We are concerned people are being encouraged to invest in high-risk schemes offered by unregulated firms without appreciating the risks involved. Many of the firms offering these products don’t need to be authorised by the FCA, as they rely on exemptions in the law that take them out of our remit. If a firm offering an investment is not regulated by the FCA there are generally far fewer protections. For example, you are unlikely to be able to take complaints to the Financial Ombudsman Service and you’re unlikely to be able to make a claim through the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. That may make it much harder to get your money back if something goes wrong. Some of the particularly risky products we’ve seen have been unlisted loan notes or mini-bonds. Unlisted loan notes or mini-bonds come in several forms and are often used to finance property developments. This involves an investor lending money, often via a third-party firm, to fund property developments. While all investments come with risk, for these products the risk can be particularly high and they are generally for experienced investors who feel confident in assessing the quality of the company’s business and the likelihood of being repaid. People selling high risk, unregulated investments typically draw people in with enticing websites, marketing campaigns and social media finfluencer promotions. If someone introduces you to the investment, they may take a fee for doing so. This would generally be taken from the amount you've invested. The opportunities we have seen offered typically come with a fixed, high rate of return, which is a promised annual rate of interest paid to investors. However, behind the glossy promotional and eye-catching brochures can sit high risk, opaque or even non-existent enterprises. If you’re considering investing, use our Register to see whether a firm is regulated by us and consider if the level of risk is right for you. It is important to stress that some investments, including unlisted loan-note or mini-bond investments, are not suitable for everyday investors. Many of those who promote these high-risk investments don’t need to be regulated by us. Exemptions in the law mean certain high-risk investments can be marketed directly to those considered wealthy or if they’re an experienced investor, known as a ‘sophisticated investor’, under strict criteria. In the UK, potential investors can self-certify that they are sophisticated. If you’re asked to confirm that you are a sophisticated investor, think carefully about whether you genuinely have experience of similar high-risk investments, and whether it’s in your best interest. Otherwise, you could be exposed to investment opportunities that aren’t appropriate and certain regulatory protections will not apply. Taking higher investment risks can be right for some people, depending on your circumstances. But you need to make sure you’re aware of the risks you’re taking. And you should also be wary of putting all your eggs in one basket. Instead, spread your investments across different products and areas so you're less dependent on any one pick to perform well for you. By diversifying your investments like this, you can smooth out the effects of one performing badly, while still reaping benefits when others do well. Our top tips to investors We urge people considering investing to check whether the firm they are dealing with and, if different, who they are investing their money with are regulated by us, and consider if the level of risk is right for them. If it’s not regulated by us, opportunities for help if something goes wrong will generally be severely reduced. Promises of high returns usually indicate high risk. If something looks too good to be true, it usually is. In judging whether a promised fixed return is relatively high, which often indicates a high investment risk, it can be helpful to compare it with what is on offer on other fixed return products, like savings bonds. If you’re asked to confirm that you are a sophisticated investor, think carefully about whether you genuinely have experience of similar high-risk investments. Research recent reports and accounts from the firm offering the investment. This will help you to judge the prospects and level of risk involved. Seek guidance or financial advice if you’re unsure. Consider diversifying your investments, so you're not exposed to the risk of a single investment failing. A good rule of thumb is to limit any exposure to high-risk investments to only 10% of your portfolio. Be wary if you’re contacted out of the blue and feeling pressured to make an investment.

ACER has been tasked with carrying out a periodic cost comparison assessing the efficiency of gas transmission system operators (TSOs) across the EU. The results should be taken into account by national regulatory authorities when setting the allowed or target revenues of the TSOs. ACER will hold a webinar to present the methodology (to be published on the same day) for its efficiency comparison, as well as the next procedural steps. When & where? Wednesday 15 October 2025, 10:00 – 11:00 CEST, online What is the event about? This webinar will present the: Summary of the input received during the public consultation and stakeholder workshop. Expert review conducted to assess the proposed methodology. Final methodology. Process going forward. This webinar also concludes the first phase of the ACER efficiency comparison, during which ACER gathered feedback on its proposed methodology. What are the next steps? Next phase (end 2025-2026) will involve data collection from gas TSOs and data validation. Read more and register (for free).

On 8 August 2025, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (“HKEX”) announced that, pursuant to HKEX’s Articles of Association, the first interim dividend for 2019 of HK$3.72 per share, payable on 26 September 2019 and remaining unclaimed on 26 September 2025, would be forfeited and would revert to HKEX. Accordingly, the unclaimed first interim dividend for 2019 amounting to HK$18,686,498.56 is forfeited and reverts to HKEX today.

NZX advises that the foreign exchange rate to be used for payment of the cash dividend payable on 3 October 2025 in Australian dollars (where applicable) has been set at 0.8813.

In celebration of its 25th anniversary, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEX) is collaborating with The Community Chest of Hong Kong (the Chest) to organise The Community Chest HKEX Gong Run, taking place on Sunday, 23 November 2025 in Central, Hong Kong. This relay event will bring together industry leaders and market participants across the financial sector and beyond to support charitable causes, demonstrating the shared commitment of Hong Kong’s financial services ecosystem to drive positive change in its broader community, for the prosperity of all. For this first-ever short-distance relay event held in the city’s bustling financial district, organisations are invited to compete in different race categories, these include the exciting All-Stars Challenge, Leaders Cup and Corporate Race. Runners from the public and private sectors, along with heads of key industry associations, will come together for a dynamic display of speed, collaboration, and team spirit in the heart of Hong Kong’s financial hub. HKEX Chairman, Carlson Tong, said: "As we celebrate 25 years of HKEX’s journey, we also recognise the dedication and hard work of people from all walks in Hong Kong, whose contributions have helped shape the vibrancy and success of our hometown. We are therefore delighted to be hosting The Community Chest HKEX Gong Run, an initiative that will bring together our financial services stakeholders to show our joint commitment to the community and underserved groups. By partnering with The Community Chest, we are extending our mission beyond our markets, to deliver real, meaningful impact to Hong Kong’s society.” For over two decades, HKEX has been firmly focused on progressing its markets and supporting the communities that it serves. These efforts were amplified with the launch of the HKEX Foundation in 2020. As of 2024, the Foundation has donated more than HK$535 million and expanded its reach to support more than 130 projects across Hong Kong. In addition to other ongoing commitments, the Foundation this year has pledged at least HK$25 million to launch a new flagship charity programme focused on supporting caregivers—addressing one of the community’s most pressing needs. HKEX Group Chief Sustainability Officer, Paul Chow, added: "As Hong Kong’s markets continue to grow, so too does our responsibility to our community. Through our long-standing partnership with The Community Chest and by rallying other organisations and stakeholders to our cause, we aim to drive positive change and reinforce HKEX’s ongoing commitment to building a more sustainable and inclusive future for all. We would like to thank the Chest, our partners, stakeholders, and other participating organisations, for their support in what promises to be a very memorable and meaningful event.” All donations raised through The Community Chest HKEX Gong Run will be allocated in full, without deduction for administrative costs, to more than 160 social welfare member agencies of the Chest. These funds will support services across six critical areas: children & youth; elderly; family & child welfare; medical & health; rehabilitation & aftercare; and community development, benefiting over 3.5 million service users annually.   Simon Kwok, Executive Committee Chairman (third from left); Diana Cesar, Campaign Committee Chairman (second from left); Billy Kong, Executive Committee Deputy Chairman (first from left) of The Community Chest of Hong Kong, join hands with Carlson Tong, Chairman (third from right); Bonnie Y Chan, Chief Executive Officer (second from right); Paul Chow, Group Chief Sustainability Officer (first from right) of HKEX, to kick-off The Community Chest HKEX Gong Run.  

