CCP NCC sets the following new concentration limit per issuer on Securities market from September 19-th, 2025: №GroupLimits per issuer (RUB) 1 X5_SHARE 2 265 000 000

The ribbon was cut on a new banking hub in Monmouth, Wales, marking the first anniversary of the FCA’s access to cash rules.  The rules mean that before banks and building societies change cash services, such as closing a branch or ATM, they must assess the impact. If significant gaps in cash access are found, they must plug them.   Monmouth is the 121st banking hub to open in 12 months. A further 93 cash deposit services – such as ATMs and Post Office counters - have also been set up. 20 of the banking hubs were established following requests from local communities for their cash provision to be assessed.  David Geale, executive director of payments and digital finance at the FCA, said: 'Cash still matters - for many consumers it’s a key budgeting tool, and for small businesses, a way to handle daily takings. We’re helping to keep cash accessible in communities across the UK.' Gareth Oakley, chief executive officer of Cash Access UK said: 'We’re pleased to be bringing vital cash and banking services to communities where these are needed. Our shared banking hubs and deposit services, which serve the customers of multiple banks, can provide a sustainable solution in communities where essential cash services are needed. From banking hubs to cash hubs and deposit ATMs, our services come in different shapes and sizes to best meet the needs of each community, but whatever their format, they all provide easy and convenient access to cash and banking services.' John Howells, chief executive officer of LINK said:  'While the way we pay for things is changing, around five million people still rely on cash or can't use digital alternatives. Cash also provides vital resilience when digital systems fail or are unavailable. Protecting access to cash therefore remains essential. One year on, the regulations have had a positive impact and build on LINK’s ongoing work to ensure every community can continue to access cash.' As part of its 5-year strategy, the FCA is focused on helping consumers navigate their financial lives, and for many this will include the use of cash. FCA data continues to show that more than 95% of the UK population can access cash within the distances set out by the government.   Background The FCA collects data to monitor cash coverage at a national level and regularly reports its findings publicly. The FCA monitors and supervises how designated banks and building societies are complying with the rules protecting access to cash. The different cash solutions include withdrawal and deposit ATMs, banking hubs, and Post Office counters. Consumers and communities who are concerned about accessing cash in their area can request a cash access assessment. Discussions with key stakeholders on what is working well, and how else access to cash can continue to improve, will be held later in the year. The FCA says these initial forums will focus on access to cash, with future forums broadening the scope to also consider wider banking services. However, any changes to the FCA’s powers over access to cash or banking services would have to be implemented by the government. Cash Access UKLink is external  provides cash and basic banking services to communities across the UK, including sourcing and opening shared banking hubs and deposit services. LINKLink is external helps to connect a reliable ATM network to banks and building societies and is also responsible for carrying out cash access assessments.

As of today, AUMOVIO SE (ISIN: DE000AUM0V10) is listed in the Prime Standard of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The initial share price was 35.00 euros. The current share price can be found at boerse-frankfurt.com.The IPO was accompanied by Goldman Sachs Bank Europe und J.P. Morgan as Lead Financial Advisors as well as Bank of America Securities as Financial Advisor. BBVA, Bank of China Frankfurt Branch, Commerzbank, Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank, DBS Bank, DZ Bank, Helaba, ING, LBBW, Mizuho und Unicredit acted as Co-Advisors. The designated sponsors in Xetra trading are ODDO BHF and ICF Bank. The specialist on the trading venue Börse Frankfurt is ODDO BHF.According to its own information, AUMOVIO offers a broad portfolio of sensor solutions, displays and brake and comfort systems backed by extensive expertise in architecture platforms and assistance systems for connected and autonomous mobility. In fiscal 2024, the company generated sales of around €19.6 billion and employed around 93,000 people in more than 50 countries around the globe.Further information can be found in our primary market statistics.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Cicely [LaMothe], John [Fieldsend], and Rob [Fisher]. Thank you also to the staff in the Division of Corporation of Finance, Division of Investment Management, Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, and Office of the General Counsel who worked on these items. Cicely, given that a permanent director has been named, I wanted to take a moment to thank you for your leadership of the Division. Working with you has been a delight. You promote others rather than yourself, and you follow through on what you say. Your no-nonsense leadership style has enabled the Division to be productive during this transition period. You do not shy away from problems; you solve them sensibly. Today’s actions exemplify this approach. First, the Commission is acknowledging the limits of our authority. The presence of a provision requiring arbitration of investor claims arising under the federal securities laws will not factor into the SEC’s decision about whether to accelerate the effectiveness of a registration statement.[1] This position is not an invention of the Commission but rather an acknowledgment of current Supreme Court precedent.[2] Knowing that the SEC will not put its thumb on the scale, companies can decide whether they want to include arbitration provisions. A common consideration for any company contemplating going public is the litigation risk that comes with being a public company.[3] Past signaling from the SEC, unrooted in any apparent statutory authority, that it would block registration statements for companies with mandatory arbitration clauses prevented companies from taking a step some viewed to be value-maximizing, and thus good for shareholders.[4] Whether those companies are correct should be up to the market to decide. If companies opt for mandatory arbitration clauses, investors can decide what to make of them. The costs and benefits of issuer-investor mandatory arbitration provisions spark lively debate.[5] The Commission, by today’s action, appropriately is staying out of that debate.[6] The market will do a better job than we can in assessing issuer-investor mandatory arbitration provisions and will do so on a case-by-case basis. This statement empowers investors to decide for themselves whether the presence or absence of a mandatory arbitration provision in governance documents is positive, negative, or neutral. Investors’ judgments will be reflected in companies’ stock prices and in the general demand for allocation in an IPO. Today we are also providing certainty to companies by making common sense changes to our rules of practice. Every day, Commission staff, by delegated authority, take effective registration statements and qualify offering statements. Were a registration to be stayed after effectiveness, a company would experience a cavalcade of horribles: impaired access to capital; less favorable financial terms; and a legal morass as the company tries to untangle what it means to have sold securities pursuant to an effective but subsequently stayed registration statement.[7] Instead, the Commission is adopting a tailored approach that allows us to consider on a case-by-case basis whether a stay is justified while removing unnecessary risk from the IPO process. Where the SEC can remove needless uncertainty from an offering process it should. I am glad to see the Commission address the sluggish IPO market from all possible angles. I have the following questions on today’s recommendations: How does the staff assess the sufficiency of disclosure regarding issuer-investor mandatory arbitration provisions when considering taking a registration statement effective? Under what circumstances might a registration statement be stayed after it goes effective? [1] Acceleration of Effectiveness of Registration Statements of Issuers with Certain Mandatory Arbitration Provisions, Release No. 33-11389 (Sept. 17, 2025) (the “Mandatory Arbitration Statement”) at 1, https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/final/2025/33-11389.pdf. [2] See Mandatory Arbitration Statement Section II.C. [3] See, e.g., Bradley Bondi Facilitating Economic Recovery and Sustainable Growth Through Reform of the Securities Class-Action System: Exploring Arbitration as an Alternative to Litigation, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol. 33, 607, 612, (2010) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1601305 (“Securities class actions impose a competitive disadvantage on U.S. capital markets relative to markets in other countries.”). [4] See, e.g., Andrew Rhys Davies, The Legality of Mandatory Arbitration Bylaws, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (Sept. 13, 208) (explaining that the SEC in 2012 “decline[ed] to exercise its authority . . . to accelerate the effective date of [an issuer’s] registration statement” and opining that “it is not at all clear that §8(a) [of the Securities Act of 1933] actually permits the SEC to block an IPO based on its dim view of arbitration (as opposed to its view as to whether the arbitration requirement is properly disclosed to investors)”), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/09/13/the-legality-of-mandatory-arbitration-bylaws/. [5] See, e.g., Alison Frankel Shareholder Alert: SEC Commissioner Floats Class-Action-Killing Proposal brief summation of the discourse (Jul. 18, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-arbitration-idUSKBN1A326T/ (“Columbia professor John Coffee predicted that the combination of non-voting shares and mandatory arbitration clauses would have a price impact on companies going public. But Penn prof Fisch said it might be hard for pension funds to steer clear of corporations with mandatory arbitration provisions because of index fund investments. Pritchard, as a supporter of the clauses, said he believes investors will pay more for shares of companies that don’t face the cost of defending securities class actions.”). [6] Mandatory Arbitration Statement at 19 (“Nothing in this statement should be understood to express any views on the specific terms of an arbitration provision, or whether arbitration provisions are appropriate or optimal for issuers or investors.”). [7] Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, Release No. 34-103980 (Sept. 17, 2025) at 5, https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/final/2025/34-103980.pdf.

The Securities and Exchange Commission today published a policy statement to announce that decisions about whether to accelerate the effectiveness of a registration statement will not be affected by the presence of a provision requiring arbitration of investor claims arising under the federal securities laws. “As an agency that trumpets the importance of disclosure and transparency, the Commission’s lack of a recent public position on this important topic is unmoored from both its mission and its mandate. That ends today,” said Chairman Paul S. Atkins. "While many people will express views on whether a company should adopt a mandatory arbitration provision, the Commission’s role in this debate is to provide clarity that such provisions are not inconsistent with the federal securities laws,” Chairman Atkins continued. “We have fulfilled that role through the issuance of this policy statement.” Issuers have periodically asked whether a mandatory arbitration provision for investor claims arising under the federal securities laws would impact the acceleration of the effectiveness of their registration statement. Today’s statement provides the Commission’s view that, based on the Supreme Court’s current interpretation and application of the Federal Arbitration Act, the existence of such a provision will not impact determinations whether to accelerate the effective date of a registration statement. As a result, when deciding on whether to accelerate effectiveness of a registration statement, the Commission staff will focus on the adequacy of the registration statement’s disclosures, including disclosure regarding the arbitration provision. Resources Fact Sheet Final Rule

