are under-served by the traditional banking sector, and it provides diversification and choice for borrowers and investors alike. According to one estimate, private credit in Australia is now valued at more than $200 billion[3]. While this amount is not systemically important, the same source estimates that private credit has grown 500 per cent[4] over the past 10 years. And with increasing investment in private credit via superannuation, that growth seems likely to continue. That’s why it’s important that we are alert to the potential risks. Here in Australia, we have a higher concentration of private credit lending to the property sector, including loans to higher risk development and construction. Over time, this could amplify the system-wide vulnerability related to residential property identified by APRA in last month’s system-wide stress test.   Private credit at current volumes is untested in a stress scenario and we are already seeing a wide variance in practices across the sector. A lack of transparency across the sector is a particular concern. Australia lags behind our international peers in terms of the data that we as a regulator have access to. We have neither the breadth, depth, or frequency of data needed to monitor and supervise retail and wholesale funds confidently.  Countries like Singapore, Canada, and the UK with similar regulatory frameworks have greater access to more reliable and recurrent data on private markets. Given that our domestic private credit growth outstrips that seen in many of these countries, we would like to see this data gap addressed to enable ASIC to more confidently supervise funds. Earlier this year, we undertook a surveillance of 28 retail and wholesale private credit funds to assess how fund managers are managing the risks that underpin investor confidence and market operation. We released the findings of that surveillance a few weeks ago in Report 820. We observed some better practices, but we also identified areas that fell short of expectations, including practices that are potentially in breach of the law. Areas for improvement include governance and transparency; fees and interest rates; valuation methodologies; liquidity; and credit management. Today, I’ll focus on three areas that will be relevant to many in the room because they are key to how researchers understand and evaluate private credit funds: The use of terminology Fee and interest disclosure; and Valuations Terminology I’ll start with the use of terminology. In our review, we found market-wide inconsistencies in terminology that make it difficult for investors to compare the nature and risks of private credit funds. Fund operators and investment managers defined and applied terms such as ‘default’ and ‘investment grade’ differently. Such inconsistent use of terms makes it difficult for investors to meaningfully compare loan default or arrears levels across funds. There were also variabilities in how funds described their underlying assets. Some funds primarily categorised their assets using terms that describe the ranking or seniority of the security – for example ‘first mortgage’ and ‘mezzanine’. Other funds categorised their assets with reference to direct lending, securitised loans or the use of funding – for example ‘commercial real estate development’. Concerningly, we found that asset descriptions sometimes failed to include clear information that would help investors understand the risks of the assets held by a fund. For example, a failure to disclose that loans will fund higher-risk real estate construction and development. Or that the fund primarily invests in unsecured loans. Again, this inconsistency makes it difficult for investors and advisers to accurately compare funds and make informed choices about what products they are investing in and the risks associated with them. The adoption of consistent industry terminology – or at least a clear explanation of key terms – would be an important step towards greater transparency for investors.  Fee and interest disclosure Transparency was also an issue when it came to fee and interest disclosure. Of the 28 funds we reviewed, only four published information about the interest rates or range of interest rates charged to borrowers. If these rates are accurately disclosed, investors are better able to judge the riskiness of the investment. Conversely, where borrowers pay fees on top of interest that are not disclosed, this masks a clear signal about the level of risk involved in the lending. Only two retail funds quantified the interest earned from their assets and borrower fees and disclosed the retained amounts as part of their wider management fee in the product disclosure statement. Only one wholesale fund passed on to investors the full economic benefits of interest earned from its assets and income earned from borrower fees. To enable investors to better assess the true cost of investing in a fund, fund managers and trustees should disclose ALL revenue they earn in connection with their funds. Clear and accurate disclosure enables investors to understand what they are paying for, directly and indirectly, and to better judge whether they are being appropriately compensated for the associated risk. Valuations The final area that I wanted to touch on is valuations. Investors rely on fair valuations to assess performance and make informed investment decisions. Private assets in particular are subject to heightened valuation risks, due to infrequent trading and limited price discovery. Many of the private credit funds we reviewed were open-ended funds, with regular monthly or quarterly redemption periods. For open-ended funds in times of stress, failure to adjust valuations in a timely manner could allow some fund members to exit at a higher price, at the expense of the remaining investors. Some of the poorer valuation practices we observed involved infrequent valuations, incomplete or absent valuation policies, insufficient independence and inconsistent approaches to valuing collateral. Where valuations are not accurate, reliable, timely or comparable, this raises serious questions about the ability of investors – and indeed researchers – to assess the performance of a fund. To guide fund managers in uplifting their practices, our report outlines ten guiding principles for private credit ‘done well’. The principles provide guidance on the three areas that I’ve mentioned - terminology, fee disclosure and valuations - as well as other areas like design and distribution, organisational capability, liquidity and governance. Each of these principles is grounded in the law. And we will be monitoring how well private credit funds adhere to them. I mentioned earlier that poor private credit practices are an enforcement priority for ASIC in 2026. We have already issued stop orders on several target market determinations and one PDS due to poor disclosure and distribution. And in instances of more egregious conduct, we have commenced enforcement investigations. We have also announced the second phase of our private credit surveillance. On the retail side, this surveillance will look at disclosures of fees and margins, and the distribution practices of private credit funds to retail investors, with a specific focus on the adviser channel.  We want to understand how retail private credit funds are distributed and, when distributed through advisers, test the quality of their advice. On the wholesale side, there are plans to look at fees, margin structures and conflicts of interest in the management of wholesale private credit funds, with a particular focus on real estate lending. Through this ongoing program of work, which will hopefully be complemented by industry efforts to lift standards, we hope that private credit will increasingly be done well in Australia, with benefits to individual investors and the broader economy. Conclusion I mentioned at the start that ASIC is focussed on minimising harm to consumers and investors. That’s a responsibility we all share. Whatever role you play in the investment ecosystem, you can help to ensure that consumers who engage in investing, within or outside superannuation, are presented with products that are safe, appropriate, and aligned with their best interests. When that occurs, it not only means better outcomes for individuals, it is also fundamental to building and maintaining trust in the system. Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today. I’m now happy to take some questions.   [1] First Guardian, Shield superannuation disasters expose deep flaws in Australia's $4.3 trillion retirement system - ABC News [2] First Guardian collapse leaves thousands at risk of losing super as ASIC freezes director assets - ABC News [3] REP 814 Private credit in Australia [4] REP 823 Advancing Australia’s evolving capital markets: Discussion paper response report | ASIC