Fiserv, Inc. (NYSE: FI), a leading global provider of payments and financial services technology, today announced it has acquired Smith Consulting Group (SCG), an operational consulting service utilized by community banks and credit unions across the United States. SCG provides deep subject matter expertise and in-market support to Fiserv clients seeking consultative engagement to enhance their strategic investments in core and surround solutions. Financial terms of the transaction were not disclosed. The addition of SCG reinforces Fiserv’s position as a leading provider of core banking and advisory services, enhancing the firm’s ability to deliver end-to-end transformation for community banks and credit unions. SCG consulting services will span DNA, Signature, Bank Intelligence and other Fiserv banking platforms. “This acquisition enhances our ability to deliver strategic value to our customers by embedding deeper expertise directly into our service model. By bringing more expertise in-house, we’re expanding our ability to advise earlier and deliver smarter solutions,” said Andrew Gelb, Head of Financial Solutions, Fiserv. “Today’s announcement is a clear step forward in our commitment to helping financial institutions achieve growth with speed, clarity, and confidence.” Fiserv and SCG have been long-standing partners supporting community banks and credit unions over the last decade. Built around a team of industry professionals with decades of experience in bank and credit union operations, SCG supports banking software system conversions and implementations, as well as consulting services focused on core, teller, customer service and call center platforms, online and mobile banking, and various other interfaces. “Large-scale transformation requires strategic planning and execution across the full suite of applications used to deliver services and experiences to a bank’s customers,” said Darren Smith, Founder and CEO of Smith Consulting Group. “We look forward to pairing our technical acumen and industry expertise with Fiserv’s leading technology platforms to ensure our clients’ success throughout these highly complex projects.”

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission today announced the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee entered a consent order against Tennessee residents Michael Griffis and Amanda Griffis for fraud involving a commodity pool. The order requires the defendants to pay $5,528,121 in restitution to defrauded victims and a $1,355,232 civil monetary penalty, totaling over $6.8 million in monetary relief. It also permanently bans them from trading and registering with the CFTC and prohibits further violations of the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations, as charged. “This case is a stark warning to be cautious about whom you trust with your money,” said Charles Marvine, Acting Chief of the Division of Enforcement’s Retail Fraud and General Enforcement Task Force. “If an investment opportunity seems too good to be true, it almost certainly is, for you and anyone you bring along.” The consent order resolves a CFTC enforcement action filed in July 2023 [See CFTC Press Release No. 8757-23]. According to the court’s findings, the Griffises – local realtors in Clarksville, Tennessee – solicited funds using their real estate connections, including clients, for a fraudulent commodity pool called “Blessings Thru Crypto.”  The couple convinced at least 145 people to contribute more than $6.5 million. They falsely claimed the funds would be used to trade commodity futures on the Apex Trading Platform with guidance from an individual known only as Coach Wendy. In reality, the platform was an illegitimate copy of an overseas exchange, and the true identity of Coach Wendy remains unknown. More than $4 million of the pool’s funds were sent to the illegitimate overseas exchange where it was immediately sent to a variety of other accounts and offshore trading platforms. The remaining funds were misappropriated for personal expenses including paying personal debts and buying a variety of consumer goods. The Division of Enforcement staff responsible for this matter are Elsie Robinson, Rachel Hayes, Christopher Reed, Charles Marvine, and former staff member Brett Shanks. Fraud Advisory The CFTC has issued several customer protection fraud advisories, including the Commodity Pool Fraud Advisory, which provides information about a type of fraud involving individuals and firms —often unregistered — offering investments in commodity pools and how customers can detect, avoid, and report these scams. The CFTC also strongly urges the public to verify a company’s registration with the CFTC at NFA BASIC before committing funds. If unregistered, a customer should be wary of providing funds to that entity. Report suspicious activities or information, such as possible violations of commodity trading laws to the Division of Enforcement via a toll-free hotline 866-FON-CFTC (866-366-2382) or file a tip or complaint online or contact the Whistleblower Office. Whistleblowers are eligible to receive between 10 and 30 percent of the monetary sanctions collected, paid from the Customer Protection Fund financed through monetary sanctions paid to the CFTC by violators of the CEA. RELATED LINKS Consent Order: Michael Griffis, et al.

MIAX Options and MIAX Emerald Options will change the maximum valid bid/ask differentials for certain symbols traded on the Exchanges. The changes to the extended quote width requirements will begin on Wednesday, October 1, 2025, and remain in effect through Wednesday, December 31, 2025, unless withdrawn by the Exchanges before that time.For additional information on the expanded bid/ask differentials, please refer to the following Regulatory Circulars: MIAX Options RC 2025-74 MIAX Emerald Options RC 2025-73 Direct questions to the Regulatory Department at Regulatory@miaxglobal.com or (609) 897-7309.

