LSEG announces it has purchased the following number of its ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each from Citigroup Global Markets Limited ("Citi") on the London Stock Exchange as part of its share buyback programme, as announced on 04 November 2025. Date of purchase: 14 January 2026 Aggregate number of ordinary shares purchased: 111,092 Lowest price paid per share: 8,924.00p Highest price paid per share: 9,066.00p Average price paid per share: 9,001.67p   LSEG intends to cancel all of the purchased shares. Following the cancellation of the repurchased shares, LSEG has 509,388,609 ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each in issue (excluding treasury shares) and holds 21,451,599 of its ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each in treasury. Therefore, the total voting rights in the Company will be 509,388,609. This figure for the total number of voting rights may be used by shareholders (and others with notification obligations) as the denominator for the calculation by which they will determine if they are required to notify their interest in, or a change to their interest in, the Company under the FCA's Disclosure Guidance and Transparency Rules. In accordance with Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 (the Market Abuse Regulation) (as such legislation forms part of retained EU law as defined in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as implemented, retained, amended, extended, re-enacted or otherwise given effect in the United Kingdom from 1 January 2021 and as amended or supplemented in the United Kingdom thereafter), a full breakdown of the individual purchases by Citi on behalf of the Company as part of the buyback programme can be found at: http://www.rns-pdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/9566O_1-2026-1-14.pdf This announcement does not constitute, or form part of, an offer or any solicitation of an offer for securities in any jurisdiction. Schedule of Purchases Shares purchased:       111,092 (ISIN: GB00B0SWJX34) Date of purchases:      14 January 2026 Investment firm:         Citi Aggregate information: Venue Volume-weighted average price Aggregated volume Lowest price per share Highest price per share London Stock Exchange 9,001.67 111,092 8,924.00 9,066.00 Turquoise        

MarketAxess Holdings Inc. (Nasdaq: MKTX), the operator of a leading electronic trading platform for fixed-income securities, will issue a press release announcing its fourth quarter and full year 2025 financial results on Friday, February 6, 2026, before the market opens. Chris Concannon, Chief Executive Officer, and Ilene Fiszel Bieler, Chief Financial Officer, will host a conference call to provide a strategic update and discuss the Company’s financial results and outlook on Friday, February 6, 2026 at 10:00 a.m. ET. To access the conference call, please dial +1-800-715-9871 (U.S.) or +1-646-307-1963 (International) and use the ID 1832176. The Company will also host a live audio Webcast of the conference call on the Investor Relations section of the Company's website at http://investor.marketaxess.com. The Webcast will also be archived on http://investor.marketaxess.com for 90 days following the announcement.

Notice Type: Exchange Notice ID: 1881.011426 2026 Nadex will observe the following modified holiday schedule for the 2026 MLK Day Holiday: Monday, January 19, 2026: The Exchange will open at its regular time at 6:00pm ET on Sunday evening for trade date Monday, January 19th, 2026. The Exchange will list a limited offering of contracts and will close at 5:00pm ET. Contracts will be listed as follows: No Binary contracts will be listed for US indices or commodities on this trade date. They will resume listing at 6PM ET (Monday) for the trade date of Tuesday, January 20, 2026. No Binary contracts will be listed for the following FX currency pairs: AUD/USD, EUR/USD, GBP/USD, and USD/JPY. They will resume listing at 6PM ET (Monday) for the trade date of Tuesday, January 20, 2026. Cryptos will observe their regular schedule. Industry Event - Live Presentations - NAICS 711 will observe their regular schedule. The Exchange will list Crypto currency related products during Monday's trade date and they observe their regular schedule. All other non-Crypto Currency or Industry Event - Live Presentations - NAICS 711 related products will NOT be listed during Monday's trade date. Tuesday, January 20, 2026: The Exchange will observe normal business hours. Wednesday, January 21, 2026: The Exchange will observe normal business hours. Thursday, January 22, 2026: The Exchange will observe normal business hours. Friday, January 23, 2026: The Exchange will observe normal business hours. Additionally, please note, Nadex’s Market Maker Agreement previously identified the following products and time periods as Illiquid Markets: All Intraday 5-Minute, Intraday 2-Hour, Daily, and Weekly, Foreign Currency Binary contracts available for trading, at times the Exchange is open, between the hours of 2:00pm ET and 3:00am ET. Nadex is extending the Illiquid Markets coverage to Cryptocurrency products for trade date January 19, 2026. As such, Nadex authorized Market Makers operating pursuant to a Market Maker Agreement will be relieved of their quoting obligations relating to size on trade date January 19, 2026, from 6:00pm ET on calendar date January 18, 2026, to 5:00pm ET on calendar date January 19, 2026. A Market Maker(s) that elects to quote in any Crypto Currency market during this period will be required to comply with the spread obligations set forth in its Market Maker Agreement. Please refer to the Holiday Product Schedule Guidelines for specific product trading hours. Should you have any questions or require further information, please contact the Compliance Department.

The Canadian Investment Regulatory Organization (CIRO) confirms that as a result of a sophisticated phishing attack, first disclosed in August 2025, approximately 750,000 Canadian investors have been impacted. We deeply regret this occurred and apologize for any inconvenience or concern. CIRO is reaching out to affected investors to alert them of the incident and offering credit monitoring as an added precaution. “We are intent on doing right by those who are personally affected,” said Andrew Kriegler President and Chief Executive Officer of CIRO. “We take our public interest role very seriously. Matters of privacy and security are extremely important to us, as are our guiding organizational values of transparency and accountability. That’s why we remain committed to further strengthening our own cybersecurity defences and data security practices and supporting the ongoing efforts of the broader investment industry.” The following information may have been impacted: dates of birth, phone numbers, annual income, social insurance numbers, government issued ID numbers, investment account numbers and account statements. CIRO does not collect account login detail, such as passwords, security questions and PINs and therefore that information was not at risk. CIRO received this information in the normal course of carrying out its regulatory mandate to protect investors from improper investment conduct and practices, and through its investigative, compliance assessment and market regulation work. Protecting Canadian Investors CIRO quickly contained the incident and took immediate steps to secure our systems and protect the information in our care. We notified law enforcement and all relevant authorities, including privacy commissioners. A leading third-party forensic IT investigator was retained to determine what information was impacted. CIRO launched a thorough investigation with the support of external cybersecurity experts. Our preliminary investigation revealed that registration information for member firms and registered individuals had been affected. We immediately shared those findings publicly and directly with our members and impacted registrants. At that time, we noted the investigation was ongoing, and we committed to sharing the final findings of the e-discovery process once the review was complete. After more than 9,000 hours of examination, we can now confirm the full extent of the incident. There is currently no evidence that the information has been misused. We continue to monitor for malicious activity and have not identified any threat activity or exposure on the dark web. As a precaution and in order to help detect possible misuse of information, CIRO is providing affected investors two-years of credit monitoring and identity theft protection with both of the major credit agencies. Step by step instructions detailing how to activate protection services will be communicated to those impacted, directly. Additional Information Only some clients or former clients of CIRO dealer members were impacted by the cybersecurity breach. Clients impacted by the cyber incident will be sent a notification letter by CIRO starting on January 14, 2026. If you did not receive a notification letter from CIRO but want to confirm whether you were impacted and should have received a notification letter, you can request this information from CIRO in writing using the contact form available in the cyber incident section of CIRO’s website (ciro.ca).

