A senior‑level forum for financial market participants to share their views on UK-related developments in financial markets, including gilts and sterling, and broader market themes with the Chancellor of the Exchequer.   Documents HM Treasury Market Engagement Group – Terms of Reference PDF, 122 KB, 6 pages This file may not be suitable for users of assistive technology. Request an accessible format. If you use assistive technology (such as a screen reader) and need a version of this document in a more accessible format, please email digital.communications@hmtreasury.gov.uk. Please tell us what format you need. It will help us if you say what assistive technology you use. HM Treasury Market Engagement Group – Terms of Reference HTML Details Overview  The Market Engagement Group (MEG) is a senior‑level forum for financial market participants to share their views on UK-related developments in financial markets, including gilts and sterling, and broader market themes with the Chancellor of the Exchequer.  Membership  We invite interested parties to apply to be a member of the MEG here:   HMT Market Engagement Group Application Form – Fill in form  Applications will close on 5 April 2026  Selection Criteria  To be successful applicants must meet the following criteria:  Demonstrated expertise and experience in UK and global financial markets  Appropriate seniority and responsibilities in their organisation  Clear motivation and ability to contribute insights relevant to the UK’s economic and market outlook Contribution to a diverse mix of institutions and market segments complementing HMT’s existing engagement  

Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (NYSE: BR), global Fintech leader, today announced that its Distributed Ledger Repo (DLR) platform processed an average of $362 billion in daily repo transactions during February, with volumes totaling $6.9 trillion. The daily average is a 457% increase year‑over‑year during the same month in 2025, reflecting continued institutional adoption of tokenized real-asset settlement at scale and the growing role of distributed ledger technology in modernizing repo and collateral markets. The mainstream trading of tokenized securities has reached an inflection point. According to Broadridge’s sixth annual Digital Transformation & Next-Gen Technology Study, more than half (54%) of firms believe blockchain and distributed ledger technology will create new opportunities across capital markets, while 53% believe the utilization of blockchain and distributed ledger technology will have a dramatic effect on the way assets are settled. “The continued growth of DLR reflects the demand we’re seeing from institutions for scalable digital market infrastructure,” said Horacio Barakat, Global Head of Digital Innovation at Broadridge. “As adoption accelerates, we’re building on DLR’s momentum by expanding into new use cases, strengthening collateral mobility, and extending into intraday funding, all while preserving the interoperability, resilience, and trust that institutions depend on.” As digital and traditional markets converge, institutions are prioritizing infrastructure that supports both seamlessly. Broadridge continues to expand its digital asset capabilities through DLR and its broader digital asset strategy, helping clients modernize market infrastructure with confidence and unlock new opportunities by connecting traditional and digital financial ecosystems. To learn more, please visit Broadridge’s DLR platform.

As of today, Gabler Group AG (ISIN: DE000A421RZ9) is listed in the Scale segment of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Scale is the growth segment in the Open Market for small and medium-sized companies (SME). The first price of the share was €47.20. The current share price is available via Deutsche Börse. Cantor Fitzgerald acted as sole Global Coordinator and Joint Bookrunner. B. Metzler seel. Sohn & Co. served as an additional Joint Bookrunner. The designated sponsor in Xetra trading is also B. Metzler seel. Sohn & Co. The specialist on the trading venue Deutsche Börse Frankfurt is ICF Bank. Lübeck-based submarine supplier Gabler Group AG is a manufacturer of subsea technologies and, according to its own information, is a leading European supplier of submarine hoistable masts for conventional submarines. Founded in 1962, the company generated pro forma net sales of €61.7 million in the fiscal year 2025, with an EBIT (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes) of €16.5 million.Further information can be found in our primary market statistics.

Global financial markets showed mixed performance in February, with several challenges driving increased volatility late in the month. Despite these fluctuations, the FTSE Mondo Visione Index closed at 100,087.05 points, a 3.2% increase from its January close of 96,985.19. Markets remained largely stable following the U.S. Supreme Court's February 20 ruling, which rejected broad U.S. tariffs imposed in 2025 under the guise of national security. The top five exchanges by market capitalisation at the end of February were CME Group ($115.13 bn), Intercontinental Exchange ($94.29 bn), Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing ($67.91 bn), London Stock Exchange Group ($61.63 bn), and Deutsche Boerse ($50.43 bn). In terms of capital returns in U.S. dollars, the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange was the month's standout performer, with its share price increasing by 25.7% from February 1 to February 28, 2026. Japan Exchange Group followed with a 25.1% rise, and Croatia's Zagrebacka Burza dd recorded an 18.1% increase over the same period. Conversely, the Saudi Tadawul Group saw the largest decline, with its share price falling 14.9%. Nasdaq and TMX Group also saw decreases of 9.6% and 9.1%, respectively. Herbie Skeete, Managing Director of Mondo Visione and Co-founder of the Index, commented on the month's top performer: "The Tel Aviv Stock Exchange's transition to a Monday-to-Friday trading week, effective January 5, 2026, aligns it with global markets and appears to have enhanced its appeal to foreign investors." For a detailed analysis of February's market performance, download the full report here. 1-YEAR PERFORMANCE CHART OF THE FTSE MONDO VISIONE EXCHANGES INDEX (USD CAPITAL RETURN) Source: FTSE Group, data as at 27 February 2026 Monthly FTSE Mondo Visione Exchanges Index Performance (Capital Return, USD) July 2014 3.1% August 2014 2.3% September 2014 -3.6% October 2014 2.8% November 2014 2.5% December 2014 -0.5% January 2015 -1.0% February 2015 8.5% March 2015 0.0% April 2015 10.7% May 2015 0.1% June 2015 -3.2% July 2015 -2.7% August 2015 -5.3% September 2015 -2.1% October 2015 7.6% November 2015 0.4% December 2015 -2.2% January 2016 -4,7% February 2016 -0.7% March 2016 6.7% April 2016 0.4% May 2016 1.8% June 2016 -2.2% July 2016 5.3% August 2016 2.3% September 2016 -1.6% October 2016 -1.6% November 2016 2.1% December 2016 0.1% January 2017 6.0% February 2017 -0.8% March 2017 1.4% April 2017 0.8% May 2017 1.6% June 2017 5.6% July 2017 2.7% August 2017 0.3% September 2017 3.6% October 2017 -0.7% November 2017 6.4% December 2017 -0.7% January 2018 10% February 2018 -0.5% March 2018 -1.6% April 2018 -1.0% May 2018 -1.5% June 2018 -0.8% July 2018 -0.7% August 2018 2.4% September 2018 -1.7% October 2018 1.0% November 2018 3.1% December 2018 -4.2% January 2019 5.4% February 2019 1.7% March 2019 -2.6% April 2019 4.6% May 2019 1.5% June 2019 4.3% July 2019 2.2% August 2019 3.7% September 2019 -0.8% October 2019 2.0% November 2019 -0.5% December 2019 1.6% January 2020 5.0% February 2020 -7.4% March 2020 -11.5% April 2020 8.0% May 2020 6.7% June 2020 2.3% July 2020 6.6% August 2020 4.9% September 2020 -5.2% October 2020 -6.7% November 2020 8.9% December 2020 7.2% January 2021 0.8% February 2021 1.4% March 2021 -2.7% April 2021 3.3% May 2021 2.5% June 2021 0.4% July 2021 0.4% August 2021 0.1% September 2021 -4.2% October 2021 5.9% November 2021 -5.6% December 2021 4.9% January 2022 -2.2% February 2022 -3.5% March 2022 3.5% April 2022 -8.6% May 2022 -5.1% June 2022 -0.7% July 2022 2.4% August 2022 -3.9% September 2022 -8.8% October 2022 -1.1% November 2022 11.5% December 2022 -2.9% January 2023 3.8% February 2023 -4.1% March 2023 5.0% April 2023 0.9% May 2023 -3.9% June 2023 3.8% July 2023 4.6% August 2023 -2.3% September 2023 -3.0% October 2023 -0.6% November 2023 7.7% December 2023 3.8% January 2024 -2.7% February 2024 4.3% March 2024 -0.1% April 2024 -3.8% May 2024 1.3% June 2024 -0.4% July 2024 3.2% August 2024 8.2% September 2024 4.7% October 2024 -1.2% November 2024 2.6% December 2024 -3.1% January 2025 4.3% February 2025 5.6% March 2025 2.2% April 2025 3.5% May 2025 4.4% June 2025 0.8% July 2025 -2.9% August 2025 -0.7% September 2025 -3.1% October 2025 -3.2% November 2025 3.6% December 2025 -0.4% January 2026 3.2% February 2026 3.2%   About FTSE Mondo Visione Exchanges Index The FTSE Mondo Visione Exchanges Index, a joint venture between FTSE Group and Mondo Visione, was established in 2000. It is the first Index in the world to focus on listed exchanges and other trading venues. The FTSE Mondo Visione Exchanges Index compares performance of individual exchanges and trading platforms and provides a reliable barometer of the health and performance of the exchange sector. It enables investors to track 33 publicly listed exchanges and trading floors and focuses attention of the market on this important sector. The FTSE Mondo Visione Exchanges Index includes all publicly traded stock exchanges and trading floors: Australian Securities Exchange Ltd B3 SA Bolsa de Comercio Santiago Bolsa Mexicana de Valores SA Boursa Kuwait Securities BSE Bulgarian Stock Exchange Bursa de Valori Bucuresti SA Bursa Malaysia Cboe Global Markets CME Group Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange PLC Deutsche Bourse Dubai Financial Market Euronext Hellenic Exchanges SA Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd Intercontinental Exchange Inc Japan Exchange Group, Inc Johannesburg Stock Exchange Ltd London Stock Exchange Group Multi Commodity Exchange of India Nairobi Securities Exchange Nasdaq New Zealand Exchange Ltd Philippine Stock Exchange Saudi Tadawul Group Singapore Exchange Ltd Tel Aviv Stock Exchange TMX Group Warsaw Stock Exchange Zagreb Stock Exchange The FTSE Mondo Visione Exchanges Index is compiled by FTSE Group from data based on the share price performance of listed exchanges and trading platforms.