Chairman Hill, Ranking Member Waters, and other members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Federal Reserve's supervisory and regulatory activities. My testimony today will focus on two areas. First, the current state of the banking sector, as detailed in the fall 2025 Supervision and Regulation Report, which accompanies my submission to the Committee. Second, progress on my priorities as Vice Chair for Supervision since my confirmation earlier this year. My priorities relate to the efficiency, safety and soundness, and stability of our financial system and the effectiveness and accountability of our regulation and supervision of that system. The financial sector plays a critical role in our economy because it serves as an essential intermediary to channel savings into productive investments and enable the flow of money, credit, and capital throughout the economy. Our supervision and regulation must support a safe and sound banking system that fosters economic growth while also safeguarding financial stability. Banking ConditionsLet me begin by providing an update on banking conditions. As the Supervision and Regulation Report shows, the banking system remains sound and resilient. Banks continue to report strong capital ratios and significant liquidity buffers, which position them well to support economic growth. The overall health of the banking sector is demonstrated by continued growth in lending, a decline in non-performing loans across most categories, and strong profitability. Notably though, nonbank financial institutions continue to increase their share of the total lending market, providing strong competition to regulated banks without facing the same capital, liquidity, and other prudential standards. Regulated banks must be empowered to compete effectively with nonbanks that are challenging banks on both payments and lending. To that end, the Federal Reserve is encouraging banks to innovate to improve the products and services they provide. New technologies can create a more efficient banking sector that expands access to credit while also leveling the playing field with fintech and digital asset companies. We are currently working with the other banking regulators to develop capital, liquidity, and diversification regulations for stablecoin issuers as required by the GENIUS Act. We also need to provide clarity in treatment on digital assets to ensure that the banking system is well placed to support digital asset activities. I think this includes clarity on the permissibility of activities, but also a willingness to provide regulatory feedback on proposed new use cases. As a regulator, it is my role to encourage innovation in a responsible manner, and we must continuously improve our ability to supervise the risks to safety and soundness that innovation presents. Prioritizing Community Banking IssuesOne of the Federal Reserve's goals is to tailor our regulatory and supervisory framework to accurately reflect the risk that different banks pose to the financial system. Community banks are subject to less stringent standards than large banks, but there remains more opportunity to tailor regulations and supervision to the unique needs and circumstances of these banks. We cannot continue to push policies and supervisory expectations designed for the largest banks down to smaller, less risky, and less complex banks. In this regard, I support efforts by Congress to reduce burden on community banks. I support increasing static and outdated statutory thresholds, including asset thresholds, that have not been updated for years. Asset growth due, in part, to inflation over time has resulted in small banks becoming subject to laws and regulations that were intended for much larger banks. I also support improvements to the Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money-laundering framework that will assist law enforcement while minimizing unnecessary regulatory burden that disproportionately falls on community banks. As an example, the thresholds for Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs) and Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) have not been adjusted since they were established, despite decades of significant growth in the economy and financial system. These thresholds should be updated to more effectively focus resources on those transactions and activities that truly are suspicious. Where possible, the Federal Reserve is taking its own actions to further tailor regulatory and supervisory measures to support community banks in more effectively serving their customers and communities. We recently proposed changes to the community bank leverage ratio to provide community banks greater flexibility and optionality in their capital framework while preserving safety and soundness and the capital strength of the banking system. This enables community banks to focus on their core mission: stimulating economic growth and activity through lending to households and businesses. We also recently released new capital options for mutual banks, including capital instruments that could qualify as tier 1 common equity or as additional tier 1 equity. We are open to further refinement of these options and look forward to feedback. It is also time to more effectively tailor the merger and acquisition (M&A) and de novo chartering application processes for community banks. We are exploring streamlining these processes and updating the Federal Reserve Board's (Board's) merger analysis to accurately consider competition among small banks. Now is the time to build a framework for community banks that recognizes their unique strengths and supports their critical role in providing financial services to businesses and families throughout the United States. Effective regulatory frameworks are an essential operational foundation for our ability to effectively supervise financial institutions. We are in the process of conducting our third Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act (EGRPRA) review to eliminate outdated, unnecessary, or overly burdensome rules. My expectation is that—unlike previous EGRPRA reviews—this review will create substantive change. This type of regular assessment should be an ongoing aspect of our work. A proactive approach will ensure that regulations are responsive and adaptable to the evolving needs of, and conditions in, the banking sector. Regulatory Agenda for Large BanksWe are also modernizing and simplifying the Federal Reserve's regulation of large banks. The Board is considering modifications to each of the four pillars of our regulatory capital framework for large banks: stress testing, the supplementary leverage ratio, the Basel III framework, and the global systemically important banking organization (G-SIB) surcharge. Stress testing. The Board recently released a proposal to enhance public accountability and ensure robust outcomes of our stress testing framework and practices. The proposal includes disclosure of the stress test models, the framework for designing stress test scenarios, and the scenarios for the 2026 stress tests. It reduces