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission today announced the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida ordered Systematic Alpha Management LLC, a registered commodity trading advisor and commodity pool operator, and Peter Kambolin, its owner and registered associated person, to pay more than $2.8 million for defrauding commodity pool participants. The defendants improperly allocated profitable trades between two commodity pools and certain proprietary accounts, misled pool participants, and violated CFTC requirements on trade allocation, ultimately defrauding pool participants of more than $1.2 million. The consent order requires the defendants to pay $1,208,503 in restitution and $1,633,119 in disgorgement. Jersey City Partners LLC, a New York firm owned by Kambolin that received some of the ill-gotten gains, is jointly liable for $701,647 of the disgorgement. The order also permanently bars the defendants from registering with the CFTC or engaging in activities requiring registration and prohibits them from trading commodity interests for their own accounts for six years. The court found from January 2019 through November 2021, the defendants marketed Systematic Alpha Management as a commodity trading advisor and pool operator offering strategies in exchange-traded cryptocurrency and foreign exchange futures. They ran at least two pools but executed those pool trades alongside trades of their proprietary accounts and then allocated the trades across the accounts each day. The defendants consistently directed profitable trades to their own accounts and assigned losing or less profitable trades to the pools, defrauding participants and violating CFTC requirements that customer trades be allocated fairly and equitably. They also misrepresented that the pools would primarily trade cryptocurrency and FX futures. In a related criminal case, in September 2023, the Fraud Section of the Department of Justice charged Kambolin with one count of conspiracy to commit commodities fraud based on the same conduct. [United States v. Peter Kambolin, No. 23-20372-CR-HUCK (S.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2023)]. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced in January 2024 to two years in prison followed by 18 months of home confinement. He was also ordered to pay $1.63 million in criminal forfeiture and $1.2 million in restitution. The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the Fraud Section of the DOJ; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of Inspector General; the Financial and Capital Market Commission of the Republic of Latvia, Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht of Germany; the British Virgin Islands Financial Services Commission; and the United Kingdom Financial Conduct Authority. The Division of Enforcement staff responsible for this matter are Lauren Fulks, Elsie Robinson, Rebecca Jelinek, Thomas Simek, Jordon Grimm, Christopher Reed, and Charles Marvine, along with former staff members Clemon Ashley and Benjamin Jackman. RELATED LINKS Consent Order: Systematic Alpha Management, et al.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Brian [Daly] and Rob [Fisher]. Congratulations, Brian, on your first rulemaking as Director of the Division of Investment Management. I support extending the compliance date for the February 8, 2024 amendments to Form PF[1] to October 1, 2026.[2] I welcome today’s action as evidence of a commitment to conduct a substantive review of Form PF and, if there are substantial questions of fact, law, and policy, to take any further appropriate actions, which may include proposing new amendments to Form PF.[3] I would, have preferred a longer extension to better accommodate a fundamental rethinking of the form to ensure its consistency with law and rationality. As I noted in my dissent to the adoption of the amendments we are extending, “Form PF has not-so-subtly morphed into an all-purpose means to gather information from the private market under the seemingly limitless rubric of systemic risk.”[4] Through Form PF, the Commissions send private funds on a scavenger hunt for an odd collection of data points, some quite sensitive, some requiring extensive work and expense by funds to assemble, and many of questionable relevance to systemic risk or investor-protection objectives. The utility of the data to the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) has never been clear. A vigorously competitive market is the best guard against stupid, harmful, and careless behavior by private funds, and costly regulatory mandates like Form PF deter competition. Regulators might sift through Form PF information dumps to detect emerging systemic risks, but a few key data points would probably be more useful indicators of systemic risk. Moreover, the less confidential information we collect, the less we have to protect. I want to thank the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and SEC staff in the Divisions of Investment Management and Economic and Risk Analysis and Office of General Counsel for their quick work in drafting the extension release. My only question is why we are not proposing a longer delay.   [1] Form PF; Reporting Requirements for All Filers and Large Hedge Fund Advisers, Release No. IA-6546, (Feb. 8, 2024) [89 FR 17984 (Mar. 12, 2024) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 279)], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-03-12/pdf/2024-03473.pdf. [2] The original compliance date for the Form PF amendments was March 12, 2025. Id. at 18031. On January 29, 2025, the Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) extended the compliance date to June 12, 2025. Form PF; Reporting Requirements for All Filers and Large Hedge Fund Advisers; Extension of Compliance Date, Release No. IA-6838 (Jan. 29, 2025) [90 FR 9007 (Feb. 5, 2025) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 279)], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-02-05/pdf/2025-02138.pdf.  On June 11, 2025, the Commission and the CFTC further extended the compliance date to October 1, 2025. Form PF; Reporting Requirements for All Filers and Large Hedge Fund Advisers; Further Extension of Compliance Date, Release No. IA-6883 (June 11, 2025) [90 FR 25140 (June 16, 2025) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 279)], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-06-16/pdf/2025-11057.pdf.          [3] Form PF; Reporting Requirements for All Filers and Large Hedge Fund Advisers; Further Extension of Compliance Date, Release No. IA-6919 (Sept. 17, 2025), https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/final/2025/ia-6919.pdf.   [4] Commissioner Hester M. Peirce, Curiouser and Curiouser: Statement on Amendments to Form PF to Amend Reporting Requirements for All Filers and Large Hedge Fund Advisers (Feb. 8, 2024), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/peirce-statement-amendments-form-pf-amend-reporting-reqs-020823. 

Thank you, Chairman Atkins, and thank you to the staff for your presentation. Today, the Commission issues a policy statement regarding the acceleration of effectiveness of registration statements for issuers that have certain mandatory arbitration provisions, and corresponding amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice.  For public offerings registered with the Commission, the effective date of the registration statement is of paramount importance. Section 8(a) of the Securities Act[1] states that the effective date shall be either the 20th day after filing or such earlier date as the Commission may determine. Most registered offerings are declared effective by acceleration. Although during our agency’s early history, the Commissioners themselves personally voted to declare registration statements effective, that task has long since been delegated to the staff. Issuers have used the acceleration provision to provide important transactional timing flexibility to consider market sentiment and economic conditions.  For decades, Commission staff, acting under the direction of various SEC chairs, has taken the position that acceleration of a registration statement would not be granted for an issuer with corporate charter or bylaw provisions requiring the adjudication of investor claims in arbitration. This policy statement is now being issued to provide instruction from the full Commission. Importantly, the policy statement does not seek to regulate the conduct of market participants nor does it attempt to resolve the interplay between the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the federal securities laws. Instead, it focuses on the Commission’s limited role as to whether there is appropriate disclosure in registration statements. Whether there are benefits to arbitration of investor claims, such as whether they lead to lower investor costs, is not a question that the Commission has been tasked to answer.  The federal securities laws are primarily designed so that the public has sufficient information to make informed investment decisions—rather than making qualitative regulatory judgments as to the most optimal investment characteristics. Issuers, investors, and market intermediaries are tasked with a straightforward proposition: do the features and characteristics of a proposed investment align with one’s individual investment goals and risk tolerance. In issuing this policy statement, the Commission has based its position on a significant body of legal precedent and legislation. This policy statement, however, recognizes that we are not the Securities and Arbitration Commission nor are we a state corporate or “Blue Sky” law regulator charged with merit-based evaluation of offerings. Today’s policy statement describes the Commission’s approach to declaring registration statements effective[2] and does not attempt to conform behavior or express a view on whether mandatory arbitration is appropriate or beneficial for issuers or investors. Most importantly, it places focus on the adequacy of disclosure as being the central consideration on declaring registration statements effective.  In tandem with this policy statement, we are amending the Rules of Practice relating to procedures governing Commission review of staff actions made pursuant to delegated authority in connection with the determination of the effective dates of registration statements and post-effective amendments and the determination of the dates and times of qualification of an offering statement and post-qualification amendments under Regulation A. These amendments reflect the fact that an automatic stay of the staff’s determination to accelerate effectiveness or to qualify an offering statement after sales have commenced would be highly disruptive to the distribution process. Today’s amendments will remove the unpredictability resulting from an automatic stay. Most importantly, the key safeguard remains in place—the issuance of a stop order under Section 8(d) of the Securities Act.[3] The Commission remains, as always vigilant as to frauds perpetrated upon investors and will use all available regulatory tools to address securities fraud involving registered offerings.   I thank the staff in the Division of Corporation Finance, the Division of Investment Management, the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, and the Office of the General Counsel, for their work on these matters. I also join in thanking Cicely LaMothe for her service as Acting Director of the Division of Corporation Finance for the past 10 months. [1] 15 U.S.C. 77h. [2] This would also apply to qualifying an offering statement and an amendment to an offering statement under Regulation A. [3] 15 U.S.C. 77h.