Nigerian Exchange Group (NGX Group), in partnership with Central Securities Clearing System (CSCS) and Women in Management, Business and Public Service (WIMBIZ), will mark International Women’s Day 2026 by Ringing the Bell for Gender Equality on March 10 at Nigerian Exchange Group House in Lagos. The event will leverage the Closing Gong Ceremony to highlight the role of capital markets in promoting gender equality. The ceremony is part of the global Ring the Bell for Gender Equality campaign, which mobilizes stock exchanges worldwide to expand women’s participation in the economy and advance gender-inclusive practices. This year’s event is held in collaboration with the International Finance Corporation (IFC), UN Women, World Federation of Exchanges (WFE), UN Global Compact, and the Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative (SSEI), under the theme: “Rights. Justice. Action. For ALL Women and Girls.” Dignitaries expected at the ceremony include Bianca Odumegwu-Ojukwu, Honourable Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; Her Excellency, Barr. Chioma Uzodimma, First Lady of Imo State; Frana Chukwuogor, Executive Commissioner, Legal & Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); Funke Akindele, award-winning actor and founder of FAAN; Ojinnika Olaghere, Director, NGX Group; and Fatima Wali-Abdulrahman of NGX Group, alongside board members of NGX Group, regulators, capital market stakeholders, and industry leaders. NGX Group will join exchanges worldwide in sounding the NGX Gong to underscore the importance of inclusive leadership, equal opportunities, and stronger market accountability in advancing gender equality. The ceremony welcomes all who wish to be part of this celebration, register now to participate ngxgroup.com/iwd2026

TMX Group today announced its financing activity on Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and TSX Venture Exchange (TSXV) for February 2026. TSX welcomed 28 new issuers in February 2026, compared with 23 in the previous month and 25 in February 2025. The new listings were 22 exchange traded funds, four mining companies, one life sciences company and one financial services company. Total financings raised in February 2026 increased 392% compared to the previous month, and were up 237% compared to February 2025. The total number of financings in February 2026 was 79, compared with 40 the previous month and 53 in February 2025. For additional data relating to the number of transactions billed for TSX, please click on the following link: https://www.tmx.com/resource/en/440. There were three new issuers on TSXV in February 2026, compared with one in the previous month and four in February 2025. The new listings were two mining companies and one clean technology company. Total financings raised in February 2026 increased 68% compared to the previous month, and were up 183% compared to February 2025. There were 124 financings in February 2026, compared with 158 in the previous month and 88 in February 2025. TMX Group consolidated trading statistics for February 2026 can be viewed at www.tmx.com. Related Document:TMX Group Equity Financing Statistics – February 2026

The current reports for the week of March 03, 2026 are now available. Report data is also available in the CFTC Public Reporting Environment (PRE), which allows users to search, filter, customize and download report data. Additional information on Commitments of Traders (COT) | CFTC.gov Historical Viewable Historical Compressed COT Release Schedule CFTC Public Reporting Environment (PRE) PRE User Guide PRE Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

The latest reports for January 2026 are now available. Additional information on Financial Data for FCMs market reports:

Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chairman Michael S. Selig today announced Brigitte Weyls, senior advisor, will depart the Commission following more than 17 years of distinguished public service. Weyls joined the CFTC in August 2008. Over the course of her tenure, she played an important role in many of the Commission’s most significant litigation, policy, and rulemaking initiatives. Her work helped shape the agency’s approach to emerging and complex markets, including prediction markets, digital assets, and precious metals. “Brigitte brought deep expertise and dedication to everything she did at the Commission,” Chairman Selig said. “Her contributions to the Commission have been significant, and we thank her for her many years of service.” During her tenure, Weyls held roles in the Division of Enforcement, Division of Market Oversight, and the Office of the General Counsel. While in the Division of Enforcement, she stood up the agency’s Triage Unit, establishing a centralized function responsible for the intake, evaluation, and prioritization of enforcement referrals and complaints. Weyls later served as chief counsel to Commissioner Caroline D. Pham and as senior counsel to acting Chairman Pham. She also served as the designated federal officer for the Global Markets Advisory Committee and the Agricultural Advisory Committee. Weyls is a graduate of Denison University and DePaul University College of Law.