In this speech Dave Ramsden sets out how a credible, proportionate and responsive UK resolution regime for banks supports sustainable growth and looks at how the resolution regime may need to evolve, alongside the Bank’s other responsibilities and wider developments in the financial system.   Dave Ramsden Deputy Governor, Markets and Banking Speech Good afternoon. I am delighted to be here and thank you to the Money Macro and Finance Society and King’s College London, two bodies I have a close affiliation with, for hosting me today. Click here for full details.

With the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) transitioning to a Monday–Friday trading week - aligning with global markets and recognizing the importance of liquidity for international investors - TASE continues to streamline the capital market and adapt it to international standards. The Exchange is announcing an expansion of its programs to encourage trading and liquidity in the derivatives market, specifically focusing on Futures on leading stock indices. Strategy and Vision Following the September 2024 launch of futures trading on leading indices, TASE is now broadening its liquidity incentive program. This expansion includes significant resource allocation, the addition of market makers, and the launch of new products. The development of a dynamic and diverse capital market is a core pillar of TASE's strategic plan. As futures are a globally recognized tool for exposure and risk management, TASE is committed to meeting international standards and making these products accessible and liquid for all market participants. Key Highlights of the New Program The new program is designed to bolster existing liquidity through market-making expansion, financial incentives, and new product offerings, with a primary focus on TA-35 Index Futures. Expanded Market Making: Adding more market makers and encouraging competition to better serve a wider client base. New Product Launch: Introduction of futures contracts on the TA-125 Index. Financial Incentives: Allocation of an annual budget for market maker compensation, alongside a separate Volume Rebate program for TA-35 index futures. Competitive Selection: Market makers will be selected through a competitive process to ensure the highest quality proposals. Rewards for Compliance: Market makers meeting quoting requirements will be eligible for fee rebates and a fixed monthly stipend.  Call for Proposals TASE invites capital market participants to take part in the development of Israel’s derivatives market. For further details regarding the program and the submission process, please contact Alon Dangot at the Trading, Derivatives, and Indices Department: Phone: +972-76-8160356 Email: tradingmethods@tase.co.il  Additional Information: Encouraging Liquidity in Futures Contracts

On 15 January 2026, the following updated constituents list for OFZ Zero Coupon Yield Curve will come into force. № Наименование Номер государственной регистрации 1 OFZ 26245 SU26245RMFS9 2 OFZ 26219 SU26219RMFS4 3 OFZ 26226 SU26226RMFS9 4 OFZ 26207 SU26207RMFS9 5 OFZ 26232 SU26232RMFS7 6 OFZ 26212 SU26212RMFS9 7 OFZ 26242 SU26242RMFS6 8 OFZ 26228 SU26228RMFS5 9 OFZ 26218 SU26218RMFS6 10 OFZ 26241 SU26241RMFS8 11 OFZ 26221 SU26221RMFS0 12 OFZ 26244 SU26244RMFS2 13 OFZ 26225 SU26225RMFS1 14 OFZ 26233 SU26233RMFS5 15 OFZ 26240 SU26240RMFS0 16 OFZ 26243 SU26243RMFS4 17 OFZ 26230 SU26230RMFS1 18 OFZ 26238 SU26238RMFS4 19 OFZ 26239 SU26239RMFS2 20 OFZ 26247 SU26247RMFS5 21 OFZ 26236 SU26236RMFS8 22 OFZ 26237 SU26237RMFS6 23 OFZ 26248 SU26248RMFS3 24 OFZ 26235 SU26235RMFS0 25 OFZ 26224 SU26224RMFS4 26 OFZ 26246 SU26246RMFS7 27 OFZ 26249 SU26249RMFS1 28 OFZ 26250 SU26250RMFS9 29 OFZ 26252 SU26252RMFS5 30 OFZ 26251 SU26251RMFS7 31 OFZ 26253 SU26253RMFS3 32 OFZ 26254 SU26254RMFS1  