Good morning. Before I begin, I want to thank the staff in the Division of Corporation Finance, the Office of General Counsel, the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis and The Division of Investment Management for their work. And thank you to the operations staff who made today’s meeting possible. Also, I would like to thank Cicely LaMothe for her service as Acting Director. For those of you who don’t know Cicely, she is a public servant in the best sense of those words. She is dedicated, hard-working, thoughtful and committed to her staff and to the public good. And she does it all with a smile and unflappable composure. She has taken on this very large task—probably for longer than she anticipated—and for that we are grateful. Thank you, Cicely. *** Today the Commission finds another way to stack the deck against investors—this time primarily small, retail shareholders in public companies. We do so by opening the floodgates to something called mandatory arbitration. So, what is mandatory arbitration? Mandatory arbitration forces harmed shareholders to sue companies in a private, confidential forum, instead of a court and without the benefit of proceeding in the form of a class action. While, in theory, arbitration could cut costs for companies, there are real downsides for investors. Arbitrations are typically more expensive for individual shareholders; they are not public; they have no juries;[1] they lack consistent procedures; arbitrators are not bound by legal precedent; arbitration precludes collective action among shareholders; there are limited rights of appeal; and, ultimately, there is no assurance that two identical investors would get the same outcome. If that collection of things transpired in a courtroom without a party’s consent, judges would not hesitate to call it what it is: a violation of due process. Today, the Commission takes two steps to advance this policy goal. First, the Commission issues a policy statement dictating that staff make public-interest findings without considering whether a corporation has forced its shareholders into mandatory arbitration.[2] And, second, we amend the Rules of Practice to ensure that no Commissioner or third party can effectively intervene to challenge those public-interest findings.[3] The policy statement fails on many fronts. It fails to identify a problem. It fails to adequately address numerous and complex legal and economic issues. And it fails entirely to discuss the practical consequences of allowing public companies to mandate arbitration. If, however, we actually were to consider whether mandatory arbitration is in the public interest—an analysis required by the Securities Act—we would face overwhelming evidence that it is not. So, to start there, what are some of those consequences? *** The Practical Consequences of Our Policy Statement First, small shareholders will be prevented from vindicating their rights. Cases involving offering frauds, accounting misstatements or other types of public company malfeasance are usually complex, and require extensive litigation resources, multiple experts, and services that require upfront fees.[4] For these types of claims, most shareholder investments are too small, and the costs of arbitration too high, to incentivize individual shareholder suits—even if the collective losses would more than justify the expense of litigation through class action. As one court put it, “The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”[5] Indeed, the primary defense of mandatory arbitration is that it provides cost savings to companies. But if every single member of a class sued in arbitration individually, there likely would not be great cost savings.[6] Part of the reason that companies will save money is precisely because many investors will decide not to sue in the first place.[7] Second, the markets will go under-policed. If we erode private rights of action, not only are shareholders uncompensated for the wrong perpetrated on them, but the wrongdoers get off scot-free. There are two ways to remedy wrongdoing in our markets—(i) by governmental enforcement action or (ii) by private lawsuit. Private lawsuits can be a more efficient remedy than government action in terms of investor recompense. In 2024, securities class action settlements brought by shareholders returned approximately $3.7 billion to harmed investors.[8] By contrast, over a similar period, Commission enforcement returned only $345 million to investors.[9] This may also explain why mandatory arbitration is so appealing – some companies would rather keep their ill-gotten gains than return them to harmed investors. If we chisel away at private actions, then we lean more heavily on the Commission to police the markets. But that crutch is faltering. The staff of the Commission has shrunk by approximately 16% since the beginning of the current fiscal year.[10] But our markets have grown.[11] So, we are reducing private enforcement mechanisms at the same time as agency resources are shrinking.[12] One might expect that, as we deregulate and seek less government intervention, we would lean more into an individual’s freedom to pursue her own recovery; not less.[13] But that is apparently not the case. Third, mandatory arbitration undermines deterrence. Deterrence is subverted, not only because wrongdoers are not held to account, but also because arbitration claims and awards are non-public. Parties bear the burden of compelled silence. Defrauded investors who are not part of an arbitration may not know they have been defrauded, nor may the markets, paving the road for the same company to inexpensively engage in the same misconduct again in the future. And where there is no public account, there is also no deterrence to other would-be wrongdoers.[14] This lack of deterrence will lead not only to more brazen misconduct, but it will also reduce the integrity of our markets. It lays the groundwork for less accurate disclosures, less reliable financial statements, and executives who are incentivized to cut corners. Less accurate market information is a solution to a problem that I don’t think exists. Fourth, market transparency and integrity will suffer. Judicial resolution of shareholder disputes provides a public good. Arguments about the costs of litigation often leave out the tremendous benefits being provided.  Private litigation allows the law to develop. Many seminal federal and state securities law cases have developed from private litigation.[15] Where caselaw is allowed to develop, it provides for consistent and predictable outcomes for market participants. On the contrary, there is no consistency in arbitration. Arbitrators are often not required to follow the law; There are not bound by precedent; Arbitrators need not provide reasoning for their decisions; Nor are they required to apply rules of evidence; Discovery and evidence are curbed; and, Judicial review is limited. This means that similarly situated investors—victims of the same mass fraud—may face significantly divergent outcomes in arbitration. That is bad for our markets, which thrive on consistency and predictability.[16] Finally, allowing companies to mandate arbitration squelches investor choice. It is worth pointing out the dissonance in allowing companies to strip investors of the choice to litigate in court, while touting the primacy of investor choice in other contexts—for example, in the Commission’s push to open the private markets to retail investors. This raises the unsavory specter that “freedom of investor choice” is only a Commission priority when that choice serves the goal of lining the pockets of favored business interests. *** The Commission’s Policy Position is Out of Step with History and the Law All of this is to say, there are compelling reasons that mandatory arbitration provisions are against the public interest and at odds with protecting investors.[17] They deprive shareholders of fundamental rights, fundamental choices, and they fly in the face of market integrity, fairness and efficiency. And perhaps that is why today’s action is so out of step with our agency’s history.[18] The Commission has never—either expressly or implicitly—granted permission to a public company to force their shareholders into mandatory arbitration.[19] And Chairmen and Commissioners of both parties—such as Chairmen Breeden, Donaldson, and Levitt—have exalted the import of private litigation,[20] alongside Congress.[21] Before today, we have never adopted a policy of willful blindness to those provisions. To be clear—the legal analysis that staff puts forward in the Policy Statement does not demand the conclusion that we reach. Today’s actions are a matter of policy and not a matter of law. Certainly, the Supreme Court has interpreted the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act to allow for greater enforcement of arbitration agreements. But, neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has ever adjudged that the FAA requires enforcement of mandatory arbitration provisions tucked away in governance documents of public companies.[22] And there are good reasons to believe that neither the FAA nor certain state laws would require enforcement of such provisions in the context of shareholder disputes.[23] For example, do corporate bylaws bear the hallmarks of privity and consent sufficient to constitute written agreements under the FAA?[24] Absent unequivocal mandates from the courts or Congress to enforce forced arbitration provisions, the Commission should enforce the securities laws, which provide (unequivocally) that any attempt to require a shareholder to waive her rights is void.[25] *** A Needless Binding of Our Hands But, perhaps the most anomalous outcome of today’s policy statement is that we predetermine a certain outcome—regardless of what a particular mandatory arbitration clause says and regardless of our statutory obligation to make a specific public interest finding for the offerings of individual issuers. Today’s statement leaves little room for staff or the Commission to make an assessment of whether a particular mandatory arbitration provision violates a quintessential shareholder right—which the Supreme Court has stated would be unlawful.[26] One could imagine many clever ways that arbitration provisions could eliminate substantive rights by, for example, wholesale eliminating remedies, limitations periods, or even entire causes of action. What if there were a provision that required shareholders to bring fraud claims within one day of the occurrence of the fraud? We have, in effect, hard-wired a finding that that mandatory arbitration is in the public interest, without any real consideration of any issuer’s filings. Do we even have authority to make such a broad finding through a policy statement? I can’t remember another time in recent history where the Commission chose to take a critical tool out of its toolbox for performing a task it was mandated to do by Congress. ***A Policy Without a Process This brings me to the utter lack of input from market participants. Today’s statement includes a quasi-economic analysis, which glaringly concludes that … we have no idea what the outcome of our policy shift might be.[27] There is a reason why we don’t know the full extent of the costs and the benefits of today’s action—because we didn’t ask. This seismic policy shift has too many ramifications to be done without an economic analysis. The last time mandatory arbitration provisions took the limelight, then-Chairman Jay Clayton promised that “[no] decision would be made by the Commission absent a fair amount [] of consideration and debate, including [input on] the law, the economics, [and] what investors want.”[28] Commissioners who came before us shared that view.[29] Hundreds of interested stakeholders have in the past written to the Commission expressing not only concern over green lighting mandatory arbitration provisions, but also seeking the opportunity to be heard before the implementation of any policy change. These interested stakeholders include members of Congress,[30] State Treasurers of both parties,[31] academics of all stripes,[32] institutional investors,[33] and investor advocates, [34] among many others.[35] Indeed, one letter from 26 Members of Congress summed it up well: [B]ecause of the longstanding public-position of the SEC, and the significant impact such a monumental shift in policy would have on American investors, any examination of this issue should be done in a transparent manner…. Anything less will be seen as a stealth attempt by the Commission to circumvent U.S. securities laws and the fundamental rights of shareholders.[36] Today we fail to heed this warning. Instead of soliciting public comment as to the practical, economic and legal effects of our actions, we cover our ears and simply do the thing that we want to do. We could have engaged in rulemaking. We could have considered building in guardrails to protect investors and market integrity. And we could have actually addressed complex substantive questions about the nexus between our policy statement and state law,[37] and the fiduciary duties corporate managers owe to investors.[38] But, full speed ahead—no matter the consequences. Through today’s policy statement, we not only silence investors in court, we also silence their ability to be heard by the Commission, the body specifically tasked with protecting their interests. This is a double slight, at best. A due process violation at worst. This also begs the question—what other consequential actions does the Commission think it can adopt without soliciting public comment? The public should be concerned because today might mark the beginning of an era in which the Commissions acts first and asks questions only later (if at all).[39] *** Doubling Down on Disenfranchisement It would be bad enough if all the Commission did today was issue the mandatory arbitration policy statement. But we simultaneously propose amendments to our Rules of Practice in order to eviscerate the procedural rights of those who might choose to challenge an issuer’s inclusion of mandatory arbitration. Currently, when either a Commissioner or a third-party requests Commission review of almost any staff action made pursuant to delegated authority, those actions are automatically stayed pending Commission consideration. This consideration is an important backstop to delegated staff action. That all goes away with today’s amendments. From now on, the automatic stay, which provides the mechanism for meaningful Commission review of registration statements before an offering hits the market, vanishes. Accordingly, I also cannot support today’s amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice. First, creating a new exception—only the third one and the first in 30 years—to the automatic-stay provisions amplifies the tension between Rule 431 of our Rules of Practice and Section 4A of the Exchange Act. Section 4A provides a statutory basis for the Commission to delegate its own authority to staff.[40] However, by statute, the Commission must review such delegated action if one Commissioner requests review.[41] Third parties may also petition the Commission for review of delegated actions.[42] The statute further specifies two (and only two) situations in which the delegated action “shall . . . be deemed the action of the Commission.”[43] Despite these two narrow circumstances in which the statute deems delegated action to be Commission action, Rule 431 broadly states, “An action made pursuant to delegated authority shall have immediate effect and be deemed the action of the Commission.”[44] On its face, the expansiveness of the rule’s text directly conflicts with the statute. In our legal system, that is impermissible, and the statute wins.[45] Historically, the automatic-stay provisions of Rule 431 eased that tension between the rule and Section 4A since decisions made pursuant to delegated authority were automatically stayed once review was requested, thus halting the immediate effect of any staff action.[46] But, by removing the pressure-release valve of the automatic-stay provisions, today’s amendments amplify the conflict between Rule 431 and Section 4A.[47] Thus, today’s amendments raise serious questions regarding whether Rule 431 violates the Exchange Act.[48] Second, the Commission errs, yet again, by deciding to enact these amendments without the benefit of public comment. We assert that today’s amendments are not subject to the notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act because they qualify for an exemption for “rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.”[49] I am not convinced that this exemption applies here since after today’s amendments an investor’s right to Commission review will exist in name only. Seems to me, this is more than just internal agency procedure.[50] Even if the amendments do qualify for the exemption to notice-and-comment rulemaking, we still should have solicited public comment. By my count, over the last 30 years the Commission has revised our Rules of Practice 17 times.[51] And, like today, we have often (though not always[52]) asserted that the revisions do not require notice-and-comment rulemaking.[53] The Commission nevertheless solicited public comment on revisions to the Rules of Practice in all but seven instances, and six of those seven involved amendments that were technical, ministerial, or related to other simultaneous amendments that themselves went through notice and comment.[54] And, again, today’s amendments are much more than technical or ministerial changes. Indeed, the only other time that the Commission carved out exceptions to the automatic stay, it did so after notice and comment.[55] So why not ask for comments today when the weight of past Commission practice would dictate that we do so? Maybe the Commission views the amendments as controversial, is afraid of the comments it might receive, and is uncertain how it might effectively answer those comments. Maybe it is just in a hurry to stymie investors’ access to courts. Whatever the reason, the Commission’s rush to adopt this change without input from the public is perplexing and hard to square with my colleagues’ past calls for more robust public comment when the Commission issues rules.[56] The Commission’s decision to promulgate these consequential amendments without first hearing from the public is unsound. Third, the amendments are bad policy. They cut off the ability for investors to obtain any meaningful Commission review of staff decisions to accelerate the effectiveness of registration statements. Once a registration statement is declared effective, issuers can offer and sell those securities.[57] Thus, without an automatic stay, the offers and sales might well be completed before the Commission can review staff actions. Unwinding those transactions after the fact would be much more difficult and disruptive than it would be under the current automatic-stay regime. In light of this, after today’s amendments, the opportunity for Commission review of staff acceleration of registration statements will exist merely as an illusion. Moreover, rather than providing issuers with more predictability, stripping away the automatic stay introduces more uncertainty and a greater possibility for disruption following Commission reversal of staff action than the current automatic-stay regime, which has been on the books for decades—seemingly without any complaint.[58] As such, even if the amendments were not being so transparently paired with the Commission’s attempt to promote mandatory arbitration clauses, they would not merit inclusion in our rulebook. But these amendments are not travelling alone. The Commission is using them as a tool to further tilt the scales and accelerate the adoption of mandatory arbitration clauses by public companies. This will, correspondingly, supercharge our descent into a world where investors are unable to effectively vindicate the rights Congress promised them in our nation’s securities laws. *** Today, the Commission has decided to hastily construct a new shortcut to its preferred policy destination. Investors will be distressed to discover that the only thing waiting to greet them at the end of their journey down this new path is a courthouse with its doors welded shut. [1] See generally SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024) (extolling the importance of the right to trial by jury). [2] Final Rule, Policy Statement, “Acceleration of Effectiveness of Registration Statements of Issuers with Certain Mandatory Arbitration Provisions,” Rel. Nos. 33-11389, 34-103988 (Sept. 17, 2025) (“Policy Statement”); see generally Securities Act Section 8, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (“The effective date of a registration statements shall be the twentieth day after the filing thereof or such earlier date as the Commission may determine, having due regard to . . . the public interest and the protection of investors.”) (emphasis added). [3] Final Rule, “Amendments to the Commission’s Rule of Practice,” Rel. No. 34-103980 (Sept. 17, 2025). [4] See Rick Flemming, Mandatory Arbitration: An Illusive Remedy for Public Company Shareholders (Feb. 24, 2018). [5] Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (cited by Letter to Chairman Jay Clayton from Twenty-Two U.S. Senators (May 3, 2018) (“Letter from 22 Senators”)). The point was reinforced by six bipartisan State Treasurers: [I]ndividual police and firefighter pensioners, teachers and municipal workers, and other individual and retail investors simply do not possess the financial size or scale to contest the inclusion of a forced arbitration clause or class action waiver in a company charter or corporate bylaw. The choice is either to forego any reasonable hope of accountability in the wake of securities fraud, or to forego the investment entirely. We can all support concepts of individual choice and freedom of contract without sacrificing our commitment to ensure that such investment choices and contractual relationships are informed and not predatory. Letter to Chairman Jay Clayton from State Treasurers of California, Illinois, Iowa, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island (July 2, 2018) (“Letter from State Treasurers”); see also Forbes, Trial Lawyers Find Unusual Allies in Fight Against Arbitration: Conservative State Treasurers (Dec. 10, 2018) (citing the State Financial Officers Foundation letter to the SEC “opposing any move to allow companies to require investors to arbitrate disputes,” and signed by ten treasurers, including from Kentucky, Indiana, Idaho, Arizona, Arkansas, Louisiana, Maine, Nevada, South Carolina and Washington) (“Letter from State Financial Officers Foundation”). [6] The Supreme Court has shown hostility to the argument that class action waivers are unenforceable. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (in upholding a class action waiver in a credit card agreement, finding that “the anti-trust laws do not guarantee an affordable path to every claim.”). That does not, however, compel this Commission to put on blinders as to what the practical effect of its actions will be as a matter of public interest. [7] Today’s policy statement brings about another anomalous result. Critics of securities class actions argue that, because most shareholders own the defendant company that they sue, a recovery is tantamount to transferring money from their left pocket to their right. I disagree with that notion and would argue that shareholder litigation benefits investors, punishes wrongdoers and corrects market ills. Nonetheless, if only large shareholders can sue and recover for wrongdoing in individual arbitrations (with small shareholders effectively locked out of recovery by the lack of a class action mechanism), and small shareholders remain the equity owners of the defendant, smaller shareholders are forced to subsidize the recoveries of larger shareholders for corporate wrongdoing. In other words, we would have a redistribution of funds from those with less to those with more—a wealth transfer running in the wrong direction. See David H. Webber, “Shareholder Litigation without Class Actions” 57 Ariz. L. Rev. 202, 258 (2015). [8] Cornerstone, Securities Class Action Settlements—2024 Review and Analysis, at 1. [9] SEC.gov | SEC Announces Enforcement Results for Fiscal Year 2024 (noting “in fiscal year 2024, the SEC distributed $345 million to harmed investors”). See also Commissioner Robert J. Jackson, Keeping Shareholders on the Beat: A Call for a Considered Conversation about Mandatory Arbitration (Feb. 26, 2018) (noting similar results for 2016 and further noting that private lawsuits in Worldcom, Enron, Tyco, Bank of America and Global Crossing resulted in recovery of more than $19.4 billion to investors; whereas the SEC obtained $1.75 billion). It is also worth noting that the remedies available to investors and regulators diverge—regulators can seek to disgorge only a wrongdoer’s ill-gotten gains, whereas investors can seek full restitution of their own losses and compensatory damages. [10] See generally Fiscal Year 2026 Congressional Budget Justification Annual Performance Plan (May 2025). [11] See, e.g., World Bank Group, Market Capitalization of Listed Domestic Companies (1975-2024) (showing U.S. market cap at $17.28 trillion in 2010 and at $62.19 million in 2024). [12] See Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, Defrauded Investors Deserve Their Day in Court (Apr. 11, 2012) (“It is unrealistic to expect that the Commission will have the resources to police all securities frauds on its own, and as a result, it is essential that investors be given private rights of action to complement and complete the Commission’s efforts.”); see also Stephen J. Choi and A.C. Pritchard, SEC Investigations and Securities Class Actions: An Empirical Comparison, June 3, 2015, Univ. of Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper No. 12-022 (finding that plaintiff lawsuits may more accurately target misconduct than SEC enforcement). [13] See generally Brian Fitzpatrick, “The Conservative Case for Class Actions,” Univ. of Chicago Press (2020). [14] As one scholar has noted: “If you take shareholder suits out of the light of day and put them in a dark closet, you lose the deterrent effect… The very reasons why some corporations would like the ability to require shareholders to arbitrate securities fraud claims are the reasons why it would be bad public policy to allow them to do so.” Alison Frankel, Shareholder Alert, SEC Commissioner Floats Class Action Killing Proposal,” Reuters (July 17, 2017) (quoting NYU Professor Jennifer Arlen). [15] See, e.g., Commissioner Elisse B. Walter, Remarks Before the FINRA Institute at Wharton Certified Regulatory and Compliance Professional (CRCP) Program (Nov. 8, 2011) (noting the overlap of private litigation with Commission action, including “decisions on core issues including the definition of ‘security,’ such as [Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990)]; when fraud is ‘in connection with’ securities purchases or sales, such as [Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co, 404 U.S. 6 (1971)]; the degree of intent needed to violate the antifraud provisions of the Securities laws, such as [Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.185 (1976)]; and the contours of the element of materiality under Rule 10b-5, such as [Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)]”); Keeping Shareholders on the Beat (citing the importance of the development of Delaware law on the fiduciary duties managers owe their investors and citing In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) and Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)). [16] These are just a few among many reasons that forced arbitration leads to bad policy outcomes. [17] See Securities Act Section 8(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (noting the requirement that the Commission’s decision to accelerate a registration statement be made with due regard to “the public interest and the protection of investors”). [18] See SEC Associate General Counsel Thomas L. Riesenberg, Commentary, “Arbitration and Corporate Governance: A Reply to Carly Schneider,” Insights: Corp. & SEC. L. Advisor, Vol. 4, No. 8, Aug. 1990, at 2 (“[I]t would be contrary to the public interest to require investors who want to participate in the nation’s equity markets to waive access to a judicial forum for vindication of federal or state law rights, where such waiver is made through a corporate charter rather than an individual investor’s decision.”) [19] See Consumer Federation of America, A Settled Matter: Mandatory Shareholder Arbitration Is Against the Law and the Public Interest, at 15-19 (2018) (“A Settled Matter”) (noting that at least twice in recent history, staff has rebuffed acceleration requests with the presence of a corporate mandatory arbitration clauses (Franklin First Financial Corp. and Carlyle Group LP), and three times staff has granted no action relief to corporations who sought to exclude proxy provisions that required the adoption of mandatory arbitration provisions (Gannett Co. Inc.; Pfizer Inc.; and Alaska Air Group, Inc.); see also Office of Chief Counsel, Division of Corporation Finance, Letter Regarding Johnson & Johnson’s Letter Dated December 11, 2018 (Feb. 11, 2019) (granting company no-action relief to exclude proxy proposal that would require the company to adopt a bylaw provision requiring disputes be arbitrated). Certain corporations have done offerings under Reg A with such provisions where there is no public interest finding required of the Commission. [20] Former Chairman Richard Breeden, for example, stated that “[p]rivate rights of action are an essential enforcement tool to protect investors against fraud. Private suits under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10(b)(5) thereunder, for example, are instrumental in recompensing investors who are cheated through the issuance of false and misleading information or by other means. When corporate officers, accountants, lawyers or others involved in the operation of a public company deceive investors for their own benefit, they should be held accountable for their actions. If this were not the case, investors would be far less willing to participate in our securities markets. This would limit the most important source, and raise the costs, of new capital for all American businesses.” Chairman Richard Breeden, Private Litigation under the Federal Securities Laws, Hearings before the Senate Securities Subcommittee (1993). Former Chairmen Donaldson and Levitt, along with former Commissioner Goldschmid, wrote a joint amicus brief stating that “Private cases, so long as they are well grounded, are an important enforcement mechanism supplementing the SEC in the policing of our markets. Most often, the larger the frauds, the greater investors must rely on private cases to recover their losses.” Brief Amici Curiae of Former SEC Commissioners in Support of Petitioner’s Interest, Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlantic, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008). [21] See, e.g., H.R. Conf. Rep. 104-369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 1995, 1995 WL 709276, at *31 (House of Representatives Conference Report noting that private securities actions “promote public and global confidence in our capital markets and help to deter wrongdoing and to guarantee that corporate officers, auditor, directors, lawyers and others properly perform their jobs. . . . [Private securities actions are] an indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their losses without having to rely on government action.”). [22] Letter to Chair Mary Jo White from Twenty-Nine Law Professors (October 30, 2013) (“Letter from 29 Law Professors”) (“[T]he FAA has never been interpreted to require the enforcement of bylaws or similar provisions unilaterally adopted to remove judicial oversight of investor disputes.”).  [23] See, e.g., id.; A Settled Matter, at 21-25; infra at n.36. The Policy Statement relies on Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S.Ct. 2332 (1987) and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989) to conclude that the anti-waiver provisions of the securities statutes do not override the FAA’s policy of favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements. Those cases, however, held that arbitration clauses in brokerage agreements did not violate the anti-waiver provisions, where that the arbitration process was carried out by a self-regulatory organization (SRO) that was subject to the oversight of the Commission. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233-34; Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 483. This was the position advocated by the Commission itself in its amicus in McMahon, noting that its position “would not apply” where the arbitration procedure was not subject to the SEC’s oversight. Notably, after McMahon and Rodriguez were decided, the Commission took the position that it would not accelerate a registration statement under Section 8A where the company mandated arbitration of shareholder disputes. See Carl Schneider, “Change, the SEC and … me: Reflections From the Loyal Opposition,” Revised Remarks before the 1998 ABA Annual Meeting, at 14 (1998) (company counsel to First Keyston noting that “I was advised that the commission itself determined not to allow acceleration of the registration statement’s effectiveness if and when we requested acceleration . . . unless we eliminated the arbitration provision.”). But see American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133. S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (noting that courts must “rigorously enforce” arbitration agreements, and that the federal anti-trust laws do not evidence an intention to preclude a waiver of class action, rendering and arbitration provision enforceable). [24] Ann Lipton, “Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws,” 104 Georgetown Law Journal 583 (2016). [25] See Securities Act Section 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (“Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this title or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void.”); Exchange Act Section 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (“Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this title or any rule or regulation thereunder, or any rule of a self-regulatory organization, shall be void.”).   [26] The Court has ruled that a mandatory arbitration provision would violate the securities laws “where arbitration is inadequate to protect the substantive rights at issue.” Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 230 (1987). [27] Policy Statement at 19-20 (“It is possible that some issuers may adopt issuer-investor mandatory arbitration provisions, which could potentially deter or prevent some investors from filing civil actions arising under the Federal securities laws. . . . It is difficult to estimate . . . the ultimate economic impact of such provisions.”). [28] Council of Institutional Investors, Spring 2018 Meeting, Plenary 1: Interview with the SEC Chair (Mar. 12, 2018) (17:40). [29] See, e.g., Keeping Shareholders on the Beat, (“[I]f we’re going to take away investors’ rights to their day in court, I hope my colleagues on the Commission can agree that we should, at least, do so in the light of day.”). [30] Letter from 22 Senators (voicing concerns that the Commission “might be willing to abandon a critical investor protection and remedy without applying the rigorous processes and analysis that would normally accompany such a major change in policy.”); Letter to Chairman Jay Clayton from Twenty-Six Members of Congress (March 12, 2018) (“Letter from 26 Members of Congress”). [31] See Letter from State Treasurers; Letter from State Financial Officers Foundation. [32] Letter from 29 Law Professors. [33] See, e.g., Comment Letter to Chairman Jay Clayton from Council of Institutional Investors (Jan. 31, 2019). [34] Letter to Chairman Jay Clayton From 56 Organizations (Jan. 16, 2018) (underscoring the need for an open and deliberative process) (“Letter from 56 Organizations”); Letter to Chairman Jay Clayton from Public Citizen and Better Markets (Mar. 16, 2018); Letter to Chairman Jay Clayton from 133 Organizations (Aug. 21, 2018).   [35] See, e.g., Letter to Jay Clayton from the North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. (Feb. 21, 2018). [36] Letter from 26 Members of Congress. [37] The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides a presumption in favor of arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 2.   But, the presumption only applies to valid and binding clauses in valid and binding contracts—matters of state law—and it does not apply “upon such grounds as exist at law or inequity for the revocation of any contract. 9 U.S.C. § 2.  Delaware law prohibits mandatory arbitration. 8 Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, Section 115(c) (2025); see also Mohsen Manesh and Joseph A. Grundfest, “The Corporate Contract and Shareholder Arbitration,” 98 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1106 (Oct. 2023) (arguing that mandatory arbitration provisions are inequitable and unenforceable under state law (which is not preempted under the FAA)); Ann Lipton, “Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws,” 104 Georgetown Law Journal 583, 587 (arguing that “corporate governance arrangements are not contractual” and therefore not subject to the FAA’s presumption because “contract law is organized around a theory of consent, whereby the application of state coercive force is justified on the presumption that the parties, acting at arms’ length, agreed to terms that they deemed to be mutually beneficial at the time”); Asaf Raz, “Mandatory Arbitration and the Boundaries of Corporate Law,” 29 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 223 (2001) (arguing that corporate law is nearly the structural opposite of contract law). The Policy Statement expressly does not address whether any mandator arbitration provision is valid and enforceable pursuant to state contract law, noting that “it is not within the Commission’s purview.” See Policy Statement at 7-8. Notably, however, earlier this week staff granted no-action relief based on matters of Indian law, making it hard to understand why, for example, Delaware law might be too inscrutable. See Office of Mergers and Acquisitions, Division of Corporation Finance, Letter re Infosys Ltd (Sept. 11, 2025) (“Indian law mandates that the Issuer Tender Offer be open to all shareholders [] on equal terms . . . .”). [38] See, e.g., Letter from 56 Organizations. [39] The Commission might do well to pause and consider how such a playbook might be used in the future when their seats are occupied by new individuals. It would not be surprising if future Commissions adopted the same tactics to advance their own (perhaps very different) policy goals. [40] See Exchange Act Section 4A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(a). [41] See Exchange Act Section 4A(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(b). [42] See Exchange Act Section 4A(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(b). [43] Exchange Act Section 4A(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c) (explaining that delegated staff action is “deemed the action of the Commission” only if either (1) the Commission declines review or (2) no review is sought within the time periods in Commission rules); see also Rules of Practice 430(b) & 431(c), 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.430(b) & .431(c) (providing time periods for seeking Commission review of delegated actions). [44] See Rule of Practice 431(e), 17 C.F.R. § 201.431(e). [45] See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., ALF-CIO v. Gates, 486 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Kavanaugh, J.) (“If the relevant statutory language is plain but is inconsistent with [agency] regulations, we must hold the regulations invalid.”). [46] See Rule of Practice 431(e), 17 C.F.R. § 201.431(e). [47] This is especially true since there is a ticking clock for investors to obtain anything resembling meaningful Commission review of the staff decisions to accelerate registration statements because, by statute, registration statements without active delaying amendments go effective no later than 20 days after filing. See Securities Act Section 8(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (effective dates of registration statements); 17 C.F.R. § 230.473 (delaying amendments). [48] This conflict looks like a facial violation, but, even if not, the rule might well violate the statute as applied to staff actions accelerating registration statements because, as explained below, such actions are particularly insulated from meaningful Commission review. [49] 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A). [50] See Am. Fed’n of Lab. and Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. NLRB, 57 F.4th 1023, 1035-36 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (noting that Section 553(b)(3)(A)’s exemption to notice-and-comment rulemaking does not apply to rules that alter the rights or interests of parties and that the exemption must be construed narrowly and invalidating a rule not promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking). [51] See Rules of Practice, Exchange Act Release No. 35833, 60 Fed. Reg. 32738 (June 23, 1995) (hereinafter “June 1995 Release”); Rules of Practice; Technical Amendments and Corrections, Exchange Act Release No. 36174, 60 Fed. Reg. 46498 (Sept. 7, 1995) (hereinafter “September 1995 Release”); Rules of Practice, Exchange Act Release No. 40636, 63 Fed. Reg. 63404 (Nov. 13, 1998) (hereinafter “1998 Release”); Rules of Practice, Exchange Act Release No. 48018, 68 Fed. Reg. 35787 (June 17, 2003); Adoption of Amendments to the Rules of Practice and Delegations of Authority of the Commission, Exchange Act Release No. 49412, 69 Fed. Reg. 13166 (Mar. 19, 2004); Adoption of Amendments to the Rules of Practice and Delegations of Authority of the Commission, Exchange Act Release No. 52846, 70 Fed. Reg. 72566 (Dec. 5, 2005); Amendments to the Informal and Other Procedures, Rules of Organization and Program Management, and Rules of Practice; Interim Commission Review of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Inspection Reports and Regulation P, Exchange Act Release No. 62575, 75 Fed. Reg. 47444 (Aug. 6, 2010) (hereinafter “2010 Release”); Rules of Practice, Exchange Act Release No. 63723, 76 Fed. Reg. 4066 (Jan. 24, 2011) (hereinafter “January 2011 Release”); Rescission of Outdated Rules and Forms, and Amendments To Correct References, Exchange Act Release No. 65686, 76 Fed. Reg. 71872 (Nov. 21, 2011) (hereinafter “November 2011 Release”); Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, Exchange Act Release No. 78319, 81 Fed. Reg. 50212 (July 29, 2016) (hereinafter “2016 Release”); Technical Amendments to Rules of Practice and Rules of Organization; Conduct and Ethics; and Information and Requests, Exchange Act Release No. 83325, 83 Fed. Reg. 25365 (June 1, 2018) (hereinafter “2018 Release”); Applications by Security-Based Swap Dealers or Major Security-Based Swap Participants for Statutorily Disqualified Associated Persons To Effect or Be Involved in Effecting Security-Based Swaps, Exchange Act Release No. 84858, 84 Fed. Reg. 4906 (Feb. 19, 2019) (hereinafter “February 2019 Release”); Technical Amendments To Update Cross-References to Commission’s FOIA Regulations, Exchange Act Release No. 86982, 84 Fed. Reg. 50737 (Sept. 26, 2019) (hereinafter “September 2019 Release”); Cross-Border Application of Certain Security-Based Swap Requirements, Exchange Act Release No. 87780, Fed. Reg. 6270 (Feb. 4, 2020) (hereinafter “February 2020 Release”); Rescission of Effective-Upon-Filing Procedure for NMS Plan Fee Amendments and Modified Procedures for Proposed NMS Plans and Plan Amendments, Exchange Act Release No. 89618, 85 Fed. Reg. 65470 (Oct. 15, 2020) (hereinafter “October 2020 Release”); Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, Exchange Act Release No. 90442, 85 Fed. Reg. 86464 (Dec. 30, 2020) (hereinafter “December 2020 Release”); Security-Based Swap Execution and Registration and Regulation of Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, Exchange Act Release No. 98845, 88 Fed. Reg. 87156 (Dec. 15, 2023). [52] See February 2019 Release (not claiming an exemption to notice-and-comment rulemaking); February 2020 Release (same). [53] See, e.g., 1998 Rule Release at 63405 (claiming an exemption for rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice); 2016 Rule Release at 50233 (same); December 2020 Rule Release at 86474-75 (same). [54] See September 1995 Release (technical/ministerial); 2010 Release (technical/ministerial); November 2011 Release (technical/ministerial); 2018 Release (technical/ministerial); September 2019 Release (technical/ministerial); October 2020 Release (amendments to Rules of Practice related to Regulation NMS amendments, which received public comment). But see January 2011 Release (promulgating rules setting forth the procedural requirements to determine whether to disapprove an SRO’s proposed rule change). [55] See June 1995 Release. [56] See Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda, Statement on Reporting of Securities Loans (Oct. 13, 2023) (expressing “significant concerns with the rulemaking process” when the public was given only 30 days to comment); Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda, Statement on Reopening of Comment Period for Share Repurchase Disclosure Modernization (Dec. 7, 2022) (“One might ask: what is the purpose of the comment period? Is it merely an item to be checked off to satisfy the lowest acceptable standard of process required by the Administrative Procedures [sic] Act? Or is it a vital component of a discussion between an administrative agency and the public in order to better understand the effects of a proposed rule, especially under a changed factual scenario? I believe it is the latter.” (footnote omitted)); Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda, Statement on the Final Rule Related to Listing Standards for Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Compensation (Oct. 26, 2002) (arguing that 30-day comment periods “significantly weaken a cornerstone of effective rulemaking: feedback from investors, issuers, and intermediaries to provide us with their expertise”); Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda, Remarks at the APABA-DC Awards and Installation Reception (Oct. 19, 2022) (“The quality of agency rulemaking suffers when the public is unable to meaningfully participate. These procedural failures also can expose Commission rulemaking to challenge in the courts.”); id. (arguing that the legitimacy of agency action needs to be restored and that “[t]he blueprint for restoring that legitimacy is straightforward: ensure that every regulatory action goes well above and beyond the bare minimum required by law”); Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda, Statement on Final Rule Amendments on Proxy Voting Advice (July 13, 2022) (arguing that a 30-day comment period spanning “major holidays, including Thanksgiving, Christmas, Hanukkah, and the beginning of Kwanzaa” was insufficient and noting that short comment period might have “resulted in the Commission only seeing a narrower picture of the public concerns and failing to capture relevant data and perspectives”); see also Commissioner Hester M. Peirce, Rendering Innovation Kaput: Statement on Amending the Definition of Exchange (Apr. 14, 2023) (“Today’s Commission treats the notice-and-comment rulemaking process not as a conversation, but as a threat.”); Commissioner Hester M. Peirce, Exclusion Preclusion: Statement on the Shareholder Proposals Proposal (July 13, 2022) (“The likelihood of receiving thoughtful comments in response to these questions and the many others in the proposal is diminished by the Commission’s continued unwillingness to afford adequate time for public comment.”); Commissioner Hester M. Peirce, Rip Current Rulemakings: Statement on the Regulatory Flexibility Agenda (June 22, 2022) (advocating for longer comment periods and contending, “We have abandoned our careful and considered approach to altering regulation in favor of effecting hasty and sweeping change”); Commissioner Hester M. Peirce, Dissenting Statement on the Proposal to Amend Regulation ATS (Jan. 26, 2022) (“I cannot comprehend why we insist on blindfolding ourselves, rather than embracing the notice-and-comment process that has been so valuable in unearthing issues for our consideration. . . . We face no emergency in these markets that compels us to limit comments to 30 days; indeed, the Commission’s precipitous rush to plow through the comment period—almost as if it were a mere formality in our process—presents a greater immediate risk to the market than any of the issues that have led to this recommendation.”). [57] See Securities Act Section 5(a) & (c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) & (c). [58] If there has, in fact, been some actual problem in the markets because of the status quo, we should have identified that problem and asked the public about it.