A total turnover of 3.695 billion shares worth ₦177.687 billion in 370,980 deals was traded this week by investors on the floor of the Exchange, in contrast to a total of 5.494 billion shares valued at ₦196.709 billion that exchanged hands last week in 370,233 deals. Click here for full details.

Please be advised the MIAX Options, MIAX Pearl Options, MIAX Emerald Options, MIAX Sapphire Options, MIAX Pearl Equities and MIAX Futures Exchanges are scheduled to begin Daylight Saving Time at 2:00 a.m. ET on Sunday, March 8, 2026. The MIAX Exchange Group will adjust system time clocks ahead 1 hour for trading beginning Monday, March 9, 2026.If you have any questions relating to options or equities trading, please contact TradingOperations@miaxglobal.com.

CCP Global is pleased to announce the publication of the CCP Global Public Quantitative Disclosure (PQD) Quarterly Trends Report (QTR) for 2025 Q4, which can be viewed here.  The CCP Global PQD QTR provides a detailed insight into the global CCP PQD landscape through various charts and analysis. The report offers market participants with a view of the distribution of collateral across Americas, APAC and EMEA. This and previous quarters' QTRs can also be found on the CCP Global website, alongside the CCP Global PQD Template, FAQ Guide, and all 60+ PQDs used to compile the report. 