The Senior Credit Officer Opinion Survey on Dealer Financing Terms (SCOOS) is a quarterly survey providing information about the availability and terms of credit in securities financing and over-the counter (OTC) derivatives markets. The SCOOS is modeled after the long-established Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, which provides qualitative information about changes in supply and demand for loans to households and businesses at commercial banks. The SCOOS collects qualitative information on credit terms and conditions in securities financing and OTC derivatives markets, which are important conduits for leverage in the financial system. The survey panel for the SCOOS began by including 20 dealers and over time has been expanded. These firms account for almost all of the dealer activity in dollar-denominated securities financing and OTC derivatives markets. The survey is directed to senior credit officers responsible for maintaining a consolidated perspective on the management of credit risks. The HTML links below include the full report; the PDF links include the summary only. 2025 September* HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2024 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2023 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2022 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2021 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2020 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2019 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2018 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2017 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2016 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2015 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2014 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2013 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2012 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2011 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF March HTML | PDF 2010 December HTML | PDF September HTML | PDF June HTML | PDF *Current Release

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) reported cumulative trading revenue of U.S. commercial banks and savings associations of $16.6 billion in the second quarter of 2025. The second quarter trading revenue was $1.6 billion, or 10.7 percent, more than in the previous quarter and $355 million, or 2.2 percent, more than a year earlier. In the report, Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activities, the OCC also reported that as of the second quarter of 2025: a total of 1,217 insured U.S. national and state commercial banks and savings associations held derivatives. four large banks held 87.3 percent of the total banking industry notional amount of derivatives. initial credit exposure from derivatives before netting increased in the second quarter of 2025 compared with the first quarter of 2025. NCCE increased $18.8 billion, or 7.6 percent, to $267.0 billion. derivative notional amounts increased in the second quarter of 2025 by $13.1 trillion, or 6.2 percent, to $223.5 trillion. derivative contracts remained concentrated in interest rate products, which totaled $148.7 trillion or 66.5 percent of total derivative notional amounts. Related Link Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activities: Second Quarter 2025 (PDF)

The Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) today provided an update on OSC TestLab: Early-Stage Capital Raising, a set of initiatives to support capital-raising for early-stage Ontario businesses announced in May 2024. The feedback received from OSC TestLab participants and stakeholders provided valuable insights that informed an update and extension of the initiatives, including a new OSC blanket order. The feedback received was also considered in the proposal announced by the CSA today launching a consultation on a proposed harmonized multilateral self-certified investor prospectus exemption. “As global geopolitical uncertainty continues to impact both the Canadian and Ontario capital markets, the importance of supporting innovation, growth and competitiveness of new and growing businesses is heightened, as they play an important role in our economy,” said Grant Vingoe, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the OSC. “These updated initiatives reflect the OSC’s ongoing commitment to fostering the conditions for growth and innovation in Ontario’s capital markets while maintaining investor protection.” OSC TestLab uses testing to evaluate capital market innovations and new approaches to regulation in Ontario’s capital markets. Since launching the OSC TestLab: Early-Stage Capital Raising initiative in May 2024, OSC TestLab has consulted with over 500 stakeholders for feedback on the initiatives through surveys, focus groups, roadshows, and one-on-one engagements. This includes early-stage businesses, angel investor groups, exempt market dealers, legal and advisory professionals, and innovation hubs.  “OSC TestLab: Early-Stage Capital Raising has allowed us to gather data and information and much of this feedback has been reflected in the updates and extensions to our capital-raising initiatives for early-stage Ontario businesses,” said Leslie Byberg, Executive Vice President, Strategic Regulation. “These insights are important as we continue to support competitiveness and access to capital for companies.” The OSC has recently updated and extended the Not-for-Profit Angel order and Early-Stage Business Registration exemption, subject to ministerial approval. In addition, the OSC has introduced a local blanket order providing a Self-Certified Investor Prospectus exemption effective October 25, 2025. The OSC’s local order is consistent with the harmonized Self-Certified Investor Prospectus Exemption that was announced by the CSA earlier today.   The OSC TestLab will continue to collect information to help evaluate the updated initiatives and invite perspectives from the participating businesses and investors and other key stakeholders in the early-stage capital-raising ecosystem. For details on these initiatives, please visit the Innovation Office website at oscinnovation.ca/TestLab  The mandate of the OSC is to provide protection to investors from unfair, improper or fraudulent practices, to foster fair, efficient and competitive capital markets and confidence in the capital markets, to foster capital formation, and to contribute to the stability of the financial system and the reduction of systemic risk. Investors are urged to check the registration of any persons or company offering an investment opportunity and to review the OSC investor materials available at https://www.osc.ca.

The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) today published final amendments to National Instrument 94-101 Mandatory Central Counterparty Clearing of Derivatives (NI 94-101). The amendments were finalized after considering comments received on proposed amendments published in 2024 (in 2025 for the BC Securities Commission).The amendments aim to update the list of mandatory clearable over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives to reflect the transition to a new interest rate benchmarks regime based on overnight interest rate benchmarks (referred to as risk-free interest rate benchmarks). The amendments also add certain classes of derivatives to this list of mandatory clearable OTC derivatives (provided in Appendix A of NI 94-101).NI 94-101 came into force in 2017 with the purpose of reducing counterparty risk in the OTC derivatives market and addressing a potential risk to financial stability, by requiring certain counterparties to clear certain prescribed derivatives through a central counterparty.Provided all necessary ministerial approvals are obtained, the amendments will come into force on March 25, 2026 in all CSA jurisdictions.The CSA, the council of securities regulators of Canada’s provinces and territories, coordinates and harmonizes regulation for the Canadian capital markets. Background: OTC derivatives are financial contracts made privately between two parties, as opposed to happening on a derivatives exchange. Because these bilateral contracts are less transparent, there is more risk associated with them. The main goals of NI 94-101 are to reduce the risk that one party in a financial contract won’t meet its obligations (called counterparty risk) and to make sure that these transactions occur, or are cleared, through a trusted intermediary (called a central counterparty). This helps support the integrity of Canada’s capital markets. The amendments to NI 94-101 aim to update and add certain classes of mandatory clearable derivatives, which are financial products that are required (in certain circumstances specified in the NI) by CSA jurisdictions to go through a clearing process. The purpose of the amendments is to align with the transition from the overnight interest rate benchmarks to the new interest rate benchmarks, and to reflect changes in liquidity in certain classes of derivatives.