Here we are again.  I can’t say that I’m surprised that we are back for yet another compliance date extension for Form PF – just three months after our last vote on the exact same issue.  We clearly have not been dissuaded from our desire to slowly but surely extinguish duly adopted amendments to Form PF via extension after extension – after extension – despite the command of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to engage in transparent notice and comment rulemaking when rescinding rules.  And while I’m not surprised we’re back, I am surprised and disappointed by our repeated flouting of the APA.  So unsurprisingly, I cannot support yet another extension.[1]  With its third and longest extension to date,[2] the Commission finally comes clean.  Today’s release further suggests that we are delaying the recent amendments, collectively “Final Form PF,” yet again to buy ourselves more time to write them out of existence – before they ever go into effect.  In other words, it seems we are delaying them indefinitely – and as long as it takes – to undo them.  This is a thinly veiled sleight of hand to dismantle the work of a prior Commission while weaseling out of the clear requirements of well-established law. Indefinite Extensions First, there is clear judicial precedent holding that an indefinite extension of a duly adopted rule is not permitted.[3]  In the past, courts have recognized sudden reversals of agency action without notice and comment under the APA as a “danger signal.”[4]  In the absence of the APA process, courts fear that an agency may undo what it has accomplished through a rulemaking without giving the public an opportunity to comment on the prospect of repealing that work.[5]  Recognizing that there is a heightened risk of an APA violation in these circumstances, courts have required close scrutiny of such actions.[6]  Courts have applied this heightened analysis to the effective dates of agency action, specifically.[7]   The Third Circuit, in fact, has been asked the exact question I had before today’s meeting: “[M]ay [an] agency promulgating [a] rule postpone it indefinitely without subjecting that indefinite postponement to the notice and comment procedures of the APA?”[8]  In short, the Court’s answer was no.  The Court held that the APA could not be read to allow for indefinite extensions of a rule’s effective date because such a reading would permit an agency to “(albeit indirectly) repeal a rule simply by eliminating (or indefinitely postponing) its effective date.”[9]  We know it is not unheard of for the Commission to extend compliance dates for a short, set amount of time to allow registrants more runway to prepare for new rules.[10]  But that is not what we endeavor to do today.  With multiple extension requests for longer and longer time periods, we convey our clear intent to indefinitely delay the compliance date of the final Form.[11]  We also fail, yet again, to seek public comment on a potential path forward, further demonstrating our willingness to conduct Commission action without public input.  This approach calls into question the legitimacy of each of these Commission actions and defies clear directives from the APA and the courts.[12]  It’s also deeply troubling that we do not acknowledge any of this directly relevant precedent in today’s release – or in either of the two previous Form PF extension releases.  Perhaps we know that we cannot legally justify these extensions, and so we aren’t even going to try.  I worry about ignoring the courts in the same way that we ignore the compliance dates for Final Form PF. Lack of Good Cause Second, the release fails to show good cause that might otherwise justify our decision to forgo notice and comment rulemaking.  While the APA generally requires notice and comment rulemaking, an agency may proceed without notice and comment when it finds, for good cause, that notice and public procedure are “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.”[13] “Good cause” is meant to be a high bar.[14]  Courts have cautioned that this exception must be narrowly construed to avoid creating an untenably large loophole in the APA.[15]  This exception is not designed to accommodate cyclical changes in the composition of the Commission and shifting policy goals.[16]  Certainly, in rare circumstances, good cause can exist.  But the release doesn’t even really try to argue that the standard is met here.[17]  It simply refers back to the same arguments we’ve been parroting for the last two extensions regarding the Presidential Memorandum and supposed compliance challenges.  And, even so, the courts have specifically objected to an agency’s delay made without notice and comment in response to an Executive Order.[18]  Our inability to provide a detailed justification is telling.[19]   Here again, the release declines to engage in any legal analysis of precedent, and instead simply cites to a few industry letters as our justification for another extension.  But, it’s clear these claims are being furnished as cover to further delay the final Form.  Interestingly, it seems that a few of the letters cited as support for those claims in the release are not even publicly available.[20]  This is a far cry from how our rulemaking process is meant to function. A Future of Regulatory Uncertainty There is a reason courts have forbidden this type of behavior.  This approach erodes duly adopted Commission rulemakings.  It erodes the rule of law.  Continuity and certainty are beneficial to registrants, investors, and the stability of the markets at large.  When the Commission adopts a rule, the investing public and other market participants should be able to rely on that rule as the law until the Commission engages in transparent notice and comment rulemaking to change or repeal those rules.  In fact, the Eight Circuit just reiterated this to us, noting: “[i]t is the agency’s responsibility to determine whether its Final Rules will be rescinded, repealed, modified, or defended in litigation.”[21]  The right thing to do would be to allow the new Form to go into effect and then, in time, engage in a notice and comment rulemaking to repeal the amendments if this Commission so desires.  Instead, we are creating a new normal where the APA is optional and final rules are only final when we feel like it.  The outcome of today’s vote is significant well beyond its impacts to Final Form PF.  Today’s vote signals that we are willing to repeatedly bend – or, in this case, extend – the rules until they break. Even though I am unable to support today’s release, I am grateful to the staff in the Division of Investment Management, the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, and the Office of the General Counsel for their work on this release.  Thank you.   [1] I note that I did not support either previous compliance date extension.  See Form PF; Reporting Requirements for All Filers and Large Hedge Fund Advisers; Extension of Compliance Date, Release No. IA-6838 (Jan. 29, 2025) [90 FR 9007 (Feb. 5, 2025)]; Form PF; Reporting Requirements for All Filers and Large Hedge Fund Advisers; Further Extension of Compliance Date, Release No. IA-6883 (June 11, 2025) [90 FR 25140 (June 16, 2025)]. [2] Form PF; Reporting Requirements for All Filers and Large Hedge Fund Advisers; Further Extension of Compliance Date, Release No. IA-[XXXX] (Sept. 17, 2025). [3] See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 683 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that an indefinite extension of a rule’s effective date constituted a “rule” under the APA and required notice and comment rulemaking.). [4] See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, at 760-61 (“By postponing the effective date of the amendments, EPA reversed its course of action up to the postponement.  That reversal itself constitutes a danger signal.  Where the reversal was accomplished without notice and an opportunity for comment, and without any statement by EPA on the impact of that postponement on the statutory scheme pursuant to which the amendments had been promulgated, the reviewing court must scrutinize that action all the more closely to insure [sic] that the APA was not violated.”). [5] See Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Grp. v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216, 103 S. Ct. 3556, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1402 (1983). [6] See supra note 4. [7] See Nat. Res. Def. Council, 683 F.2d at 761–62 (“In general, an effective date is ‘part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and of future effect.’  It is an essential part of any rule: without an effective date, the ‘agency statement’ could have no ‘future effect,’ and could not serve to ‘implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.’ In short, without an effective date a rule would be a nullity because it would never require adherence.”). [8] Nat. Res. Def. Council, 683 F.2d at 761. [9] Nat. Res. Def. Council, 683 F.2d at 762 (“[A] holding that EPA’s action here was not a rule subject to the rulemaking procedure of the APA would create a contradiction in the statute where there need be no contradiction: the statute would provide that the repeal of a rule requires a rulemaking proceeding, but the agency could (albeit indirectly) repeal a rule simply by eliminating (or indefinitely postponing) its effective  date, thereby accomplishing without rulemaking something for which the statute requires a rulemaking proceeding.”). [10] See, e.g., Amendments to Form ADV; Extension of Compliance Date, Release No. IA-3129 (Dec. 28, 2010)  (extending the compliance date for Form ADV amendments for four months to provide certain investment advisers additional time to design, test and implement systems and controls to satisfy their obligations to prepare and deliver brochure supplements); Press Release: SEC Extends New Short Sale Rule Compliance Date (Nov. 4, 2010) (extending the compliance date for Rule 201 and Rule 200(g) of Regulation SHO from November 10, 2010 to February 28, 2011 to provide additional time to market participants for programming and testing of systems for implementation); Disclosure of Mutual Fund After-Tax Returns; Extension of Compliance Date, Release No. 33-8010; 34-44850 (Sept. 26, 2001) (extending the compliance date for amendments to rule 482 under the Securities Act and rule 34b-1 under the Investment Company Act from October 1, 2001 to December 1, 2001 to give funds and third-party providers sufficient time to resolve outstanding technical issues regarding the appropriate methodology to be used in calculating standardized after-tax returns and perform any necessary systems changes). [11] I acknowledge the technical distinction between an effective date and a compliance date, however, they are functionally identical in terms of the APA analysis in our current circumstances. [12] See supra note 4. [13] See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B). [14] “Any agency faces an uphill battle to meet that burden.  The D.C. Circuit has repeatedly warned that ‘the good cause exception “is to be narrowly construed and only reluctantly countenanced.”’”  Nat'l Venture Cap. Ass'n v. Duke, 291 F. Supp. 3d 5, 16 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp. v. EPA, 236 F.3d 749, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). [15] See Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. E.P.A., 568 F.2d 284, 292 (3d Cir. 1977). [16] Senate Rept. No. 752, 79th Congress, 1st Session at 16. (1945) (“Impracticable” means a situation in which the due and required execution of the agency functions would be unavoidably prevented by its undertaking public rule-making proceedings . . . “Public interest” supplements the terms “impracticable” or “unnecessary”; it requires that public rule-making procedures shall not prevent an agency from operating and that, on the other hand, lack of public interest in rule making warrants an agency to dispense with public procedure.”). [17] See Nat'l Venture Cap. Ass'n v. Duke, 291 F. Supp. 3d 5, 16 (D.D.C. 2017) (“Because notice and comment is the default, ‘the onus is on the [agency] to establish that notice and comment’ should not be given.”). [18] See Nat. Res. Def. Council, 683 F.2d at 767 (“[I]t was possible to comply with both the APA and with E.O. 12291.  Thus, E.O. 12291 does not constitute good cause for EPA’s failure to comply with the APA when it initially postponed the effective date of the amendments.”).  [19] The courts are clear that “good cause” cannot be the result of an agency’s own delay.  See Nat'l Venture Cap. Ass'n, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 16; Council of S. Mountains, Inc. v. Donovan, 653 F.2d 573, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“Otherwise, an agency unwilling to provide notice or an opportunity to comment could simply wait until the eve of a statutory, judicial, or administrative deadline, then raise up the “good cause” banner and promulgate rules without following APA procedures.”).  Moreover, courts have been unmoved by arguments, like the ones in today’s release, that last minute agency action was needed to avert compliance with rules because they were soon to be eliminated.  Env’t Def. Fund, Inc. v. E.P.A., 716 F.2d 915, 920-21 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“EPA’s justification for invoking the good cause exception was an alleged pressing need to avoid industry compliance with regulations that were to be eliminated.  According to the agency, it was ‘essential to take ... action [ ] before the regulated community expend[ed] resources.’”). [20] I note that two letters in the release are not publicly available.  See supra note 2, at n. 7.  Moreover, none of the letters cited in the release were submitted to a public comment file.  See id. [21] See State of Iowa v. Securities and Exchange Commission, Order No: 5557595 (8th Cir. Sept. 12, 2025).