The post-pandemic inflation surge placed severe strain on our societies, fuelled political frustration and amplified institutional distrust. It also hit the most vulnerable hardest – those with low incomes and without real assets. But although the scars of this episode are still visible, pressure is building on central banks around the world to shift their focus away from inflation and towards growth. These calls are emerging at a time when central bank independence is under mounting pressure and fiscal consolidation is being constrained by deep political polarisation.[1] In the euro area, these arguments are sometimes framed as a push for a dual mandate, urging the ECB to place greater weight on employment alongside price stability, often drawing explicit comparisons with the Federal Reserve’s statutory objectives. In my remarks today, I will argue that a dual mandate rarely leads to fundamentally different policy prescriptions. In a world marked by more frequent supply-side shocks, the main challenge of central banks, regardless of their mandate, is to preserve a credible commitment to price stability. I will also draw lessons for monetary policy today and discuss the implications of the rise of artificial intelligence (AI), which could boost productivity and help ease the supply-side constraints arising from reduced immigration and demographic ageing. From stagflation to central bank independence Calls for central banks to prioritise growth often appear intuitively reasonable. Growth creates jobs, raises incomes and strengthens the fabric of society. During the 1960s and 1970s, many central banks responded to exactly this logic. They often subordinated monetary policy to fiscal and political objectives, adopting policies explicitly aimed at sustaining growth and keeping unemployment low. History has shown that such policies can come at a high cost. Across countries, inflation rose sharply in the 1970s, forcing central banks to aggressively tighten monetary policy, resulting in a surge in unemployment (Slide 2). Stagflation severely eroded trust in economic institutions. This experience gave rise to the institutional framework we rely on today: independent central banks with clear mandates to anchor inflation expectations through credibility. This framework is built on the modern consensus of a vertical long-run Phillips curve, which invalidates the pre-1960s view of a stable, exploitable inflation-unemployment trade-off.[2] Yet, different economies drew lessons in different ways. Some, like the euro area, chose a single central bank mandate focused squarely on price stability, with growth and employment treated as secondary objectives. Others, like the United States, opted for a dual mandate, explicitly balancing price stability with maximum employment. Although policy paths have not always been fully aligned across these frameworks, both have ultimately succeeded in delivering price stability and anchoring inflation expectations. This shared success raises two deeper questions relevant to today’s debates. First, how does the conduct of monetary policy under a single mandate differ in practice from that under a dual mandate? Do these mandates produce materially different policy responses, or does the inflation process impose constraints that are more similar than the institutional language would suggest? Second, if the institutional framework was built to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, what risks arise today when central banks are asked to place greater weight on employment? Have changes in labour markets, central bank credibility and the nature of inflation made these risks more manageable than before? Single and dual mandates often lead to similar policies The answer to the first question is that the distinction between a single and a dual mandate is often largely inconsequential. In practice, stabilising inflation and stabilising employment often lead to the same policy response. For demand-driven fluctuations, this is self-evident. When demand weakens, inflation tends to fall and unemployment rises. In this case, both a price stability mandate and an employment mandate point towards monetary policy easing. Conversely, when demand overheats, inflation rises and labour markets tighten. Then both mandates point towards monetary policy tightening. This insight closely resembles what economists call the “divine coincidence”: in a typical business cycle, monetary policy stabilises demand in a way that keeps both inflation and employment close to their desired levels. The dual mandate only truly “bites” when stabilising inflation requires accepting weaker employment outcomes. But even if such a trade-off arises, both mandates often lead to similar policies. The pandemic provides a recent illustration. When inflation surged, central banks around the world – whether operating under a single mandate or pursuing explicit employment objectives – responded with comparable vigour, even if doing so meant tolerating higher unemployment (Slide 3). The reason is straightforward: once the combination of excess savings, rising energy prices and disrupted global supply chains began to feed into inflation expectations and second-round effects, restoring price stability to limit the broader economic fallout became the overriding task. As a result, the scope for divergence was limited. Monetary policy had to ensure that supply-side shocks did not translate into persistently higher inflation. The same logic also works in reverse. In the euro area, once the disinflation process was firmly under way and medium-term inflation expectations remained anchored, the ECB began to remove policy restriction, even though domestic inflation was still elevated. This decision reflected a forward-looking assessment: maintaining an overly restrictive stance for too long would have risked imposing unnecessary economic costs in terms of weaker growth and higher unemployment. The experience during the pandemic thus illustrates an important point: a central bank with a single mandate is not indifferent to employment outcomes. It recognises that price stability must be secured in a manner that minimises avoidable volatility in output and labour markets. This is closely mirrored in the ECB’s mandate: price stability is the primary objective, while support for employment is conditional on it – that is, “without prejudice to the objective of price stability”.[3] For a central bank with a dual mandate, monetary policy is better understood as a balancing exercise rather than a lexicographic ordering.[4] Still, inflation imposes a constraint: employment can be supported only insofar as inflation remains consistent with price stability; once inflation deviates sustainably, the scope for employment support narrows sharply. In practice, many central banks therefore operate in remarkably similar ways, regardless of the formal structure of their mandates. The broad consensus, built over decades, is that without price stability, maximum employment cannot be sustained. The real distinction between mandates may therefore lie less in day-to-day policy decisions and more in communication, accountability and the political economy of central banking. Pandemic revealed limits of supporting employment This brings me to the second question: if the institutional framework of inflation targeting and central bank independence emerged because attempts to foster employment proved destabilising, then why would one think that asking central banks to pay more attention to employment today would lead to better outcomes? The pandemic offers three lessons suggesting this confidence may be misplaced. More frequent supply shocks make monetary policy more challenging The first is that monetary policy becomes more of an art than a science when supply shocks become more prevalent.[5] In the years before the pandemic, policymakers increasingly came to believe that the Phillips curve was flat, as inflation proved remarkably unresponsive to tightening labour markets (Slide 4).[6] This experience helped explain why major central banks, including the ECB, entered the pandemic with policy settings that were historically accommodative, designed to tighten labour markets, strengthen wage growth and ultimately lift inflation back to target on a sustained basis. This growing conviction, however, fostered a misconception: namely that inflation could not re-emerge rapidly under certain conditions. In reality, the slope of the Phillips curve only tells us how inflation responds to changes in slack, holding other shocks constant. But a very flat curve does not imply immunity from inflation. That is what we saw during the pandemic. While strong demand played a role, the inflation episode was not simply a movement along a stable Phillips curve. Instead, we saw a steepening of the curve and large upward shifts, driven by supply bottlenecks, energy shocks and changes in price-setting behaviour and inflation expectations.[7] Looking ahead, the global economy is likely to be exposed more frequently to such supply-side disturbances – from energy price spikes and trade fragmentation to climate-related shocks. The recent escalation of the conflict in Iran, which has heavily affected energy markets and shipping routes, serves as a stark reminder of this vulnerability. As a result, managing inflation – regardless of whether central banks have single or dual mandates – is not about fine-tuning unemployment along a stable Phillips curve; it is about credibly committing to the inflation target. In today’s more volatile world, policy cannot rely on established empirical relationships. It must operate under uncertainty about the type, size, persistence and transmission of shocks. Judgement then becomes as important as models, and credibility becomes the central policy asset. In response to these insights, major central banks have adjusted their policy frameworks. The Federal Reserve has moved away from its flexible average inflation targeting approach, which had emphasised making up for past shortfalls by allowing inflation to run above target for some time. In the same vein, the ECB in its latest strategy statement no longer highlights a willingness to allow inflation to overshoot.[8] Running the economy hot can fuel second-round effects The second lesson is closely related: putting too much emphasis on employment can make it more difficult to control inflation. A key lesson from the pandemic is that when labour markets are tight, supply shocks transmit more forcefully into prices and wages. Second-round effects play an important role in understanding this mechanism. When unemployment is low and vacancies are high, workers have more bargaining power to recover real wages after an inflation shock. At the same time, firms are more likely to pass higher input costs into output prices to protect their margins when demand is strong enough to tolerate price increases. These processes can take place even when longer-term inflation expectations remain anchored. This is essentially what we observed during the pandemic inflation surge. In 2021 and 2022, the wage drift – reflecting firm-level adjustments, bonuses and labour market pressures beyond negotiated agreements – was a dominant driver of growth in compensation per employee in the euro area (Slide 5, left-hand side). In a tight labour market, employers typically offer newly hired or incumbent employees higher wages than those set out in prevailing collective agreements.[9] At the same time, firms were quick to pass on rising input costs to consumers. Many firms began to adjust prices far more frequently than they had done previously, reflecting demand conditions that were sufficiently robust to accommodate this pass-through (Slide 5, right-hand side).[10] In that sense, running the economy hot may make second-round effects more likely – and once these take hold, monetary policy would need to tighten more aggressively to prevent a wage-price spiral, eroding earlier employment benefits. Supply-side constraints make expansionary policy less effective The third lesson is that expansionary policies become less effective in stimulating employment once the economy is close to its potential. In the years following the sovereign debt crisis, the euro area economy operated below capacity. Unemployment was high, labour force participation was depressed and large parts of the workforce were either underemployed or discouraged. In this environment, an accommodative monetary policy stance delivered tangible gains. Existing slack was gradually reabsorbed, participation increased and unemployment fell (Slide 6, left-hand side). Monetary policy helped bring idle resources back into productive use. But once slack was absorbed, policy began to run into diminishing marginal returns.[11] Matching frictions became more and more important, slowing the pace at which unemployment could fall and driving up the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio (Slide 6, right-hand side). In such an environment, additional demand stimulus cannot sustainably increase employment. In fact, a large part of the improvement in euro area labour markets observed in recent years reflected supply‑side responses rather than demand stimulus.[12] In particular, rising participation and a significant influx of foreign workers helped expand the labour force and alleviate shortages. Foreign‑born workers accounted for around half of labour force growth in recent years, helping firms meet demand and significantly contributing to GDP growth (Slide 7). In that sense, over the past 15 years, the euro area economy has transitioned from a primarily demand-constrained regime to one in which supply constraints have become more prevalent. And in a supply-constrained environment, expansionary demand policies become a less effective tool for increasing employment or growth.[13] Implications for monetary policy today What do these lessons imply for monetary policy today? Euro area inflation is projected to be at our 2% target over the medium term. In the near term, the recent spike in energy prices following the tensions in Iran makes the inflation path more uncertain. However, as long as deviations from our target – in either direction – remain temporary and small with well-anchored inflation expectations, they are of limited relevance for policy decisions, as they naturally occur when an economy is exposed to volatile energy prices (Slide 8). What matters for monetary policy is the medium-term outlook – that is, whether underlying price dynamics and wage developments are consistent with the target over the policy-relevant horizon. Judged on this basis, the lessons from the pandemic suggest that policymakers must tread carefully. Inflation could re-emerge with tight labour markets and strong domestic demand Although vacancy rates have declined from historical peaks, labour markets across the euro area remain tight by most conventional metrics. Unemployment is low by historical standards and is below estimates of the natural rate of unemployment (Slide 9, left-hand side). Firms in many sectors continue to report difficulties in filling positions (Slide 9, right-hand side). This tightness directly feeds into wages. While negotiated wage growth is expected to moderate, overall compensation per employee remains elevated relative to levels consistent with stable inflation (Slide 10). Wage drift continues to add to total labour costs in an environment where labour is becoming structurally scarcer owing to rapid demographic ageing, moderating immigration and rising skill mismatches. This constellation of factors poses upside risks to the future trajectory of domestic inflation, particularly in labour-intensive services where wages account for a large share of total costs and the pass‑through tends to be gradual but persistent. At the same time, expansionary fiscal policy is increasingly underpinning aggregate demand, pushing the economy towards its potential or even beyond it (Slide 11, left-hand side). In the manufacturing sector, new orders and expectations for future output have risen markedly and are now at their highest levels since the Russian invasion of Ukraine four years ago (Slide 11, right-hand side). In parallel, governments are actively responding to shifts in the global trade and security order. New trade agreements are opening alternative markets that should help offset part of the slowdown in trade with the United States. Efforts are also intensifying to better leverage the EU’s Single Market. Governments are reducing internal barriers to further strengthen both domestic demand and resilience.[14] Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that the ongoing adjustment in global trade patterns is unlikely to have a material impact on the euro area inflation outlook. ECB staff analysis finds that the estimated impact of trade diversion from China on the euro area is modest and statistically insignificant (Slide 12, left-hand side).[15] Even under extreme counterfactual scenarios in which imports from China rise markedly and import prices fall noticeably, the estimated impact on core inflation would remain small.[16] The exchange rate does not materially alter this picture. Since last summer, the euro has remained broadly stable in both nominal and real effective terms, including against the Chinese renminbi (Slide 12, right-hand side). Most of the appreciation observed in the first half of last year can be interpreted as a sign of confidence in the euro and in Europe’s economic potential at a time of elevated geopolitical uncertainty. The upshot is that, with tight labour markets and strengthening domestic demand, price pressures could re-emerge if demand outpaces supply. The lessons from the pandemic suggest that, in this environment, central banks should focus on anchoring expectations rather than trying to fine-tune economic activity. Higher productivity driven by AI may ease monetary policy stance endogenously Central to understanding the evolving balance between supply and demand, and its implications for price stability, is whether technological progress driven by AI can meaningfully relax supply-side constraints arising from declining immigration and demographic ageing. A critical but unresolved question is whether AI will be labour-augmenting or labour-substituting. History suggests that, at least over the medium to long run, most general-purpose technologies, including digital technologies, enhance labour rather than replace it (Slide 13).[17] Recent firm-level evidence points in a similar direction: AI adoption appears to be associated more with task reallocation and productivity gains than with broad-based employment losses.[18] The challenge for central banks lies in identifying the effects of AI in real time. As with digital technologies in the 1990s, the adoption and widespread use of AI technology may take time to unfold, and early signals of productivity gains may be fragmented and slow to appear in macroeconomic data. This was essentially Alan Greenspan's wager at the time: he recognised that potential output was rising even before it was visible in headline statistics, and he was ultimately proven right when productivity growth surged. Also today, central banks need to consider the possibility that accelerating investment expenditure could be foreshadowing a rise in the economy’s supply potential. In this case, the monetary policy stance would ease endogenously, as higher productivity growth raises the marginal product of capital, which in turn increases the equilibrium real interest rate.[19] And if the equilibrium real rate rises, leaving policy rates unchanged would automatically imply a more accommodative stance, unless inflation fell at the same pace.[20] In that sense, central banks would already be accommodating the AI shock simply by not tightening, allowing the economy to expand without generating undue inflationary pressures.[21] In the euro area, expectations of stronger underlying growth, bolstered by the German fiscal package and a growing European reform momentum, have already led to a measurable and persistent rise in real distant forward rates – a widely-used market-based measure of the natural rate of interest (Slide 14, left-hand side). This trend could be reinforced by rising investment in and adoption of AI. However, today’s conditions call for greater prudence than in the late 1990s for two main reasons. The first is that, at the time, productivity data already showed signs of acceleration by the mid-1990s. The Federal Reserve did not bet on purely hypothetical gains. Today, by contrast, productivity growth remains subdued, at least in the euro area, and there is considerable uncertainty around the timing, scale and distribution of the productivity effects of AI. The transmission into measurable aggregate productivity may be gradual, uneven across sectors and accompanied by transitional frictions.[22] In fact, in the short run AI is more likely to be inflationary than disinflationary.[23] It requires large investments in energy-intensive data centres and may create new bottlenecks in specialised chips and skilled labour. The second reason for greater prudence today is that the stakes are arguably higher. The long period of elevated inflation, and the marked rise in the frequency of supply shocks, has left inflation expectations more fragile than in the past, as shown by the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey.[24] Despite the significant progress we have made in bringing inflation down, median inflation expectations remain elevated across horizons, while mean inflation expectations have been creeping up even before the recent energy price shock (Slide 14, right-hand side). In this context, the costs of misjudging the balance between supply and demand are higher. If central banks were to accommodate aggregate demand based on AI optimism and inflation were to resurge, the loss of credibility would be severe. It could also fuel financial stability risks at a time when market participants are already concerned about potential overvaluations. A prudent approach, therefore, is to let the data guide policy rather than relying on a still speculative narrative. Conclusion All in all, and with this I would like to conclude, the ECB’s price stability mandate is well-equipped and robust to deal with the challenges central banks face today. It provides a firm anchor in a world marked by more frequent supply-side shocks, and it is flexible enough to accommodate temporary deviations from target while keeping policy firmly focused on the medium term. In this volatile world, the lessons from the pandemic suggest that central banks should resist the temptation to fine-tune the economy, accommodate fiscal policy or deliberately run the economy hot in pursuit of marginal short-term gains. The costs of misjudgement can be significant: credibility, once eroded, is difficult to rebuild. Current monetary policy in the euro area is firmly grounded in these lessons. With inflation projected to be at our target over the medium term and inflation expectations anchored, monetary policy remains in a good place. But we cannot be complacent. We need to be vigilant as the current geopolitical and macroeconomic environment creates upside risks to inflation over the policy-relevant horizon. In particular, we must carefully monitor the persistence of the energy price shock, its impact on inflation expectations and any indication that firms start passing through higher input costs to their customers. Over time, the adoption and widespread use of new technologies like AI could expand supply, raise the natural rate of interest and relieve some of these structural constraints. The task of monetary policy will be to identify these forces and calibrate policy appropriately. Thank you. Annexes 6 March 2026 Navigating inflation and employment in an era of supply shocks and AI – Presentation slides See also Kase H. et al. (2026), “The perils of narrowing fiscal spaces”, BIS Working Papers, No 1328. Friedman, M. (1968), “The Role of Monetary Policy”, American Economic Review, Vol. 58, No 1, pp. 1-17; and Phelps, E. S. (1967), “Phillips Curves, Expectations of Inflation and Optimal Unemployment over Time”, Economica, Vol. 34, No 135, pp. 254-281. See Article 127(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The ECB’s primary mandate is price stability, but it is also tasked with supporting general economic policies in the EU, including policies to maintain high levels of employment – provided this does not conflict with price stability. See also Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statement on Longer Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, as reaffirmed effective 27 January 2026. See also Blinder, A. S. (1998), Central Banking in Theory and Practice, MIT Press. Costain, J., Nakov, A. and Petit, B. (2022), “Flattening of the Phillips Curve with State-Dependent Prices and Wages Purchased”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 132, No 642, pp. 546-581; Benigno, P. and Ricci, L. A. (2011), “The inflation-output trade-off with downward wage rigidities”, American Economic Review, Vol. 101, No 4, pp. 1436-1466; Lombardi, M., Riggi, M. and Viviano, E. (2023), “Workers’ Bargaining Power and the Phillips Curve: A Micro–Macro Analysis”, Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 21, No 5, pp. 1905-1943; and Kohlscheen, E. and Moessner, R. (2022), “Globalisation and the slope of the Phillips curve”, Economics Letters, Vol. 216. See, for example, L’Huillier, J.-P. and Phelan, G. (2025), “Can Supply Shocks Be Inflationary with a Flat Phillips Curve?”, International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 21, No 2, April; and Gudmundsson, T., Jackson, C., and Portillo, R. (2024), “The Shifting and Steepening of Phillips Curves During the Pandemic Recovery: International Evidence and Some Theory” , IMF Working Paper Series, WP/24/7. The evidence remains inconclusive as to whether the slope of the Phillips curve has steepened during the pandemic. See Beaudry, P., Hou, C. and Portier, F. (2025), “On the Fragility of the Nonlinear Phillips Curve View of Recent Inflation”, NBER Working Papers, No 33522, National Bureau of Economic Research; and Beschin, A. et al. (2025), “The slope of the euro area price Phillips curve: evidence from regional data”, Working Paper Series, No 3133, ECB, Frankfurt am Main, October. ECB (2025), The ECB’s monetary policy strategy statement (2025). See also Bates, C., Bodnár, K. and Schlieker, K. (2024), “Recent developments in wages and the role of wage drift”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 6, ECB. Ghassibe, M. and Nakov, A. (2025), “Business Cycles with Pricing Cascades”, Working Paper Series, ECB, No 3123. See also Schnabel, I. (2020), “Monetary policy in changing conditions”, speech at the second EBI Policy Conference on “Europe and the Covid-19 Crisis – Looking back and looking forward”, Frankfurt am Main, 4 November; and Schnabel, I. (2020), “COVID-19 and monetary policy: Reinforcing prevailing challenges”, speech at The Bank of Finland Monetary Policy webinar: New Challenges to Monetary Policy Strategies, Frankfurt am Main, 24 November. See also Lagarde, C. (2025), “Beyond hysteresis: resilience in Europe’s labour market”, opening panel remarks at the annual Economic Policy Symposium “The policy implications of labour market transition” organised by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City in Jackson Hole, Jackson Hole, 23 August. Aggregate labour market outcomes are primarily structural in nature, reflecting unemployment benefits, the degree of union density, the tax wedge and product market policies which include opportunities for new firms to access markets. Schnabel, I. (2026), “Made in Europe”, speech at a lecture in memory of Eugen Böhm von Bawerk, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna, 11 February. Le Roux, J. and Spital, T. (2026), “Global trade redirection: tracking the role of trade diversion from US tariffs in Chinese export developments”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 1, ECB. Corsello, F., Pica, S. and Venditti, F. (2025), “The Great Wall of Chinese goods: The effect of tariff-induced re-rerouting on euro area consumer prices”, VOXEU column, 12 June. See also Autor, D. H. (2015), “Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace Automation”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 29, No 3, pp. 3-30. Hampole, M. et al. (2025), “Artificial Intelligence and the Labor Market”, NBER Working Paper No 33509; and Albanesi, S. et al. (2025), “New technologies and jobs in Europe," Economic Policy, Vol. 40(121), pp. 71-139. By contrast, if AI is primarily labour-substituting, it will automate tasks previously performed by workers without enhancing the productivity of remaining jobs. See Barr, M. S. (2026), “What Will Artificial Intelligence Mean for the Labor Market and the Economy?”, speech at the New York Association for Business Economics, New York, 17 February; and Cook, L. D. (2026), opening remarks for the “AI and Productivity across the Economy” panel at “The Great Realignment: Navigating AI, Demographic, and Geoeconomic Shifts”, 42nd Annual NABE Economic Policy Conference, Washington, D.C., 24 February. By contrast, higher labour insecurity arising from the concern that AI is labour-substituting could raise precautionary savings, thereby counteracting the impact of higher productivity growth on the natural rate of interest. Similarly, upward pressure on the natural rate would be mitigated if AI were to cause an increase in income and wealth inequality. See, for example, Aoki, Y. et al. (2025), “Expecting job replacement by GenAI: effects on workers' economic outlook and behavior”, BIS Working Paper, No 1269, May; and Rockall, E. J., Tavares, M. M. and Pizzinelli, C. (2025), “AI Adoption and Inequality”, IMF Working Paper, No 2025/068, April. Price and wage rigidities imply that even if cost savings from new technologies were to arise immediately, the associated disinflationary impulses would come with a measurable lag. ECB research shows that monetary policy itself may affect investment in innovative technologies. See Elfsbacka-Schmöller, M., Goldfayn-Frank, O. and Schmidt, T. (2025), „Beyond the short run: monetary policy and innovation investment”, Working Paper Series, ECB, No 3080. See also Daly, M. (2026), “The AI Moment? Possibilities, Productivity, and Policy”, speech at the Silicon Valley Leadership Group, San Jose, 17 February. See also Jefferson, P. N. (2026), “Economic Outlook and Supply-Side (Dis)Inflation Dynamics”, speech at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 6 February. See also Blanco, A., Ottonello, P. and Ranošová, T. (2025), “The Dynamics of Large Inflation Surges”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, March, pp. 1-31.