Thank you, Madame Ambassador, for the introduction and the opportunity to speak today. My topic is the implications of deregulation for monetary policy, an appropriate one for this setting.1 Greece's recovery from the crisis that began in 2009 was only possible after the Greek people implemented substantial and painful reforms, including alleviating suffocating over-regulation in many sectors. In addition to the other reforms embraced by Greece, deregulation freed businesses to compete domestically and internationally, and promoted individuals' access to the economy. The range of reforms has included liberalizing product and service markets, easing licensing and administrative burdens, opening previously restricted professions, and increasing labor market flexibility. The government liberalized electricity and gas utilities; privatized airports, ports, and utilities; and reformed bankruptcy procedures and other business laws. While it is challenging to quantify how these deregulatory actions have affected the economy, there is little doubt that these reforms have supported a remarkable return to economic growth and higher living standards. Macroeconomic stability has returned to Greece. Unemployment has fallen to its lowest level since the Global Financial Crisis, and investment and exports have rebounded. Product and labor market reforms helped restore competitiveness, reduce unit labor costs, and encourage firm entry. By easing the ability of supply to respond to prices, these reforms have improved the transmission of monetary policy. While monetary policy is set by the ECB, its transmission varies in part with how national governments manage their economies. Long-term Greek borrowing rates narrowed their spread to Germany's, below 1 percent, compared with 6 percent a decade ago. Greece has a come a long way, impressing the whole world with its recovery. Regulation and the Economy's Supply SideFor all the conversation around Mario Draghi's report,2 Greece shows that well-targeted deregulatory reforms can help lay the foundation for more sustained and robust economic growth by expanding the productive capacity of the economy, known as the supply side. Such sustainable increases in actual and potential growth have different implications for monetary policy than purely cyclical growth spurts, which boost growth in the near term without raising economic potential. These jolts can create substantial inflation, undermining growth in the medium term by forcing central banks to raise interest rates, and also in the long term by causing a misallocation of resources. Recent experiences have reinforced the need for central bankers to fully consider the broad range of nonmonetary factors that could affect the appropriate stance of monetary policy. One such factor that is especially important at this juncture is the regulatory burden borne by businesses and individuals, which has begun to recede in the past year.3 I believe that the sweeping deregulation underway in the United States will significantly boost competition, productivity, and potential growth, allowing faster economic growth without putting upward pressure on inflation. This would support continued easing of restrictive monetary policy, but ignoring these effects would result in monetary policy that is needlessly contractionary. One challenge for central bankers in fully incorporating deregulation into their economic outlooks is that it is difficult to measure in aggregate. Economists are inclined to study things when there are quantitative data to illuminate their work—a version of the famous "lamppost problem" of only looking where the lamppost shines. This may have contributed to a tendency to give short shrift to regulation in judging the economic outlook. Quantitatively measuring regulations is more difficult than taxes, subsidies, or interest rates. Regulations that businesses face can vary enormously based on the sector, size, and sometimes even the age of a company. Some regulations ban activities altogether. Some regulations impose fixed or variable costs for complying. Some regulations affect consumption decisions and some affect production. Regulations can vary enormously across jurisdictions and sometimes within jurisdictions. Additionally, enforcement determines how binding regulations are in practice, and enforcement can be even harder to measure than the effects of regulations themselves. These measurement challenges are evident in the abundance of economic studies on specific regulations but the much smaller volume of work that tries to comprehensively measure the aggregate effects of the accumulation of regulations on the macroeconomy.4 From the perspective of an individual firm, it may be easy to adjust behavior in response to one regulation, known as a "margin of adjustment," but compounding regulations can constrain the ability to shift costs by hitting multiple margins of adjustment.5 One pebble doesn't stop a stream, water can flow around it; but enough pebbles will. A common approach to quantifying the effects of regulations is to count the number of pages of new regulations, though this does not account for varying economic significance across pages. Another approach is to count the number of work hours required to comply, as reported under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). However, there is wide variation in how different regulatory agencies produce these costs estimates, even sometimes variation within agencies, and more importantly, the counting of work hours related to the PRA does not capture the full opportunity cost of the regulations—that is, how that lost hour of work could have been used more productively—or the firms and industries that don't exist because of the regulation.6 If a firm needs to hire a person to comply with some new regulation and can't hire a sales associate who could generate new business or can't engage in a productive activity at all, then the foregone opportunity can be significantly larger than the wage for compliance hours.7 There has been some progress in measuring regulation through advances in natural language processing and artificial intelligence, and I expect more of this to come. For instance, Patrick McLaughlin's QuantGov project at Stanford University's Hoover Institution uses computational tools to move beyond regulation page counts toward counting restrictions and obligations imposed by the text and quantifying regulations by industry.8 In other work, Joseph Kalmenovitz uses machine learning methods to count and separate regulations that are relevant for a firm's core businesses from those that are not relevant.9 These measures show a substantial drop in the number of rules in 2025.10 Among other deregulatory efforts is the current U.S. Administration's "one-in-ten-out policy" revoking 10 old regulations for every new one adopted.11 Based on the pace of the Administration's deregulatory efforts in the first part of 2025, I estimate that 30 percent of the regulatory restrictions in the Code of Federal Regulations will be eliminated by 2030, though this may prove an underestimate.12 Regulations can have far larger consequences for the supply side than, for example, taxes, because they can amount to outright prohibitions and thus function as infinite taxes. Quantity controls are usually far more damaging than those that directly affect prices.13 Consider agglomeration, when a group of firms in the same general industry benefit from proximity, such as R&D labs and production plants, or clients and customers. An auto parts producer benefits from being close to an automaker. Environmental or other restrictions that restrict co-location can affect the entire economy's supply side by preventing the agglomeration necessary for an industry to be profitable. Take one piece of an industrial ecosystem away because of a regulation and the rest become harder to sustain. Supply chain ecosystems exist—or don't—because of regulations determining what activity can take place and where. I think it is hard to argue that, say, the excess burden of going from a 30 percent to a 33 percent marginal tax rate has the same effect as a regulation preventing an entire industry from existing domestically. Regulations, particularly those that affect physical production, can force the economy from high-productivity sectors to low-productivity sectors by encouraging capital-intensive production to move to less regulated places, such as China. Research on the effects of regulation on the supply side of the economy has developed along two major lines of inquiry. The first studies regulation's effect on total factor productivity (TFP) and growth by making production more expensive.14 If regulations make, say, electricity or manufactured goods more expensive to produce, they lower TFP.15 Regulations can also distort investment decisions across sectors or impede innovation, leading to an economy-wide misallocation of resources with commensurate effects on aggregate productivity levels.16 An alternative way of modeling regulation is via its effects on free entry and markups. Regulatory costs that appear marginal from an industry perspective often originate as fixed costs from a firm perspective. An existing homebuilder building one more house may be marginal, but for a new entrant to build it, they would have to invest in vast compliance infrastructure. In many jurisdictions, they'd have to learn how to measure carbon emissions, decipher labor regulations, pass various inspections at different stages, and pay other fixed costs. The barriers to building a house have become so burdensome that many builders exit entire markets, leaving numerous large metro areas without desperately needed supply. As such, regulations often serve as barriers to entry, with all the attendant consequences: reduced competition, artificially high returns to scale, higher markups, reduced innovation, and reduced productivity growth. Let's call these "markup regulations."17 There is abundant evidence both within and across countries that increased regulation causes reduced firm entry, decreased competition, and lower investment, all consistent with elevated fixed costs.18 Decreased firm entry, competition, and innovation lead to a malaise familiar to many: Formerly dynamic industries calcify, flagship businesses choose to move elsewhere or shutter completely, and communities feel cheated out of their way of life. Implications for Monetary PolicyNow let me discuss the implications of regulation and deregulation for monetary policy. Most theory and research suggest that increasing the regulatory burden reduces productivity and thus puts upward pressure on prices. This is intuitive: Regulations impede production, and deregulation removes those impediments. More production means lower prices, and vice versa. But gauging the magnitudes of these effects is more difficult. Work by Dustin Chambers, Courtney A. Collins, and Alan Krause found that a 1 percent increase in U.S. federal regulations in a particular industry is associated with a roughly 10 basis point increase in consumer prices in that industry, and that is only in the near term.19 Longer-term effects and effects from more substantial changes in regulations are, in my view, likely to be substantially larger, since firm entry and the effects of increased competition develop over time. Supply chain ecosystems can take years to rise or fall. I'd also expect cross-industry spillovers to boost aggregate effects above this level. But even these modest within-industry, short-term effects would be substantial in the context of the potential 30 percent decline in the regulatory code that I projected earlier. This implies a cumulative drag of roughly 3 percent on the consumer price level through 2030, a little over half a percent per year.20 What happens in the short term depends on various factors—the types of regulations involved, the way these regulations affect firms and households, and the manner of enforcement. On balance, I believe the substantial deregulation that has occurred in 2025 will continue over at least the next three years and be a large positive shock to productivity that will put downward pressure on prices. On net, this supports a more accommodative stance of monetary policy. As I have argued, I think the primary effects of deregulation are on the supply side of the economy and have the effect of increasing potential output more than they increase actual output. For example, if the number of goods I can produce is effectively limited by regulation, and that cap is removed, this means I can produce more. If demand increases and production is limited by regulation or some other factor, then prices increase. If demand rises and these shackles have been removed, then output grows and pressure on prices is much smaller. While I think of regulation as primarily a supply-side factor, it can also affect demand. For instance, the news of planned deregulatory action can stimulate investment now for future production, increasing aggregate demand and prices in the short run, before prices adjust to the lower level that would prevail over the longer run. However, I see little reason to expect the short-run effect on demand will exceed potential. In my earlier speech, I assumed that deregulation immediately increases actual output half as much as potential output, and then the two converge over a few years. While some approaches assume TFP shocks increase actual and potential output by the same amount, work by Olivier Coibion, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, and Mauricio Ulate shows that a structural approach to modeling the supply-side results in potential output overshooting actual output in response to a TFP shock. 21 Of course, this matters because the output gap is a primary input into calculating the appropriate setting for monetary policy. If actual output falls below potential output, there is slack in the economy that could be accommodated by looser monetary policy. If deregulation boosts potential output above actual, the correct response is to cut rates. At the same time, by increasing the marginal product of capital, deregulation may raise the so-called neutral rate of interest at which monetary policy is neither accommodative nor restrictive. I addressed this in my first speech as a member of the Federal Reserve Board.22 Turning to markups, the second channel for the effects of regulation on the supply side, models indicate that if monetary policy ignores the deflationary effects of deregulation, then we risk causing an unnecessary contraction in the economy. That is the implication of an important 2014 paper by Gauti Eggertsson, Andrea Ferrero, and Andrea Raffo, which models deregulation as a reduction in markups—increased competition—in a standard New Keynesian model.23 They find that the appropriate response of monetary policy is to reduce interest rates in response to this type of deregulation shock and offset its consequent deflation. If for some reason monetary policy fails to do so, then deflation and economic contraction needlessly result. This model implies that, if the Federal Reserve fails to reduce policy rates in response to deregulation, there will be adverse consequences. Greece's experience testifies to this. Had the ECB not implemented exceptionally loose monetary policy and effectively accommodated Greece's structural reforms, the outcome could have been quite different. I believe that central bankers should be paying close attention to the effects of regulation on productivity, output, and prices. In recent quarters, policy has been tighter than it should have been to reflect significant deregulation lifting potential growth and reducing inflation. Going forward, I expect that the ambitious deregulation underway in the United States will boost growth without boosting inflation and be one factor supporting a further easing of monetary policy. In this regard, Greece and the ECB have lit the path. I have raised this point with my Federal Open Market Committee colleagues and expect to continue to do so in our deliberations. 1. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee. I am deeply indebted to Casey Mulligan for many conversations about the economics of regulation, but again, the ideas here reflect only my own views.  2. Mario Draghi (2024), The Future of European Competitiveness, September 9.  3. In this speech, I am focusing on general economic regulations, not regulations on the banking sector, which are implemented by the Federal Reserve in conjunction with other regulatory agencies. For more on banking regulations, see Stephen I. Miran (2025), "Regulatory Dominance of the Federal Reserve Balance Sheet," speech delivered at the Bank Policy Institute and Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council, Washington, November 19.  4. For example, lots of papers show very clear implications for productivity and "dynamism" of regulations that inhibit labor adjustment (see Steven J. Davis and John Haltiwanger (2014), "Labor Market Fluidity and Economic Performance," paper presented at "Re-Evaluating Labor Market Dynamics," a symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, held in Jackson Hole, Wyo., August 22; and David H. Autor, William R. Kerr, and Adriana D. Kugler (2007), "Does Employment Protection Reduce Productivity? Evidence from US States," The Economic Journal, vol. 117 (June), pp. F189–217). For a theory approach, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) is a classic—a tax on firing is a tax on hiring (see Hugo Hopenhayn and Richard Rogerson (1993), "Job Turnover and Policy Evaluation: A General Equilibrium Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 101 (5). For land use regulation literature, see Leonardo D'Amico, Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko, William R. Kerr, and Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto (2024), "Why Has Construction Productivity Stagnated? The Role of Land-Use Regulation," NBER Working Paper Series 33188 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, November).  5. For example, a regulation that raises input costs might incent a firm to cut costs by reducing headcount, but the firm may find that response problematic as well because of other regulations.  6. For instance, the Small Business Administration and General Services Administration measure PRA paperwork burdens in dollars, whereas other agencies like FinCEN and parts of the Department of Agriculture measure these burdens in hours. Variation within agencies is usually across units, like the Food and Drug Administration relative to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services within the Department of Health and Human Services.  7. Standard economics would suggest that, if the compliance associate is seen as a fixed cost but a new salesperson is seen as a variable cost, the optimality condition would ignore the fixed cost and have the firm hire the sales associate anyway. This is well and good for large firms that generate abundant cashflow or have easy access to liquidity, but many smaller firms face more binding cashflow and liquidity constraints and will be unable to hire that salesperson. Moreover, even for large firms, the compliance associate may be a variable cost for expanding an existing line of business, or he or she may be a fixed cost that impedes the firm's expansion into a new line of business or market. See the discussion that follows of "markup regulations" and competition.  8. Quantgov (2025), "What is Quantgov," webpage.  9. Joseph Kalmenovitz (2023), "Regulatory Intensity and Firm-Specific Exposure," The Review of Financial Studies, vol. 36 (August), pp. 3311–47.  10. See footnote 12 for McLaughlin's analysis. Kalmenovitz's analysis is available on his website, https://www.jkalmenovitz.com/, accessed January 5, 2025.  11. Executive Office of the President (2025), "Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation, Executive Order 14192," Federal Register, vol. 90 (February 6), pp.9065–67.  12. McLaughlin (2025) estimates 2,404 deregulatory actions from the Spring 2025 Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions. If the average deregulatory action removes 25.6 restrictions from the CFR, which was the average through July 1 of this year, then 61,542 restrictions will be removed per year. Five years at this rate will remove 28 percent of a total of 1.1 million restrictions. I rounded up to 30 percent because I expect the pace of deregulation to accelerate with the accelerated pace of Senate confirmations due to the Senate's recent adoption of en bloc confirmation; with more personnel, deregulation will be much quicker than it was in the first few months of a fresh administration. Indeed, I think 30 percent will ultimately prove to be an underestimate. As McLaughlin notes, we will soon get the Fall 2025 Unified Agenda, which will allow me to update this calculation. I used McLaughlin's analysis rather than Kalmenovitz's for this exercise because, as of January 5, Kalmenovitz's measure showed a nearly 25 percent reduction in overall federal regulatory burden over the course of 2025, and as optimistic as I am regarding the coming deregulatory trend, that magnitude seems aggressive to me at present. Moreover, Kalmenovitz's measure is prone to revision. See Patrick McLaughlin (2025), "Early Data on Deregulatory Push in Washington," Third Order, October 28, https://thirdorder.substack.com/p/early-data-on-the-deregulatory-push.  13. Discussion of conditions for the social optimality of taxes over regulations can be found in Alberto Alesina and Francesco Passarelli (2014), "Regulation Versus Taxation," Journal of Public Economics, vol. 110, pp. 147–56.  14. The effects of regulation on TFP were one point I made in my first speech as a Federal Reserve Board member; see Stephen I. Miran (2025) "Nonmonetary Forces and Appropriate Monetary Policy," speech delivered at the Economic Club of New York, New York, September 22.  15. For evidence of the relationship between regulation and TFP, see John W. Dawson and John J. Seater (2013), "Federal Regulation and Aggregate Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 18 (June), pp. 137–77. For a rigorous theoretical model of productivity enhancements in a Schumpeterian model, see Bentley Coffey, Patrick A. McLaughlin, Pietro Peretto (2020), "The Cumulative Cost of Regulations," Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 38 (October), pp. 1–21.  16. Alberto Alesina, Michele Battisti, and Joseph Zeira (2018), "Technology and Labor Regulations: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 23 (March), pp. 41–78.  17. Of course, antitrust regulations are designed to increase and not decrease competition; but these are a small portion of the overall regulatory code, and I am focused here on regulations outside of antitrust.  18. Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, Giuseppe Nicoletti, and Fabio Schiantarelli (2005), "Regulation and Investment," Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 3 (4), pp. 791–825; James B. Bailey and Diana W. Thomas (2017), "Regulating Away Competition: The Effect of Regulation on Entrepreneurship and Employment," Journal of Regulatory Economics, vol. 52, pp. 237–54; Germán Gutiérrez and Thomas Philippon (2017), "Declining Competition and Investment in the U.S.," NBER Working Paper Series 23583 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, July); and Dustin Chambers, Patrick A. McLaughlin, and Tyler Richards (2022), "Regulation, Entrepreneurship, and Firm Size," Journal of Regulatory Economics, vol. 61, pp. 108–34.  19. Dustin Chambers, Courtney A. Collins, and Alan Krause (2017), "How Do Federal Regulations Affect Consumer Prices? An Analysis of the Regressive Effects of Regulation," Public Choice, vol. 180, pp. 57–90.  20. Of course, this predicted decline is relative to what consumer prices would have done in the absence of the deregulatory actions and not a prediction about an absolute change.  21. See Olivier Coibion, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, and Mauricio Ulate (2018), "The Cyclical Sensitivity in Estimates of Potential Output," (PDF) Brookings Paper on Econonomic Activity, Fall, pp. 343–441. Coibion et al. show that in a Blanchard-Quah (BQ) approach to estimating potential output, TFP shocks increase potential output much more rapidly than actual output (figure 12). The BQ approach relies on the uncontroversial theoretical assumption that supply-side shocks affecting potential output are those which have permanent effects on the level of output while demand shocks are restricted to having no permanent effects. It provides a more structural economic grounding for estimating potential output than various filter-based approaches. The case for actual and potential output moving up the same amount in response to a TFP shock seems more plausible if the TFP shock is driven by a new technology, which requires investment to implement. But not all TFP shocks are the same, and regulations are quite different. If today a regulation limits the amount of carbon a factory can emit, but tomorrow the factory can emit more carbon, it does not require the same amount of new investment as would be required to, say, implement new computer technologies. Letting an existing smokestack run for 24 instead of 8 hours is quite different from having to buy graphical processing units to develop a large language model. In other words, it may be appropriate to consider regulatory TFP shocks as having different consequences for output gaps than technological TFP shocks have. See also Boivin, Kiley, and Mishkin (2011), who observe that the response of actual output to a TFP shock depends crucially on the monetary response, underlining that it is crucial for the Fed to stay abreast of TFP shocks in formulating the appropriate stance of policy (Jean Boivin, Michael Kiley, and Frederic Mishkin (2011), "How Has the Monetary Transmission Mechanism Evolved Over Time?" in Benjmain M. Friedman and Michael Woodford, eds., Handbook of Monetary Economics, Vol. 3. (Amsterdam: Elsevier), pp. 369–422).  22. In that speech, I included a boost to neutral rates from deregulation (which was offset by reductions in neutral rates from other sources like reduced population growth and smaller fiscal deficits). I also included a wider output gap because of potential growth increasing faster than actual growth as a result of deregulation. In that speech, I did not model an explicit deregulation-driven reduction in prices, either from a TFP boost or a reduction in markups, an oversight partially addressed here.  23. Gauti Eggertsson, Andrea Ferrero, and Andrea Raffo (2014), "Can Structural Reforms Help Europe?" Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 61, pp. 2–22. 