The securities regulators of Alberta, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Northwest Territories, Nova Scotia, Nunavut, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan, and Yukon have published a Notice and Request for Comment for a proposed new harmonized multilateral instrument to support capital raising for Canadian businesses and investment opportunities for eligible investors within participating jurisdictions.“Local exemptions for self-certified investors have been well-received by both market participants and investors, which has led to the proposal to create a harmonized exemption,” said Stan Magidson, Chair of the CSA and Chair and CEO of the Alberta Securities Commission. “The proposed exemption is designed to balance investor protection with greater flexibility for businesses pursuing investment and seeks to support capital formation and innovation across Canada.”The proposed exemption would complement existing accredited investor exemptions to enable broader participation in the capital markets by individuals with relevant experience or expertise. To invest as a self-certified investor, a person must certify that they meet at least one of the qualifying criteria and acknowledge the investment risks. Self-certified investors would be permitted to invest up to $50,000 per calendar year across multiple businesses.Proposed Multilateral Instrument 45-111 Self-Certified Investor Prospectus Exemption aims to harmonize the exemption across the participating jurisdictions and, if adopted, would replace: Alberta Securities Commission Blanket Order 45-538 Self-Certified Investor Prospectus Exemption; Financial and Consumer Affairs Authority of Saskatchewan General Order 45-538 Self-Certified Investor Prospectus Exemption; Manitoba Securities Commission Blanket Order 45-505 Self-Certified Investor Prospectus Exemption; and Ontario Securities Commission Instrument 45-510 Self-Certified Investor Prospectus Exemption (Interim Class Order). Details of the proposal are set out in CSA Notice and Request for Comment Proposed Multilateral Instrument 45-111 Self-Certified Investor Prospectus Exemption and its proposed companion policy, which are available on participating CSA members’ websites. The comment period closes on January 5, 2026.The CSA, the council of the securities regulators of Canada’s provinces and territories, co-ordinates and harmonizes regulation for the Canadian capital markets.