AutoRek, the financial control platform trusted by leading global institutions, has announced the recognition of two team members at WatersTechnology’s Women in Tech & Data Awards. Michelle Earp, VP Marketing, has been recognised as Marketing Professional of the Year, while Amelia Doyle, PMO Lead, has been recognised as Gender Equality/Diversity Professional of the Year (vendor). The Women in Tech & Data Awards celebrate the outstanding contributions of women driving positive change across the industry, recognising those who are not only excelling in their fields, but also inspiring the next generation. Michelle and her team have been key in aligning AutoRek's global growth ambition with our go-to-market execution. Undertaking a marketing transformation that supported the company's expansion into the US while strengthening its presence across EMEA, embedding customer advocacy, partner leverage, and commercial accountability at the heart of it all. Amelia has been recognised for her work leading AutoRek's Women's Resource Group (ERG), building initiatives designed to empower women, foster community, and create tangible pathways for professional growth, including the 'Bring Your Daughter to Work Day', which has since inspired partners including Microsoft to replicate the format. Ali Cowen, Chief People Officer, AutoRek commented: "We are incredibly proud of Michelle and Amelia for this well-deserved recognition. Their contributions go far beyond their day-to-day roles, acting as positive examples to women across the sector as they help to shape a more inclusive and forward-thinking industry. AutoRek is working to ensure women in tech and data have the platform, visibility and support to reach their full potential. Michelle and Amelia’s recognition is a testament to that commitment.”   The awards reflect AutoRek's dedication to fostering an inclusive workplace where women can thrive, lead, and inspire the next generation of talent in technology, data, and financial services.