Michelle Hillery, Managing Director, Head of Repository & Derivatives Services at DTCC, commented on the recent approval from the FCA for the formal public registration of DTCC’s Markets in Financial Instruments Directive/Regulation (MiFID/R) UK ARM license: “The UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) recently approved the formal public registration of DTCC’s Markets in Financial Instruments Directive/Regulation (MiFID/R) UK ARM license, marking a significant milestone in the evolution of transaction reporting for UK financial markets. The service, set to launch in Q2 2026, offers market participants a unified, industry-owned solution that empowers clients to consolidate derivatives trade reporting alongside equities & fixed income securities & bonds reporting, elevate data quality and take advantage of resilient infrastructure for end-to-end regulatory reporting. DTCC has been supporting regulators globally in their supervisory duties to monitor systemic risk under various regulations, including EMIR, SFTR, MAS, HKMA, ASIC, JFSA, CAD and more. The launch of the UK MiFID ARM service supports fulfilment of regulatory supervisory mandate by delivering enhanced transparency and robust monitoring against market abuse. As regulatory requirements continue to evolve, DTCC will deliver robust solutions that enable firms to streamline their transaction reporting obligations while achieving a harmonized global framework and cost saving benefits. UK MiFID ARM service will provide real-time visibility, advanced exception management, and comprehensive analytics—all while minimizing operational risk and promoting compliance. DTCC continues to serve as a trusted partner and key liaison - engaging regulators and advocating for clients to find mutually beneficial solutions, committed to supporting firms during regulatory reporting shifts by offering advanced trade reporting analytics and user testing solutions that are designed to facilitate effective data management as well as improve data accuracy.”