TMX Group today announced the release of its first Reconciliation Action Plan, detailing the company's long-term commitments to further Indigenous reconciliation in Canada. The Reconciliation Action Plan, developed through extensive engagement with Indigenous organizations, leaders, and experts, focuses on four key pillars: Pillar 1: Capital Realignment – Support increased capital flows to First Nations, Inuit, and Métis businesses, communities, and priorities. Pillar 2: Relationships – Establish long-term relationships with First Nations, Inuit and Métis peoples and organizations in Canada, and work together to achieve prosperity for Indigenous peoples. Pillar 3: Truth, Learning and Action – Advance learning opportunities within TMX and among ecosystem partners, and publicly demonstrate continued commitment through transparent reporting. Pillar 4: First Nations, Inuit and Métis Talent – Support the current and next generation of First Nations, Inuit and Métis talent at TMX and in the Canadian financial sector. "We are proud to announce the launch of our Reconciliation Action Plan, which outlines the work we have undertaken in close collaboration with the Indigenous community to increase capital market access and representation, and reaffirms our commitment to the work ahead," said John McKenzie, CEO, TMX Group. "Financial markets create opportunity and fuel economic growth. Our commitment to improving Indigenous inclusion and representation includes creating ways for Indigenous people and businesses to seize opportunities to participate in that growth, ultimately strengthening our ecosystem and economy now and long into the future." "In nearly five years of working with TMX, we have seen them show up as true partners, continuously looking for creative ways to meaningfully contribute to reconciliation. Their commitment to including Indigenous people and businesses in rooms and at tables where we have not been invited before is making a significant difference in changing the conversation," said Tabatha Bull, CEO, Canadian Council for Indigenous Business. "Through this work, and their progress in our Partnership Accreditation in Indigenous Relations program, TMX is helping to build more equitable and inclusive capital markets that create new opportunities for Indigenous business and all Canadians." View the full Reconciliation Action Plan here.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you.1 Today, I would like to discuss a vital tool for supervising the safety and soundness of the largest banks and preserving the stability of our financial system. I was there, at the Treasury Department in 2009, when stress testing was first used in the United States in the heat of battle, an ad hoc measure to reverse a loss of confidence in U.S. banks that was a major force then driving the Great Recession. By examining how the balance sheets of banks would be affected by a worsening of financial and economic conditions, this process was intended to reveal weaknesses that could threaten the solvency of banks and prevent them from playing their central role in the economy.2 Stress testing ultimately succeeded in helping to restore confidence during the crisis, and in the aftermath this battle-tested tool became a formal and integral part of the effort to repair the ensuing damage and strengthen the banking system. Stress testing has continued to evolve in the years since then to maintain that strength and help limit the chances of another devastating financial crisis. Stress testing changed as its purpose changed from wartime to peacetime—from mitigating the crisis to preserving safety, soundness, and stability. It has changed as banks and regulators learned more about how stress testing works in practice and as part of an otherwise evolving supervisory and regulatory framework for banks that must necessarily adjust as finance itself evolves. Adjusting regulation in this dynamic environment is challenging, and one of those challenges is dealing with unintended consequences. The Federal Reserve made changes to stress testing in 2020 intended to make it more predictable and to better integrate it with overall capital regulation, but those changes are now at the center of litigation brought by large banks. The Fed responded in April by proposing more changes intended to address these criticisms. But as I explained in voting against those measures, I believe these steps will substantially impair stress testing, concealing rather than revealing crucial weaknesses in the risk management of individual banks and in the stability of the financial system.3 As the Federal Reserve Board considers these changes, I believe we should focus on how best to address the original purpose—and preserve the effectiveness—of stress testing. As I will explain, I believe that the best way to further these goals is to separate stress testing from capital requirements in order to maximize the informative value of the tests and their results and untangle them from the larger and complex task of setting capital requirements. I will lay out that alternative approach toward the end of these remarks, but first I believe it is helpful to take a step back and recall how stress testing has evolved to this point, then turn to where it should go from here. It all began during the Global Financial Crisis. Capital markets froze, resulting in business failures and prompting the need for unprecedented public-sector intervention. Credit to households and businesses slowed to a trickle, and millions of people were losing homes and jobs. By the fall of 2008, there was a broad-based lack of confidence in the banking system, as large banks faced questions about their exposures to losses related to real estate and other assets. These were questions that large banks in many cases couldn't credibly answer because of the complexity and opacity of their direct and indirect exposures to mortgages at the center of the crisis. Without this information, investors assumed the worst, driving down equity prices of banks, which complicated efforts by banks to bolster their balance sheets. Restoring confidence in the banking system required credible information from a reliable source. Treasury worked with the Federal Reserve to design the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) to test the capital adequacy of what were determined to be the 19 most systemically important banking and financial institutions. In addition, Congress had provided a backstop in the form of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) had backstopped bank funding through guarantees, and the Federal Reserve had stepped up in significant ways to bolster the financial system and the economy. The existence of a government backstop played a big role in the success of the first stress test. With the use of public funding on the line, the rigor and transparency of the stress test was doubly important.4 Rebuilding Confidence in the Largest BanksThere were five aspects of the SCAP that are elemental to stress testing and have been present in the different tests since then. First, there was the use of a severe but plausible scenario for macroeconomic conditions. The scenario assumed a deeper and more prolonged recession than forecasters expected. Because of the focus on housing-related losses, the scenario's assumption of a further severe decline in housing prices was essential to rebuilding confidence. Second, there was the use of economic models to translate a given scenario into quantified losses for each bank. The banking regulators worked together to develop models to map the stress scenario into a range of associated loss rates for different loan categories and iterated with the banks to assess their specific exposures. Third, based on the extent of those projected losses, the test arrived at a firm-specific amount of capital that each bank would need in order to withstand this stress and keep lending to customers. A fourth aspect of the SCAP and subsequent stress tests was the public disclosure of the scenario, the basic testing methodology, and, most importantly, firm-specific results. And lastly, in addition to the balance sheet data and other numbers related to the stress test, the Federal Reserve produced a qualitative supervisory assessment of the banks' capital planning decisions and processes. One essential element of that first test is that the supervisors reviewed and assessed the data and modeling assumptions used by the banks, which helped to provide credibility for the loss estimates. The result of the SCAP was that 10 of the 19 tested institutions were required to raise capital sufficient to keep them above regulatory minimums if the scenario were to materialize—a total of $75 billion. The 10 were given six months to develop capital plans to meet their stress test minimums. The SCAP was remarkably successful. There was skepticism that the test would be sufficiently severe or transparent to be credible, and bank stock prices were volatile due to speculation about what the stress test results would reveal. But bank stocks recovered after the results were announced in May. Most banks that had been struggling to raise capital were able to do so, with 9 of the 10 able to find private sector sources of funding by the six-month deadline.5 Credit default swaps for large banks returned to levels seen before the acute stage of the crisis.6 Bank lending was slower to recover, but stabilizing the banks helped stop the crisis and the U.S. economy started the long process of recovery that July. Supporting the Resilience of the Largest BanksI have compared the SCAP to a battlefield campaign, and while the financial crisis certainly felt like combat at the time, my point is to emphasize the unique challenge of making financial regulatory policy in an emergency. The goal was to restore public trust in banks that were under fire, and as the job shifted to preserving that trust, it was apparent that there should be an ongoing role for stress testing in peacetime as well. Starting with the yearly stress test established in 2010 with the Dodd-Frank Act and continuing with the integration of stress testing into the Federal Reserve's annual Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR), the peacetime approach focused on institutionalizing bank resilience and risk-management practices. The Federal Reserve Board conducted the first CCAR exercise in 2011. CCAR was an overall assessment of the capital planning processes of banks, which included quantitative and qualitative components. Either of those components could form the basis for an objection by the Fed to firm plans to distribute capital to shareholders, distribution which would reduce the capital available that the firm could use to buffer its losses. The quantitative evaluation of a firm's capital adequacy was driven by the results of the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test, or DFAST.7 It departed from the SCAP in at least two important ways. First, rather than making the severe scenario just a more negative version of the current consensus forecast, the Fed built a process to develop thematic forward-looking scenarios using macroeconomic models calibrated to historical data.8 Some parts of the scenario design framework are purposely countercyclical under normal conditions—for instance, the minimum peak unemployment rate is set at 10 percent. The countercyclicality of stress test scenarios is an attempt to lean against pro-cyclical effects that can make borrowers appear overly resilient in good times, something which could cause the model to significantly understate the magnitude of borrower defaults when the economy turns.9 The second way that the Dodd-Frank stress test departed from CCAR is that most losses under DFAST are projected by applying models developed and operated by the Federal Reserve based on data provided by the banks. Using Fed-developed and validated models provides for independent risk assessments. The granular data provided by banks has been valuable in ensuring that the stress tests are truly risk sensitive and in understanding broader trends and interconnections in the financial system. In addition to this quantitative test, CCAR assesses the ability of banks to determine their capital needs in the future. Supplementing the DFAST model administered by the Fed, each bank projects its income over the stress scenario using its internal models, providing supervisors with a view of governance and risk management of the bank's capital planning process. If a bank did not pass either the quantitative or qualitative evaluation, the Board of Governors was able to object to the capital plan and restrict the firm's shareholder distributions. Over time, several criticisms of CCAR's approach emerged. The first was that CCAR was wholly separate from the process used to set a bank's basic, risk-based capital requirements. Large banks also criticized CCAR for a lack of transparency and predictability that resulted in them pre-committing to lower capital distributions and higher levels of capital. In 2020, the Federal Reserve Board addressed these bank criticisms by creating the stress capital buffer (SCB). To address the criticism that CCAR was additive and wasn't integrated into capital planning, the SCB combined the basic capital requirement for banks with one equal to a bank's projected capital ratio decline during the stress test plus a year's worth of planned dividends, linking components of the capital framework. To address the claim that CCAR lacked transparency and predictability, the SCB requirement was set for each participating bank at a level that reflected its losses in the stress test and provided banks with flexibility to change their dividends in real time.10 Another bank criticism was that CCAR's use of a qualitative assessment was subjective. The SCB dropped the qualitative objection and recast the assessment of capital planning practices as a traditional supervisory exam. By more directly integrating stress testing into capital regulation, the SCB increasingly moved stress testing away from supervision and toward the regulatory arena, a consequential decision. While this change was intended to promote consistency and predictability, in retrospect, it may have reduced some of the value of the exercise, in that it reduced the range of facts and circumstances the Board would take into account when evaluating an individual firm's capital adequacy. As a result, the Board's flexibility to adjust capital adequacy determinations based on the unique features of different firms, including different business models and risk profiles, was constrained. When I became Vice Chair for Supervision in 2022, we continued the process of evolving the stress test as necessary. In particular, the Fed conducted multiple scenarios not directly connected to setting banks' capital requirements.11 Using additional scenarios has helped us to understand how a broader range of risks might affect the banking system. For example, we've explored a stagflation scenario and looked at the failures of large non-bank counterparties. Using multiple scenarios has helped to keep our risk-assessments dynamic. Benefits and Effects of the Current Stress Testing FrameworkBefore turning to the legal challenges of the current stress test framework, I would be remiss not to emphasize the value of that framework. The stress test has been a critical element that led to strengthening both the quantity of capital in the banking system and the risk-management capabilities of large banks. Since the Global Financial Crisis, large banks have more than doubled their risk-based common equity capital ratios—from roughly 5 percent to 12 percent or more. At the same time, they have made meaningful improvements in their ability to measure, monitor, and manage their own risks. The stress test has directly contributed to both. Despite this success, some have argued for what they term "full transparency" of the test. But the criticism can be misleading because two important points are often omitted. First, the Federal Reserve already provides substantial information about the design of the test and has expanded those disclosures over time. Banks are far from uninformed. They