The Securities and Exchange Commission and U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission each voted to further extend the date for investment advisers to comply with amendments to Form PF, the confidential reporting form used by certain private fund advisers. The Commissions extended the compliance date to Oct. 1, 2026. The Form PF amendments were adopted in February 2024 and the original compliance date was March 12, 2025. The compliance date was previously extended to June 12 and then October 1, but this further extension will provide time to complete a substantive review of Form PF in accordance with a Presidential Memorandum and take any further appropriate actions, which may include proposing new amendments to Form PF. Resources Joint Final Rule Compliance Extension

The attached tables and charts released on Wednesday summarize the economic projections made by Federal Open Market Committee participants in conjunction with the September 16-17 meeting. Projections (PDF) | Accessible Materials

Recent indicators suggest that growth of economic activity moderated in the first half of the year. Job gains have slowed, and the unemployment rate has edged up but remains low. Inflation has moved up and remains somewhat elevated. The Committee seeks to achieve maximum employment and inflation at the rate of 2 percent over the longer run. Uncertainty about the economic outlook remains elevated. The Committee is attentive to the risks to both sides of its dual mandate and judges that downside risks to employment have risen. In support of its goals and in light of the shift in the balance of risks, the Committee decided to lower the target range for the federal funds rate by 1/4 percentage point to 4 to 4‑1/4 percent. In considering additional adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will carefully assess incoming data, the evolving outlook, and the balance of risks. The Committee will continue reducing its holdings of Treasury securities and agency debt and agency mortgage‑backed securities. The Committee is strongly committed to supporting maximum employment and returning inflation to its 2 percent objective. In assessing the appropriate stance of monetary policy, the Committee will continue to monitor the implications of incoming information for the economic outlook. The Committee would be prepared to adjust the stance of monetary policy as appropriate if risks emerge that could impede the attainment of the Committee's goals. The Committee's assessments will take into account a wide range of information, including readings on labor market conditions, inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and financial and international developments. Voting for the monetary policy action were Jerome H. Powell, Chair; John C. Williams, Vice Chair; Michael S. Barr; Michelle W. Bowman; Susan M. Collins; Lisa D. Cook; Austan D. Goolsbee; Philip N. Jefferson; Alberto G. Musalem; Jeffrey R. Schmid; and Christopher J. Waller. Voting against this action was Stephen I. Miran, who preferred to lower the target range for the federal funds rate by 1/2 percentage point at this meeting. Implementation Note issued September 17, 2025