Exegy, a global leader in high-performance market data and trading technology, today announced it has acquired NovaSparks Inc. (NovaSparks), a provider of real-time market data normalization and distribution solutions, specializing in Field Programmable Gate Array (“FPGA”) enabled products. This strategic acquisition further strengthens Exegy’s ability to meet the most demanding speed and scale requirements of modern electronic trading platforms used by elite capital markets businesses. “We are thrilled to welcome the NovaSparks customers to Exegy. We have a strong track record of blending the strengths of talented teams and proven products to elevate the user experience and deliver greater value to our clients, and we are excited to continue this strategy with NovaSparks,” said David Taylor, CEO of Exegy, “Following our acquisitions of Vela Trading Systems and Enyx, the addition of NovaSparks is the latest milestone in our mission to be the leading capital markets technology provider, delivering nanosecond speeds, global scale, and broad market coverage.” NovaSparks clients immediately benefit from Exegy’s global scale and stability, as well as its managed services organization, which provides 24/7 follow-the-sun support and deployment management. This includes existing NovaSparks partnerships and integrations with third-party trading platforms. Luc Burgun, CEO of NovaSparks, added: “Joining forces with Exegy allows us to improve our innovation and customer support capabilities. Our clients will continue to receive the ultra-low latency performance they rely on, but now with the backing of Exegy’s global presence and services infrastructure.” Exegy is committed to maintaining existing NovaSparks products and investing to develop new solutions that combine the best performance and capabilities from both product and intellectual property portfolios.