Today, ACER releases its report on the Danish gas transmission tariffs directed at Energinet, Denmark’s transmission system operator (TSO). The report assesses the compliance of the proposed reference price methodology (RPM) with the requirements of the EU Network Code on Harmonised Transmission Tariff Structures (NC TAR). What is the proposed tariff methodology? The Danish TSO proposes to: Apply a uniform postage stamp reference price methodology with an ex-post entry-exit split, combined with discounts for gas storage facilities. Continue recovering transmission revenues through capacity-based tariffs only, meaning users pay based on the network capacity they book, not the volume of gas they transport. Maintain the existing joint market zone, which integrates the upstream section of the Baltic Pipe (the pipeline connecting Norwegian gas to Poland via Denmark) into the Danish entry-exit zone. Costs of this infrastructure continue to be covered by network users through a separate non-transmission tariff. Keep two non-transmission services in place: upstream Baltic Pipe infrastructure and emergency gas supply. Continue offering ex-ante discounts for interruptible capacity in steps (5% intervals). This allows users to book extra capacity at reduced prices that can be used when the network is not fully utilised, though it may be interrupted if users with guaranteed capacity rights need network access. What are ACER’s key findings?  After analysing the consultation document, ACER concludes that: The proposed methodology meets EU rules on transparency, non-discrimination and volume risk. Compliance with the requirements on cost-reflectivity, avoidance of cross-subsidisation and the prevention of cross-border trade distortions cannot be fully assessed due to lack of detail on the upstream infrastructure. There is insufficient information to assess whether the proposed pricing for the upstream non-transmission services complies with network code principles. The proposed emergency supply tariff falls outside the scope of the network code framework (which covers transmission and non-transmission services provided to network users), as it pays for a security-of-supply service provided directly to end users. Read more about ACER findings and recommendations.