volatility and balances model robustness and stability with full transparency. It also ensures that any future significant changes to these models will benefit from public input prior to implementation. Supplementary leverage ratio. The banking agencies recently finalized changes to the enhanced supplementary leverage ratio proposal for U.S. G-SIBs.1 These changes help ensure that leverage capital requirements serve primarily as a backstop to risk-based capital requirements, as originally intended. When the leverage ratio generally becomes the binding constraint, it discourages banks and dealers from engaging in low-risk activities, including holding Treasury securities, because the leverage ratio assigns the same capital requirement across both safe and risky assets. Basel III. The Board, together with our federal banking agency colleagues, has taken steps to advance Basel III in the United States. Finalizing Basel III is an important act of closure for the banking sector, reducing uncertainty and providing clarity on capital requirements, enabling banks to make better-informed business and investment decisions. My approach is to address the calibration of the new framework from the bottom up, rather than reverse engineer changes to achieve pre-determined or preconceived approaches to capital requirements. Modernizing capital requirements to support market liquidity, affordable homeownership, and the safety and soundness of banking is an important goal of these changes. In particular, the capital treatment of mortgages and mortgage servicing assets under the U.S. standardized approach has resulted in banks reducing their participation in this important lending activity, potentially curtailing access to mortgage credit. We are considering approaches to more granularly differentiate the riskiness of mortgages with benefits extending to financial institutions of all sizes, not just the largest banks. G-SIB surcharge.  In addition, the Federal Reserve is working to refine the G-SIB surcharge framework in coordination with broader capital framework reform efforts. It is essential that our comprehensive framework strikes the right balance between safety and soundness, ensuring financial stability and promoting economic growth. The surcharge must be carefully calibrated to avoid inadvertently inhibiting the ability of the banking sector to support the broader economy. We must maintain a robust financial system without imposing unnecessary burdens that impede economic growth. SupervisionI will now turn to the Federal Reserve's supervisory program. Over the last seven years, I have consistently emphasized the importance of transparency, accountability, and fairness in supervision. These principles guided my approach as a state banking commissioner, and they continue to guide my approach today. I also remain focused on the Board's responsibility to promote the safe and sound operations of banks and the stability of the U.S. financial system. An effective supervisory framework must focus on those factors that affect a bank's financial condition including material risks to bank operations and to the stability of the broader financial system, not immaterial issues that divert attention from core safety and soundness. It must be risk-based by design, concentrating resources where risks are most consequential and tailoring oversight to each institution's size, complexity, and risk profile. I have consistently supported a risk-focused, tailored approach to supervision and regulations, and it is the direction I have provided to Federal Reserve examiners in recent guidance and also released publicly.2 As part of this effort, the Federal Reserve is also considering a regulation that would clarify the standards for enforcement actions based on an unsafe or unsound practice, Matters Requiring Attention (MRAs), and other supervisory findings based on threats to safety and soundness. Our revised framework will prioritize addressing substantive threats to banks rather than administrative deficiencies. By focusing our supervisory resources on material issues that historically have correlated to bank failures, we create a more effective and efficient oversight system that enhances financial stability. Another step we are taking to address these concerns is through the review of our CAMELS framework, which has been in place since 1979 with minimal modification. The management ("M") component, for example, has been widely criticized as an arbitrary and highly subjective catch-all category. Establishing clear metrics and parameters for all of the components will ensure transparency and objectivity in our supervisory assessments. Bank ratings should reflect overall safety and soundness, not just isolated deficiencies in a single component. Prior to the recent modification of the Large Financial Institution (LFI) ratings system, banks have often been labeled as not "well managed" despite strong capital and liquidity positions. To address this shortcoming, the Board recently finalized revisions to the LFI ratings system that address the mismatch between ratings and overall firm condition. In addition to sharpening the focus on financial risks, updating our ratings frameworks, and refining our supervisory tools, we are also reviewing our supervisory directives, reports and actions. Further, the Board officially ended the practice of using reputational risk in our supervisory program.3 This change addressed legitimate concerns that supervision around an ambiguous concept like reputational risk could improperly influence a bank's business decisions. We are also considering a regulation to prevent Board personnel from encouraging, influencing or compelling banks to debank or refuse to bank a customer due to their constitutionally protected political or religious beliefs, associations, speech or conduct. Let me be clear: banking supervisors should never, and will not under my watch, dictate which individuals and lawful businesses a bank is permitted to serve. Banks must remain free to make their own risk-based decisions to serve individuals and lawful businesses. Thank you, again, for the opportunity to appear before you this morning. As you know, the Federal Reserve is currently in the pre-Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting blackout period during which FOMC members are not permitted to discuss monetary policy. Therefore, unfortunately, I will not be able to discuss monetary policy during today's hearing. With that in mind, I look forward to answering your questions. 1. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Agencies Request Comment on Proposal to Modify Certain Regulatory Capital Standards," press release, June 27, 2025.  2. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Federal Reserve Board Releases Information Regarding Enhancements to Bank Supervision," press release, November 18, 2025.  3. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Federal Reserve Board Announces That Reputational Risk Will No Longer Be a Component of Examination Programs in Its Supervision of Banks," press release, June 23, 2025. 