ETFGI, a leading independent research and consultancy firm renowned for its expertise in subscription research, consulting services, events, and ETF TV on global ETF industry trends, reported today that assets invested in the ETFs industry globally reached a new record of US$17.85 trillion at the end of August. During August, the ETFs industry globally gathered net inflows of US$183.04 billion, bringing year-to-date net inflows to a record US$1.27 trillion, according to ETFGI's August 2025 Global ETFs industry landscape insights report, the monthly report which is part of an annual paid-for research subscription service. (All dollar values in USD unless otherwise noted)   Global ETF Industry Highlights – August Month-End Record AUM: Assets invested in ETFs globally reached a new all-time high of US$17.85 trillion at the end of August, surpassing the previous record of US$17.34 trillion set in July 2025. Strong YTD Growth: Assets have grown 20.2% year-to-date, rising from US$14.85 trillion at the end of 2024. Robust Inflows: August saw US$183.04 billion in net inflows. Historic YTD Inflows: Year-to-date net inflows of US$1.27 trillion mark the highest on record, exceeding the previous highs of US$1.07 trillion in 2024 and US$833.40 billion in 2021. 12-Month Momentum: Over the past 12 months, ETFs have gathered US$2.08 trillion in net inflows. Consistent Growth: August marked the 75th consecutive month of net inflows. The Global ETFs industry has 14,662 products, with 29,050 listings, assets of $17.85 Tn, from 896 providers on 81 exchanges in 63 countries. iShares remains the largest ETF provider globally, with US$5.06 trillion in assets under management, representing a 28.3% market share.  Vanguard ranks second with US$3.87 trillion and a 21.7% share.  SPDR ETFs follows in third place with US$1.82 trillion, accounting for 10.2% of the market. Together, these top three providers—out of a total of 896—control 60.2% of global ETF assets. The remaining 893 providers each hold less than 5% market share individually. “The S&P 500 index rose 2.03% in August, bringing its year-to-date gain to 10.79%. Developed markets excluding the US index advanced 4.29% during the month, and are now up 24.56% year-to-date. Among developed markets, Denmark (+6.37%) and Japan (+6.24%) experienced the largest declines in August. Emerging markets index posted a 2.48% gain in August, with year-to-date performance reaching +16.04%. Chile (+9.63%) and Brazil (+8.46%) led the gains among emerging markets during the month,” according to Deborah Fuhr, managing partner, founder, and owner of ETFGI.   Growth in assets in the Global ETFs industry as of the end of August        Global ETFs industry Net Asset Flows – end of August 2025 Total Net Inflows: ETFs globally gathered US$183.04 billion in net inflows during August. Equity ETFs: Attracted US$75.25 billion in net inflows for the month, bringing year-to-date (YTD) inflows to US$553.06 billion—slightly below the US$590.37 billion recorded by this point in 2024. Fixed Income ETFs: Reported US$48.43 billion in August inflows, pushing YTD inflows to US$264.87 billion, ahead of the US$221.89 billion gathered by the end of August 2024. Commodities ETFs: Saw US$7.68 billion in net inflows during August, with YTD inflows reaching US$52.64 billion, a sharp reversal from the US$1.29 billion in net outflows reported YTD in 2024. Active ETFs: Drew US$53.39 billion in net inflows in August, bringing YTD inflows to US$377.13 billion, significantly higher than the US$212.63 billion recorded YTD in 2024. Substantial inflows can be attributed to the top 20 ETFs by net new assets, which collectively gathered $58.27 Bn during August. Vanguard S&P 500 ETF (VOO US) gathered $9.17 Bn, the largest individual net inflow. Top 20 ETFs by net new assets August 2025: Global Name   Ticker Assets($ Mn)Aug-25 NNA($ Mn) YTD-25 NNA($ Mn)Aug-25 Vanguard S&P 500 ETF   VOO US     734,246.24             81,044.84           9,172.44 iShares Core S&P 500 ETF   IVV US     652,636.25             16,626.22           4,763.14 Vanguard Short-Term Corporate Bond ETF   VCSH US       39,349.38              3,860.81           4,150.07 iShares iBoxx $ Investment Grade Corporate Bond ETF   LQD US       30,241.75                 459.65           3,549.68 iShares 0-3 Month Treasury Bond ETF   SGOV US       55,317.64             25,368.09           3,534.47 iShares Ethereum Trust   ETHA US       16,418.72              9,600.06           3,382.44 SPDR Portfolio S&P 500 ETF   SPLG US       83,856.10             22,856.97           3,042.64 Vanguard Intermediate-Term Corporate Bond ETF   VCIT US       57,273.69              6,577.19           2,921.48 SPDR Gold Shares   GLD US     105,640.32             10,949.00           2,577.33 Bosera CSI Convertible Bond and Exchangeable Bond ETF   511380 CH         8,975.02              2,828.02           2,374.86 Invesco Nasdaq 100 ETF   QQQM US       58,797.73             13,934.24           2,217.33 Vanguard Total Bond Market ETF   BND US     135,819.57             11,521.02           2,119.14 Vanguard Total Stock Market ETF   VTI US     523,580.36             23,944.58           2,013.10 Vanguard FTSE Developed Markets ETF   VEA US     172,363.19              8,169.02           1,996.59 Capital Group Municipal High-Income ETF   CGHM US         2,109.61              2,023.36           1,870.13 Janus Henderson AAA CLO ETF   JAAA US       25,049.18              8,407.83           1,815.24 Fullgoal CSI Hong Kong Connect Internet ETF   159792 CH       10,605.15              5,808.86           1,755.36 iShares Core MSCI EAFE ETF   IEFA US     149,481.18              6,077.28           1,749.16 Vanguard Growth ETF   VUG US     186,428.40             10,447.94           1,666.90 iShares Core U.S. Aggregate Bond ETF   AGG US     130,617.52              7,595.85           1,595.49   The top 10 ETPs by net new assets collectively gathered $3.30 Bn over August. iShares Physical Gold ETC (SGLN LN) gathered $877.21 Mn, the largest individual net inflow.   Top 10 ETPs by net new assets August 2025: Global Name   Ticker Asset($ Mn)Aug-25 NNA($ Mn) YTD-25 NNA($ Mn)Aug-25 iShares Physical Gold ETC   SGLN LN       25,227.93              3,032.61              877.21 Invesco Physical Gold ETC - Acc   SGLD LN       23,666.18              1,482.35              632.10 Fidelity Ethereum Fund   FETH US         3,416.36              1,177.21              493.44 iPath Series B S&P 500 VIX Short-Term Futures ETN   VXX US            824.61                 705.07              349.27 WisdomTree Copper   COPA LN         1,044.69                (295.56)              236.50 Grayscale Ethereum Mini Trust ETF   ETH US         3,057.88                 794.87              198.62 AMUNDI PHYSICAL GOLD ETC (C) - Acc   GOLD FP         8,577.75              1,295.79              152.63 Xtrackers IE Physical Gold ETC Securities   XGDU LN         6,318.09                (752.71)              147.63 ProShares Ultra DJ-UBS Natural Gas   BOIL US            535.63                 195.22              114.15 WisdomTree Physical Gold - GBP Daily Hedged   GBSP LN         2,485.37                 296.31              101.74   Investors have tended to invest in Equity ETFs during August.

AI and Anti-Financial Crime pioneer Themis, a certified B-Corp, today announced the launch of AI Investigator — an intelligent LLM-driven due diligence platform designed to transform how organisations of all sizes detect and prevent financial crime. Built with input from hundreds of compliance professionals and backed by an Innovate UK grant, AI Investigator uses generative AI and domain-specific models trained on Themis’ proprietary data to automate investigations. The platform delivers real-time risk analysis across ownership structures, adverse media, and regulatory filings, with results delivered in minutes not days or weeks. “When we look back in a few years, we’ll wonder how due diligence was ever done without AI. By making checks faster and broader in reach, our AML-trained AI agents turn this into something accessible and instinctive for all. By putting enhanced due diligence into everyone's hands, we are truly democratising due diligence”. said Dickon Johnstone, CEO of Themis.“That’s how we finally gain the upper hand in the fight against financial crime and stop the deliberate exploitation of people, businesses and the natural world around us by criminals and organised crime groups.” Key features of the AI Investigator: AI-Driven InvestigationsTrained AI Agents deliver automated checks triggered with minimal input. Behavioural Analysis & Pattern Matching At ScaleAssessing probability of links to financial crime based on real criminal conviction data and established financial crime typologies. Financial Crime IndicatorsThemis has developed a proprietary knowledge base covering indicators across all major predicate crime types. This foundation enables AI agents to detect hidden risks and potential exposure to financial crime with enhanced precision and contextual insight. Scalable & Cloud-AgnosticOffers seamless integration across sectors and tech stacks. Themis’ clients span financial institutions, corporates, professional services, private equity, real estate and government. This broad community has shaped the design of AI Investigator, ensuring it meets the complex needs of organisations facing financial crime risk beyond regulated sectors. Abu Dhabi is fast becoming a global AI hub, investing AED 13 billion between 2025 and 2027 – leading the delivery of the UAE’s national strategy to become the world leader in AI by 2031. This Falcon Economy vision, powered by government, business, investors and institutions like ADGM and Hub71, has created one of the world’s most dynamic AI ecosystems. In this environment, Themis has accelerated breakthroughs in proprietary LLMs and agentic AI trained by financial crime specialists—making Abu Dhabi the fitting stage for the global launch of AI Investigator.

WealthBlock, the AI-powered platform transforming how private fund managers raise capital and manage investors, today announced the appointment of William McNeil as Chief Revenue Officer and General Counsel. McNeil will lead the company’s revenue growth strategy while supporting its mission to help private funds, GPs, RIAs and family offices modernize their investor experience with AI-powered workflows—from digital onboarding and KYC to capital calls and investor reporting.  WealthBlock’s platform is trusted by firms managing hundreds of millions to billions in AUM to scale operations, reduce compliance risk and deliver white-glove investor journeys, without pulling teams away from their core strategic work. This powerful value proposition is critical for both General Partners (GPs) and Broker-Dealers (BDs), as they increasingly rely on WealthBlock as their infrastructure partner of choice.  McNeil brings a unique blend of revenue leadership, legal expertise and fintech strategy to WealthBlock with a proven track record helping financial organizations embrace digital transformation while maintaining rigorous compliance and operational discipline. He has extensive experience scaling private capital with AI and building infrastructure for both GPs and LPs, and creating new B2B sales systems tailored to the financial and legal sectors.  “We’re thrilled to welcome William to the leadership team,” said Trilliam Jeong, CEO of WealthBlock. “His ability to expand revenue operations, align legal and financial strategies and bring innovation to private capital markets is exactly what we need for our next stage of growth. As more GPs and BDs seek infrastructure partners to elevate investor experiences, WealthBlock is well-positioned to lead, and William will play a pivotal role in making that vision a reality.”  Momentum Meets Opportunity at WealthBlock  WealthBlock continues to accelerate growth, recently onboarding several new clients in Q3 2025 including a Registered Investment Advisor (RIA) and a Broker-Dealer firm. These partnerships underscore the company’s expanding footprint in the financial ecosystem and its critical role as the infrastructure layer powering the next generation of investor experiences.  “WealthBlock is redefining what it means to deliver an exceptional investor experience,” said William McNeil, Chief Revenue Officer and General Counsel at WealthBlock. “I’m excited to join this exceptional team as we help our clients leverage AI-powered infrastructure to scale their operations, reduce compliance burdens and create seamless investor journeys. This is an incredible opportunity to drive meaningful impact and to help WealthBlock continue leading as the operating system for investor experiences.”  

Confluence Technologies, Inc. (“Confluence”), a global leader in data-driven investment analytics and regulatory reporting solutions, has released a new capability within its Revolution Composites platform that delivers standard GIPS® verification exports built specifically to the requirements of The Spaulding Group (TSG). This enhancement streamlines the verification process for asset managers by eliminating the time-consuming task of manually mining and formatting data and responding to multiple requests. Instead, clients can now generate and deliver precisely formatted TSG-standard verification reports at the push of a button – reducing operational risk, accelerating timelines, and lowering the cost of verification. The new export standardizes and automates this workflow, reducing delays and improving accuracy. “The Revolution Composites platform was already a powerful tool for managing and reporting composite data,” said Damian Handzy, Manager Director, Analytics at Confluence. “With this new enhancement, and our collaboration with TSG, we’re taking a step further – embedding automation and standardization directly into the workflow to simplify a critical, high-friction task for our clients and their verification partners.” “As the second largest verifier in the world, we know that when it comes to GIPS standards compliance and verification, the biggest challenges many firms face aren’t about intent, but execution. Too often, the verification process gets bogged down in formatting issues and repeated data requests. This collaboration with Confluence directly addresses that problem, giving firms that comply with the GIPS standards a standardized, automated way to provide exactly what we need. It saves our clients time, reduces risk, and allows everyone to focus on the real purpose of verification,  which is allowing firms to stand behind their compliance with confidence while building greater trust in their performance reporting,” said John D. Simpson, CIPM, Chief Verification Officer, TSG.