receive substantial information about the models in annual model methodology disclosures.12 Any material model changes are phased in over two years, with full explanation. Second, what critics call "transparency" is not disclosure of basic information about the rigor and methodology of the test essential for its credibility; instead, it is the equivalent of handing out the questions to the test in advance. That would fundamentally undermine the rigor of the test, which is intended to assess resilience under conditions not fully known in advance, just as in a financial crisis. In short, the framework strikes a deliberate balance: providing banks with enough information about scenarios and models to ensure fairness and accountability, while preserving the rigor that makes the stress test an effective safeguard. Challenges to the Current Stress Testing FrameworkIn December 2024, bank trade associations brought suit against the Board of Governors, challenging the role of stress testing in setting SCB requirements for large firms. The trade associations have challenged what they contend is the opacity of certain elements of the stress testing process and have argued that the models and scenarios should be released in proposed form to promote transparency and facilitate public comment. In anticipation of, and in response to, this litigation, the Board announced that it would disclose and seek public comment on all of the models that determine the hypothetical losses and revenue of banks under stress, as well as the annual stress scenarios. The Board also proposed to change its rules to average stress testing results over two years to reduce the year-over-year volatility in the capital requirements that result from annual stress testing. These proposed changes represent a policy choice to respond to the litigation by enhancing transparency and promoting public participation, and they are not intended to materially affect overall capital requirements. But in my judgment, they are a mistake that will make stress testing less rigorous and nimble. Subjecting the stress testing models to the notice and comment process could lead them to ossify, and their dynamism and effectiveness may fade. Stress testing models are inherently complex and require adjustments to maintain accuracy and relevance to appropriately account for quickly developing risks. Changes in the models would require new notice and solicitation of comment, and the time lag and burden in making changes would be significantly extended. We saw this type of ossification play out before the Global Financial Crisis, when supervisory stress testing of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac became formulaic and failed to capture escalating risks, with dire consequences.13 An additional problem is that the comment process may have an uneven effect, since banks have an incentive to object to aspects of the models that result in higher capital requirements and not to highlight the areas in which the models underestimate downside risk. Responding to these comments could create a one-way ratchet that successively weakens capital requirements. Knowing the details of the stress test in advance will also increase the likelihood that banks are able to game the results to lower their capital requirements. We have seen examples of how firms have been able to game stress tests. For instance, some firms started to use so-called "macro hedges" in the late 2010s. Many of these macro hedges were hedges against a deep recession, similar to a stress test scenario, and these short-term hedges were cheap because investors assessed these scenarios as extremely unlikely (they were far "out of the money" in option terms). The hedges reduced projected capital losses in the stress tests by billions of dollars for some banks. But they weren't credible protection from the effects of a recession because maintaining these hedges would become prohibitively expensive as the economy moved into an actual downturn. This is just one example of attempts to game the stress tests, that were eventually addressed through the supervisory process. But this example underscores how full disclosure of the Fed's stress models and scenarios would enable banks to optimize stress test results by, among other things, adjusting their balance sheets based on their knowledge of where the models underprice risk, in order to reduce their capital requirements without materially reducing risks. Banks are likely to change their behavior in other ways that increase risk. Banks may invest less in their own risk management if the test becomes too predictable. Full disclosure of the Board's models may encourage concentration across the banking system in assets that receive comparably lighter treatment in the test, which could create risks to financial stability. And banks are likely to reduce their management buffers, making it more likely that they would breach their required buffers and minimums in the event of stress. The upshot is that a full-transparency stress testing regime can increase systemic risks because risk is underestimated and capital is too low. The stress tests could lose their credibility. A loss in credibility is bad for the banks, the banking system, financial stability and, ultimately, American families and businesses. An Alternative Path ForwardAs an alternative to these proposed changes, I would favor prioritizing the rigor of the stress testing framework by separating stress testing from binding regulatory capital requirements, which would instead be increased commensurately.14 The Dodd-Frank Act requires that the Board conduct stress tests on large banks "to evaluate whether such companies have the capital, on a total consolidated basis, necessary to absorb losses as a result of adverse economic conditions."15 While these results can and should still play a role in informing supervisory and management assessments of the appropriate capital level for particular banking organizations, decoupling the stress test results from the preliminary SCB would enable the Board to preserve essential aspects of stress testing, including the generation of credible and detailed information on the risk exposures of banks and how their capital levels would be affected by a stress event. Such information would be valuable in the supervision of banks in normal times and especially important if banks and the financial system are again threatened by crisis. If the stress tests are no longer used to inform the calculation of a firm's preliminary SCB requirement, the legal justification for publishing the models and scenarios for comment would be eliminated, and I've already discussed the policy grounds for not publishing them. So, the Board could abandon the notice and comment proposal. The Board could approach these statutorily required tests primarily as a supervisory exercise and could thereby retain flexibility to design and adjust the models and scenarios as appropriate to ensure their rigor and robustness. Moreover, as authorized by the Dodd-Frank Act, the Board could run multiple scenarios to provide greater dimension to the assessment of risks.16 As history teaches us, shocks and crises can manifest through a range of channels, and testing a large bank's unique profile under a range of risks is more likely to yield high-value information about a bank's likely resilience to potential stress events. The net result of these changes would be to increase the nimbleness, dynamism, and effectiveness of our current stress testing framework. The Board's continued publication of firm-specific results would promote transparency and market discipline. So that this change does not reduce overall capital in the system, SCBs could instead be set entirely by regulation. For most non-G-SIBs subject to the SCB requirement, the current 2.5 percent buffer floor likely remains an appropriate level. For G-SIBs with a lot of trading, past stress tests have routinely indicated that SCBs should likely be set higher than the 2.5 percent floor, and any regulatory capital measure designed to replace the current SCB framework would need to account for this gap. While further analytical work is required, the shortfall generated by decoupling the stress tests from the SCB may be largely addressed by a regulatory capital requirement linked to the risks in the trading book, with perhaps some other adjustments as required to maintain appropriate capital levels. If, over time, stress testing results indicate that this replacement regulatory capital measure routinely exceeds or falls short of the capital levels required to provide adequate resilience to stress conditions, the Board could revise the regulatory measure through a notice-and-comment process, informed by data gathered in the stress testing process. This proposed approach of decoupling the stress tests from regulatory capital and increasing regulatory capital to make up the shortfall in the SCB appears to me to be the best way to retain the value of stress testing as a supervisory exercise while maintaining appropriate levels of capital in the system. However, replacing the current framework of individualized SCBs—informed by firm-specific stress test results—with broadly applicable, formulaic regulatory capital requirements would result in a diminution of the risk sensitivity reflected in SCB requirements. That is, capital levels for firms that are subject to the stress tests would be relatively less tailored than they currently are and less reflective of the unique business models, exposures, and risk profiles of a particular firm. To address this loss in risk sensitivity, I would propose that, in exceptional circumstances, the Board could use its capital directive authority to impose individualized capital requirements on specific firms to account for a firm's particular circumstances, including its capital structure, riskiness, complexity, financial activities, and other appropriate risk-related factors.17 This would be similar to the United Kingdom's Pillar II-B requirements and those of other jurisdictions.18 While these requirements could be informed by the stress test results in part, they would also take into account qualitative factors and supervisory judgment. Because these individualized requirements would consider the specific risks of a firm, they would be adjusted to reflect a specific firm's risk profile. While I don't believe it would be advisable for this type of exercise to become the default manner for setting capital requirements, in exceptional cases, it would preserve some of the tailoring benefits of the current SCB regime in a manner that comports with the changes I have discussed. Furthermore, it would preserve the ability for the Board to address stress results that demonstrate significant deficiencies in capital adequacy under a stressed scenario, when the firms are otherwise in compliance with regulatory capital requirements. With these changes, stress testing could maintain its flexibility and adaptability and therefore could retain its value as an effective tool for identifying idiosyncratic risk in a major bank and ensuring that capital is sufficient to address the risk. Among the benefits would be the space this approach would allow for continued innovation in stress testing. Such innovation is vital as finance evolves and banks continue to seek ways to reduce supervisory and regulatory requirements. This approach could allow for scenario design and modeling advancements unencumbered by the limitations I've spoken of imposed by the notice-and-comment process. In conclusion, I believe it is critical to maintain the dynamism and rigor of stress testing so that supervisors, banks, and the public understand the underlying vulnerabilities in the banking system and at the largest banks and understand that these firms are holding sufficient capital to address these vulnerabilities. I have deep concerns that the set of changes the Board is now considering risks reliance on a stress test that can no longer effectively assess the resilience of the largest banks and lacks credibility, thus putting our financial system and economy at risk. 1. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee.  2. The stress tests during the Global Financial Crisis also included measures to address bank balances sheet weaknesses in a timely manner under stressed conditions, further supporting confidence, as discussed below.  3. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Statement on Stress Test Proposal by Governor Michael S. Barr," press release, April 17, 2025.  4. At the point of the stress tests results, taxpayers had already acquired an actual stake in all but one of the 19 SCAP institutions, which had accepted a total of just under $190 billion in funding from the emergency Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Banks could go to TARP to get more capital if needed after the stress test, but most were able to tap market sources and repay TARP.  5. Troubled Asset Relief Program: Bank Stress Test Offers Lessons as Regulators Take Further Actions to Strengthen Supervisory Oversight  (PDF) (GAO, September 2010).  6. Seung Jung Lee and Jonathan D. Rose, "Profits and Balance Sheet Developments at U.S. Commercial Banks in 2009," Federal Reserve Bulletin, September 2, 2010. 7. The number of financial institutions that participated in the annual DFAST exercise has varied from 18 to 33 between 2013 and 2025.  8. See 12 CFR pt. 252, appendix A (The Federal Reserve's Policy Statement on the Scenario Design Framework for Stress Testing). Although stressed losses in DFAST are projected for a two-year time horizon, the macroeconomic scenario itself is on a three-year time horizon. This reflects the fact that the CCAR capital planning exercise performed by the banks goes out three years. Moreover, a three-year scenario provides the public with greater transparency regarding the entirety of the conditions assumed as part of the macroeconomic cycle contemplated in the test. The number of scenario variables has increased notably from SCAP and the early days of CCAR.  9. Ben Bernanke, Mark Gertler, and Simon Gilchrist, "The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework," in Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol. 1, 1999, (ScienceDirect, 1999), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S157400489910034X.  10. As part of its efforts to address concerns about transparency, in early 2019 the Fed finalized a proposal to augment its disclosures regarding its stress testing models. 84 Fed. Reg. 6784 (2019).  11. See Michael S. Barr, "Multiple Scenarios in Stress Testing," speech at the Stress Test Research Conference at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, MA, October 19, 2023.  12. See, e.g., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2025 Supervisory Stress Test Methodology (PDF) (Board of Governors, June 2025); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2024 Supervisory Stress Test Methodology (PDF) (Board of Governors, March 2024).  13. Scott Frame, Krisopher Gerardi, and Paul Willen, "The Failure of Supervisory Stress Testing: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and OFHEO," Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper No. 15-4 (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, October 2015).  14. See Daniel Tarullo, "Reconsidering the Regulatory Uses of Stress Testing," (PDF) Hutchins Center Working Paper #92 (Brookings, May 2024).  15. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i)(1).  16. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i)(1)(B) ("The Board of Governors—(i) shall provide for at least 2 different sets of condition under which the evaluation required by this subsection shall be conducted, including baseline and severely adverse.") (emphasis added).  17. 12 U.S.C. § 3907(a)(2). Other statutes provide the Board with authority to impose individualized capital requirements through the issuance of orders. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1844(b), 1467a(g)(1).  18. See Bank of England, "CP16/22 – Implementation of the Basel 3.1 Standards: Interactions with the PRA's Pillar 2 Framework," chapter 10 (BOE, November 30, 2022). 