MarketAxess Holdings Inc. (Nasdaq: MKTX), the operator of a leading electronic trading platform for fixed-income securities, today announced that Chris Concannon, Chief Executive Officer, and Ilene Fiszel Bieler, Chief Financial Officer, will participate in the Goldman Sachs Financial Services Conference on December 9, 2025. Mr. Concannon and Ms. Fiszel Bieler will participate in a fireside chat at 10:00 a.m. ET. The live webcast and replay for the fireside chat will be available on the events and presentations section of the MarketAxess Investor Relations homepage, https://investor.marketaxess.com/events-and-presentations.

The report summarizes banking conditions and the Federal Reserve’s supervisory and regulatory activities, in conjunction with semiannual testimony before Congress by the Vice Chair for Supervision. 2025 December:Report: PDF | Data Sources and Terms 2024 November:Report: HTML |  PDF | Chart Data and DescriptionsTestimony: HTML | PDF May:Report: HTML | PDF | Chart Data and DescriptionsTestimony: HTML | PDF 2023 November:Report: HTML | PDF | Chart Data and DescriptionsTestimony: HTML | PDF May:Report: HTML | PDF | Chart Data and DescriptionsTestimony: HTML | PDF 2022 November:Report: HTML | PDF | Chart Data and DescriptionsTestimony: HTML | PDF May:Report: HTML | PDF | Chart Data and Descriptions 2021 November:Report: HTML | PDF | Chart Data and Descriptions April:Testimony: HTML | PDFReport: HTML | PDF | Chart Data and Descriptions 2020 November:Testimony: HTML | PDFReport: HTML | PDF | Chart Data and Descriptions May:Testimony: HTML | PDFReport: HTML | PDF | Chart Data and Descriptions 2019 November:Testimony: HTML | PDFReport: HTML | PDF | Chart Data and Descriptions May:Testimony: HTML | PDFReport: HTML | PDF | Chart Data and Descriptions 2018 Testimony: HTML | PDFReport: HTML | PDF | Chart Data and Descriptions

Comptroller of the Currency Jonathan V. Gould today issued the following statement on the release of the report titled “Operation Chokepoint 2.0: Biden’s Debanking of Digital Assets,” issued by the U.S. House of Representatives’ Financial Services Committee majority staff. The congressional staff report on the Biden Administration’s coordinated effort to debank digital assets confirms what many have long suspected: the Biden Administration’s actions discouraged and prevented the institutions within the regulated banking system from engaging with digital assets. I commend Financial Services Committee Chairman Hill and his staff for shining a light on the politicization of banking which has hampered industry’s efforts to modernize, innovate, better serve their customers and contribute to the national economy. To provide transparency around the OCC’s prior requirement for non-supervisory objection before a national bank engaged in digital asset activities under Interpretive Letter 1179, the OCC recently published each formal bank request submitted and the agency’s response. Additionally, the OCC has removed references to reputation risk in its handbooks and guidance documents and, with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, issued a proposal to codify the elimination of reputation risk from its supervisory programs. These actions eliminate one of the tools previously used by regulators to drive debanking. Consistent with the President’s Executive Order on Guaranteeing Fair Banking for All Americans, the OCC continues its investigation into the role played by the largest banks in debanking digital asset customers or other legal businesses. The OCC intends to hold these banks accountable for any unlawful debanking activities it identifies, and to ensure OCC-supervised institutions provide access to financial services based on individualized, objective and risk-based analyses. Related Links Summary of Interpretive Letter 1179 Requests Comptroller of the Currency Jonathan V. Gould

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) today announced that it is maintaining assessment rates for the 2026 Calendar Year. OCC-regulated institutions will continue to benefit from the decrease in assessment rates that the agency made as recently as September 2025. For the September 30, 2025, semiannual assessment, the OCC reduced the rates in the general assessment fee schedule by 30 percent for assets up to $40 billion and 22 percent for assets above $40 billion and reduced the rates in the independent trust and independent credit card assessment fee schedules by 22 percent. The 2026 assessment rates will provide the OCC with sufficient resources to ensure a well-trained staff that keeps up with emerging trends and embraces new technologies in performing the agency’s important mission to maintain the safety and soundness of the federal banking system. The calendar year 2026 assessment rates will be in effect as of January 1, 2026, and will be reflected in assessments paid on March 31, 2026, and September 30, 2026. Related Link Schedule

In November 2025, total trading volumes across Moscow Exchange's markets was RUB 149.2 trln. Equities Market Trading volume in shares, DRs and investment fund units was RUB 2.3 trln. ADTV was RUB 87.8 bln. Bonds Market Turnover in bonds reached RUB 4.4 trln, excluding overnight bonds. ADTV was RUB 167.3 bln. The total volume of bond issues and buybacks amounted to RUB 3 trillion. This included the placement of RUB 244 billion of overnight bonds. Derivatives Market Trading volumes on the market was RUB 11.5 trln. ADTV was RUB 440.8 bln. Money Market Money Market turnover was RUB 116.9 trln. ADTV was RUB 4.5 trln. The CCP-cleared repo segment reached RUB 54.3 trln, including the GCC repo segment which totalled RUB 46.2 trln. Read more on the Moscow Exchange: https://www.moex.com/n95745

Monthly statistics including stock and derivative statistics; Volumes and Market cap Most traded companies Most active members Listings and member Attachments:Statistics_November_2025_summary_.pdf