Rimes, a leading provider of enterprise data management and investment platform solutions to the global investment community, is pleased to announce the appointment of Vijay Mayadas as President and Chief Executive Officer. Mayadas, a seasoned FinTech executive with a track record of scaling global businesses and driving innovation in financial markets, succeeds Brad Hunt, who will assume the role of Vice Chair, Rimes Board of Directors. With more than 25 years of pioneering experience at the intersection of technology, data, and financial services, Mayadas joins Rimes after 12 years at Broadridge Financial Solutions, where he most recently served as President of Capital Markets. In that role, he grew the business from $600 million to over $1 billion in recurring revenue and during his tenure helped drive the company’s market capitalization from under $3 billion to nearly $30 billion. Mayadas also spearheaded the launch of industry-first innovations, including AI-powered trading platforms and distributed ledger solutions that are now processing trillions of dollars in monthly transactions. Donal Smith, Chair of Rimes Board of Directors, commented: “Vijay is a world-class leader who brings an excellent track record of scaling global FinTech franchises and driving breakthrough product innovation. With deep, hands-on expertise in leveraging next-generation technologies, especially AI, Vijay is uniquely qualified to accelerate Rimes’ strategy and lead the company in its next chapter of market leadership and growth.” “Rimes has built an extraordinarily successful business over the last 30 years - truly the gold standard in benchmark and index data,” said Vijay Mayadas, President and Chief Executive Officer, Rimes. “I am incredibly excited about the opportunity in front of us. In a world of increasingly AI-driven workflows, the need for trusted, independent and highly-curated data - an “intelligence fabric” - is more critical than ever. There is no company better positioned than Rimes to fill that gap.” Backed by Five Arrows, the alternative assets arm of Rothschild & Co, Rimes has further built on its unique market leadership position at the heart of the global investment ecosystem, powered by deep partnerships with its blue-chip clients and an unparalleled network of 800+ data partners. This powerful ecosystem is the engine for Rimes' innovation, which has delivered mission-critical solutions across the entire investment lifecycle—from its gold-standard benchmark and ESG data to its sophisticated asset allocation and rebalancing platform for the world’s most complex asset owners. Under Mayadas’ leadership, Rimes will accelerate its investment in this ecosystem—in its people, its technology, and its partnerships—to ensure every client is empowered to turn data into a true competitive advantage.

Generation Investment Management, the sustainable investment manager, today published its ninth Sustainability Trends Report, which annually seeks to answer the question of where the world stands in the transition to a low-emissions economy. This year's assessment analyses the question: Can ambitious global climate action survive the decision by the current United States government to walk away? The report also reveals the current status of and shifts needed in sustainability across the global economy – spanning the sectors and activities of Power; Transportation; Buildings & Industry; People, Land & Food; and Financing the Transition. Al Gore, Chairman of Generation Investment Management, said: "The current US position on the future of the sustainable economy is not only wrong, it is irresponsible. It is nothing short of a tragedy that one of the world's most dynamic economies will be retreating as the low-emissions technologies of the future are implemented and commercialised everywhere else." "In the face of such recklessness, the rest of the world must not cower, but stick together and show fortitude against the bullying and threats of the fossil fuel industry and its political allies. It is imperative that investors, business leaders and government officials harness their power to embrace the opportunity created by the sustainable solutions at our fingertips and get the climate crisis under control." A CRITICAL JUNCTURE IN GLOBAL CLIMATE AMBITION In January 2025 President Trump signed an executive order repealing or sharply limiting climate investments that had been adopted under his predecessor. He filed formal notice to withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, a decision that will take formal effect in January 2026. He has even moved to revoke the federal government's authority to regulate greenhouse gases at all, a move that – if allowed by courts to take hold – would likely hobble climate action by future US presidents. The US government's abandonment of climate action could not come at a worse time for the rest of the world. Countries are in the middle of a cycle in which they are supposed to be announcing ambitious new plans for emissions cuts by 2035. Those plans were nominally due in February 2025 but only a handful were filed by then, as other countries waited to see what the world's largest historical emitter would do. Even now relatively few plans have been filed, and they reveal a distinct lack of ambition in setting new emissions targets. The 30th meeting of parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, better known as the Conference of the Parties or COP30, will occur this November 2025 in Belém, the large Brazilian city that serves as a gateway to the Amazon River system. This meeting is a critical moment. The decision of the US to walk away from climate action could backfire, prompting other countries to see that it is in their interest to stick together against US bullying and threats. The best possible outcome would be an ambitious series of national pledges to continue cutting emissions and accelerating the transitions to lower emissions and restored nature.   THE ENERGY TRANSITION COMES WITH A 'MADE IN CHINA' STAMP The bulk of future emissions are projected to come from developing countries, including China. In effect, this means that action – or inaction – by the US is no longer conclusive in determining the planet's long-term fate. Despite its historical responsibility, alongside other industrialised nations, for the emissions that are endangering the planet, the US no longer holds the keys for accelerating the transition to a more sustainable way of life. For the foreseeable future, the energy transition comes with a 'Made in China' stamp. The dramatic embrace of solar power, wind power, electric cars and other advanced technologies in China demonstrates that the country is already accepting this position. The possibility of a fully green China – an 'electrostate' – is by no means imminent, but it looks more achievable than only a few years ago. Manufacturing and deployment in China has played such a central role in driving down the costs of these technologies that sales of Chinese-made energy technologies are accelerating all over the world. We see this in Pakistan, for example, where a mad rush is under way to install Chinese-made solar panels as a strategy to cope with an unreliable power grid, while sales of Chinese-made electric cars are soaring in countries as diverse as Brazil and Indonesia. A NEED TO RECOGNISE THE URGENCY OF THE LAND TRANSITION In the same way the world now speaks of an energy transition to guide the global push for cleaner energy, The Sustainability Trends Report highlights the case for the world to recognise the need for a land transition – using farm land more efficiently and restoring wild nature to disused farm land. Some 2.3 billion people faced moderate to severe food insecurity in 2024 – an increase of more than 600 million people from a decade earlier. A more acute measure, chronic undernourishment, stands at 673 million people, more than 8 percent of the world's population. One way to meet future food needs in the face of a deteriorating climate would be to put more land under plow. Yet, agriculture is itself a major cause of the global climate crisis, accounting for around a quarter of global emissions, and humanity has already claimed more than 40 percent of the world's habitable land for agriculture. The result has been an immense destruction of the natural world, with much of the world's wildlife apparently on its way to extinction. This creates an urgent double imperative: to increase the supply of food for a global population expected to peak above 10 billion, and to save what is left of wild nature even as we do so. These are not two problems: they are a single, interlocking problem to which a land transition is the solution. Accelerating trends across sectors and activities outlined in the report include: Power Renewable electricity is now growing rapidly, with solar energy continuing to be the breakout star as the production of electricity from solar panels rose 28 percent last year. But power demand is starting to grow rapidly too, in some countries for the first time in two decades: new data centres are gulping down electricity with leading utilities in the US promising a wave of new power plants burning fossil gas. More cars and heat pumps are drawing power from the grid. It remains unclear when we will turn the corner and see electricity emissions begin to fall, particularly with the rise of populist political movements that are hostile to renewables. The report examines whether artificial intelligence can be compatible with a sustainable world. Perhaps the most critical immediate issue is the exploding power demand associated with running the latest AI models, and how to meet it without driving up harmful emissions. Important efforts are beginning to supply clean baseload power to support the decoupling of emissions intensity and compute intensity. This decoupling is required urgently at every level of the AI value chain: the chip level, the software level, the facility level and the consumer level. AI could be an enormous help in cutting emissions, if it is used to make systems like power, transportation and food more efficient. A recent study found that AI applications across those systems could reduce global emissions by 6 to 10 percent annually by 2035. In addition to energy use, sustainability considerations of AI include skills productivity, job displacement, and the importance of privacy and security in the AI transition. Transportation The worldwide boom in electric cars continues apace. Sales rose sharply last year and the growth continued into the first months of 2025, with a 35 percent increase globally in the first quarter of this year and sales jumps across most major markets. However, the US is the most important laggard, with only about 10 percent of its car sales being electric in 2024. Yet of all the emissions from transportation, more than 40 percent can be attributed to moving goods rather than people – while sales of electric heavy lorries or trucks jumped 80 percent in 2024, they remain less than 2 percent of global truck sales. Industry & Buildings Practically no progress has been made in decarbonising heavy industry, with the report highlighting the bursting of the "great hydrogen bubble," and the slowness of governments to adopt other strategies that could help to get industry moving. Hydrogen is not the only example where the clean-up of the world's industry is stuck in neutral. Hopes for a global treaty to control plastics pollution, and the emissions associated with production of virgin plastic, have been dashed twice by the fossil-fuel interests that oppose it. Governments committed themselves to doubling the rate at which the energy efficiency of buildings is improving, but to achieve that goal, investments in making buildings more energy-efficient need to rise sharply. The International Energy Agency actually forecasts a decline in 2025. People, Land & Food An increase in world hunger is a reversal of a decades-long trend of slow, steady improvement in nutrition across much of the world. For all its success, the modern food system is wasteful – approximately 30 percent of the food farmers grow is never eaten, highlighting one of the challenges governments face in securing food supply in an overheating climate.  Financing the Transition Public finance for the sustainability transition faces enormous strain as some governments redirect funds to competing priorities, cut climate commitments and struggle with political backlash. Rich countries' pledges often fall short, deepening mistrust with developing nations. Yet there are signs of resilience and progress. A landmark agreement made two years ago commits developed countries to channel $300 billion annually by 2035, alongside a pledge to try to come up with a much larger sum, $1.3 trillion. Clean energy investment already outpaces fossil fuels 2-to-1, and the momentum is clear, even if not yet fast enough. Looking Ahead Politicians have time and again made a promise to the vast majority of people around the world who want to see climate action that emissions would peak and then begin to fall, and they have yet to redeem that promise. COP30 is a chance to begin to follow through. Key focus will be placed on the Brazilian president's creative proposal for a new global fund designed to save tropical forests and his ability to bridge the bitter divides between rich and poor nations over climate finance. The tardiness of countries in submitting their new emissions-limiting plans is certainly an ominous sign for successful outcomes at the meeting. If the world is to have a successful conference outcome and regain climate action momentum without the US, it is imperative that countries submit ambitious plans now. About Generation Investment Management Generation Investment Management is an independent, private, owner-managed partnership headquartered in London, with a US presence in San Francisco. Since its founding in 2004, Generation has played a pioneering role in the development of sustainable investing. Its vision is a sustainable world in which prosperity is shared broadly, in a society that achieves wellbeing for all, protects nature and preserves a habitable climate. Generation pursues its vision with urgency by seeking to deliver long-term, attractive, risk-adjusted investment returns and positive impact, and by advocating for the adoption of sustainable investing across the wider market. For more information, please visit us at generationim.com.

Ms Emmanuelle Wargon is the new Chair of the Board of Regulators of the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). Mr George Niculescu is the new Vice-Chair of the ACER Board of Regulators. Mr Volker Zuleger has been appointed Director ad interim of ACER. The Director manages the EU Agency. The Board of Regulators is one of the Agency’s governing bodies. It represents the national energy regulatory authorities in ACER. The Board of Regulator appointments were made, by consensus, at the 134th meeting of the ACER Board of Regulators today in Copenhagen. Ms Wargon and Mr Niculescu succeed Ms Clara Poletti (Italy) and Mr Rafal Gawin (Poland), the outgoing Chair and Vice Chair respectively. At national level, Ms Wargon is Chair of the ‘Commission de Régulation de l’Énergie (CRE)’, the French energy regulatory authority, since August 2022. Mr Niculescu is President of the ‘Autoritatea Nationala de Reglementare in domeniul Energiei (ANRE), the Romanian energy regulatory authority, since April 2023. The ACER term of office of the new Chair and Vice Chair takes effect immediately, from 17 September 2025, for a two-and-a-half year mandate (which is renewable). Mr Volker Zuleger was appointed Director ad interim of ACER, following a decision by the Agency’s Administrative Board on 12 September. He takes over as interim Director on 16 October 2025, ensuring the continuity of the service and the proper running of the Agency. He succeeds Mr Christian Zinglersen, who vacates the ACER Director post on 15 October to take up a new position elsewhere. Mr Zuleger is currently Head of ACER’s Coordination, Operations and Legal (COL) Department, having worked for the Agency in different roles for 14 years. The next step is the recruitment of the new ACER Director. This selection process will follow an open and transparent procedure launched by the European Commission. Read more.