The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has published updated reporting instructions and XML schema (version 1.2.0) for the weekly reporting of commodity derivatives positions under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II), reflecting the changes from the latest review. Beyond the changes directly originating from MiFID II – such as the requirement to publish two weekly reports and the exclusion of (spot) emission allowances from position reporting – the updated XML schema and reporting instructions also include other amendments to ITS 4, like the harmonisation of reporting units for energy derivatives. The adjustments are based on ESMA’s Final Report submitted to the European Commission in December 2024, which is currently pending adoption. ESMA has opted for this approach to ensure a consistent reporting framework and minimise the need for frequent updates to the XML schema and instructions. Next steps ESMA will start applying the new XML schema and reporting instructions on 1 April 2026. As of that date, reporting entities should only use the latest version 1.2.0. In case of any technical issues, stakeholders can notify ESMA under Trading_Unit@esma.europa.eu. Related Documents DateReferenceTitleDownloadSelect 25/09/2025 ESMA65-955014868-14991 Commodities derivatives weekly position reporting - Reporting instructions 25/09/2025 ESMA65-955014868-14993 XML Schema for commodities derivates weekly reporting (version 1.2.0)

tax legislation applies to tax free lump sums and the tax implications when lump sums are returned to pensions To support firms' understanding of that statement, we are providing an explanation of how our existing rules on cancellation rights operate in these scenarios. Under our rules, consumers have the right to cancel certain contracts, typically within 30 days of entering the contract, if they change their mind. However, the right to cancel does not arise in all circumstances. A consumer accessing tax-free cash in itself does not trigger cancellation rights under our rules.  Our rules do not exempt firms from HMRC requirements. This means firms should be mindful how they structure their contracts in light of the interaction between HMRC requirements and ours. FCA rules: the right to cancel Our rules, specifically COBS 15.2, ensure that a right to cancel applies when a consumer enters certain specified contracts. In the context of pensions and retirement, specified cancellable contracts include a pension transfer contract and a contract to join a personal pension scheme. A contract allowing a person to take a Pension Commencement Lump Sum (PCLS), sometimes known as a tax-free lump sum, is not listed as a cancellable contract in COBS 15.2 so a contractual term allowing someone to take a PCLS does not of itself trigger cancellation rights. Taking a PCLS We do not tell firms how to structure PCLS in their contractual arrangements with customers. This is a design choice for firms. In making that choice, firms should consider the interplay with tax legislation. Taking a PCLS and designating funds for drawdown are two separate activities. They do not have to take place at the same time. Designation to drawdown can happen up to 12 months before or 6 months after a PCLS is taken, or without a consumer choosing to access a PCLS at all.  Also, PCLS can be taken with an annuity.  We understand that firms have adopted varying approaches to structuring PCLS. For example: The original pension contract may already enable a consumer to take a PCLS, designate funds to drawdown and make income withdrawals from the drawdown fund, all without needing to establish a new contract or vary a contract. A firm may choose to give effect to PCLS in a separate contract from the contract giving drawdown or annuity options. Or give effect to PCLS in the same contract but limiting cancellation rights to the drawdown/annuity options.  In such cases, a right of cancellation does not arise for the PCLS. Or a firm may have chosen to deliver PCLS as part of a: contract to join a pension scheme pension transfer contract contract to vary an existing pension scheme the first time a consumer exercises an option to make income withdrawals  Unless limited to the activities expressly specified in our rules, the firm will be treated as voluntarily adding cancellation rights in relation to other rights arising under that contract, including those relating to PCLS. Our rules do not prevent a pension provider from choosing to offer cancellation rights in their contracts in additional circumstances beyond those set out in our rules. Firms will need to consider the implications of tax legislation when voluntarily offering cancellation rights. Where a consumer has taken a PCLS and then wishes to return that money to a pension, tax legislation will affect what firms and their customers are able to do and whether a consumer will incur a tax charge. HMRC’s newsletterLink is external  provides more information.