Nasdaq, Inc. (Nasdaq: NDAQ) (“Nasdaq” or the “Company”) today announced its offers to purchase for cash in the order of priority set forth in the table below (the “Acceptance Priority Levels”) up to an aggregate purchase price of $95,000,000 (excluding Accrued Interest (as defined below)) (the “Maximum Tender Payment”) for its outstanding Notes, subject to (i) a sub-cap of $80,000,000 in aggregate principal amount (the “2028 Notes Cap”) of the Company’s 5.350% Senior Notes due 2028 (the “2028 Notes”) and (ii) a sub-cap of $10,000,000 in aggregate principal amount (the “2052 Notes Cap”) of the Company’s 3.950% Senior Notes due 2052 (the “2052 Notes”). The 2028 Notes and the 2052 Notes are referred to collectively herein as the “Notes,” such offers to purchase are referred to collectively herein as the “Tender Offers” and each a “Tender Offer,” and the 2028 Notes Cap and the 2052 Notes Cap are referred to collectively herein as the “Series Notes Caps” and each a “Series Notes Cap.”   Title of Security Security Identifiers Principal Amount Outstanding Acceptance Priority Level(1) Series Notes Cap(1) Early Tender Premium(2)(3) U.S. Treasury Reference Security(4) Fixed Spread(basis points) 2028 Tender Offer 5.350% Senior Notes due 2028 CUSIP:63111X AH4ISIN:US63111XAH44 $880,000,000 1 $80,000,000 $30.00 3.500% UST due November 15, 2028 35 bps 2052 Tender Offer 3.950% Senior Notes due 2052 CUSIP:631103 AM0ISIN:US631103AM02 $429,995,000 2 $10,000,000 $30.00 4.750% UST due August 15, 2055 75 bps (1)   The Tender Offers are subject to the Maximum Tender Payment of $95,000,000 and the applicable Series Notes Caps.(2)   Per $1,000 principal amount of Notes validly tendered on or prior to the Early Tender Date (as defined below) and accepted for purchase by the Company.(3)   Does not include Accrued Interest, which will also be payable as described below.(4)   The applicable page on Bloomberg from which the dealer manager will quote the bid side price of the U.S. Treasury Security is FIT1. The Tender Offers are being made upon the terms and subject to conditions described in the Offer to Purchase, dated December 1, 2025 (as it may be amended or supplemented from time to time, the “Offer to Purchase”), which sets forth a detailed description of the Tender Offers. Notes validly tendered prior to or at the Early Tender Date will be accepted for purchase in priority to other Notes validly tendered after the Early Tender Date, subject to the Series Notes Caps and the Maximum Tender Payment, even if such Notes validly tendered after the Early Tender Date have a higher Acceptance Priority Level than the Notes validly tendered prior to or at the Early Tender Date. The Company reserves the right, but is under no obligation, to increase or decrease any or both of the Series Notes Caps and/or the Maximum Tender Payment in its sole discretion at any time without extending or reinstating withdrawal rights, subject to compliance with applicable law. The Tender Offers for the Notes will expire at 5:00 p.m., New York City time, on December 30, 2025, or any other date and time to which the Company extends the applicable Tender Offer (such date and time, as it may be extended with respect to a Tender Offer, the “Expiration Date”), unless earlier terminated. Holders of Notes must validly tender and not validly withdraw their Notes prior to or at 5:00 p.m., New York City time, on December 12, 2025 (such date and time, as it may be extended with respect to a Tender Offer, the “Early Tender Date”), and the holder’s Notes must be accepted for purchase, to be eligible to receive the applicable Total Consideration (as defined below). If a holder validly tenders Notes after the applicable Early Tender Date but prior to or at the applicable Expiration Date, and the holder’s Notes are accepted for purchase, the holder will only be eligible to receive the applicable Tender Offer Consideration (as defined below). Subject to the Maximum Tender Payment, the Series Notes Caps, the Acceptance Priority Levels and proration, if applicable, the total consideration for each $1,000 principal amount of the Notes validly tendered (and not validly withdrawn) prior to the Early Tender Date and accepted for purchase pursuant to each Tender Offer will be calculated in the manner described in the Offer to Purchase by reference to the applicable Fixed Spread for such Notes specified in the table above plus the applicable yield based on the bid-side price of the applicable U.S. Treasury Reference Security specified in the table above at 10:00 a.m., New York City time, on December 15, 2025 (excluding Accrued Interest with respect to each series of Notes, the “Total Consideration”). The Total Consideration includes an applicable early tender premium per $1,000 principal amount of Notes accepted for purchase as set forth in the table above (with respect to each series of Notes, the “Early Tender Premium”). Notes validly tendered after the Early Tender Date but prior to the Expiration Date and accepted for purchase will receive the Total Consideration minus the Early Tender Premium (with respect to each series of Notes, the “Tender Offer Consideration”). In addition to the consideration described above, all holders of Notes accepted for purchase in the Tender Offers will receive accrued and unpaid interest on such Notes from the last interest payment date with respect to such Notes to, but not including, the applicable settlement date (“Accrued Interest”). The Company intends to fund the purchase of validly tendered and accepted Notes with available cash on hand and other sources of liquidity. The purpose of the Tender Offers is to purchase a portion of the Notes, subject to the Maximum Tender Payment and the Series Notes Caps, in order to reduce the Company’s total outstanding public debt. The Tender Offers will expire on the applicable Expiration Date. Except as set forth below, payment for the Notes that are validly tendered prior to or at the Expiration Date and that are accepted for purchase will be made on a date promptly following the Expiration Date, which is currently anticipated to be December 31, 2025, the first business day after the Expiration Date. The Company reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to make payment for Notes that are validly tendered prior to or at the Early Tender Date and that are accepted for purchase on an earlier settlement date, which, if applicable, is currently anticipated to be December 17, 2025, provided that the conditions to the satisfaction of the applicable Tender Offer are satisfied. The Company is not obligated to conduct any early settlement or have any early settlement occur on any particular date. Tendered Notes may be withdrawn prior to or at, but not after, 5:00 p.m., New York City time, on December 12, 2025. The Tender Offers are subject to the satisfaction or waiver of certain conditions which are specified in the Offer to Purchase. The Tender Offers are not conditioned on any minimum principal amount of Notes being tendered. Information Relating to the Tender Offers The Offer to Purchase is being distributed to holders beginning today. J.P. Morgan Securities LLC is serving as dealer manager in connection with the Tender Offers. Investors with questions regarding the terms and conditions of the Tender Offers may contact the dealer manager as follows: J.P. Morgan Securities LLC270 Park AvenueNew York, New York 10017Attention: Liability Management GroupU.S. Toll-Free: (866) 834-4666Collect: (212) 834-3046   D.F. King & Co., Inc. is the Tender and Information Agent for the Tender Offers. Any questions regarding procedures for tendering Notes or request for copies of the Offer to Purchase should be directed to D.F. King & Co., Inc. by any of the following means: by telephone at (877) 478-5045 (toll-free) or (646) 845-0146 (collect) or by email at nasdaq@dfking.com. This press release does not constitute an offer to sell or purchase, or a solicitation of an offer to sell or purchase, or the solicitation of tenders with respect to, the Notes. No offer, solicitation, purchase or sale will be made in any jurisdiction in which such an offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful. The Tender Offers are being made solely pursuant to the Offer to Purchase made available to holders of the Notes. None of the Company or its affiliates, their respective boards of directors, the dealer manager, the tender and information agent or the trustee with respect to any series of Notes is making any recommendation as to whether or not holders should tender or refrain from tendering all or any portion of their Notes in response to the Tender Offers. Holders are urged to evaluate carefully all information in the Offer to Purchase, consult their own investment and tax advisors and make their own decisions whether to tender Notes in the Tender Offers, and, if so, the principal amount of Notes to tender. About Nasdaq Nasdaq (Nasdaq: NDAQ) is a global technology company serving corporate clients, investment managers, banks, brokers, and exchange operators as they navigate and interact with the global capital markets and the broader financial system. We aspire to deliver world-leading platforms that improve the liquidity, transparency, and integrity of the global economy. Our diverse offering of data, analytics, software, exchange capabilities, and client-centric services enables clients to optimize and execute their business vision with confidence. Cautionary Note Regarding Forward Looking Statements This press release contains forward-looking information that involves substantial risks, uncertainties and assumptions that could cause actual results to differ materially from those expressed or implied by such statements. When used in this communication, words such as “enables,” “intends,” “will,” and similar expressions and any other statements that are not historical facts are intended to identify forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements in this press release include, among other things, statements about the proposed Tender Offers and the expected source of funds. Risks and uncertainties include, among other things, risks related to the ability of Nasdaq to consummate the Tender Offers on the terms and timing described herein, or at all, Nasdaq’s ability to implement its strategic vision, initiatives, economic, political and market conditions and fluctuations, government and industry regulation, interest rate risk, U.S. and global competition, and other factors detailed in Nasdaq’s reports filed on Forms 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K and in other filings Nasdaq makes with the SEC from time to time and available at www.sec.gov. These documents are also available under the Investor Relations section of the Company’s website at http://ir.nasdaq.com. The forward-looking statements included in this communication are made only as of the date hereof. Nasdaq disclaims any obligation to update these forward-looking statements, except as required by law.