Professor Alan Taylor External member of the Monetary Policy Committee Have we reached ‘peak trade’ and is globalisation now facing a downswing? What are the implications for monetary policy? Alan Taylor discusses the evolution of world trade, drawing on historical perspectives from the first age of globalisation in the 1800s up to the present.  Driving over the peak, or a false summit? - speech by Alan TaylorOpens in a new window

The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the EU’s financial markets regulator and supervisor, published today a second thematic note on sustainability-related claims, focusing on ESG strategies. The note concentrates on ESG integration and ESG exclusions, as references to these strategies are often made by market participants and widely referenced in marketing communications directed to retail investors.  ESG integration and ESG exclusions can mean different things to different market participants. Lack of transparency when using these terms poses a notable greenwashing risk to investors. The aim of the note is not to define these strategies, but to call on market participants to be clear about what they mean when referencing them. Similarly to the first thematic note on ESG credentials, this publication offers practical do’s and don’ts for making sustainability claims. These are illustrated through concrete examples of good and poor practices that are based on observed market practices. Related Documents DateReferenceTitleDownloadSelect 14/01/2026 ESMA36-429234738-165 Thematic notes on clear, fair and not misleading sustainability-related claims: ESG strategies

The European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, EIOPA and ESMA – the ESAs) have today signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Bank of England (BoE), the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). This agreement enhances the cooperation between the authorities to oversee critical ICT third-party service providers (CTPPs) as required by the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA). The MoU establishes clear principles and procedures for cooperation, information sharing and coordination of oversight activities between the relevant authorities responsible for EU CTPPs/UK CTPs oversight. The MoU aims at enhancing third-party risk management and contributing to the overall operational resilience of the financial sector in the EU and UK through strong cross-border cooperation.  ​​Legal basis and background The MoU has been prepared in accordance with DORA Articles 36, 44, and 49, which cover the ESAs’ oversight powers, international cooperation, and financial cross-sector exercises, communication and cooperation. ​To exchange information with a third-country authority, the ESAs must ensure that the confidentiality and professional secrecy regime in the third country is equivalent to that in the EU. Therefore, before signing this MoU, the ESAs conducted an assessment that confirmed the UK confidentiality and professional secrecy regime’s equivalence with that in DORA. Related Documents DateReferenceTitleDownloadSelect 14/01/2026 MoU DORA oversight ICT CTPPs Memorandum of Understanding between the ESAs and the UK Financial Authorities on the oversight activities of critical ICT third-party service providers 14/01/2026 DORA Art.55 ESAs targeted equivalence assessment of DORA confidentiality and professional secrecy regimes

The FCA, Bank of England and Prudential Regulation Authority have together signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the European Supervisory Authorities to enhance cooperation and oversight of critical third parties (CTPs) that fall under the UK’s CTP regime. The MoU establishes a framework for coordinating and sharing information on the oversight of CTPs under the UK regime and critical third party providers (CTPPs) under the EU’s Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), including during incidents such as power outages or cyber-attacks. The MoU aims to manage potential risks to financial stability and market confidence, as well as strengthen international cooperation. It will also help reduce duplication and regulatory burden on CTPs and CTPPs. The UK’s CTP regime complements similar international standards and is designed to be compatible with DORA. The agreement demonstrates UK regulators’ commitment to cross-border cooperation and strengthening operational resilience to support growth and promote market stability. Background In 2024, UK regulators introduced new rules to bolster the resilience of critical third parties providing key services to the financial sector. These rules came into effect on 1 January 2025 and apply once a CTP is designated by the Treasury. The Treasury is responsible for deciding which third party service providers should fall under the new CTP regime. The rules will require designated CTPs to provide regular assurance, undertake resilience testing and report major incidents. The designation process has begun and the regulators will continue to work with the Treasury throughout the designation process. The regime does not reduce the responsibility of financial firms and Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs) to manage their own operational resilience and third-party risks in line with existing outsourcing rules.

• With a valuation of 15 million euros, the Asturian company will be the first to join BME's growth markets in 2026 The Board of Directors of BME Growth approved the listing of Treelogic on January 16, after analyzing and studying the documentation submitted by the company and issuing a favorable report from the market coordination and listings committee. Treelogic will be the second company to join the BME Growth market so far this year.  The company has set a reference price for the start of trading of its shares at 2.5 euros per share, giving the company a total value of 15 million euros. The company's Registered Advisor is DCM Asesores, and LINK SECURITIES S.V. S.A. will act as liquidity provider. The company's trading code will be “TRTK”. Treelogic is a Spanish technology company specializing in the design, development, and implementation of advanced solutions based on data, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity, with a notable line of business in the field of digital health (eHealth). The company actively participates in European R&D projects, translating the knowledge generated into solutions applicable to the market. Treelogic’ Information Document’s is available on the BME Growth website, where you can find all the information about the company and its business. BME’s growth markets (BME Growthopens in a new tab and BME Scaleupopens in a new tab) are aimed at small and medium-sized enterprises. In 2025, these markets welcomed 14 new companies and now have more than 150 listed firms, which raised 605 million euros last year through 105 capital increases. BME offers alternatives for every type of company—from those in their early formation stages, via preparatory steps in the Pre-Market Environment, to growth markets and the main stock exchange for large corporations. Among the advantages of accessing capital markets for small and medium-sized enterprises are financing, enhanced reputation, greater visibility, support for inorganic growth, and an improved ability to attract and retain talent.