Solactive announces its collaboration with Harvest Global Investments Limited (“Harvest Global”) on the launch of the Harvest G2 Tech 50 ETF, which tracks the Solactive Harvest Tiger G2 Tech 50 Select Index. The ETF provides exposure to technology companies listed in Hong Kong and the United States within a single rules-based framework. Technology companies represent a significant segment of global equity markets, supported by ongoing developments in areas such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, digital platforms, and hardware and software solutions. The United States hosts many large technology companies, while Hong Kong serves as a key listing venue for Chinese technology firms. By including securities from both markets, the index reflects companies operating across two major innovation ecosystems. The Solactive Harvest Tiger G2 Tech 50 Select Index is a rules-based equity index comprising up to 50 constituents. The selection includes the 30 largest eligible Hong Kong-listed companies by free float market capitalization and the 20 largest eligible U.S.-listed companies by free float total market capitalization. The eligible universe applies minimum size and liquidity thresholds and requires Hong Kong securities to be eligible for Southbound Stock Connect. Constituents are weighted by free float market capitalization, subject to a maximum weight of 8% for Hong Kong components, 5% for U.S. components, and a 38% aggregate cap for U.S. securities. The index is calculated in HKD and rebalanced semi-annually in accordance with the published methodology. The ETF was listed on 6 March 2026 on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange with the ticker code (HKEX:3169). Timo Pfeiffer, Chief Markets Officer at Solactive, commented: “We are pleased to collaborate with Harvest Global on this launch. At Solactive, we work closely with our clients to develop transparent, rules-based index solutions that address evolving market requirements and regional investment frameworks. By combining technology companies listed in Hong Kong and the United States in this index, it aims to provide investors with a diversified tool to invest in the blooming technology sector.” Charlie Chen, Chief Executive Officer at Harvest Global, commented: *“We are pleased to collaborate with Solactive on this latest launch, offering investors a distinctive approach to accessing technology leaders across two of the world's most dynamic innovation hubs. By combining Hong Kong- and U.S.-listed technology companies within a single, rules-based framework, the product addresses growing demand for diversified exposure to the technology sector. We look forward to continuing our partnership with Solactive to bring thematic investment opportunities to Hong Kong investors.” *

London Stock Exchange Group plc (LSEG) announces today that it has purchased the following number of its ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each on the London Stock Exchange from Morgan Stanley & Co. International Plc (Morgan Stanley) as part of its share buyback programme, as announced on 26 February 2026: Ordinary Shares Date of purchase: 05 March 2026 Number of ordinary shares purchased: 599,689 Highest price paid per share: 8,850.00p Lowest price paid per share: 8,650.00p Volume weighted average price per share: 8,752.38p   LSEG intends to cancel all of the purchased shares. Following the cancellation of the repurchased shares, LSEG has 503,525,278 ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each in issue (excluding treasury shares) and holds 21,451,599 of its ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each in treasury. Therefore, the total voting rights in the Company will be 503,525,278. This figure for the total number of voting rights may be used by shareholders (and others with notification obligations) as the denominator for the calculation by which they will determine if they are required to notify their interest in, or a change to their interest in, the Company under the FCA's Disclosure Guidance and Transparency Rules. In accordance with Article 5(1)(b) of Market Abuse Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 (as it forms part of the law of the United Kingdom by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as implemented, retained, amended, extended, re-enacted or otherwise given effect in the United Kingdom from 1 January 2021 and as amended or supplemented in the United Kingdom thereafter) a full breakdown of the individual trades made by the Morgan Stanley on behalf of the Company as part of the buyback programme can be found at: http://www.rns-pdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/5709V_1-2026-3-5.pdf This announcement does not constitute, or form part of, an offer or any solicitation of an offer for securities in any jurisdiction. Schedule of Purchases   Shares purchased: 599,689 Date of purchases: 05 March 2026 Investment firm: Morgan Stanley & Co. International Plc   Aggregate Information: Venue Volume weighted average price Aggregated Volume Lowest price per share Highest price per share XLON 8,755.27p 568,729 8,650.00p 8,850.00p TRQX 8,699.27p 30,960 8,650.00p 8,740.00p

Shanghai Futures Exchange (SHFE) hereby releases the revised Lead Futures Contract Specifications of Shanghai Futures Exchange (the Specifications) and Lead Futures Rules of Shanghai Futures Exchange (the Rules), which have been reviewed and adopted by its Board of Directors and reported to the China Securities Regulatory Commission. The revised Specifications and Rules and the delivery discount shall take effect starting from lead futures contract PB2703 as of March 17, 2026. The delivery discount of the substitute relative to the standard deliverable as set forth in the Specifications is 150 yuan/ ton. Following the completion of delivery for lead futures contract PB2702, secondary lead ingots that conform to the grade and quality specifications for substitute set forth in the Specifications will be eligible to apply for the registration of standard warrant. All related parties shall issue reminders before the implementation of the revised Specifications and Rules. Please visit the official website of SHFE for the Chinese version. If there is any discrepancy between the English version and the Chinese version, the Chinese version shall prevail. Appendices： 1. Comparative Table 2. Lead Futures Contract Specifications of Shanghai Futures Exchange (Revised) 3. Lead Futures Rules of Shanghai Futures Exchange (Revised)  