Fiserv, Inc. (NASDAQ: FISV), a leading global provider of payments and financial technology, today announced the appointment of Walter Pritchard as Senior Vice President, Head of Investor Relations, effective December 1, 2025. Pritchard brings more than 25 years of experience in investor relations, corporate strategy, finance and equity research. Most recently, he served as Senior Vice President of Investor Relations and Corporate Development at Palo Alto Networks, where he helped align company strategy with external investor messaging and led corporate development and strategic finance to support the company’s evolution and growth. Prior to Palo Alto Networks, Pritchard served as Managing Director at Citi and Cowen & Company, covering the global software and broader technology industry. He began his career at SoundView Technology Group, holds the Chartered Financial Analyst designation and earned his Bachelor of Arts in Chemistry from Pomona College. “Walter brings deep expertise in understanding market dynamics and communicating with investors and analysts,” said Paul Todd, Chief Financial Officer at Fiserv. “We look forward to collaborating with him to strengthen our engagement with the investment community as we work to drive long-term shareholder value. We are thrilled to welcome Walter to Fiserv.”

Nasdaq (Nasdaq:NDAQ) today publishes monthly trade statistics for the Nordic1 and Baltic2 markets. Below follows a summary of the statistics for November 2025: The share trading increased by 11.7% to a daily average of 3.319bn EUR, compared to 2.972bn EUR in November 2024. Compared to the previous month, October 2025, the daily average increased by 6.0%. Cleared derivatives volume decreased by 0.5% to a daily average of 279,417 contracts, compared with 280,784 contracts in November 2024. ETP trading3 (Exchange Traded Products) decreased by 3.7% to a daily average of 42.5m EUR compared to 44.2m EUR in November 2024. Novo Nordisk A/S was the most traded stock per day during the past month, followed by Investor AB. Goldman Sachs Bank Europe SE was the most active member during the past month, followed by Morgan Stanley Europe SE. Nasdaq Nordic’s share of order-book trading in our listed stocks increased to 74.2%, compared to 72.7% in the previous month4. The average order book depth at the best price level was larger at Nasdaq Nordic than the second most liquid trading venue, see detailed figures per exchange:For OMXC25 companies 1.9 larger For OMXH25 companies 2.0 larger For OMXS30 companies 2.6 largerNasdaq Nordic’s average time at EBBO5 (European Best Bid and Offer) was:For OMXC25 companies 73.6% (-1.4% from October) For OMXH25 companies 83.9% (3.7% from October) For OMXS30 companies 84.2% (-1.6% from October)1) Nasdaq Copenhagen, Helsinki, Iceland and Stockholm2) Nasdaq Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius.3) ETP trading (ETF, ETN, ETC, AIF) figures includes Nasdaq Copenhagen, Helsinki, Iceland and Stockholm.4) Included are the main European marketplaces that offer trading in Nasdaq Nordic listed shares. Source: BMLL5) EBBO (European Best Bid and Offer) refers to the current best price available for selling or buying a trading instrument such as a stock. Source: BMLL