TASE publishes today the list of companies that entered the “TASE 100 Club”, which includes companies with a market cap exceeding NIS 200 million, that have achieved a share yield of at least 100% in 2025. For the third consecutive year, TASE publishes the “TASE 100 Club” constituents, this as part of its efforts to improve the public’s acquaintance with the TASE-listed companies. According to TASE’s Research Unit, 45 companies achieved a yield of more than 100% in 2025, as compared to only 35 companies in 2024. The highest share yield in 2025 was achieved by Aryt Industries, operating in the defense-military sector, with a price gain of more than 400%. Investment houses, More and Meitav, achieved a yield of 300%, and an additional eight companies achieved a yield in excess of 200%. Out of the 45 companies included in the “TASE 100 Club”, 20 companies were awarded 5 stars, having achieved a positive yield in each of the past three years, as compared to only five companies awarded the 5-star top rating in 2024. 25 companies were awarded four starts, having achieved a cumulative positive yield over the past 3 years, as compared to 23 companies in 2024. The 2025 list includes many major companies, including 29 companies with a market cap in excess of NIS 2 billion. The list comprises 24 companies included in the TA-125 index, as compared to 10 companies in 2024. The list contains companies from a wide range of sectors, the most prominent 14 technology sector companies, including 6 defense companies. 8 insurance companies. 6 financial services companies. Despite multiple challenges over the past year, the companies exhibited business resilience that was also reflected in the capital market. TASE's leading indices recorded outstanding yields compared to leading global indices: the TA-35 index increased by 51.6% and the TA-90 index increased by 46.6%.  Rating System of the “TASE 100 Club” The TASE staff applies a star system (3-5 stars) to rate the companies that achieved a yield exceeding 100% in 2025, which awards 5 stars to companies that achieved a positive yield in each of the past 3 years, 4 stars to companies that achieved a cumulative positive yield over the past 3 years, and 3 stars to other club members with a yield of more than 100% in the past year. During the month of January, TASE will host the management of the “TASE 100 Club” constituents in a special Opening Bell Ceremony.  The table below presents the list of the “TASE 100 Club” constituents for 2025 and their rating. # Company Name Sector 2025 Yield 2024 Yield 2023 Yield 3-year Cumulative Yield Market Cap 31.12.2025 NIS Millions Rating 1 ARYT INDUSTRIES Technology 408.3% 132.5% 403.4% 5848.2% 4,645 ***** 2 MORE INVESTMENTS. Financial Services 302.9% 108.3% -12.0% 638.4% 4,179 **** 3 MEITAV INVEST Financial Services 293.1% 130.3% 29.2% 1069.3% 9,634 ***** 4 CI SYSTEMS Technology 266.0% -11.2% 49.2% 384.9% 509 **** 5 TSG  IT Technology 253.0% -11.8% --- 211.4% 1,530 **** 6 NEXT VISION Technology 252.8% 101.9% 302.4% 2766.1% 19,112 ***** 7 TURPAZ Industry 238.3% 40.5% -19.6% 282.3% 7,148 **** 8 MESHEK ENERGY Energy And Oil & Gas Exploration 219.6% -17.8% -14.6% 124.3% 5,903 **** 9 RP OPTICAL Technology 219.3% --- --- 219.3% 2,183 **** 10 ANALYST Financial Services 216.0% 90.2% 7.9% 548.5% 2,272 ***** 11 SOLROM HOLDINGS Technology 210.9% 186.7% -41.2% 424.1% 529 **** 12 AYALON INSURANCE Insurance 187.5% 120.9% 23.8% 685.9% 2,367 ***** 13 DORAL ENERGY Technology 186.8% 47.6% 3.9% 340.1% 7,313 ***** 14 MENORA MIV HOLD Insurance 177.9% 70.8% 41.3% 570.6% 24,913 ***** 15 LINEAGE THERAP Biomed 175.9% -52.5% -0.3% 30.6% 967 **** 16 MIA DYNAMICS Technology 173.5% -20.9% -20.6% 71.7% 232 **** 17 RAPAC Investment & Holdings 165.6% 23.1% -3.5% 215.5% 1,144 **** 18 PHOENIX Insurance 164.9% 47.6% 4.8% 309.8% 33,391 ***** 19 WESURE GLOBALT Insurance 164.6% 281.5% -33.7% 569.3% 1,953 **** 20 BET SHEMESH Industry 155.5% 153.2% 77.9% 1050.9% 7,104 ***** 21 IMCO INDUSTRIES Technology 154.5% 94.4% 65.4% 718.1% 420 ***** 22 OPC ENERGY Energy And Oil & Gas Exploration 151.4% 23.6% -38.8% 90.3% 22,507 **** 23 HAREL INVEST Insurance 150.9% 92.5% -5.3% 357.3% 25,575 **** 24 QUALITAU Technology 150.6% 246.0% 160.2% 2156.0% 2,753 ***** 25 CLAL INSURANCE Insurance 145.3% 48.7% -1.2% 260.6% 16,465 **** 26 MEGA OR Real-Estate & Construction 139.8% 39.4% -10.6% 198.8% 9,898 **** 27 MAX STOCK Commerce & Services 132.5% 72.6% 27.7% 412.6% 3,568 ***** 28 TURBOGEN Technology 131.9% 42.0% -47.4% 73.1% 419 **** 29 ENLIGHT ENERGY Technology 129.7% -11.5% -1.1% 101.1% 19,123 **** 30 MIVTACH SHAMIR Investment & Holdings 128.8% 84.8% 30.3% 450.8% 3,991 ***** 31 TEL AVIV STOCK EXCHANGE Financial Services 127.4% 125.5% 2.4% 425.0% 8,788 ***** 32 MIGDAL INSUR. HOLDINGS Insurance 125.5% 68.9% 3.6% 294.5% 16,356 ***** 33 M.L.R.N Financial Services 124.5% 39.8% -24.1% 138.2% 451 **** 34 DISCOUNT INV. Real-Estate & Construction 119.3% 22.2% -30.5% 86.2% 1,347 **** 35 NETO M.E HOLDINGS Industry 112.3% 93.6% -42.6% 135.9% 870 **** 36 MORE PENSION Financial Services 112.2% 94.6% -23.0% 217.8% 1,945 **** 37 BONUS BIOGROUP Biomed 110.9% -28.7% -13.0% 30.7% 293 **** 38 RIMON CONSULT Real-Estate & Construction 107.7% 24.0% 20.1% 209.4% 3,235 ***** 39 AFCON HOLDINGS Investment & Holdings 107.4% 85.0% -34.8% 150.3% 2,041 **** 40 EL AL Commerce & Services 106.2% 130.0% 34.1% 535.9% 9,471 ***** 41 TOP GUM Technology 105.5% 10.6% 4.4% 137.4% 1,662 ***** 42 TERA LIGHT Technology 104.3% -9.0% 50.9% 180.6% 1,056 **** 43 I.D.I INSURANCE Insurance 103.2% 48.3% 36.8% 312.1% 3,574 ***** 44 KENON HOLDINGS Energy And Oil & Gas Exploration 102.3% 61.5% -16.9% 171.5% 10,942 **** 45 DELTA BRANDS Commerce & Services 101.4% 70.0% 3.8% 255.4% 2,998 *****