Good morning,  Mr Yeoh Oon Jin, Chairman, Singapore Institute of Directors  SID Council Members Ladies and Gentlemen 1. I am pleased to join you today at the inaugural SID Chairpersons Guild forum. 2. Singapore’s equity market has seen some encouraging developments in the past year, with improvements in trading volume and valuations. Measures rolled out by the Equities Market Review Group sought to solidify the foundations of a healthy, well-functioning market. a. Investor interest and demand, including in small and mid-cap stocks, have been raised through the EQDP and the enhanced grant support for research coverage.  b. For listed companies, regulations have been streamlined and are more targeted. c. For brokers, we will support initiatives that enable them to offer broader value-added services, to reach their clients and serve them better. 3. The stage, the lighting, the costumes, the music. We have gotten all of these ready, for all of you – Chairmen and Board Directors of listed companies - to now play your parts. We want all our listed companies to be in a position to shine, and we hope that some of our listed companies will grow into superstars. 4. The next stage is critical. It is not something policymakers can make happen on our own. We need the whole ecosystem to work together. New high-quality listings, listed companies communicating new strategies for value creation, and more investors being drawn in. These three developments will form a self-reinforcing dynamic for the sustained growth and deepening of the market.  5. Chairmen and Board Directors of listed companies play a critical role in this next stage. When you create value for your companies and communicate well to the market, you will also create a positive dynamic for the equity market as a whole. Board practices in value-creating companies 6. We know the fundamental elements of value creation. There is a body of research around corporate performance that we can draw on. Let me just highlight a few key areas of research regarding the important role of Boards and management in leading and driving value creation.   a. First, companies should be grounded in strong governance (CG) practices and share more about their practices with investors. A recent study[1] showed that companies that both implement and disclose strong CG practices, provided further support to valuations than just implementing the CG practices. Companies should both implement and disclose.b. Second, companies should implement disciplined capital allocation processes. Strong boards are disciplined stewards of capital. They ensure the right resources are allocated to initiatives that generate value and are prepared to adjust strategies and redeploy or return capital when it is not creating the needed value.  In short, invest more in success and don’t settle for mediocrity. i. One notable study found that companies which were more deliberate about reallocating capital had, on average, higher shareholder returns [2]. ii. Some companies may be concerned about shorter-term earnings uncertainty if resources were allocated to long-term priorities. These concerns can be overcome. A recent study[3] noted that over 90% of investors, primarily institutional, were willing to overlook temporary underperformance if companies articulated compelling long-term strategies aligned with investment objectives. c. Third, companies should have a well-developed strategy for engaging investors. i. This extends beyond disclosures, to more comprehensive efforts to strengthen companies’ Investor Relations capabilities. ii. One study[4] found evidence that small and mid-cap companies can benefit from concerted Investor Relations efforts.iii. The study found that small and mid-cap companies that had sharper, well-articulated Investor Relations strategies generally saw increases in disclosure, media coverage, trading activity, institutional investor ownership and analyst following, resulting in positive impact on valuations.  MAS’ support to build good board practices  7. I cannot emphasise enough that strong board leadership can influence strong shareholder outcomes. Many of you already have in place strong corporate governance, business strategy and investor communication practices. We want more listed companies to do so. 8. MAS will support the efforts of chairpersons and boards in putting in place such good practices in place. Let me share three ways we will provide this support. Building capabilities to unlock value  9. First, as part of the Value Unlock programme, MAS and SGX launched two targeted grants to strengthen listed companies’ capabilities. We aim to enable key capabilities in corporate strategy, financial management and investor relations. The grants have two aspects 10. The first is to support learning and training. We recognise companies are at different stages of this journey, and the two grants will address different needs. a. The Equip Grant addresses foundational training needs - the essential building blocks for effective value creation. b. The Elevate Grant is for companies ready to take on deeper shareholder engagement and value creation activities. It provides targeted support, connecting companies with professional consultants to refine strategy, sharpen market positioning and strengthen shareholder communications.  11. The second aspect is practical application. Capability must translate to actions which are visible to investors and the market.  a. Equip Grant recipients must commit to participate in investor and media engagements or maintain an active presence on digital platforms, and participate in investor network events. b. Elevate Grant recipients will need to go further, to publish their shareholder value enhancement plans, key performance targets, and progress reports. c. The SGX Investor Fair is expected to take place by year-end or early next year. It provides a dedicated platform for companies, including grant recipients, to showcase their improvements to corporate governance and long-term value creation.  12. I would like to be very clear about this point. The Value Unlock programme is not just about doing training and giving out grants. It is very much about bringing about transformation in corporate practices and concrete outcomes. We believe the best results are achieved when listed companies own the process and outcomes, and work in partnership with us. We will be closely tracking the progress and outcomes, and will also take feedback as we implement.  Setting norms for value creation  13. Second, we want to establish broad industry norms for value creation practices. 14. We are reviewing the Code of Corporate Governance, or CG code, to uplift market-wide expectations and norms for  Boards’ role in value creation and investor engagement. The review is done in conjunction with SGX and the Corporate Governance Advisory Committee, and will consider possible changes from two angles. 15. The review will look at how the CG Code can place more emphasis on Boards’ responsibilities for shareholder value creation and investor engagement. a. For example, we will consider how the principles of the Code can be supplemented with practical guidance on the topic of value creation. Guidance could be given as to how Boards provide strategic oversight, and challenge to management on issues such as capital efficiency, and whether market valuation adequately reflects a company’s earnings potential and value. 16. The Code review will also look to enhance provisions relating to corporate culture, board effectiveness and risk management. An enhanced Code will help equip boards to better steward long-term shareholder value and build deeper investor confidence.  Enhanced disclosures  17. The third way in which MAS and SGX will support transformation in listed companies is through enhancements to mandatory disclosures. 18. To be clear, disclosures have a role in fostering shareholder communication. However, mandatory disclosures on its own may be insufficient to drive deep and sustainable transformation. It carries the risk of being a box ticking exercise, if there is no real ownership by company leadership, with no sustainable or meaningful benefit for investors or the company.   19. Hence, disclosure requirements are the third plank of our approach, complementing the first plank of building capabilities through the Value Unlock programme, and the second plank, of raising the norms for corporate governance and value creation through the CG Code.  a. SGX will consider mandatory disclosures relevant to shareholder value such as dividend policy, investor relations policy and the link between remuneration and value creation. b. SGX has recently issued a Regulator’s Column, which clarifies the expectations and encourages companies to provide forward guidance. SGX is working with the industry to develop additional resources, that support companies in preparing meaningful forward-looking disclosures. 20. Alongside the review of disclosure requirements and guidance, we have enhanced MAS’ GEMS research scheme to incentivise greater coverage of companies that enhanced their disclosures. Companies that enhance the quality of their disclosures will better position themselves to be covered by research analysts, widening their reach to investors. Conclusion21. As chairpersons, directors and senior leaders, you can lead the transformation of your companies. Many of you have expressed interest in or already applied for the Value Unlock programmes.  22. Some companies are already veterans at shareholder value creation and have established investor trust – please share your experiences with the community of company leaders here. Together, we can raise Singapore's corporate governance standards and build an equity market where strong fundamentals drive sustainable value creation. 23. This is our shared opportunity – let’s build on the good start we have made to establish a sustainable, flourishing market for companies and investors. 24. Thank you very much. *** [1] The impact of corporate governance on firm value: Understanding the role of strategic change. International Review of Economics & Finance, Volume 103, 2025. [2] Corporate long-term behaviours: How CEOs and boards drive sustained value creation – McKinsey & Company, FCLTGlobal, 2020. See also How to put your money where your strategy is, McKinsey Quarterly, 2012. [3] Stewarding Value – Unlocking Market Potential Through Engagement – Stewardship Asia Centre, 2025. [4] Investor relations, firm visibility and investor following, Brian J. Bushee, The Wharton School University of Pennsylvania, Gregory S. Miller, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 2005.  

Following today’s joint issuance by the federal bank regulatory agencies of answers to frequently asked questions to clarify the capital treatment of tokenized securities, the Bank Policy Institute, Futures Industry Association, Global Blockchain Business Council, Global Digital Finance, Global Financial Markets Association, Institute of International Finance, International Swaps and Derivatives Association, and Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association issued the following statement: “Today’s interagency FAQs are a positive first step in providing much needed clarity for banks seeking to engage in tokenized securities activities.  We look forward to further action in the near-term by the U.S. banking agencies to clarify the bank capital treatment of these and other digital asset-related activities.  We would note that expedited revisions of the Basel cryptoasset framework that appropriately reflect recent developments in the digital assets market are needed at the global level.”