Deutsche Börse with its trading venues Xetra and Frankfurt generated a turnover of €135.46 billion in November (previous year: €118.72 billion / previous month: €146.23 billion). €131.40 billion were attributable to “Deutsche Börse Xetra” (previous year: €115.02 billion / previous month: €141.05 billion), bringing the average daily Xetra trading volume to €6.57 billion (previous year: €5.48 billion / previous month: €6.13 billion). Trading volumes on “Deutsche Börse Frankfurt” were €4.06 billion (previous year: €3.70 billion / previous month: €5.18 billion). By type of asset class, equities accounted in total for €102.04 billion. Trading in ETFs/ETCs/ETNs generated a turnover of €31.51 billion. Turnover in bonds was €0.68 billion, in certificates €1.18 billion and in funds €0.05 billion. The DAX stock with the highest turnover on Xetra in November was Rheinmetall AG with €8.55 billion. Hensoldt AG led the MDAX with €999.02 million, while Salzgitter AG led the SDAX index with €146.19 Mio million. In the ETF segment iShares Core MSCI World UCITS ETF generated the largest volume with €864.01 million. Trading volumes November 2025 in billion euros:   Xetra Frankfurt Total Equities 100.12 1.93 102.04 ETFs/ETCs/ETNs 31.28 0.22 31.51 Bonds - 0.68 0.68 Certificates - 1.18 1.18 Funds - 0.05 0.05 November ‘25 in total 131.40 4.06 135.46 October ‘25 in total 141.05 5.18 146.23 November ‘24 in total 115.02 3.70 118.72 Further details are available in Deutsche Börse’s cash market statistics. For a pan-European comparison of trading venues, see the statistics provided by the Federation of European Securities Exchanges (FESE).

The FIA-sponsored European Agent Trustee Model (EATM) has gone live at LCH Ltd for its SwapClear service, marking an important milestone in a multi-year project between FIA, a consortium of bank clearing members, two European clearinghouses, and external counsel. The EATM is a new client clearing model designed to broadly replicate the futures commission merchant (FCM) clearing model in the US, with the aim of increasing the clearing capacity of globally systemically important bank (G-SIB) clearing members. It is intended to co-exist with, rather than be a substitute for, other clearing models available in Europe.  Five years in the making, the EATM has been created by FIA in collaboration with Bank of America, Barclays, Citi, Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan, as well as LCH Ltd, Eurex Clearing and Linklaters. It was initially designed for use with over-the-counter derivatives, but could be extended to exchange-traded contracts, subject to demand.  The EATM has been developed under English law, with an equivalent structure currently being developed under German law.  Under the EATM (English law), clearing members may enter trades with a CCP on behalf of their clients and hold those trades on trust for those clients. This differs from Europe’s predominant ‘principal model’ in which clearing members act as financial intermediaries between their clients and the CCP.   This means that under the EATM, a clearing member is party to one transaction – the client transaction with the CCP, whereas under the principal model, it is party to two transactions – one with the CCP and one with the client.  The aim of the EATM is to bolster capacity, particularly among G-SIB clearing members, which face additional capital charges when they clear OTC derivatives for their clients under the principal model.  “By effectively removing the double-counting, the EATM will help increase the capacity of clearing members offering client clearing in Europe through cost savings and efficiencies,” said Walt Lukken, FIA President and CEO. “The EATM provides welcome capacity for clearing services at a time of unprecedented growth in our markets.” The EATM replicates many features of the US FCM clearing model and was made possible by significant developments and improvements in the understanding of the legal underpinnings of the US version. “It has historically been difficult to design a clearing model outside the US that substantially replicates the US FCM clearing model, due to some uncertainty about the legal basis of that model,” said Mitja Siraj, FIA’s Vice President of Legal, Europe.  “Recent legal memoranda prepared for FIA and ISDA by external counsel have provided more clarity and enabled the articulation of the legal relationships underlying the US FCM clearing model. This has made it easier to reverse engineer that model. What has been a statutory construct unique to the US legal system has now been replicated through different arrangements that are referred to as agent-trustee structures outside the US.” Today’s launch by LCH Ltd’s SwapClear marks the go-live of the EATM (English law) model. This means that UK-based clearing members of SwapClear can offer the EATM to their clients, irrespective of their clients’ location.  Eurex Clearing is in the process of implementing the same model and will inform market participants once it has been completed. Both CCPs also intend to implement the EATM in due course for Germany-based clearing members.  While LCH Ltd and Eurex Clearing have been involved in the project from the start, the EATM is designed to be CCP-neutral and can be offered by any European CCP. It has also been designed to ensure there is minimal disruption to existing CCP operations, processes and rules. “LCH Ltd’s SwapClear service is delighted to work with FIA in support of our clearing members and the wider cleared swaps community as the first CCP to offer this model,” said Nick Rustad, Global Head of SwapClear & Listed Rates.   “Today’s launch of the new EATM model reflects a long-term coordinated effort among the FIA, consortium members, and CCPs to create future OTC clearing capacity in EMEA. The EATM model combines access to European segregation models and rulesets with the capital efficiency of the US agency model, offering our clients further optionality,” said Helen Gordon, Global Head Derivatives Clearing Product, J.P. Morgan.“The new EATM model is a key development in Europe to add capacity in client clearing. Barclays is pleased to have an alternative to manage a large and growing notional footprint. We know this is important for our clients and we strive to remain at the forefront of industry initiatives,” said Gary Saunders, Global Head of Liquid Financing Platform Services at Barclays.  "We are delighted to have helped the industry bring such a complex project to a successful conclusion," said Michael Voisin and Sarah Willis, who co-led the Linklaters team. "We began working on the legal analysis which underlies the EATM over 10 years ago and, over the last five years, have built on our initial feasibility study to design and implement the model.”   An FAQ with further details on the EATM client clearing model in Europe is available here.   FIA has published EATM-related documentation here.   

Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. (NYSE:ICE), a leading global provider of technology and data, today announced that InnovestX Securities Co. Ltd., a leading brokerage and securities company in Thailand and a subsidiary of SCBX , the parent company of Siam Commercial Bank (SCB), one of Southeast Asia’s leading financial institutions, has selected ICE’s Portfolio Analytics (IPA) platform to enhance its risk management and analytics capabilities. “At InnovestX, our mission is to empower investors with seamless access to world-class investment opportunities powered by technology, innovation and transparency,” said Payon Pongsawaree CIO of InnovestX. “As the investment and securities arm of SCBX, we manage a diverse and growing portfolio of structured products that requires accurate pricing and efficient risk oversight. ICE’s IPA solution strengthens our risk management capabilities and enables us to scale efficiently, and deliver greater value to our clients as we continue to expand in Thailand.” With ICE’s IPA solution, InnovestX will gain a single platform for pre-trade pricing, intraday analytics and lifecycle management across multiple asset classes. ICE’s robust data and analytics can help InnovestX deliver more precise and timely valuations and improve the investment decision-making process for its clients. “We are well equipped to assist firms like InnovestX as they expand their structured product business and enhance their risk management activities,” said Christy Chan, Head of Client Development, APAC at ICE Data Services. “Our streaming market data and on-demand analytics, combined with pre-trade pricing and lifecycle management tools, provide the transparency and efficiency that can help leading issuers meet their clients’ investment and risk management needs and support growth in dynamic markets like Southeast Asia.” ICE’s IPA solution combines continuous market data, pricing, analytics and on-screen risk tools for simple to complex products across multiple asset classes. These capabilities can help firms like InnovestX to manage exposure, monitor risk and price products on an intraday basis, while supporting greater transparency and efficiency in rapidly growing markets. For more information on ICE Data Derivatives solutions, please visit: https://www.theice.com/market-data/pricing-and-analytics/derivatives.

JPX group companies undertake various initiatives and disseminate information with the aim of providing the most attractive markets to all users. Every month, we showcase the highlights of these efforts in short and concise summaries just for you. JPX Monthly Headlines November 2025 Nov. 4 / Nov. 17: Launch of J-Quants DataCube and Expansion of J-Quants Pro Dataset Nov. 5: JPXI Enlists the Support of AWS to Improve its Data/Digital Businesses Nov. 5: Notional Amount of Single Stock Options Trades in October 2025 Hits Post-Integration High for Second Consecutive Month Nov. 7: Record High Clearing Volume for JPY Interest Rate Swaps and Second-Highest Trading Volume for 3-Month TONA Futures in October 2025 Nov. 26: Japan–Southeast Asia Market Forum 2025

Japan Exchange Group, Inc. (JPX) today held the 20th General Meeting of the Council for Eliminating Antisocial Forces in the Exchange Market, which is organized with the National Police Agency and the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department.The Council aims to strengthen cooperation between police agencies and JPX to help build a sound and fair market by blocking any relationship with antisocial forces, including organized crime groups that attempt involvement in the markets of Tokyo Stock Exchange, where cash equities such as shares are traded, and Osaka Exchange and Tokyo Commodity Exchange, where futures and other derivatives products are traded.Through the activities of the Council, we are specifically working on: 1. eliminating antisocial forces in the cash equity and derivatives markets; 2. strengthening cooperation and sharing information with police agencies; and 3. actively participating and cooperating in activities conducted by police agencies to eliminate organized crime groups and other antisocial forces.In today's 20th general meeting, the Council reviewed its activities over the past year, and members shared detailed information and had a lively exchange of opinions on recent developments.JPX will continue to strengthen its activities to eliminate antisocial forces through the activities of the Council and devote its utmost efforts to further enhance the reliability of the cash equity and derivatives markets.

Japan Exchange Group released Trading Overview in November 2025. Cash Equity Market - In November 2025, the daily average trading value for the Prime Market (domestic common stocks) was JPY 7.8177 trillion.- The daily average trading value for the ETF market was JPY 414.8 billion. Derivatives Market -In November 2025, total derivatives trading volume was 36,414,589 contracts and the second highest record for November.-In November 2025, total derivatives trading value was JPY 274 trillion and the second highest record for November.-In November 2025, trading volume for the night session and the ratio of the night session were 16,196,473 contracts and 44.5%. Reference(TSE) Reference(OSE and TOCOM) (note)･Changes in line with the TSE Market RestructuringIn line with the TSE market restructuring put into effect on April 4, 2022, the format of the Domestic Stocks section of the Preliminary Figures for Trading Conditions in April has been changed from the former market divisions to the new market segments from April 4, 2022.･Data contained in the PDF file in the above Reference(OSE and TOCOM) includes trading volume/value for Flexible Futures and Options.