ClearBid Global Markets (CBGM) today announced it has selected Archax as its regulated digital asset partner to expand the reach of its cross-border digital bond trading and data platform into the UK and EU regions. CBGM is a full-service electronic trading platform and complete securities and data source, that effectively connects global bond markets utilising a digital Dutch Auction. This results in real-time, transparent and market-driven price discovery. It is an innovative substitute for traditional ‘over the counter’ (OTC) methods, with a direct focus on capital markets-based financing for infrastructure, corporate and asset-backed borrowers. Archax is a regulated digital asset exchange, broker and custodian, based in the UK, EU, US and UAE. Targeted at professionals and institutions, Archax supports all types of digital assets – from unregulated cryptocurrencies through to regulated tokenised real-world assets (RWAs). By selecting Archax as a strategic partner for cross-border expansion, CBGM will initially leverage Archax’s FCA regulations in the UK to offer its digital bond pre-issuance, trading and data platform to investors based there. Moving forwards, CBGM then plans to do the same in the EU region by leveraging Archax’s permissions there too. Robert Novembre, Founder and CEO of ClearBid Global Markets, comments: “Our partnership with Archax marks a significant milestone for CBGM as we expand into the UK and advance our global mission to redefine capital markets. By combining our vision for transparent, data‑driven markets with Archax’s fully regulated digital infrastructure, we are delivering institutional clients unprecedented visibility and liquidity across global bond markets. This collaboration empowers market participants to navigate complex environments through a single, seamless digital gateway”.”. Nick Donovan, Chief Revenue Officer of Archax, adds: “Archax is all about being the most credible, institutional and regulated, digital asset solution in the marketplace. We are always on the look-out for potential partners who can leverage our regulatory stack and together expand our digital offerings in the space. As such, we are excited to be working with ClearBid Global Markets with their innovative digital approach for providing access to bonds for capital markets participants.” CBGM’s digital bond marketplace is designed to revolutionise how capital is raised and invested by addressing the current market’s lack of transparency due to manual, antiquated pricing processes, as well as the lack of efficient accessibility and connectivity between markets, which limits global capital flows and growth for emerging markets.

The World Federation of Exchanges (“WFE”), the global industry association for exchange groups and CCPs, has warned of a substantial gap between regulatory expectations and industry expectations around quantum computing risk preparedness.Major public authorities, standards bodies, and cross-border policy groups have begun issuing guidance, calling for early preparation and coordinated migration to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). This is driven by two core concerns:  Long lead times required to upgrade cryptographic systems; and  The “harvest now, decrypt later” threat where attackers steal encrypted data today to unlock it in future once more powerful technologies become available to break the encryption. The WFE Global Cybersecurity Working Group recently conducted a preliminary survey on the Quantum Computing Preparedness, the results of which highlight the importance of other competing priorities. In particular, Generative AI risks are viewed as far more urgent and immediate, consuming most organisational attention and investment. Quantum Computing is seen as a longer-term threat, with many firms hesitant to commit too many resources until clearer timelines or stable standards emerge. Most WFE members estimate a 5–10+ year window before cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) emerge, in line with NIST FAQs. Consequently, resourcing remains proportionate to a long-term risk, not an imminent one, and shouldn’t be prioritised at the expense of more immediate operational concerns such as AI-driven threats and Cyber Resiliency. This is consistent with the WFE’s 2025 Annual Survey of Risks where AI and Cyber Resilience risks continued to be ranked highest by members, as they have consistently for two years.  Although members do not consider Quantum Computing risk to be imminent, they have already begun laying the necessary groundwork for future preparedness, including: Actively monitoring regulatory guidance, vendor progress, and developments in NIST standardisation. Several are incorporating Quantum Computing discussions into risk committees and cyber governance forums. Preliminary quantum risk assessments. Including quantum-safe encryption criteria in procurement and vendor evaluation cycles. Considering projects to map existing cryptographic assets, as the first step in any migration roadmap. Working with the WFE to develop a best-practice guide on quantum transition, and a structured roadmap for market infrastructures. Nandini Sukumar, CEO of the World Federation of Exchanges, said, “While Quantum Computing readiness is undoubtedly important, the migration to post-quantum cryptography remains a long-term undertaking, and the practical groundwork - planning, asset mapping, and vendor coordination - should be paced appropriately. Whilst exchanges recognise that Quantum Computing is a meaningful risk, regulators must understand that preparation should not deflect from more imminent risks related to AI and Cyber Resilience.”Read the full paper here.

Nasdaq (Nasdaq: NDAQ) announces that Bitwise has listed their first Exchange Traded Products (ETPs) on Nasdaq Stockholm. The launch includes six physically backed ETPs tracking cryptocurrencies. “We are delighted to welcome Bitwise as a new ETP provider on Nasdaq Stockholm. This launch strengthens our commitment to offering investors innovative and transparent investment opportunities. By expanding the range of locally listed ETPs, we enable both retail and institutional investors to access digital assets in a regulated and cost-efficient manner,” says Helena Wedin, Head of ETF and ETP, Nasdaq European Markets. Bitwise Asset Management is a global crypto asset manager with more than $15 billion in client assets and a suite of over 40 investment products spanning ETFs, separately managed accounts, private funds, hedge fund strategies, and staking. The firm has an eight-year track record and today serves more than 4,000 private wealth teams, RIAs, family offices and institutional investors as well as 15 banks and broker-dealers. “Through our listing on Nasdaq Stockholm, we are able to offer institutional investment products directly to Swedish investors in local currency, with the level of transparency, regulatory compliance, and security the market expects. Sweden is one of the world’s most active markets for crypto ETPs, and we are seeing growing institutional interest,” says Marco Poblete, Regional Director Nordics, Bitwise The six new products, all denominated and traded in SEK and listed on Nasdaq Stockholm, include: Bitwise Physical Bitcoin ETP Bitwise Core Bitcoin ETP Bitwise Physical Ethereum ETP Bitwise Ethereum Staking ETP Bitwise MSCI Digital Assets Select 20 ETP Bitwise Diaman Bitcoin Gold ETP Bitwise Solana Staking ETP These products cater to both retail and institutional investors, offering diversification and regulated access to digital assets.

LSEG announces it has purchased the following number of its ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each from Citigroup Global Markets Limited ("Citi") on the London Stock Exchange as part of its share buyback programme, as announced on 04 November 2025. Date of purchase: 13 January 2026 Aggregate number of ordinary shares purchased: 110,290 Lowest price paid per share: 8,966.00p Highest price paid per share: 9,142.00p Average price paid per share: 9,067.57p   LSEG intends to cancel all of the purchased shares. Following the cancellation of the repurchased shares, LSEG has 509,499,701 ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each in issue (excluding treasury shares) and holds 21,451,599 of its ordinary shares of 679/86 pence each in treasury. Therefore, the total voting rights in the Company will be 509,499,701. This figure for the total number of voting rights may be used by shareholders (and others with notification obligations) as the denominator for the calculation by which they will determine if they are required to notify their interest in, or a change to their interest in, the Company under the FCA's Disclosure Guidance and Transparency Rules. In accordance with Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 (the Market Abuse Regulation) (as such legislation forms part of retained EU law as defined in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as implemented, retained, amended, extended, re-enacted or otherwise given effect in the United Kingdom from 1 January 2021 and as amended or supplemented in the United Kingdom thereafter), a full breakdown of the individual purchases by Citi on behalf of the Company as part of the buyback programme can be found at: http://www.rns-pdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/7736O_1-2026-1-13.pdf This announcement does not constitute, or form part of, an offer or any solicitation of an offer for securities in any jurisdiction. Schedule of Purchases Shares purchased:       110,290 (ISIN: GB00B0SWJX34) Date of purchases:      13 January 2026 Investment firm:         Citi Aggregate information: Venue Volume-weighted average price Aggregated volume Lowest price per share Highest price per share London Stock Exchange 9,067.57 110,290 8,966.00 9,142.00 Turquoise