London Stock Exchange Group plc (LSEG) today confirms that, further to the announcement of 30 May 2025, Dame Elizabeth Corley, CBE will join the Board as a Non-Executive Director on 1 December 2025. As previously announced, she will also join the Risk and Nomination Committees. This announcement is made in accordance with UK Listing Rule 6.4.7R.

There was a positive response to the “hawkish cut” by the FED, with digital asset investment products seeing US$1.9bn of inflows last week. Bitcoin and Ethereum led with inflows of US$977m and US$772m respectively. Meanwhile, Solana (US$127.3m) and XRP (US$69.4m) also attracted strong demand, driven by the hype around crypto ETF launches in the United States. Total AuM hit a YTD high of US$40.4bn, putting the market on track to match or slightly exceed last year’s US$48.6bn inflows. The full research features in CoinShares’ weekly newsletter ‘Digital Asset: Fund Flows’, which can also be found here.

The offering was more than four times oversubscribed, attracting over USD 2 billion in orders from regional and global investors. Arada now has USD 1.5 billion in total Sukuk listed on Nasdaq Dubai across three issuances, reinforcing its strong presence in the UAE’s debt capital markets. Nasdaq Dubai welcomed the listing of a USD 450 million Sukuk issued by Arada Developments LLC (“Arada”), a leading UAE-based master developer. Issued under Arada Sukuk 2 Limited’s USD 1 billion Trust Certificate Issuance Programme, the Sukuk matures in 2030. The offering was oversubscribed more than four times, attracting over USD 2 billion in orders from regional and international investors. The issuance was priced at a profit rate of 7.150%, reflecting strong investor appetite. This listing builds on Arada’s established track record in the debt capital markets. Following this admission, Arada’s total outstanding Sukuk on Nasdaq Dubai now amount to USD 1.5 billion across three transactions. HRH Prince Khaled bin Alwaleed bin Talal Al Saud, Executive Vice Chairman of Arada, rang the market-opening bell at Nasdaq Dubai on behalf of the company to celebrate the listing, in the presence of Hamed Ali, CEO of Nasdaq Dubai and Dubai Financial Market (DFM). Prince Khaled said: “We are delighted to be returning to Nasdaq Dubai for the listing of our third Sukuk, which reflects the continued rise in international investor confidence in Arada. Since our last issuance, we have expanded into two new markets and continue to achieve record results across launches, sales and deliveries. This strong performance has underpinned significant global demand for our Sukuk programme and reinforces our position as one of the region’s fastest-growing master developers.”  Hamed Ali, CEO of Nasdaq Dubai and Dubai Financial Market (DFM), said: “Arada’s return to Nasdaq Dubai reaffirms the depth and diversity of our Sukuk market. The strong investor demand reflects issuer confidence and enhances the range of opportunities available to our global investor base. As the region’s international exchange, we remain committed to connecting issuers with global capital and supporting the growth journey of leading UAE corporates, while advancing Dubai’s position as a premier hub for Islamic finance.'' This listing supports Arada’s strategic expansion plans, enabling the company to capitalise on growth opportunities within the UAE and across international markets. The total value of Sukuk listed on Nasdaq Dubai has reached USD 100.6 billion. Overall, the value of debt securities currently listed on the exchange stands at over USD 141.6 billion.